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Introduction 
I n a recent work, Donald Hickey enumerated more than a dozen top-ics on the War of 1812 needing further historical inquiry. One 
subject he did not mention was the militia. Nevertheless, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the soldiers employed during this war were militia, and 
their role and contribution during the War of 1812, surprisingly, has 
never been systematically studied or properly evaluated.! 
Perhaps the reason for the neglect is the difficulty of preparing a 
comprehensive study of the various state militia encompassing all as-
pects of their participation in the War of 1812 (e.g., state-by-state ac-
counts). Such an undertaking would be a daunting, perhaps impossible 
task, given the paucity of sources. I intend to pursue here only the mod-
est objective of describing the federal utilization of militia to supple-
ment the military forces during the War of 1812, surveying their 
performance in general, and reviewing the operational aspects of mili-
tia participation at the state level. For purposes of this work, I define 
"militia" to include drafted (or regular) militia plus volunteer militia 
companies (as distinguished from twelve-month volunteers in federal 
service). Finally, because the militia system obviously failed to provide 
an adequate force, particularly to prosecute the war vigorously, I will 
also attempt to explain the reasons for this failure. 
The militia system broke down at the state level largely because 
the Constitution divided responsibility for the militia. While the fed-
eral government was empowered to use state militias to "execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and to 
"provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," state gov-
ernments had the right to appoint the officers and train the militia ac-
cording to the discipline prescribed by the federal government.2 There 
was, however, no coordination of training or organization of militia at 
the state level nor any clear definition of the proper relationship of state 
versus federal authority over the militia in wartime. Consequently, dur-
I
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2 Introduction 
ing the War of 1812 issues were raised concerning who was authorized 
to call militia into service; who paid them; who equipped and organized 
them; and how and where they were to be used. Obviously there were 
many other questions relating to the use of the militia during the War 
of 1812; I have noted only the most significant. 
It is well known that the state militias were not prepared to tIght a 
war in 1812. Long years of neglect by the states, or indifference on 
their part, meant that when Congress called on April 10, 1812, for 
100,000 militia to be held in readiness for possible duty, many states 
were unprepared. State legislatures often passed elaborate militia laws, 
but public apathy, indifference, and even hostility led to a situation where 
there was no efficient,reliable militia force to prosecute the war. A con-
gressional report in 1804 (still valid in 1812) asserted that there were 
few points on which any two militias were similar, "making impossible 
the interchangeability of units which was regarded as the essence of any 
national reserve force."3 As late as 1812, despite the threat of war, which 
had been growing for several years, some states were effectively forced 
to organize their state militias from the ground up. 
Ultimately, the problem with the utilization of militia was a ques-
tion not of their willingness to fight but rather of their ability to fight. 
Incredible as it may seem, there were many reports that militia showed 
up not only without weapons but shoeless, barely clothed, and lacking 
blankets, camp equipment, or any of the articles necessary for a military 
camp. Also, perhaps equally incredible given our modern perceptions 
of frontiersmen, many militia not only had no musket but did not even 
know how to use weapons once they had been issued. Such raw militia 
could hardly be expected to master the twenty-three distinct motions 
required to prime, load, ram, and set a firelock in a flintlock musket in 
the brief time before they were marched off to engage the enemy. When 
properly organized, equipped, and capably led, the militia could be a 
formidable fighting force, as they showed at New Orleans. Militia were 
rarely properly trained or prepared to perform their military duties, 
however, and in numerous cases during the war militiamen broke and 
ran before the enemy had even engaged them in battle. Examples in-
clude one of the earliest battles at Brownstown and conduct by the mi-
litia on the west bank at the final Battle of New Orleans. 
On several occasions during the war, state militia in federal ser-
vice refused to enter Canada. While this was embarrassing to some 
state authorities, it accorded with the view of others that militia were to 
be used for the defense of the nation and not as an offensive force. 
Moreover, governors of several New England states refused to place 
their militia under federal control and supported their actions with a 
fi
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narrow, legalistic argument that certain federal constitutional require-
ments had not been met. 
Other states were eager to call out their militia even when the 
national authorities had not asked them to do so, and they complained 
when the federal government refused compensation.4 Understandably, 
the national government, with only limited financial means, could not 
permit unnecessary militia calls. 
Perhaps the most damning indictment of the militia system, and 
an indication of its failure, was the establishment of state armies. Al-
though the Constitution barred states from keeping troops in times of 
peace, it was silent on this subject during times of war. Undoubtedly, 
most state governors would have maintained that their state armies were 
just extensions of the militia system and were a way of organizing them 
for quick responses to federal requisitions, but in time such armies would 
acquire the attributes of a permanent force. Had the war continued 
another year, it seems certain that a significant majority of states would 
have had permanent state armies, with all the consequences implicit in 
such status, such as the need to withhold funds from the federal gov-
ernment to pay for the armies. 
In fact, near the end of the war four states contemplated with-
holding a portion of their direct taxes to pay for defense costs. By 1815 
ominous complaints were being heard from various parts of the coun-
try that many militiamen who had served in the war remained unpaid. 
As a result low morale made militiamen less willing to continue making 
sacrifices for the country. 
Fortunately, the war ended before even more serious problems 
confronted the federal government. States quickly forgot their schemes 
to create efficient, standing military forces. Moreover, in the first flush 
of peace and the news of the victory at New Orleans, the militia was 
restored to its idealized status in the hearts of most Americans. Most 
responsible leaders of the federal government, however, understood the 
lesson of the War of 1812: the militia was an unreliable main defense 
force. Society at large continued to harbor a strong prejudice against a 
standing army, but the growing professionalism of the regular army 
after the War of 1812 portended increasing neglect of the militia by the 
federal government. Genuine reliance on the militia in the pre-War of 
1812 era gave way to mere verbal reliance in the postwar era. 
4
Chapter 1 
The Militia before 
the War of 1812 
'""T"\vo of Englands legacies for the American colonists were a fear of 
1. standing armies and a reliance upon citizen soldiers, or militia-
men, for defense. The British generally left the local defense to the 
colonies, and they in turn placed responsibility for local defense on the 
colonial towns and the towns' militia. By regarding every man as a 
trained, armed soldier prepared to respond to any emergency, the colo-
nists sustained a belief that there was no need for a professional, stand-
ing army. Consequently, there was no organized intercolonial militia 
system, no central command, and no permanent commissariat. l 
During the Revolutionary War numerous problems arose in the 
use of militia. Short enlistments limited their availability; they lacked 
discipline and training; and they were poorly armed and led. Early in 
the war General George Washington confessed that he felt a "want of 
confidence, in the generality of the Troops." His experience confirmed 
him in his opinion, and his famous statement regarding the militiamen 
was often repeated: "[They] come in, you cannot tell how; go, you can-
not tell when, and act, you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, 
exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment." So many 
problems arose that the Continental Congress moved cautiously to create 
a regular army, which played an important role in winning indepen-
dence. Nevertheless, of the 395,858 men who served during the Ameri-
can Revolution, 164,087 were militiamen.2 
After the war, Washington and other military leaders recommended 
maintaining a small national force as well as proposing plans to im-
prove and perfect the state militia forces to create, essentially, a na-
tional militia. A common feature of all these proposals by Washington, 
Baron Friedrich von Steuben, Henry Knox, and Alexander Hamilton 
was to make the state militia systems uniform and interchangeable when 
ry-'w d'
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they were called into duty by the national government. In order to 
achieve the goal of uniformity and interchangeability, the training had 
to be carried out under the auspices of the national government, and 
militiamen were to be classed by age, with the youngest given more 
training and kept in a higher state of readiness; not all men were to be 
trained. These proposals, however, were met by two major objections: 
the cost of the training elicited criticism, and there were fears that such 
training would create an elite militia force equivalent to a standing army. 
State leaders opposed the plans, and nothing was done. 3 
The militia clause of the Articles of Confederation (Article 6) ex-
plicitly forbade the states to maintain an army in time of peace, but 
every state was to keep a "well-regulated and disciplined" militia, armed 
and equipped, and "constantly ready for use."4 Without any central ad-
ministrative supervision, however, little was done during the Confed-
eration period beyond the maintenance of thirteen unrelated militia 
systems. 
In the Constitutional Convention it was conceded that a national 
force could be maintained, but the country would rely chiefly on the 
militia for defense. It was also agreed that the national government 
must be able to use state militias or else it would have to rely on a 
standing army. The resulting compromise was shared authority over 
the militia, an experiment in federalism. The federal government was 
authorized to call upon state militias "to execute the laws of the Union, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and "to provide for orga-
nizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," but the states had the re-
served right to appoint the officers and train the militiamen according 
to the discipline prescribed by the federal government.s 
In the debate over ratification of the Constitution, many Anti-
Federalists expressed fears, to be reiterated many times in the future, 
that congressional control over arming, training, and organizing the 
state militia would jeopardize the liberty of the people. Some Anti-Fed-
eralists, however, contended that Congress would fail to arm the militia 
and would leave the population disarmed or, even worse, that the citi-
zens would react to the neglect of the government by shirking the bur-
den of militia duties. Others argued that federal control over discipline 
and classification might create a select militia that would in actuality be 
a standing army. Without extensive training for the whole populace, it 
was argued, the large body of the population would be powerless against 
such a force. Still others believed that state militias would be forced to 
serve for long periods and would be marched to all parts of the union to 
maintain and enforce national laws. 6 
Congress displayed a timidity at the outset regarding its role in 
3
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providing for a well-regulated militia. The need for a viable national 
defense force was painfully obvious in the first years of the republic. 
Many problems, for example, plagued commanders using state militias 
in the Indian disturbances in the early 1790s. The government em-
ployed a mix of state militiamen, regulars, and six-month volunteers. 
The difficulties of organizing and establishing lines of command can 
readily be imagined, and the poorly equipped and undisciplined troops, 
notably those under the command of Arthur St. Clair, governor of the 
Northwest Territory, suffered a terrible defeat on November 4, 1791. 
The Indian victory prompted Congress to increase the authorized 
strength of the regular army (from 900 to 5,373), and it also provided 
the impetus for an act to organize state militias.7 
Secretary of War Henry Knox proposed a plan, dated January 18, 
1790, for the uniform organization of all state militias. He proposed 
dividing militiamen into three classes: an advanced corps composed of 
eighteen-to-twenty-year-old men; a main corps of men twenty-one to 
forty-five years of age; and a reserved corps embracing men from forty-
six to sixty years of age. He argued that an annual appropriation of 
about $385,000 would be sufficient for the federal government to train 
the advanced corps of approximately 32,500 men for thirty days, which 
was, he noted, less than one-eighth of a dollar per capita. The main 
corps was to be mustered and trained at state expense four days per 
year; the reserved corps was to be mustered for inspection two days per 
year. Knoxs proposal was debated and tabled by Congress in both 1790 
and 1791.8 
In 1792, Congress finally produced a weakened version of Knox's 
proposal, the Uniform Militia Act. The final version was the result of 
intense debate, and the deletions made in the original bill were neces-
saryto secure its passage. Although Federalists tended to support a stron-
ger bill, the outcome was not a party or sectional measure. Rather, states' 
rights ideology, and not partisanship, apparently prevailed. Gone was 
Knox's classification scheme. Instead, all able-bodied white male citi-
zens between eighteen and forty-five were required to enroll and to 
furnish their own stand of arms (a musket and accouterments: bayonet, 
cartridge box and pouch, cartridges, powder, lead, priming wire and 
brush, and flints). Thus a duty was laid upon a large body of citizens 
that entailed an additional expense; it was a form of tax imposed upon 
all militiamen, many of whom could not afford to arm and equip them-
selves. The federal government, in effect, shifted the responsibility for 
arming the militia to the individual and made the states responsible for 
enforcement. Instead of appropriating federal funds for training (the 
expense of Knox's plan may have been a factor for some congressmen), 
.7
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the law merely allowed states to organize their militia in their own fash-
ion (which was a factor for congressmen concerned that states would 
lose control of their militia to the national government). Even worse 
from the standpoint of establishing a uniform militia, the law allowed 
state legislatures to form the divisions, brigades, and companies. For 
example, it recommended, rather than prescribed, that each brigade 
consist of four regiments "if the same be convenient." The only uni-
form feature specified was that each state would have an adjutant gen-
eral and each brigade a brigade inspector. The next year, Knox cited 
several difficulties and inconveniences caused by the Uniform Militia 
Act. Beyond the failure of militiamen to arm themselves, he noted that 
the states were not imposing penalties to enforce the law. Again, he 
suggested that Congress establish a select corps of militia through clas-
sification.9 
Based upon the experience of using militia in the St. Clair expedi-
tion, General Anthony Wayne made almost no use of militia in his cam-
paign against the Indians in 1793-1794; his only concession was using 
mounted volunteers from Kentucky; who performed well for him. The 
first significant use of the militia after the Uniform Militia Act was the 
suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. President Washington 
called out more than 12,000 militiamen from four states, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Numerous problems arose, not 
the least of which was raising the militia. There was widespread sympa-
thy with the rebels among the lower class, and the militia force eventu-
ally raised was composed of draftees and substitutes. One historian has 
characterized the force as "the flotsam of early American society." The 
militiamen were unruly and destructive, and desertion rates were high. 
According to WIlliam Findley, who was a spokesman for moderate west-
ern Pennsylvanians during this crisis and later served as U.S. congress-
man, the conduct of the militiamen was such that they gave the militia 
a bad name. "In the late expedition," he said, "the name militia was 
understood to have the same idea fixed to it as plebeian or lower order of 
citizens." He added, "An army arranged in this manner never can have 
confidence within itself, nor embrace the confidence of their fellow 
citizens." Secretary Knox complained that the War Department had to 
issue 10,000 weapons to the 15,000 militiamen who served in the Whis-
key Rebellion. 10 
Almost from the beginning, presidents and governors made pro-
posals to reform and improve the state militias. It soon became evident, 
however, that Congress was reluctant to adopt any reform proposal, 
and governors were rarely successful in improving the organization and 
efficiency of their state militia. Obviously, since utilization of militia 
9
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was a means of national defense, the initiative had to come from the 
national level, but given the reluctance of congressmen to confront the 
situation, it is not difficult to explain why such initiatives failed. The 
militia myth was deeply embedded in the psyche of the Americans, as 
well as the belief in states' rights and a distrust of the national govern-
ment. Attempts to convert the militia into an efficient military force 
were met with deep suspicion. 
State laws conforming to the Uniform Militia Act of May 8, 1792, 
restricted the national governments use of state militia in many ways. 
For example, provisions in some state constitutions restricted service to 
the state unless the legislature consented to allow the militia to be used 
elsewhere. Another problem was that militiamen called into national 
service were limited to three months' service in one year. Then, too, 
the states failed to eliminate perhaps the greatest defect of all, the use of 
substitutes to meet an individual's obligations. Knox, among others, la-
mented that the wealthy and middle classes escaped the burden of mili-
tia duty by procuring substitutes from "the most idle and worthless part 
of the community."ll 
The lack of preparedness and uniformity within the various state 
militias soon became evident. In his annual message of December 3, 
1793, President Washington called upon Congress to correct the "im-
perfections" of the Uniform Militia Act. When nothing was done, he 
reminded Congress the next year of the "striking defects" in the militia 
law and suggested that "the devising and establishing of a well-regu-
lated militia would be a genuine source of legislative honor and a per-
fect title to public gratitude." He renewed his call in 1795, and in his 
last annual message in 1796, Washington plaintively reiterated his ap-
peal for militia reform: "My solicitude to see the militia of the United 
States placed on an efficient establishment has been so often and so 
ardently expressed that I shall but barely recall the subject to your view 
on the present occasion." One of Washington's last acts as president 
was to veto a bill passed on February 22, 1797, dismissing two compa-
nies of light dragoons. He agreed that some cavalry, either militia or 
regular, was needed, and it was his opinion "that the latter will be less 
expensive and more useful than the former in preserving peace between 
the frontier settlers and the Indians."12 
Militia reform came before Congress in 1794, 1795, and 1796. 
David Cobb of Massachusetts, reporting for his House committee on 
the militia on March 24, 1794, concluded that "until further experience 
shall be had under the existing law, the committee are of [the] opinion 
that no amendment is necessary." In 1795, a House committee headed 
by William Branch Giles of Virginia reported a bill on February 12 that 
t'
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proposed a substantial reform of the militia. Included was a classifica-
tion scheme similar to the plan advanced earlier by Baron von Steuben. 
Able-bodied white males between twenty and forty were to be divided 
into two classes: the select corps, those between twenty and twenty-
five, and the reserve corps, comprising those between twenty-five and 
forty. This corps would be trained by the national government, although 
the amount of time and cost was not calculated by the committee. Con-
cerns were raised in the ensuing debate about the great expense and the 
inconvenience to those called for training. The plan was declared un-
constitutional and against the will of the people. Supporters of the 
proposal repeatedly pointed to the failures of the present system. Even-
tually, the measure was postponed, but a thousand copies of the pro-
posal were printed and distributed to the states. 13 
In the next Congress, the bill was reintroduced in December 1796, 
but it immediately ran into trouble when a motion was made to strip 
out the classification scheme. Robert Goodloe Harper, a Federalist rep-
resentative from South Carolina, cited President Washington's calls for 
militia reform and pointed to recent examples of raw and undisciplined 
militiamen incapable of performing their duties efficiently. "You must 
either give up the idea of an efficient military force, or you must adopt 
a mode similar to that now proposed," he declared. Thomas Henderson 
of New Jersey insisted, however, that the bill did not conform to the 
republican principle that "military service ought to be as equally di-
vided among its citizens as possible." It was also unconstitutional, he 
argued, because the national government "had no power to call out 
people to train them for military service," and it was too expensive. 
Robert Rutherford of Virginia contended that the national government 
"had nothing to do with the Militia in the several sovereign States ... 
for the Government to enact Militia laws is against the express decision 
of the Union."14 
Harper, sensing the mood of the House, asked in exasperation, 
"Are we to let our Militia remain in its present situation, and throw our 
whole dependence on the Standing Army?" The question was referred 
to a committee headed by Henry Dearborn of Massachusetts. The House 
finally took up the militia reform bill on February 21. After perfunctory 
debate, the committee was discharged by a vote of 42-32, and militia 
reform in the Washington administration was dead. Is 
Despite the undoubted sincerity of many individuals on both sides 
of the militia reform issue, cynicism was developing about the militia. 
Charles Nisbet, president of Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylva-
nia, for example, wrote an English friend in 1792: "Our Leaders flatter 
the People by declaiming against standing Armies, and pretending to 
I3
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believe that the Militia is the best Security of a Nation." Republican 
party leaders alleged that the Federalists proposed a militia system so 
burdensome and frightening that Congress would strengthen the regu-
lar army instead. In fact, Federalists generally believed regulars were 
superior to militia. What they wanted was both an effective regular 
force and an efficient militia system.16 On the other side, opponents of 
militia reform conceded weaknesses in the militia system but contended 
that if the federal government was truly to be a bulwark of liberty and 
preserve the people's rights, then it could not be allowed to appropriate 
the states' militia for its own use or to exercise control over the training 
of state militia. Classification raised the specter of professionalism. An 
efficient elite militia force might pose as much of a threat to the nation 
as a standing army. 
The unreliability of the militia caused the Federalists to turn to 
other expedients during the crisis of 1798 when war with France loomed. 
President John Adams invited Congress on May 16, 1797, to consider 
revision of the militia laws, but he undoubtedly knew that little was 
likely to happen. Instead, the Federalists, especially the Hamilton-
ian wing of the party, pushed not only for an increase in the regular 
force but also for a volunteer force and a provisional army in lieu of 
dependence on the militia. Although a provisional army was authorized, 
President Adams could activate it only if war was declared or in case of 
invasion or the imminent threat of invasion. 17 
The crisis passed, and the provisional army was never activated. 
But it was clear that the Federalists had lost faith in the militia even as a 
reserve force. In fact, Secretary of War James McHenry asserted, justi-
fying the creation of a military academy in a message to Congress in 
1800, that "even in times of the greatest danger, we cannot give to our 
militia that degree of discipline, or to their officers that degree of mili-
tary science, upon which a nation may safely hazard its fate."18 Had the 
Federalists remained in office, it is likely that in any future crisis they 
would again have turned to volunteers or provisional forces controlled 
by the federal government to supplement regulars. In fact, the states 
were very remiss in forwarding to the federal government the annual 
reports on the status of their militia. When the Republicans came into 
office in 1801, only six states and one territory reported, and this num-
ber was more than had ever done so before. 
It was party dogma for the Republicans that state militias were the 
bulwark of liberty and the main support for national defense. President 
Thomas Jefferson, however, modified that position somewhat in his 
inaugural address. He declared his faith in "a well-disciplined militia, 
our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war, till regulars 
"Wh
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may relieve them." In his first annual message on December 8, 1801, he 
reiterated this idea and asked Congress "to amend the defects which 
from time to time shew themselves in the laws for regulating the militia 
until they are sufficiently perfect."19 
Like his predecessors, Jefferson urged militia reform in every an-
nual message but one. In his fifth message on December 3, 1805, 
Jefferson proposed a specific mode of reform for the militia: the old 
Federalist scheme of classification. He suggested that Congress should 
"organize or class the militia as would enable us on any sudden emer-
gency to call for the services of the younger portions, unencumbered 
with the old and those having families." The census, he argued, showed 
that there were upwards of 300,000 men between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-six years of age, "a competent number for offense or de-
fense in any point where they may be wanted, and will give time for 
raising regular forces after the necessity of them shall become certain." 
He claimed classification would reduce active service "to the early pe-
riod of life" and allow in "advanced age a quiet and undisturbed repose 
in the bosom of their families. "20 
Congress responded to Jefferson's calls for reductions in the regular 
force. His partisans sought to carry out a "chaste reformation" of 
the army, namely, to "republicanize" it and make it responsive to the 
Republicans, and in 1802 they reduced the regular army to approxi-
mately 3,000. Despite the obvious intention of the Jefferson adminis-
tration to continue to rely on the militia for national defense, Congress 
remained reluctant to make changes in the system. For example, a House 
committee headed by Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts reported on 
February 7, 1803, that there was no need to amend the Uniform Militia 
Act because any deficiency in the system was not "in that part of the 
system which is under the control of Congress, but from omission on 
the part of the State Governments." The committee consequently pro-
posed a resolution urging the president to write a letter to the state 
governors "to carry into effect the militia system adopted by the na-
tionallegislature. "21 
Varnum was also the chairman of the House committee that re-
ported onJeffersons classification scheme proposed in December 1805. 
The committee raised numerous objections, including the point that 
classification and reorganization of the militia would violate the consti-
tutions of several states and derange existing systems. Contrary to all 
evidence, the committee asserted that "military discipline is rapidly pro-
gressing ... and it cannot with propriety be doubted, that the militia of 
the United States, under the existing organization, are amply compe-
tent to a defence against the intrusion of any invading enemy."22 Clearly, 
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for a variety of reasons, Congress did not want to tamper with the 
militia. 
The stubborn refusal of Congress to make any alterations in a 
militia system so obviously disorganized and so poorly prepared to ful-
fill the role expected of it forced the Jefferson administration to rely on 
volunteers for national defense just as the Adams administration had 
earlier. An act of February 24, 1807, authorized the president to accept 
30,000 volunteers. It was stipulated that if they were called into service, 
the volunteers would be commanded by their own officers. The volun-
teers were to be on call for two years, and they were obligated for one 
years service if they were called to duty. Ironically, Republican support 
for volunteers may have been influenced by the fact that the officers of 
the militia, for the most part, were Federalists. 23 In April 1808, because 
of the war in Europe and problems with England, Congress atJ effersons 
urging increased the size of the regular force to approximately 10,000, 
although the actual level never exceeded 6,000 before 1812.24 
Congress did take one step forward in militia reform when it passed 
a law on April 22, 1808, providing $200,000 annually for the distribu-
tion of arms to the militia. The arms would be distributed and appor-
tioned on the basis of the returns of the states. The lack of arms among 
the militias, particularly in the South and West, was a national disgrace. 
It was a good estimate that perhaps fewer than one-third of the militia-
men were armed according to the law. One committee of Congress 
calculated in 1806 that there were about 250,000 arms in the hands of 
militiamen, but very likely many of the arms were unfit for use. Militia 
returns are incomplete, but the number of enrolled militiamen was some-
where between 650,000 and 700,000. The sum allocated would not pro-
cure much over 14,000 arms per year, hardly enough to keep up with 
the natural increase each year in the newly enrolled militiamen.25 
President Jefferson called out militiamen and volunteers in 1808 
to enforce the embargo policy, but the exercise confirmed the disorga-
nization of the state militias. Half of the states failed to render inspec-
tion returns, an indication that they probably had little or no idea of the 
number of militiamen organized or available for duty. Five governors 
failed to acknowledge the president's request at all, and many of those 
who did complained about the difficulty of mobilizing their militiamen, 
warning that they could give no guarantees about the condition of the 
troops or the arms.26 
Militia reform thus eluded the Jefferson administration, and Con-
gress thwarted or evaded recommendations from the administration to 
render the militia more useful to the government as a national defense 
force. Undaunted, Jefferson's successor, James Madison, renewed the 
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requests for militia reform, including classification. There was little like-
lihood that Congress would act. As Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland 
reported for his committee on March 6, 1810: "The prejudices against 
such a mode of organization in many parts of the Union, and the diffi-
culties to be surmounted, at a moment like the present, have deterred 
the committee from submitting such a project." Smith concluded, "If 
the States are anxious for an effective militia, to them belong the power, 
and to them too belong the means of rendering the militia truly our 
bulwark in war, and our safeguard in peace."27 
An acrimonious debate arose in Congress in 1810 during the sec-
ond session of the Eleventh Congress as to whether state militias could 
be used in an offensive war beyond the border of the United States. 
Surely arguments used in this debate, which gained wide circulation, 
served some militiamen during the War of 1812 in their refusal to cross 
into Canada. 
President Madison asked Congress on January 3, 1810, to renew 
the act authorizing 100,000 militiamen, due to expire on March 30, and 
requested a volunteer force of20,000 "for a short period." He also urged 
that the militiamen be classified and organized to ensure their prompt 
aid when needed. In the House of Representatives, Samuel W Dana 
(Conn.) raised objections on January 10 to the way in which the detach-
ment of 100,000 militiamen had been allocated among the states. He 
asserted that the allocation should reflect state population and not mi-
litia returns. Otherwise, he argued, states could exempt more of their 
citizens and reduce "their proportion of the public burden." Southern 
states, whose representation was based in part on their slave popula-
tion, objected, and it was also noted that some western states had nearly 
doubled their population and, until the next reapportionment, would 
fall quite short of their just proportion. Eventually, the question was 
committed to a select committee.28 
The committee reported a bill on March 1. The president was 
authorized to require state executives to hold in readiness 100,000 mi-
litiamen, basing allocations on militia returns or, where they were not 
current, "by such other rule as he shall judge equitable." Other provi-
sions authorized volunteers to serve six-month tours under their own 
officers and, if called to duty, to serve "any place, not beyond the sea, 
out of the jurisdiction of the United States." After a brief debate about 
the equity of basing the allocation on militia returns, Archibald Van 
Horne (Md.) moved to strike the words "not beyond the sea," because 
he did not believe the militia could be marched anywhere outside the 
United States. A desultory debate ensued over what sort of troops these 
were and the meaning of the term "volunteer."29 
28
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Erastus Root (N.Y.) acknowledged that the Constitution was si-
lent on whether the militia could be sent out of the jurisdiction of the 
United States, but he argued that the expression "repel invasion" could 
never have been intended to stop the militia at an arbitrary line. He 
asserted that militiamen when called into service became regular troops. 
Van Home, in reply, stubbornly insisted that he could find no constitu-
tional authorization to use the militia to invade a foreign territory, and 
he asked why, if they were regular troops, the officers were appointed 
by the state.30 
Ezekiel Bacon (Mass.) declared that militiamen as volunteers could 
give their "free consent to go out of the limits of the United States." 
Philip Key called this force a provisional army to invade Canada and 
argued that such troops could not "act under officers deriving their 
commissions from the several states." Matthew Lyon (Ky.) declared 
that the bill had all the constitutional objections voiced against Mr. 
Adams's volunteers "save that they are to be commissioned by the State 
authorities."31 
John Ross (Pa.), for the committee, responded that they had wanted 
to raise a force to meet current exigencies that would "not be a moth in 
the finances, and yet ... effectual when it is requisite to call it into 
action." The "not beyond the sea" clause was to address a contingency 
that might happen. States were to commission the officers because it 
might have excited jealousy if the United States had undertaken to com-
mission them. Opposing the bill, he said, was "to impede the Adminis-
tration of the Government." Supporters argued that it provided a force 
for defense, and it was cheap. The volunteers received no pay unless 
called into service, and the only expense would be arming the force and 
providing for ten days of training a year.32 
By this time, it was generally conceded that the militia constituted 
a military force that might be used in case of war, but it was also be-
lieved the militiamen must voluntarily consent to cross a territorial bor-
der. Federalists threw up numerous amendments clearly designed to 
defeat the bill. Republicans beat back the amendments, usually by sub-
stantial margins of thirty to forty votes. One motion made by Jacob 
Hufty (N.J.), a Republican, was accepted: the quotas for states whose 
returns had not been regularly received were to be apportioned accord-
ing to the number of free white males between sixteen and forty-five in 
the last census. Near the end, Jonathan o. Moseley (Conn.) reiterated 
a point made by many, that militias were never intended "to be perma-
nently relied upon in case of actual warfare." If it was necessary to raise 
a regular army, he argued that it should be done openly.33 
Federalists charged the bill would raise taxes and would lead to a 
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standing army and military despotism. It was acknowledged, however, 
that danger would arise from a president with "more martial ambition 
than the present." The bill passed 70-47. The Senate, however, post-
poned action on the House bill on April 2 8 and did not take it up again. 34 
Following the debate, on March 22, 1810, John Randolph of 
Roanoke introduced a resolution to reduce the military and navy estab-
lishment. When the resolution was taken up on April 16, Nathaniel 
Macon (N.c.) moved to amend the resolution to read "that the whole 
Army ought to be disbanded." Macon was probably acting from a belief 
that the regular army was too demoralized to be effective. In any event, 
his motion created an uproar. Roger Nelson (Md.) expressed his aston-
ishment; he doubted that anyone but the mover would vote for the 
resolution. Alexander McKim (Md.) pronounced it "the most extraor-
dinary proposition ever made to a deliberative body." But there were 
supporters of the resolution. Samuel McKee (Ky.) maintained that even 
if war was certain, it was still unnecessary to keep a large regular army. 
He preferred to rely on "the hardy sons of the country for defence" 
rather than on those who had "loitered out their days in camp" and 
were taken "from the very dregs of society." If the war came, he assured 
the House, the people would "rally around the standard of the coun-
try." Samuel Dana argued that Macon's motion, if passed, would re-
quire militiamen to serve in garrisons to preserve the public stores, an 
action that would be "extremely vexatious" to citizens. "We would spoil 
one very good cultivator of the soil to make one very bad soldier," he 
dec1ared. 35 
Erastus Root amended Macons bill to read that the military and 
naval establishment ought to be reduced; the amended bill passed and 
was referred to two committees. John Smilie was assigned to chair the 
military reduction committee, while John Randolph chaired the naval 
reduction committee. On April 24, Smilie reported a bill to reduce the 
army to one regiment of light artillery, two regular regiments, and one 
company of bombardiers (roughly 3,000), but the bill was apparently never 
taken up, no doubt because of concern that it might never pass. Randolph's 
committee called for the reduction of the navy by half, to three ships, but 
after lengthy debate, the bill was ordered to lie on the table.36 
It is unclear whether this debate was a delicate game of bluff, 
designed for constituent consumption, or a sincere effort by some 
members to abolish or drastically to reduce the regular military estab-
lishment during a relatively dangerous period. Those who supported 
reduction appeared to place great faith in the militia. The assumption 
seemed to be that if war came, U.S. forces would be involved only in 
defensive operations. 
34
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When the Eleventh Congress reconvened for its third session in 
December 1810, Madison's annual message advocated training "at the 
public expense ... certain portions of the commissioned and non-com-
missioned officers." He argued that "the instruction and discipline thus 
acquired would gradually diffuse through the entire body of the mili-
tia." Also, Secretary of War William Eustis, responding to a Senate 
resolution of April 7, proposed new regulations to improve the disci-
pline of the militia. While the modern French system "would claim 
preference," he asserted that it would require an entirely new organiza-
tion of companies, battalions, and regiments, and it was "doubtful 
whether the officers of the militia would bestow, gratuitously, the time 
and attention necessary for their own, and the instruction of the 
men under their command." He recommended continuing the regula-
tions prepared by Baron von Steuben in 1779.37 Aside from the fact 
that inertia and apathy probably made it impossible to reorganize the 
state militias on the French system-a point that Eustis made-it was 
inappropriate to tinker with militia reorganization on the eve of a pos-
sible war. 
Little was done in the third session to meet Madison's call for a 
volunteer force. The Senate authorized a number of volunteer compa-
nies on February 28, 1811, "not exceeding fifty thousand men." The 
House, however, decided that it was too late in the session to attempt to 
remodel the law, and the bill was indefinitely postponed.38 
The Eleventh Congress, true to its reputation, weak and divided, 
did virtually nothing to prepare the country's defenses in the face of a 
looming crisis with Great Britain. Neither the army nor the militia was 
measurably strengthened. This task remained for the Twelfth Congress, 
which at least had a clearer idea of what it wanted to do. 
37
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Chapter 2 
Congress and 
Military Mobilization 
On the eve of war with Great Britain in 1812 it was clear to many 
that Congress had failed to provide for a uniform militia. North 
Carolina's legislature passed a resolution in December 1811 complain-
ing that state militias were disciplined "according to the notions that 
prevail in different parts thereof; thereby tending to create disorder, 
rather than an uniformity of Discipline." Its representatives in Con-
gress were instructed to work to establish "one detailed and general 
system ... to make an improved uniform organization in Military Tac-
tics throughout the United States." Kentucky's legislature suggested 
classification in a resolution of February 8, 1812, as a measure that would 
save "more than a million dollars" annually just in labor for those "ex-
cused from uselessly attending musters." Kentucky and North Caro-
lina, at least, believed that the solution to the militia problem lay with 
the federal government.1 
Congress, notwithstanding, apparently believed the militia could 
be used primarily as an auxiliary force without extensive reform. The 
early military failures in 1812, however, which were largely attributable 
to the militia, quickly disabused Congress of the assumption that the 
militia would be adequate even as an auxiliary force. Despite their natu-
ral inclinations to favor militias and their generally penurious ways, 
Republicans in Congress gradually moved to increase the regular force 
and raise volunteers. Still, the obstructionist tactics of the Federalist 
minority and dissident Republicans limited the success of these efforts 
to raise a force to prosecute the war and raised questions about their 
loyalty to the Union. The government also faced a shortage of money 
to wage the war. Not just Federalists but even many Republicans were 
too parsimonious to raise the taxes necessary to fund the government 
adequately during the war. 
!
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Madison's third annual message of November 5, 1811, as the cri-
sis with Great Britain grew, clearly showed a move toward reliance upon 
volunteers rather than drafted militia. In the new Twelfth Congress a 
debate quickly arose over the correct proportion of regulars versus vol-
unteers. In the Senate, William Branch Giles (Va.) addressed a proposal 
to enlist 25,000 additional regulars. Although Giles was not persuaded 
that militias could not be used beyond the limits of the United States, 
he asserted that this view precluded Congress from including the mili-
tia in the estimate. Giles did not believe a volunteer force would be 
suited to an offensive war, because "it was always found to be the most 
expensive and least efficient force." Joseph Anderson (Tenn.), on the 
other hand, argued that 25,000 additional regulars would be impracti-
cable. Newly raised troops would be little better than volunteers, and 
the latter would be "more acceptable to the nation." After further de-
bate, the bill passed and was sent to the House.2 
In the House, Henry Clay supported a 25,000 increase in the regu-
lar army. It was better, he argued, "to err on the side of the largest 
force." Volunteers, he declared, might be suited for "the first opera-
tions of the war," but they would be unfitted for siege operations or for 
the manning and garrisoning of forts. William Widgery (Mass.) insisted 
that there was no need to raise a regular force to take Canada. "The 
Militia of New England States only wanted authority to do the busi-
ness," he said, ignoring the fact that Federalist leaders would oppose 
such an action. John C. Calhoun also supported the proposed increase 
in the regular army. "We ought either to submit," he stated, "or make 
an energetic defence." After lengthy debate, during which members 
mostly explained their vote, the House passed the Senate bill, with slight 
modifications, by a three-to-one margin. President Madison signed the 
bill into law on January 11, 1812.3 
The measure to raise 50,000 volunteers, which had been sepa-
rated from the regular army bill and passed by the House, came to the 
Senate in late January. Giles again spoke against relying upon volun-
teers, declaring that the 30,000 authorized duringJefferson's presidency 
had been merely a paper army, so why should they rely on one now in 
the face of the threat of actual war? He "disliked to vote for nominal, 
when the country required actual measures." Nevertheless, the bill passed 
and authorized the president to accept and organize a volunteer mili-
tary corps not exceeding 50,000 men, committed for two years but to 
serve for only twelve months. The volunteers had the same status as the 
militia, for the presumption was that they were not to be used for for-
eign service without their consent. Militia companies who volunteered 
would be allowed to keep the same officers.4 
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Peter B. Porter (N.Y.) introduced a resolution on February 18 to 
authorize the president to engage, commission, and organize an addi-
tionaI20,000-man provisional army of short-term volunteers that could 
be used while the 25,000 regular army was being raised. Militiamen 
who would "not submit to the drudgery of a camp for five years" might 
volunteer to attack Canada while there was no one to oppose them but 
militia "inferior to our own." If an attack on Canada was delayed a year 
to raise a regular force, he warned, they would be met by regulars "su-
perior to our own." Although many of his fellow New Yorkers were 
ready to do service, "they will not become slaves to the Army for five 
years." As Porter noted, approval of 25,000 regulars and 50,000 volun-
teers had not given the president a single man. "Should they insult the 
President by telling him to go to war, when he had not a man to fight 
with?" Porter's resolution, however, was defeated.5 
On January 28, David R. Williams, chairman of the Committee 
on the Militia, introduced a proposal to divide the militiamen into three 
classes: a minor class (eighteen to twenty-one) to do duty only in the 
state and serve up to three months; a junior class (twenty-one to thirty-
one) to serve in any part of the United States for not more than twelve 
months; and a senior class (thirty-one to forty-five) to serve in the state 
or adjoining states and territories for no longer than twelve months. 
Also, the bill proposed to give each militiaman a stand of arms when he 
reached eighteen years of age and enrolled in the militia. An additional 
$400,000 annual appropriation was proposed to purchase such arms.6 
Classification was always a sectional issue. Southerners generally 
favored classification; Northerners opposed the innovation. Motions 
to strike out classification, to alter the way the arms were distributed, to 
recommit, and to postpone indefinitely were all defeated. A motion to 
lower the additional sum for arms to $200,000 passed. 
Ebenezer Huntington, who served as a colonel in the Revolution-
ary Army and as a congressman from Connecticut in the third session 
of the Eleventh Congress, expressed the northern point of view regard-
ing classification. The militia, he wrote early in 1810, generated "enor-
mous waste and expense attending their every movement." He added, 
"Too much has already been done with the militia, if they are not to be 
a substitute for standing troops, and too little will always be done if they 
are made a substitute." Whatever was done, he declared, would "make 
them food for powder on the day of battle." There were good reasons 
for opposing classification. Even in Connecticut, Huntington noted, 
the limits of military company districts often had to be spread wide to 
obtain sixty-four men; if classing was used, the districts would have to 
be inconveniently large to embrace men of a certain age group. It would 
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be even more of a problem in the sparsely settled South and West. 
Huntington doubted that militias would ever be made efficient. "It is 
our parsimony which makes us too highly estimate militia; if the militia 
were more expensive than enlisted troops, there is not an American but 
would reprobate the idea."7 
Benjamin Tallmadge, perhaps remembering this correspondence 
with Huntington, now asked what urgent occasion there was for this 
bill. Militias in the northern states, he asserted with considerable exag-
geration on February 2, 1812, had become "formidable armies." Class-
ing would cause great inconvenience. It would "introduce novel dis-
tinctions" and "smells too strong of the detestable conscription of the 
French Emperor." An army formed from such conscripts, "called out 
under the imposing title of classified militia . . . , would be an army 
unknown to the Constitution." He reiterated a point made by many 
speakers on this subject: the militias belonged to the several states and 
were not militias of the United States.8 
During the debate there was an effort to separate the issues of 
classing and arming the militia. Some speakers favored arming but op-
posed classing. After lengthy debate, the bill was engrossed for a third 
reading by only three votes (62-59). On February 4, the bill was de-
feated by three votes, 55 to 58. Obviously, supporters of the bill were 
unable to keep the coalition together. One member who voted for the 
original bill changed to the opposition, but the most critical factor was 
that nine of the bill's supporters, including several southern members, 
were absent for the final vote.9 
A few days later, Williams introduced a separate bill to arm the 
militia. When Jonathan Roberts (Pa.) moved to give the state legisla-
ture the discretion on distribution of arms, supporters of the bill re-
sponded that the amendment would arm the state government and not 
the people. In rebuttal it was argued that the legislature could be trusted 
and could better distribute the arms. Eventually, Roberts's motion and 
all other efforts to alter the bill were defeated, and the bill passed and 
was sent to the Senate. The upper chamber amended the House bill, 
but the nature and extent of the amendments were not reported. The 
only alteration noted was that the appropriation was set at $300,000. 
The House received the Senate amendments, and then the bill was laid 
on the table, and it was apparently never taken up again. 1O Perhaps the 
Senate amendments were of such a nature that the House believed at-
tempts to reconcile the differences would be futile. More likely; the House 
itself was so divided (the bill had passed by a margin of only five votes) 
that a bill satisfactory to all proponents was unlikely to be obtained. 
On paper, Congress had created a formidable force. It had ap-
.
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proved a regular army of 35,000 and an additional 50,000 volunteers, 
presumably men coming from existing militia companies. On April 10, 
Congress authorized 100,000 militiamen in the states to be detached 
for call for a two-year period. The militiamen called into service, how-
ever, were to serve up to six months instead of the usual three. II 
In all of the years from the passage of the Uniform Militia Act in 
1792 to the Civil War, Congress came closer in the first session of the 
Twelfth Congress to amending and reforming the militia law than it 
ever did. In the end, Congress made a fateful decision to keep the mili-
tia system in place rather than try to reorganize it significantly on the 
eve of the War of 1812. All things considered, the decision was prob-
ably wise, but Congress and the nation were soon to learn that the 
nation's defense could not safely be entrusted to the militia. 
Congress's failure to address the militia problem adequately dur-
ing the war is unsurprising, given its failure to reform the militia in the 
years prior to the War of 1812. In fact, after the military defeats in 
1812, which were generally blamed on the militia, Congress sought to 
increase the regular force and raise volunteers. But partisan politics di-
vided the Congress. The government also faced a shortage of money to 
wage the war. Even Republicans were too parsimonious to raise the 
taxes necessary to fund the war effort adequately. 
The failures at Detroit and along the Niagara frontier, the experi-
ences of calling out militiamen either poorly equipped or not at all, and 
the myriad problems of organization, training, and discipline, not to 
mention refusals to cross international borders, convinced many ob-
servers that militias were too unreliable and too expensive. Consequently, 
when the Twelfth Congress reconvened for its second session on No-
vember 2, 1812, reassessment of the role of the militia in the war effort 
was on its agenda. 
Secretary Eustis resigned in December, and James Monroe be-
came the acting secretary of war. Monroe proposed to the chairmen of 
the two military affairs committees that the militia should be reserved 
primarily for defensive operations and should be supported at critical 
points by regulars. Monroe called for an additional 20,000 regulars for 
one year. Monroe conceded, however, that recruitment of the force 
already authorized had been slow. 12 
In the House, David R. Williams introduced a bill on December 
29, 1812, to raise an additional force of 20,000 regulars deemed neces-
sary because the militia was unreliable. Experience had shown that when 
militiamen were called out, the number of officers were proportion-
ately greater than needed, while the number of privates was less than 
needed, so that the government was compelled "to pay nearly double 
11
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the force necessary to maintain anyone point." Congress should not 
deceive themselves that they could rely on volunteers. "It is a miserable 
contrivance," he asserted, "perfectly nugatory, except to accomplish dis-
appointment. "13 
The debate in the House lasted for more than two weeks and oc-
casionally degenerated into nasty and acrimonious exchanges. Many 
supporters of the bill candidly assessed the failures of the militias as 
justification for this bill. Jonathan Moseley, a Federalist from Connecti-
cut, mocked supporters of the bill, who had assured the House in the 
last session that in a few months militiamen with a few regulars would 
conquer all of Canada except Quebec. But "disasters and disgrace" re-
sulted from the military operations. Now it was being said that 20,000 
men raised for one year would be adequate. Moseley wondered whether 
the raw troops to be raised would be any better than ordinary militia. 
Such a force, he asserted, would be "totally inadequate."14 
According to Lyman Law, another Federalist from Connecticut, 
the proposed bill said to the militiamen, "You are useless, you are no 
longer to be trusted-they are despised, degraded, and neglected." He 
predicted that the militia would "dwindle into insignificance." John Rhea 
(Tenn.) disputed Law's statement. The bills object, he maintained, was 
to preserve the militias within the limits of their respective states, so 
that the militias "may be less frequently taken off from their rural and 
other occupations." Rhea added cynically, "it is well known how careful 
the Governors of some States are of the militia." Lest his listeners miss 
his point, which was that some New England governors had withheld 
their militias from the federal government, he added that the proposed 
bill would give the president a force that would "not be controlled by 
any novel constructions of the Constitution."15 
Felix Grundy (Tenn.) argued that the force was not wanted, as 
some Federalists alleged, to put down insurrection at home. The oppo-
sition denounced militiamen and volunteers as "inefficient" and "a use-
less waste of the public treasure," but they also opposed this force. They 
seemed to want to carry on a war "without an army." George M. Troup 
(Ga.) agreed that the war must be conducted with either regulars or 
militiamen, but when militias were asked for, the opposition said no: 
"they are constitutionally under the control of the State authorities for 
local defence." When regular troops were asked for, the opposition ar-
gued that "regular armies are dangerous to Republics; they confer too 
much patronage." The opposition really wanted to repeal the declara-
tion of war and have the United States "lay down our arms, and throw 
ourselves upon the generosity of the enemy."16 
Attempts to amend the bill, including extending the period of ser-
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vice from one year to three, were defeated. Harmanus Bleecker, a Fed-
eralist (N.Y.), maintained that the failures of the militia should not be 
attributed to the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, or Rhode 
Island for withholding their militias. It was not because the war was 
unpopular that the ranks of the army had not been filled; the reason was 
simply that the people were more comfortable at home and preferred 
to stay there. The militias had rendered no efficient service, and he 
quoted George Washington that they were no better than "armed mobs." 
The war, he avowed, was destroying the illusion so long "kept up in the 
country by the many strange and absurd things which have been said of 
the importance and efficiency of the militia. Sir, it is all idle-the mili-
tiaman is best employed at his plough." If the regular army was to be 
filled, he concluded, it "must be composed of idle, dissolute, and disor-
derly persons."17 
As the bill moved to the third reading and virtually every debating 
point possible had been made, many were reiterated. John Randolph, 
near the end of the debate, renewed the charge that the bill degraded 
the militia and raised in its place "a great standing, military, mercenary 
. force." The militia, he argued, was the army of every free country and 
"that country in which they are not honored ... is at the brink of that 
abyss," in other words, on the verge of despotism. IS 
Joseph Desha of Kentucky chided the Federalist opposition that 
their long-winded speeches (no doubt antiwar speeches not delivered 
inJune 1812) would not change the vote of the "substantial part of this 
house," and they did not. The bill passed easily, 77 to 42, on January 14, 
1813. In the Senate, the bill, with amendments, was accepted. It was 
then signed into law on January 29. 19 
Joseph Gales supported the measure in the National Intelligencer. 
"It is supposed, that in the neighborhood of the enemy, large bodies of 
respectable citizens will turn out to serve for one campaign, who would 
not engage to serve for five, or even more than one year." Undoubtedly, 
he said, it would be better to raise men for five years, "if they were to be 
had." He noted that whenever it was proposed to the militia corps, "to 
pass the line [the Canadian border], the constitutional objection is raised, 
which creates division, and reduces the number for service." He added, 
"The absurdity of having a force in the field, to march to a certain line 
and halt there, must be evident to every one. The only force to be relied 
on must be one, willing to go any where, and every where ... , com-
pletely trained and well-disciplined."20 
The question of arming the militia was again raised in the second 
session of the Twelfth Congress. In the House, a bill was proposed from 
the Committee on the Military by David Williams to appropriate 
.
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$400,000 for arms, which also included a section for classification of 
militia. Benjamin Tallmadge (Conn.) opposed, arguing that the bill would 
punish those who had complied with the law by arming themselves and 
would reward those who had not. About $1 million had accrued to the 
fund since the law of 1808 passed, he observed, but apparently less than 
$100,000 had been expended for arms, and another $100,000 had passed 
to the credit of the sinking fund "because it had not been drawn for 
within the time limited by law." Either the executive department "has 
been guilty of gross neglect in the non-execution of the law of April, 
1808," he declared, "or else that the money could not be judiciously 
expended." In any event, with ample money on hand, the extra sum did 
not seem necessary. The true problem, he continued, was that in the 
United States there was a "want of artisans, who shall be capable of 
doing the business in a workmanlike manner." He noted that an army 
officer who had recently inspected the arms at the public armory at 
Springfield reported "that out of fifty or sixty thousand stands ... he 
could not select one thousand fit for use." Tallmadge did not suppose 
private factories could do much better. If they could deliver 20,000 stands 
a year, the appropriation under the law of 1808 would still be adequate. 
He noted that at that moment-five years later-many states still had 
not received a single stand of arms (weapon and accouterments)Y 
William Ely (Mass.) doubted that the current arms were as defec-
tive as Tallmadge suggested. Yet he conceded that mistakes had been 
made in the past, as when bayonets had been soldered to the barrels of 
15,000 muskets. Many of these, he observed, might still be made into 
good muskets. Ely acknowledged that skilled artificers were scarce and 
that experience had shown that arms procured under contract "were 
very poor." Such arrangements, he asserted, should not be made with-
out good reason to believe that they could be fulfilled competently. He 
cited a case in Pennsylvania where a contract for rifles had been let to a 
manufacturer reputed to produce them "more perfect than in any other 
part of the Union." Two thousand were inspected, received, and paid 
for. Although the inspectors had been highly recommended, complaints 
were made later, and upon reinspection, "not one rifle of the whole 
number was found to be fit for use, or good for anything. "22 
Ely also opposed classification "pressed upon us year to year, by 
gentlemen from the Southern section of the Union, he knew not why." 
Southern militia, he claimed, were imperfect because of neglect, and "if 
the States would not enforce those laws, he had no idea they would 
enforce this." If the South wanted classification, then they should adopt 
it rather than press for a measure that would injure the militias in one 
part of the Union more than it would benefit those in the other. In-
.
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deed, classification probably would not have helped the South. Classifi-
cation might have inconvenienced fewer men, and in an agricultural 
region this point might have carried some weight, but the greater dis-
persion of population in the South would have made it very difficult to 
form, organize, and train militia.23 
Josiah Quincy saw something darker in the effort to establish clas-
sification. The Massachusetts congressman believed the object was to 
place "all the youth of the nation at the command of the Executive, as a 
disposable force, to march anywhere, and do anything for which any 
Congress may pass a law." Despite these and other objections, support-
ers of the bill prevailed by a vote of sixty-seven to forty-eight. In the 
Senate, however, Joseph Varnum (Mass.), after reporting the House 
bill without amendment, moved to postpone further consideration. As 
Joseph Gales reported in the Daily Nationallntelligencer, the militia bill 
was "suffered to die a natural death, not having been taken up in the 
Senate."24 No further measures affecting the militia were introduced in 
the Twelfth Congress. 
In the first session of the Thirteenth Congress, the touchy issue 
of compensating states for militia drafts not authorized by the federal 
government was raised. Solomon Sharp (Ky.) moved on June 4,1813, 
to study what compensation ought to be made for mounted riflemen 
called into service from Kentucky in 1812 to defend Forts Wayne and 
Harrison. Felix Grundy (Tenn.) noted that many states had incurred 
expenses for defense "not authorized by law," and he asked that this 
matter be referred to a committee. Charles Goldsborough (Md.) agreed. 
Citing his state's grievance against the national government for uncom-
pensated militia costs, he said that all expenses of the militiamen "called 
out by the State authorities for the defence of the soil, ought to be 
defrayed by the General Government." Sharp declined to make his 
motion general, but Goldsborough moved to broaden the study for 
paying militia expenses called out under state authority in 1812.25 
Samuel McKee (Ky.) argued that Goldsborough's amendment al-
tered the nature of the original motion, which dealt with a special case 
where the Kentucky militiamen had been called out and not to defend 
their particular state. Goldsborough'!> amendment, nevertheless, received 
solid support and was passed, with the stipulation that territorial gov-
ernments be included upon the motion of Jonathan Jennings of the 
Indiana Territory. Troup of Georgia reported for his committee on the 
resolution in the second session of the Thirteenth Congress. They rec-
ommended that individuals who lost property be compensated, but the 
committee did not recommend any increased compensation for "ex-
traordinary military services."26 
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The subject of the distribution of arms under the law of 1808 was 
raised again during this session. Timothy Pitkin, a Federalist from Con-
necticut, observed that documents placed before the House showed that 
approximately 16,000 of 31,000 arms procured under the appropria-
tions of the 1808 law had been distributed to only eleven states and . 
territories. He offered a resolution to inquire why some states had re-
ceived a distribution and others had not. Troup responded that the reso-
lution might "excite distrust and jealousy between the General and State 
governments." If the distribution was examined, he argued, "we shall 
find that nothing like political prejudice has operated, as the gentleman 
has seemed to insinuate." Three New England states (New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont) had gotten 4,500 of the 16,000, and al-
though Connecticut and Massachusetts had received none, neither had 
Pennsylvania, New York, or Virginia. Pitkin denied that he sought to 
introduce political considerations; the construction placed on the law, 
he argued, differed from that which had been intended. Apparently, he 
added, the secretary of war could give arms to "particular favorite States 
... whilst to others not a single musket would be given." He claimed 
"each State, whether well or ill-armed previously, ought to have its pro-
portion of arms."27 
James Fisk (Vt.) moved successfully to refer the resolution to the 
Committee on Military Affairs. He opposed the resolution, he said, 
because it implied "a censure on the Executive." He thought that the 
arms had been distributed where they were most needed and that the 
Executive had "proceeded on perfectly just grounds." First-term con-
gressman Daniel Webster (N.H.) entered the debate, arguing that the 
Act of 1808 was a peace measure, not a war measure, and contained no 
provisions for making distinctions. John C. Calhoun (S.c.) observed 
that the law's object was the defense of the country. Even the peace 
establishment had for its ultimate object a state of war. Eventually, the 
resolution was adopted "with very few dissenting votes." On July 8, 
however, Troup reported the opinion of the Committee on Military 
Affairs that it would be "inexpedient" to make any changes in the law, 
and the report was ordered to lie on the table.28 ' 
The Committee on Military Affairs in the Senate also took up 
amending the militia law pertaining to responsibility for militia drafts. 
The War Department had recently announced rules for calling out mi-
litia, placing that responsibility with the commanding general of each 
of the military districts. The bill now pending allowed state governors 
that authority. Senator Samuel Smith (Md.) consulted Secretary John 
Armstrong on the proposed bill. Armstrong offered several objections. 
He explained that the War Department rules were made to operate on 
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individuals and not on companies, regiments, or brigades. Prior to the 
establishment of rules for drafts, there was often "a great deficiency in 
the rank & file, and a great redundancy in the commissioned part of the 
Corps." Some brigades called out had a full complement of staff and 
platoon officers that did not contain a thousand privates. The War 
Department rule was designed to establish a balance in the grades. Under 
the proposed bill, Armstrong continued, a governor would presumably 
"take them as he finds them, already organized into Companies and 
Regiments; and will, by doing so, perpetuate the evi1. "29 
Armstrong further observed that the bill did not provide for mus-
ter or inspection by an officer of the United States prior to acceptance, 
which was "indispensable with regard to militia detachments." The bill 
also gave governors power to exhaust the military arsenals of the United 
States and made no provision for the safekeeping or return of arms 
drawn from the arsenals. Finally, he questioned the principle embodied 
in the bill enabling states or territories to defend themselves at the ex-
pense of the United States. "The expenditures made at different points 
during the last year," he noted, "carry in them an admonition against 
the employment of militia, under calls not immediately authorized by 
the Executive of the Union."30 As far as can be determined, the bill 
never emerged from committee. 
As the year 1813 drew to a close, the government could point to 
mixed results in its conduct of the war. Some successes were intermingled 
with continued failures. In the West, Tecumseh was dead and his In-
dian confederacy broken. The British had been defeated at the Battle of 
the Thames, and the West and Lake Erie were safely in American hands. 
The militiamen deserved part of the credit, particularly volunteer mili-
tiamen under Co1. Richard M. Johnson. Along the Niagara frontier, 
early successes were marred by devastation and defeat at the end of the 
year, and along the St. Lawrence virtually nothing had been accom-
plished even to threaten this vital waterway. Large numbers of militia-
men still refused to cross the international boundary; and they contin-
ued to display a lack of discipline by retreating before the enemy. 
Congress seemed incapable of providing an alternative, and the coun-
try faced the next campaign still relying on militias to bear a large part 
of the burden of military action. 
In the second session of the Thirteenth Congress, which met in 
December 1813, compensation for militiamen called out under state au-
thority was brought up again. In this case the issue was pay to Tennessee 
militiamen engaged against hostile Indians. John W Taylor (N.Y.) re-
ported for the House Committee on Militia that no legislative provision 
was necessary. The proper procedure, he said, was to apply to the federal 
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government for sanction to use militia, and the committee had no knowl-
edge of any cases where sanction had been refused. There had to be con-
trols, he said; otherwise the United States would be charged with the 
"expenses of militia detachments, ordered into service, perhaps, without 
necessity, and possibly for objects inconsistent with the public welfare.'!31 
After returning from the northern front in late 1813, Secretary of 
War Armstrong proposed on January 1, 1814, that Congress fill the 
ranks of the regular army by conscription. An adequate regular force, 
he argued, would "enable us to finish the war (without again calling on 
Militia) in one Campaign." Armstrong considered the militia wasteful, 
poorly trained, and unreliable. His plan would have classed "the whole 
body of militia into as many classes as there were soldiers wanting, and 
to make every class furnish one during the war, or to have one draughted 
from each of them." Elisha Potter (R.I.) thought it more equitable to 
raise soldiers by enlisting and giving large bounties to induce them to 
enlist voluntarily than by adopting the conscription plan proposed by 
Secretary Armstrong. This would have compelled "the young and very 
poor men," he said, "to do all the duty and bear the burdens of the war, 
while the rich, and those who are excused from doing duty in the mili-
tia, would be excused." Potter also bitterly criticized the refusal of the 
New York and Pennsylvania militiamen to cross into Canada in the Nia-
gara campaign. He presumed some were men who approved the con-
duct of the administration and were "willing to support the war by vot-
ing, when it costs neither blood nor money." The militias of both states, 
he declared, had proven "a dead weight on the Administration ... , 
and although much fault had been found with the Administration about 
the prosecution of the war, for his part, with such help as they had, he 
felt more to pity than to find fault with them."32 
Jonathan Fisk (N.Y.) defended his state's militia from the charge 
of cowardice. He insisted that insufficient boats were available to com-
ply with Gen. Stephen Van Rensselaers order to cross at Queenston in 
November 1812, and Gen. Alexander Smyth "refused to lead them over." 
In fact, Fisk said, some militia "broke in pieces the arms they could not 
be permitted to measure with the enemy ... , yet they are charged with 
refusing to do their duty!" Morris S. Miller (N.Y.) gave a very different 
assessment of his state's militia. He defended Van Rensselaer, but the 
state militiamen "were lost to every generous and manly feeling" and 
were "guilty of a shameful desertion of the standard of their country, 
and a cruel and cowardly abandonment of their commander in the hour 
of danger."33 
On February 3, 1814, Troup introduced a bill to allow the presi-
dent to retain in service certain volunteer corps. Under the 1812 law 
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authorizing 50,000 volunteers, six regiments had been called into ser-
vice: one from New Hampshire and Maine; two in New York; one in 
Virginia; and two in Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory. Their terms 
were now expiring, but about 1,000 were willing to serve during the 
war, provided they serve Wider their own officers. Even this seemingly 
innocuous bill met stiff opposition because it was feared that more than 
1,000 would offer their services. Ultimately, the bill passed.34 
Finally, the second session attempted to revise the militia law. The 
hill was introduced by John W Taylor on March 28,1814. The opposi-
tion objected particularly to provisions that strengthened the powers of 
courts-martial to proceed against militiamen in their absence, to pun-
ish individuals for contempt of court by word or gesture, and to compel 
witnesses to attend. Taylor defended the bill, arguing that the objective 
was "to prevent the requisitions of militia by the President from being 
disregarded by the Governors of States, or rendered inefficient by the 
contumacy of subordinate officers or privates." Despite criticisms of 
the powers given to courts-martial, the measure made its way through 
both houses and became law on April 18. In addition to strengthening 
the courts-martial, militiamen were compelled to serve six months after 
arriving at the place of rendezvous. (They were to be paid, however, for 
expenses incurred in marching to the rendezvous.)35 
Congress did not lack for advice. Many proposals were put forth 
during the war to resolve the manpower problem. One proposal for mi-
litia reform was put before the country early in 1813 by Col. Edmund 
Pendleton Gaines. Adj. Gen. Thomas Cushing inquired whether any el-
ementary treatise might be adapted to the discipline of militia. Gaines 
responded in a long letter dated January 2, 1813, that was published in 
March in the Daily National Intelligencer. He called for "a radical change 
in the militia laws." The militia system, he asserted, "must be improved, 
or it must be laid aside altogether." Discipline could not be learned "in 
the sweet social walks of domestic life." Gaines proposed that young, 
unmarried men be organized and marched to military posts on the fron-
tier and seacoast, placed under discipline from regular army officers, and 
asked to "serve as regulars or regular militia for two or three years." New 
militiamen would rotate in as the old went out. If this plan was adopted 
on a small scale, he said, it would soon be seen as "the most economical 
and efficient system of defence that can be devised" and would in a few 
years gain the approbation of 90 percent of the people. He denied that 
his scheme would be tantamount to establishing a standing army. "Who 
can for a moment believe that such an army of regular ffiilitia, alternately 
going from and returning to the bosom of their friends in every part of 
the union, can be considered as dangerous to our happy republic?"36 
un
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Near the end of the war, Andrew Jackson gave Tennessee con-
gressmanJohn Rhea advice about militia reform. "I hope Congress will 
see the necessity of placing the militia in a state [condition]," he wrote, 
"that when called for, they can be relied on." He proposed two specific 
reforms. First, the length of service should be extended "at least to one 
year." Short enlistments, he argued, were "the greatest curse to a na-
tion in a state of war-and such army can never be in a state to oper-
ate." Second, any militiaman called into service who left it "without a 
regular discharge should be apprehended, and transferred to the regu-
lar service and compelled to serve during the present war." He added, 
"This will alone put down the spirit of mutiny and desertion that per-
vade our militia."37 
Jackson also expressed to Acting Secretary of War Monroe in 
November 1814 a plan to reduce expenses entailed in the frequent calls 
for militia. Basically, after the government had determined the number 
of militiamen needed for the war Oackson supposed about 150,000) 
and the apportionment of each state, they should be called out for the 
duration of the war. The quotas would, Jackson argued, be filled imme-
diately if these militiamen were given the premiums and bounties cur-
rently offered by the government. Placing these troops under selected 
and experienced officers for training, the force would "present an effec-
tive army in every quarter, sufficient to drive all enemies from your 
shores, and to reduce Canada."38 In effect, Jackson proposed to con-
script the militiamen into the regular army. He perhaps did not appre-
ciate the political difficulties of carrying out on the national level a 
scheme that turned the state militia into a standing army. Jackson's pro-
posal would also have been strongly opposed by many state leaders. 
The Daily National Intelligencer published several similar propos-
als in late 1814. One was a series of essays signed "Spirit of the Times," 
who criticized individuals who opposed improving the militias by citing 
the cost and inconvenience of placing citizens in camps for training and 
discipline. As a consequence, the writer averred, the nation had paid 
dearly for want of such training. Citizens must "yield a portion of his 
personal ease and comforts" and go into camps and submit themselves 
to training. A second essay chastised Congress for not making the mili-
tia more efficient. The new system must provide for classing the mili-
tia; "it will be in vain to alter the old [system]." A third essay advised 
Congress to limit exemptions to those "really disabled, or conscientiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms," but they should pay a pecuniary compen-
sation in lieu of service. Also, younger men should be placed in military 
schools and should be educated at public expense.39 
Another writer, "Jackson," declared that Congress should compel 
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every eighth or tenth person to provide an able-bodied person, which 
would raise a force of 140,000 to 160,000. "Jackson" also questioned 
exempting persons over forty-five during wartime. Such people, he ar-
gued, generally had more to defend, and many would be willing to 
serve.40 
Another anonymous writer argued that temporary forces raised 
for an emergency and disbanded after the crisis were inadequate. As a 
substitute for the current inadequate enlistment system, he proposed 
that "every seven, ten, or twelve men ... find one person to serve for 
one, two, or three years or during the war." Since some substitutes were 
paid as much as $100, he argued that if ten men united to pay $50 each, 
the total of $500 plus the present inducements for enlistment-$124 
bounty, 160 acres of land, and the pay of $8 per month-would supply 
"thousands who would cheerfully accept the above sum of near one thou-
sand dollars . ... " (The average unskilled worker earned about $10 per 
month.) A regular force would more effectively impress the enemy, he 
argued. "It is well known they estimate our militia very lightly; and that 
they dread our regulars."41 
The Thirteenth Congress reconvened for the third session on 
September 19 in an atmosphere of crisis. Washington had been burned, 
the peace negotiations at Ghent had apparently broken down, and the 
prospects were that the British would prosecute the war even more vig-
orously. Worse, recruitment in the regular army lagged, and the strength 
of the army was only about half the authorized strength of 62,000. It 
was imperative that Congress devise ways of mobilizing American man-
power. Madison not only asked Congress to fill the regular army and to 
encourage volunteers but also renewed his request for classification to 
give the militia greater energy and efficiency.42 
J ames Monroe, who took over the War Department after 
Armstrong's resignation in early September, submitted a bewildering 
array of options to the House Military Affairs Committee on October 
17. One possibility was to classify the free male population (ages eigh-
teen to forty-five) into groups of 100. Each group would provide four 
men; failing to do so, the men would be raised by a draft on the whole 
class and would be paid by a tax upon the inhabitants of that class. A 
second option was to class the whole militia into three groups (eighteen 
to twenty five, twenty-five to thirty-two, and thirty-two to forty-five) 
that might be called upon as necessary by the president for service of up 
to two years. A third proposal was to offer exemption from militia ser-
vice to every five men who provided one to serve for the war. The final 
choice was to continue the present policy of raising troops but to in-
crease the land bounty. Senator Obadiah German of New York compli-
40
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cated matters by offering yet another plan that would divide the militia 
into classes of ten, with each class to provide one man for one year. 
German would have these men serve "in a corps of local militia, to be 
organized in each State for the defence thereof," while Monroe's idea 
had obviously been to use the force not for defense but for offensive 
purposes.43 
These preliminary proposals at length gave rise to two bills intro-
duced in the Senate on November 5. One legalized the enlistment of 
men eighteen to twenty-one years old without the consent of parents 
or guardian, and it doubled the land grant to 320 acres. Despite consid-
erable opposition, this bill passed the Senate on November 12. The 
House took up the bill on December 2 and debated it over the next four 
days. Cyrus King (Mass.) denounced the measure as "calculated to de-
stroy the militia system, and ... the sovereignty of the States." Ignoring 
the fact that eighteen-year-olds served in the militia, King termed the 
bill a minor conscription bill, "the most inhuman, immoral, and op-
pressive, that ever was attempted to be established by this, and, of course, 
by any other assembly, called deliberative." He declared melodramati-
cally, "I beseech you, as friends of humanity, to spare the tears which 
the passage of this law will cause to flow; I appeal to you as fathers, by 
every endearing tie which binds you to your children, not to deprive 
the aged parent of the child of his youth, the support and solace of his 
declining years, lest you bring his gray hairs with sorrow to the grave." 
King asserted that the administration had first tried patriotism to raise 
troops. When that failed, it attempted to buy soldiers with bounties, 
land, and wages, and, still baffled, they were now turning to conscrip-
tion, "to kidnap the people, as you would slaves; and," he added, "they 
will deserve this fate, if they tamely submit to such oppression." Tho-
mas P. Grosvenor, a Federalist from New York, thought that the bill 
might add perhaps 1,000 recruits to the army. It was, he said, "a mea-
sure combining strong characters of weakness and violence, of folly and 
madness," and he cited his agreement with Daniel Webster's argument 
that if apprentices could be enlisted in defiance of their masters, then 
why not enlist slaves?44 
One change to the Senate bill was made when the House accepted 
a motion by John W. Taylor to allow recruits a four-day period to change 
their minds. All Federalist attempts to amend or weaken the measure 
were defeated decisively. The bill passed the House on December 6 by 
a vote of95 to 52, and it was signed into law four days later.45 
The second measure, dubbed a conscription bill by the Federal-
ists, engendered a vast amount of acrimonious debate. The bill pro-
vided that the whole body of the militia would raise 80,430 men to 
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serve for two years. Each state was to fill its quota, based on its ratio of 
representation in Congress. The militia of each state was to be divided 
into as many classes as were required to provide men, and each class 
was obliged to furnish a man, either by contract or draft. Any two classes 
who provided two soldiers for the regular army were to be exempted 
from the operation of the act. Denunciations of the bill quickly fol-
lowed. Joseph Varnum, a Republican from Massachusetts, declared that 
the bill was "unnecessary, unequal, and unjust." Varnum was possibly 
trying to head off a Federalist assault on the bill, but he had always been 
sensitive to any tampering with the militia system. He subjected the bill 
to a devastating critique and concluded that it violated correct military 
procedure and all pretense at fairness between rich and poor. In the 
end, he charged, it would fail to produce the number of soldiers wanted.46 
David Daggett (Conn.), a Federalist, asserted that in Connecti-
cut, five-sixths of the property was possessed by exempts. This bill un-
justly placed the burden upon the least affluent. Moreover, as the bill 
depended upon state governments to carry the law into effect, he doubted 
that many state governors would consent "to annihilate the power of 
the State over its militia." In New England, he noted ominously, "They 
too well know and too highly appreciate the privileges of free men to 
approve a conscription, however disguised. "47 
Beyond converting all the state militias into a regular army, 
Jeremiah Mason (N.H.) saw another insidious purpose in Monroe's 
proposal, namely to levy a tax on the free male population and to relieve 
"the slaveholding States from the increased tax." He calculated this would 
mean a difference of $400,000 between Virginia and Massachusetts. 
Another New England Federalist, Christopher Gore (Mass.), contended 
that the militia was never intended to be used to prosecute an offensive 
war or even to be relied upon as a permanent defense force. Classing 
was the "first step on the odious ground of conscription .... The honey 
on the edges of the cup will not disguise the bitterness of the venomous 
drug at its bottom." Gore's motion to reduce the term of service to nine 
months was defeated by six votes.48 
Similar denunciations followed. Robert Goldsborough, a Mary-
land Federalist, lamented "that blood-stained plea of tyrants, which has 
served every scheme of usurpation to sacrifice the lives and liberties of 
men." Eventually, the bill was passed on November 22 by a seven-vote 
margin and sent to the House.49 
"Americanus" decried in the pages of the Daily National Intelligencer 
the "heedless clamor against the bill" and asked why it was called con-
scription. Under the old system, if 100 men were wanted, then each 
regiment had to furnish by lot 50 men who were obliged to go or find a 
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substitute. In the new system every 25 men furnished 1, thus exempting 
24 men, and if each class had one willing to serve, the force was raised 
voluntarily. Furthermore, the old system took poor men who could not 
afford a substitute as well as poor men who served as substitutes, a "mani-
fest inequality." Under the new system the rich participated, at least in 
contribution. The author also questioned the reasoning that "it is more 
just to force a man to serve six months, contrary to his will, than for him 
voluntarily to agree to serve as many years."50 
It is often difficult to separate political rhetoric and genuine state-
ments of principle, but in this debate the concern expressed by the F ed-
eralists appears to have been real. No doubt the characterization of this 
measure as a "conscription" bill served as an emotional rallying point 
for the opposition. Federalist orators repeatedly alluded to the French 
conscription. Joseph Pearson, a Federalist congressman from North 
Carolina, in a letter to his constituents, characterized the bill as one 
that threatened "the horrors of conscription and impressment, under the 
disguise of militia draft." Even in the privacy of his room, Timothy 
Pickering, the Federalist congressman from Massachusetts, confided in 
a private memorandum that the country seemed to be heading toward a 
military dictatorship. "The French revolutionary scenes will be acted 
over again," he wrote, "conscription, forced loans, military tribunate, 
and the guillotine." Pickering contended that the people never con-
templated "vesting Congress with a general power to impress the men 
requisite to compose an army."51 
The House took up the Senate bill on December 2. George Troup 
criticized the Senate measure because it placed reliance for the pros-
ecution of the war on irregular militia, and he predicted that "defeat, 
disaster, and disgrace must follow." The country needed a regular force. 
Volunteers and state troops should be raised to serve in lieu of militia. A 
regular force would be not only more efficient but more economical as 
well. John C. Calhoun responded that the reason for preferring the 
Senate bill was obvious. It had already been passed by the Senate, and if 
the House passed it, it would become law.52 
A select committee of the House offered several amendments, 
which were debated at length. One, easily passed, authorized the presi-
dent, whenever the governor of a state failed to comply with the requi-
sition, "to call directly on the officers of the militia." Another based 
apportionment of the militia on free population in the last census rather 
than on representation. John W. Eppes (Va.), perhaps to make the bill 
more palatable to Republicans, moved to reduce the term of service 
from two years to one year; the motion passed by twenty votes. 53 
Morris Miller (N.Y.) cited a case in New York where the governor 
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had pardoned a horse thief "on condition that he should enlist, and 
serve in the Army." He warned that if the majority persisted in attempts 
to raise a force for conquest, "the States must and will take care of 
themselves; and they will preserve the resources of the States for the 
defense of the States." He added that some states "may consider them-
selves bound by duty and interest to withdraw from this Confederacy."54 
No doubt Miller's speech, delivered only a week before the antiwar 
meeting of the New England states at Hartford (see Chapter 9), had a 
sobering effect on the House, but it may also have served to keep the 
administration supporters together despite the obvious distaste that many 
Republicans felt for the bill. 
Daniel Webster also raised his mighty voice against the conscrip-
tion bill. On December 9, he depicted a desperate government trying 
to raise a standing army from the militia; a government "more tyranni-
cal, more arbitrary; more dangerous, more allied to blood & murder, 
more full of every form of mischief, more productive of every sort & 
degree of misery, than has been exercised by any civilized Government, 
with a single exception, in modern times." Conscription would mean 
death to half of those chosen. "They will perish of disease & pesti-
lence," he said, "or they will leave their bones to whiten in fields be-
yond the frontier." He predicted that the states would interpose their 
authority "between their citizens & arbitrary power." If the administra-
tion could not form an army without conscription, it would find that "it 
can not enforce conscription without an army." He ridiculed charges 
that New Englanders were trying to dissolve the union. Rather, "Those 
who cry out that the Union is in danger are themselves the author of 
that danger."55 
Charles J. Ingersoll (Pa.) dismissed the "pathetic threats" of the 
Federalists, but he feared this opposition would deter supporters from 
any action. Experience had shown that neither militia nor voluntary 
enlistments could be relied upon. "The fatal doctrine of citizen sol-
dier," he said, " ... has cost us more money, more blood, more mourn-
ing, in six months, than a war of six years should or would cost under 
proper military organization." He added, "No rational, no feeling man 
can doubt as to the shocking inexpediency of such a system." Militia 
classification and draft was obviously the best and fairest way to raise a 
force. He concluded, "Dismemberment would be but a little misfor-
tune, contrasted with what may be our lot, unless we rise up to the 
exigency .... Convulsion is no more to be dreaded than paralysis."56 
Richard Stockton (N].) declared that the bill "reverses everything." 
The militia, he argued, "is converted into the regular force, the regu-
lars into the auxiliary!" William Irving (N.Y.), in defense of the bill, 
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asserted that it was "impossible to fill the ranks of the Army" because of 
"various and unjustifiable means that have been resorted to, for the 
purpose of impeding or discouraging enlistments." "What are we to 
do," he asked, "but try more efficient means, or surrender the honor, 
and barter the interests of the country for imaginary Constitutional 
scruples? "57 
Several efforts were made to weaken the bill, without success. A 
motion by Webster to reduce the term of service to six months, how-
ever, failed by only one vote. After an unsuccessful attempt to recommit 
the bill, it was engrossed and ordered to a third reading by a margin of 
twenty votes. 58 
By now it was clear there were enough supporters to pass the bill. 
All the opposition could do was to make dire predictions about the con-
sequences of passage. Artemas Ward, Jr. (Mass.), declared that no gov-
ernment had the right "to compel the citizens of our country to enter 
the regular Army," and he added, "resistance is not only lawful ... ; it is 
a duty."59 
A call for the previous question finally shut down the debate by a 
twelve-vote margin. The bill was passed by the same margin and sent to 
the Senate. The close margin reflected, perhaps, that some Republi-
cans defected when they believed it safe to do so. The major changes 
made in the Senate bill reduced the term of service from two years to 
one; the president was allowed to bypass state governors who refused to 
act by using militia officers to requisition troops; and the force could be 
used beyond the limits of the state or contiguous state. The Senate 
accepted the latter amendment, but it refused to accept the two former 
amendments. The House refused to yield on its amendments and called 
for a conference committee. The House conferees recommended eigh-
teen months' service as a compromise and receded on the amendment 
authorizing the president to call directly on militia officers for troops. 
The House, however, refused to yield on either point and demanded 
another conference. In the Senate, on December 28, Rufus King (N.Y.), 
taking advantage of the fortuitous absence of some of the bill's support-
ers, moved to postpone the bill to the end of the session, and his motion 
passed by 14-13. This step effectively killed the bill for the session. 
Daniel Webster wrote his brother that King's motion was "accidental-
unpremeditated ... Mr. King made the motion-some members hap-
pened to be out-it was immediately put & carried."60 
After three months of discussion, Congress still had not provided 
a means of raising additional troops. "Franklin" argued in the National 
Intelligencer on October 25, 1814, that Congress by raising bounties 
and paying beforehand was doing it wrong. He recommended raising 
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150,000 volunteers who would serve six months and would be given 
liberal pay and allowances. They would "answer all needs and would be 
cheaper."61 
Perhaps reflecting this attitude, George M. Troup, for the House 
Military Affairs Committee, on October 27 reported a bill to authorize 
the president to accept the services of volunteers. On November 2, 
Troup proposed an amendment to raise the term of service from nine 
months to twelve. The three additional months, he explained, were for 
discipline and instruction, leaving nine months for actual service. The 
motion passed by two votes. Troup admitted in debate that the volun-
teers were not intended to substitute for the kind of force needed to 
prosecute the war.62 
The bill generated considerable debate and several amendments. 
Richard M. Johnson (Ky.), a member of the Military Mfairs Commit-
tee, commented on November 7 that the committee had decided to call 
up the bill in the belief that "it would meet with little or no discussion 
or diversity of opinion." It had been so amended, however, that some 
provisions of the bill were inconsistent, and he moved to lay it on the 
table. Nearly a month later, on December 2, Johnson moved to amend 
the bill "to reinstate it precisely in the form in which it stood before it 
underwent amendment by the House." The bill was ordered engrossed, 
was read a third time, and passed on December 6.63 
The Senate did not act on the volunteer bill until the failure of the 
conscription bill. Now the volunteer bill stood as the only viable op-
tion. The House bill was amended by the Senate, the most important 
change being to authorize the president to accept state troops to meet 
the militia quota of the state. The House accepted some amendments 
and disagreed on others. After going to a conference committee, the 
bill finally passed and was signed into law on January 27, 1815. The 
president was authorized to accept up to 40,000 state troops (appor-
tioned by states). If the number of state troops did not reach 40,000, 
additional volunteers were authorized up to a total of 80,000. The of-
ficers would be commissioned by the president, subject to Senate ap-
proval. The term of service was twelve months.64 
Early in February 1815 yet another idea for raising troops was 
broached by Charles Rich (Vt.), who proposed instructing the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs to study arranging into classes citizens owing 
direct taxes of $400 to $800; each class would then be allowed to fur-
nish one man for the army in lieu of taxes. "Every taxable citizen," he 
believed, "would in a degree voluntarily become a recruiting officer." 
Webster declared the plan would "seriously obstruct the recruiting ser-
vice" and would "produce no good." Furthermore, the direct tax had 
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already been pledged, and an additional tax was not practicable. Tho-
mas Grosvenor (N.Y.) characterized the plan as a "wild project," but 
the proposal gained some support. James Fisk, Rich's colleague from 
Vermont, declared that "some efficient and certain measures to fill the 
ranks of the regular army" had to be taken. "What answer," he asked, 
"could they give to their constituents, if they returned home and left 
the country comparatively defenseless?" Troup noted that his commit-
tee had endeavored to ascertain the opinion of both houses on the dif-
ferent modes of raising men and had found "no efficacious measure, 
calculated certainly and promptly to fill the regular army." Certain 
measures were not pushed on the House because there was no disposi-
tion to act on them. The committee had tried instead to improve the 
recruiting service and to gain acceptance of volunteers and state troops. 
The 80,000 authorized, with the 60,000 regular troops already approved, 
gave a possible force of 140,000, and it "might reasonably be expected 
to produce one hundred thousand; as great a number, perhaps, as, un-
der the circumstances, the finances of the country would bear." Despite 
opposition, the resolution was referred to the Committee of the Whole 
by a six-vote margin. A little over a week later, however, the matter was 
postponed indefinitely following news of the end of the war.65 
Thus after three years of conflict, Congress still had not provided 
the country with an adequate force to prosecute the war. The effort was 
flawed from the beginning. Assumptions about the utility of the militia 
were difficult to overcome, and even at the war's end some congress-
men maintained that the militia was a competent force to prosecute the 
war. Always lurking in the background was the fear of a standing army. 
No doubt, many Federalists were being hypocritical when they wrung 
their hands about the classification of militia, about conscription as an 
alternative to militia, and about the use of volunteers in lieu of militia. 
On the other hand, many Republicans had to overcome deeply ingrained 
prejudices to support party measures that proposed the various plans 
that have been enumerated. In the end, Congress was too divided and 
too indecisive to provide the manpower to prosecute the war. 
.
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Chapter 3 
Militia Organization 
Federal utilization of militia was based upon the idea that each state 
militia was organized, armed and equipped, and capable of turning 
out quickly for duty upon the call of the government. Sadly, this was 
rarely the case in any state. The disorganized state of the militia was not 
unknown when war was declared on June 18, 1812, but no doubt few 
understood or anticipated the myriad problems that would be encoun-
tered in using militias to prosecute the war. Senator Obadiah German 
(N.Y.) was one who pointed out that those who counted upon using the 
militia to prosecute the war would be disappointed. OnJune 13 he ob-
served that the 1,600 militiamen from New York called into service 
exhibited "a spectacle that would wound the feelings of the most cal-
lous man." They were without hats, blankets, camp kettles, or any nec-
essary camp equipage. It was with utmost difficulty that their officers 
prevented them from marching back home. He predicted, correctly, 
that the militia would not perform well in the campaign of 1812: "the 
evils attending upon calling a large portion of the militia into actual 
service for any considerable time, is almost incalculable. After a short 
time, sickness, death, and many other evils will teach you the impropri-
ety of relying on them for carrying on the war."l 
Indeed, frontier militia units were so poorly organized that when 
state militiamen were drafted, it was difficult to determine who belonged 
to which militia company, because many units had never been mus-
tered. Although state laws prescribed fines for failure to join a militia 
unit, many eligible men never enrolled. Ohio Governor ReturnJ. Meigs, 
ignoring the fact that states were ultimately responsible for militia or-
ganization, lamented to his legislature in December 1812 that Con-
gress had not provided "a more efficacious system of militia organiza-
tion, discipline and duty." He complained particularly that so much 
time was consumed in collecting and organizing militiamen that it was 
often too late to meet an emergency.2 Meigss statement reflected the 
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situation in Ohio and generally throughout the West and South. 
The lowest level of organization for militias was the company. 
Typically, a company had sixty-four privates, but it varied from forty to 
eighty on the frontier, where the population was scattered and it was 
not always convenient to form companies according to the prescribed 
numbers. Militia districts might have to be spread out too far to reach 
the prescribed numbers, or the number of eligible men in a district 
might not be enough to form two companies. A typical company had 
one captain, two lieutenants (first and second), an ensign, four sergeants, 
four corporals, and a drummer. A fifer and a clerk were often added as 
well. Captains and subordinate officers were elected by the company. 
The captain then typically chose the sergeants and corporals and ranked 
them. 
The situation became more ~omplicated when Adj. Gen. Thomas 
H. Cushing issued new rules on March 19, 1813, for militia drafts. All 
requisitions had to be made by an officer of the United States autho-
rized to make such calls on the executive of the state or territory; calls 
would be explicit as to the number of privates, noncommissioned offic-
ers, and commissioned officers required (the previous method of call-
ing for regiments or brigades was thereby discontinued); companies 
called into service should have 100 privates, eight noncommissioned 
officers, and five commissioned officers; and payment would be made 
by the regimental paymaster or the paymaster accompanying the army 
or the division to which it belonged.3 
When the federal government issued the new rules for drafted 
militias, state governors were confronted by the fact that the companies 
of their state militias usually had only about two-thirds the number of 
privates called for by the national government, so that to meet the quota 
it was necessary to merge companies. Some officers had to be left home, 
and men were forced to serve under unfamiliar officers. Consequently, 
governors urged their legislatures to improve and revise state militia 
laws to meet the new situation. Governor Joseph Alston of South Caro-
lina, for example, recommended in November 1813 that the legislature 
increase the number of divisions. Otherwise, if South Carolina troops 
acted with U.S. forces or troops of sister states, "our general officers 
must always invariably be outranked." Governor James Barbour also 
noted to the Virginia legislature in December 1813 that the state mili-
tia system did not comply with the regulations of the War Department, 
so that some officers had been excluded from service. Pennsylvania gov-
ernor Simon Snyder also pointed out to his legislature "the discordance 
between our militia system and that of the United States." Conforming 
with the rules and regulations of the United States would hasten de-
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taching militiamen to service and would prevent "those contests be-
tween corps and officers for rank and precedence which have too fre-
quently tended to injure the reputation of our citizen soldiers and the 
public service."4 
In his annual message in October 1814, Georgia governor Peter 
Early called for consideration of abolishing the cavalry because the war 
had offered "little use for this species of troops." They were "for the 
most part exempt from the public service." Early recommended "radi-
cal changes" in the militia system, "calculated for a peace Establish-
ment." Specifically, he wanted to change the law that prescribed elec-
tion of officers after the militia had marched to rendezvous, because it 
left no means to organize and march them there. He also called for 
revising the Georgia militia organization, which varied from those pre-
scribed by the federal government and created problems when they 
were to be received into the service of the United States.5 
It was notorious that most states never solved the problem of mi-
litia requisitions. Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky, for example, called 
upon his legislature in December 1815, after the war was over, to revise 
militia laws to "prevent in future those evasions and delays in comply-
ing with executive requisitions for militia which were so severely felt 
during the last war."6 
The next level above the company was the battalion, composed of 
four to eight companies (again, the number varied on the frontier) with 
approximately 500 men. Two battalions formed a regiment (roughly 
1 ,000 men). The next higher level of organization was the brigade, con-
sisting of two to four regiments, and finally the division was the highest 
level, formed out of two to four brigades. The officers above the rank of 
captain, filling the positions in battalions and regiments, were elected 
by the commissioned officers, and the highest levels (brigadier and major 
generals) were usually appointed by the governors of the states, ap-
proved by the legislature. 
One of the most vexing problems in using the militia related to 
disputes over time in service. Congress extended the tour of duty for 
militiamen in federal service from three months to six months in April 
1812. Several states passed similar laws, but others retained the three-
month tour for state service. Sometimes, however, militiamen were not 
retained for the full term. Problems arose when the same militiamen 
were summoned for a second tour. When a call for militiamen was made 
on May 17, 1814, for example, Georgia militiamen who had already 
completed a term of service, even those who had served for only sixty 
days, resisted the new draft. Governor Early issued a general order on 
June 3, 1814, that those who had served for sixty days on the frontier 
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the previous winter, as well as those who had served with General John 
Floyd, were exempt from this call. It also became an issue whether vol-
unteer cavalrymen were liable to do duty as classed militia. A general 
order of June 25 declared that "whenever any militia man has been 
drafted into the first class, but has since joined a troop of cavalry, he is 
nevertheless to do duty in the line." Governor Early cited the problem 
to one cavalry officer in September 1814: "I have for months past felt 
such great inconvenience from the existence of a number of half filled 
volunteer companies through the State, that 1 consider it adviseable 
[sic] to commission no more of them." He added, "We cannot get them 
received into the United States service with their present numbers, and 
notwithstanding the willing spirit which prevails among them, they 
become exempts from service."7 
Early's point was well taken. When Capt. Jack Cocke's volunteer 
rifle corps appeared at rendezvous in October 1814 with sixty men-
rather than the ninety-six promised-Early ordered Col. Jett Thomas, 
the regimental commander, and General Floyd, the brigade commander, 
to merge Cocke's company and added that if he gave any trouble he 
should be arrested. Nevertheless, Cocke's company resisted being 
merged, and Thomas and Floyd did not act as the governor ordered, 
probably from doubts about their authority to do so. Governor Early; 
in fact, in his message to the legislature on October 18, requested power 
to consolidate volunteer companies. On November 17, Early informed 
Floyd that a law providing for the consolidation of volunteer compa-
nies was about to pass and that he would order a sufficient number to 
join Cocke's company to complete it. On December 1, he wrote Floyd 
that the law had passed and that he would order troops from a recently 
commissioned rifle company commanded by Captain Henry Buford to 
choose by lot enough troops to complete Cocke's company. Buford and 
his other officers promptly submitted their resignations, but Early re-
fused to accept them, noting, "You ought to be aware that an officer 
cannot resign whilst under orders." Nonetheless, Buford and his com-
pany were not forced to merge with Cocke's. Early informed Floyd on 
February 1,1815, that while he had the power under the law to consoli-
date the volunteer companies, they were officered under the old state 
regulations, and he added that it was "impracticable unless 1 were present, 
to exercise this power with any advantage. Perhaps under all the cir-
cumstances," he concluded, "it would be best, if General [Thomas] 
Pinckney will sanction it, to let them remain as they are, provided the 
number of officers shall bear a proper proportion to the number of 
privates in each company."8 
Normally, when the federal government issued a call for militia, 
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state governors first appealed for volunteers. Many who joined were 
from organized volunteer units. Presumably they were more willing to 
serve and were better trained and disciplined than ordinary drafted mi-
litia. Most of those who were ultimately raised, however, came from the 
regular militia companies, and their training was often either indiffer-
ent or nonexistent. When the troops were being recruited for volun-
teer units, the recruiter frequently turned to the organized militiamen 
and appealed to their patriotism. If this did not raise sufficient troops, 
then the recruiter might threaten a militia draft. If a draft was used, 
militiamen might have to serve under officers who were strangers. The 
argument was made that if the recruits formed a volunteer company 
they would serve under officers of their own choosing. On occasions, 
prospective volunteers were plied with alcoholic beverages, liberally 
distributed, and then signed up. Such tactics often bred bitter resent-
ment and lowered the morale of the troops thus raised.9 
Because of the lax organization of the militia, and despite the fact 
that all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 
by law, had to join a militia company, there were many who were able to 
slip through the cracks and never had to perform militia duty. Others 
who belonged to militia units often did everything they could to avoid 
military duty. During peacetime many individuals never attended mus-
ter and paid fines for their nonattendance. When war was declared they 
remained nonparticipants. 
For those individuals who were opposed to militia duty, or for 
whatever reason, even merely because it was inconvenient, every state 
authorized the hiring of substitutes. Maryland, for example, allowed 
Quakers and other "conscientiously scrupulous" men to pay a three-
dollar exemption fee during peacetime to avoid militia duty, but it was 
stipulated that in wartime they must either meet the draft or procure a 
substitute. If they did not, the regiment commander was authorized to 
hire a substitute, chargeable to the individual drafted and, if necessary, 
to recover the costs by a distress action and sale of property. Judging 
from the frequent references to their ill-kempt appearance, those hired 
as substitutes were desperately poor men who were enticed to accept 
service by offers of substantial sums. Many were physically or mentally 
incapable, which accounts for laws in several states that the substitutes 
had to be able-bodied and acceptable to a company commander. State 
laws also included provisions that a person acting as a substitute must 
stand his own term, but if he was drafted while serving a term for an-
other, the individual hiring the substitute must either do the service of 
the substitute or hire another.lO 
Substitutes could make their best deal with any individual, but in 
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the states where fines could be used to hire substitutes, the laws often 
established maximum amounts that could be paid to a substitute. If state 
laws are any guide, the average fee was around $20 a month (as in Ohio 
and Indiana Territory) or $100 for a tour of six months (Kentucky). 
New Jersey authorized a fee of $50 for an unspecified period of time. 11 
State laws reflected a great concern to ensure equity in militia 
service. States defined, often in elaborate ways, the procedure for call-
ing out militia. Vermont was one of the first to elaborate a procedure in 
November 1812. Two boxes were used, one with the names of those 
eligible, and the other with either a blank card or one that said "drafted." 
Names were drawn until the required number was reached. In several 
states, a classing system was used, although methods for choosing men 
varied. Pennsylvania and Maryland broke their militiamen into ten 
classes (or groups) by lot. Each class rotated into service until everyone 
had served. Ohio divided each infantry company into eight classes, and 
each class served in succession. Kentucky and New Jersey were like 
Ohio, except that they created as many· classes by lot as were required 
for the draft, and each class provided one individual for service. New 
Jersey imposed a $50 fine on any class that failed to designate an indi-
vidual to serve; the fine was used to procure a substitute. A Virginia law 
ofJanuary 18, 1815, devised the most elaborate and complex classifica-
tion procedure of all. It would group militiamen according to property 
values as nearly equal as the proximity of the individuals would allow. 
Each class furnishing a man for the draft exempted the entire class, but 
failure to provide a soldier resulted in a fine of $0.50 for every $100 of 
value of property in the class. The war ended before the law was imple-
mented. 12 
Although there were severe penalties for desertion, including death, 
many militiamen, coerced into service, refused to do their duty and 
returned to their homes. No doubt they did not consider their action to 
be desertion. On one occasion in the fall of 1812, Ensign WIlliam Holton 
and twenty-five Kentucky militia, rather than obey an order from Gen. 
WIlliam Henry Harrison of which they disapproved, returned to their 
homes in Kentucky. However desertion was defined-whether it was 
failure to appear for duty or absence without leave-it was a serious 
problem throughout the war. The most common causes cited by militia 
deserters were poor health, substandard food, no pay, lack of proper 
clothing, bad leadership, and morale problems among the militia. No 
doubt fear of death in battle also played a part in desertions. 13 
In the early months of the war, desertion was dealt with by appeals 
to patriotism and condemnation in public newspapers. Also, rewards 
were advertised in newspapers, usually for ten dollars, for the appre-
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hension of deserters. Nearly every newspaper issue in the early months 
of the war carried such advertisements. In October 1812, President 
Madison issued a proclamation offering a full pardon to all deserters 
who surrendered to the commanding officer of any military post.14 
Failure to rendezvous was dealt with in much the same way as 
desertion. Kentucky, for example, lumped the two together. An indi-
vidual failing to rendezvous or to provide a substitute was considered a 
deserter, and a law of February 3, 1813, declared that a person taking a 
deserter would be rewarded with "a credit for a tour or tours of duty for 
the length of time such deserter was bound to serve." The receipt en-
tided the bearer to exemption from a tour of duty (the receipt was as-
signable). The deserter was required to serve the next tour or to com-
plete his present tour. Mississippi Territory and Virginia also gave persons 
apprehending deserters credit for a six-month tour. In Mississippi the 
deserter had to serve the term of the person apprehending him. Many 
states treated desertion as just another offense subject to fines and/or 
imprisonment punishable by court-martial. North Carolina, however, 
was more drastic than most. A law in 1813 stipulated that deserters 
could be fined $20 to $50, could be required to forfeit their pay, and 
could be imprisoned from one to six months. At the discretion of the 
court-martial, the deserter could also be turned over to serve as a pri-
vate in the regular army of the United States not exceeding double the 
time of the term called out for state service. 15 
Some states were more zealous than others in enforcing fines for 
failing to appear for tours of duty. Governor Meigs called upon his 
Ohio legislature on December 7, 1813, to review the state militia law, 
citing "various and contradictory constructions by the militia Boards of 
Inquiry." He noted that "the merits or demerits of the delinquent, in 
regard to neglect or refusal, seem, in many instances, not to have been 
considered; but the highest possible penalties have been adjudged." Such 
penalties pressed heavily upon "those whose circumstances are unpros-
perous or unfortunate." He called for a more uniform rule, but he added 
that they should not move from one of "too much rigor" to one of "too 
great relaxation of the principle of dUty."16 
States adopted still other approaches to deal with individuals fail-
ing to perform militia duty. Maryland considered empowering militia 
officers to force recalcitrant militiamen into service, but instead it passed 
a law providing that an individual failing to serve in person or to pro-
vide a substitute (approved by the company commander) would be fined 
up to fifty dollars. A Georgia law in 1814, passed because of the frustra-
tions caused by the failure of militiamen to show up at a rendezvous, 
declared that the company commander was "invested with full and ample 
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power to coerce the attendance of any defaulter." The law also stipu-
lated that any person moving to another area had ten days to report 
with a certificate from the captain of his former district stating the class 
he belonged to; failure to do so would cause him to be assigned to the 
class next called into service. In the Mississippi Territory, Governor 
David Holmes, without the benefit of law, but drawing on the opinion 
of his attorney general and "gentlemen learned in the law," determined 
that militia officers had the power to compel obedience. Holmes di-
rected that the duty be p~rformed by an officer of discretion and mod-
eration who would not allow the men under his command "to insult the 
person whom they may be about to apprehend, or to use towards him 
any personal violence except that which is absolutely necessary." In no 
event were they to "fire upon a person resisting the order, or suffer any 
act that may hazard the life of such person, unless the detachment should 
be assailed in a manner that made self-defence necessary to their own 
preservation. "17 
Obviously, most states settled on less drastic remedies. Most im-
posed large fines and, in some cases, imprisonment. South Carolina 
established the most extreme penalties for failure to rendezvous: a fine 
(imposed by a court-martial) of up to $500, plus the amount of taxes 
last paid to the state, and imprisonment for up to three months. The 
most common rate was $20 per month which, with a six-month tour, 
came to $120, still very harsh, considering that this was a sum equal to 
a years wages for the average unskilled worker. States also mandated 
imprisonment along with fines. The average period of incarceration 
was three months, although some states tied the length to the amount 
of the fine, usually one month for every $5 of fine. Fines and/or impris-
onment did not deter Rhode Island and Virginia from also compelling 
a militiaman to serve the next tour of duty. IS 
Courts-martial, which were authorized to levy these penalties, did 
not always give out maximum sentences. In the Mississippi Territory, 
for example, when a volunteer cavalry unit failed to obey a callout, the 
court was very lenient. Capt. ] ames K. Cook, the commander, was court-
martialed for disobeying the order of his commander-in-chiefby refus-
ing to repair to the place of rendezvous. The court found Cook guilty, 
but he was sentenced only to pay a forty-dollar fine and to be publicly 
reprimanded; thereafter he would be restored to his command. Gover-
nor Holmes expressed his "astonishment at the inadequacy of the pun-
ishment." He asserted that this was "the first and only instance" in which 
an officer refused to obey an order and to appear at the place of rendez-
vous with his command. "No punishment that could have been legally 
inflicted upon the accused," he declared, "would have been dispropor-
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tionate to his offence." Holmes remitted the part of the sentence that 
publicly reprimanded Cook, deeming such reprimands applicable only 
to minor offenses, but decreed that the fine would be executed. Holmes 
then revoked Cook's commission, as well as his two subalterns, dis-
solved the volunteer company, and required the individuals in it to en-
roll in infantry companies. 19 
At least three states passed laws against encouraging desertion. 
Vermont decreed in 1812 that any person who might "flatter or men-
ace" a militiaman from doing his duty or induce him to desert could be 
fined from $20 to $500 plus costs of prosecution. Virginia stipulated in 
1813 that those who encouraged desertion could be fined up to $300 
and imprisoned up to one year. Ohio provided that persons dissuading 
militiamen from marching were subject to a fine of up to $150.20 
At the beginning of the war in 1812 the situation was often too 
chaotic to enforce military discipline by courts-martial. In time, the 
organizational structure was better formed, and courts-martial to en-
force discipline were more effectively applied. Desertion and numerous 
other infractions, such as sleeping on guard duty, insubordination, and 
striking a superior officer were among the offenses punishable by courts-
martial. Generally, soldiers in the regular army were held to a stricter 
code of conduct than members of the militia. Militia courts-martial usu-
ally punished men who deserted by applying some physical punishment. 
Prisoners were typically paraded before the entire unit, which witnessed 
the punishment. Whipping was abolished in the army in May 1812, but 
other cruel expedients were used, such as to "ride the wooden horse," a 
narrow pole or sharpened block of wood. Courts-martial sometimes 
prescribed that weights be attached to the feet of those riding the wooden 
horse. They might have their hands and feet tied together .and be car-
ried around the camp suspended from a rail. Prisoners were also stripped 
to the waist, daubed with tar, and labeled with a paper attached to the 
tar stating the nature of their crime in large lettering. Also, mutilations 
were employed, including cropping of ears and branding (usually on 
the cheeks). Other humiliations forced upon these unfortunates included 
having one eyebrow shaved or half of the head. William Thackara, a 
private in a Pennsylvania volunteer unit, noted in his diary that one 
soldier "was drummed out of camp, to the tune of the Rogue's March, 
with a bottle around his neck and a label on his back for drunkenness."21 
Perhaps the most common punishments were fines, hard labor 
with a ball and chain, and reduced rations (such as bread and water, or 
whiskey). Capital punishment was also employed, of course, sometimes 
as an object lesson. One unfortunate Ohio soldier, William Fish, was 
executed for desertion and for threatening the life of his commander. 
19
20
in.
'
48 Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 
Three other privates were condemned to death by the same court-mar-
tial, but they were pardoned by Gen. William Henry Harrison. One 
soldier, however, was placed beside his coffin with a cap over his head. 
He remained there while Fish was shot and then heard his reprieve 
announced. Such affairs obviously had a sobering effect on the assembled 
troopS.22 
Although the soldiers were infused with a sense of deference for 
their officers, those officers who failed to gain the confidence of their 
men could sometimes be cruelly victimized by pranks. One such officer 
was Brig. Gen. James Winchester, a man who had served with credit in 
the Revolutionary War but who was from Tennessee and was distrusted 
by the Kentucky militia. Private Elias Darnall recorded in his journal 
that Winchester, "being a stranger and having the appearance of a su-
percilious officer," was "generally disliked." Private William Northcutt 
related two pranks played on Winchester. On one occasion a porcupine 
was killed and skinned. The skin was stretched "over a pole that he used 
for a particular purpose in the night, and he went and sat down on it, 
and it like to have ruined him." Winchester's dignity was also assaulted 
when troops "sawed his pole that he had for the same purpose nearly in 
two, so that when he went to use it in the night it broke into and let his 
generalship, Uniform and all fall Backwards in no very decent place, for 
I have seen his Rigementals hanging high upon a place the next day 
taking the fresh air."23 
Offenses of disobedience, drunkenness, neglect of duty, incompe-
tence, and general bad conduct were of course not limited to the rank 
and file. Officers found guilty of such offenses, however, were usually 
cashiered or were given the opportunity to resign, although lesser of-
fenses were punished by suspension from service for a period of time, 
fines, or reprimands, which were sometimes read before the assembled 
regiment.24 
Early in the war, governors were flooded with requests for defer-
ments. Militiamen on the frontier cited the danger of Indians and of 
leaving their homes unprotected or the need to plant their crops. Still 
others cited the press of their business and the financial hardship that 
would result from their absence. States varied on how they handled the 
matter of exemptions. The 1792 militia law allowed states to add indi-
viduals or groups to those exempted in the law by Congress, and the list 
grew over the years to the point where it could be called an abuse in" 
many states. In Massachusetts, which was not necessarily the worst ex-
ample, a legislative committee estimated early in 1813 that there were 
at least 120,000 able-bodied males in the state but only 70,530 enrolled 
in the militia.25 For those unable to squeeze through the legislative loop-
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hole of a legal exemption from militia training, others simply paid the 
relatively modest fines levied by the state militia laws. 
When the war came, however, the situation changed. Some state 
laws stipulated that the exemptions applied only in peacetime, and some 
states amended their laws to reduce the number of exemptions and to 
enroll many who had heretofore not been a part of the system. Mary-
land, for example, in a law of] anuary 7, 1812, set out an extensive list of 
exempts: judges, registers, clerks, teachers, customhouse officers and 
clerks, mail carriers, ferrymen, pilots, inspectors of imports, treasurers, 
ministers of the gospel, Quakers, Menonists (Mennonites), Tunkers 
(Dunkers), and others conscientiously scrupulous against bearing arms. 
OnJune 18, 1812, the day the war was declared, a law stipulated that 
only ministers of the gospel and those exempted by Congress were not 
liable for service. All certificates of disability were even declared null 
and void, and surgeons were required to take an oath to grant none but 
to those justly entitled to them.26 
Governor WIlliam Plumer pointed out to the New Hampshire 
legislature early in the war that many men procured exemptions from 
militia service from surgeons "without sufficient cause." The effect cre-
ated "a spirit of murmuring and complaint in those soldiers who were 
equally entitled to certificates, but who disdaining to apply for them, 
performed their duty."27 
Kentucky also drastically revised its list of exemptions. An Act of 
January 29, 1812, included most occupations noted above for Mary-
land, plus new ones such as keepers of jails and guards, the public printer 
and his employees, and the president, cashier, and clerks of the Bank of 
Kentucky. Still, conscientiously scrupulous individuals were required 
to pay for their exemption at the rate of one dollar per muster, with six 
musters mandated by the law. An act of February 3, 1813, decreed, 
however, that all previously exempt had to stand for duty except minis-
ters of the gospel. The law authorized a commanding officer of a com-
pany to hire a substitute if a conscientiously scrupulous individual re-
fused to perform his duty or failed to secure a substitute. Whatever was 
paid to the substitute, up to $100, must be borne by that individual. If 
the delinquent belonged to a society, such as the Quakers, the law pro-
vided that the sheriff might bring a debt action against the community 
property and sell some of the property to satisfy the fine. Some states 
did not alter their lists of exemptions, but they encouraged the body of 
exempts to organize volunteer groups. Among these states were Con-
necticut and Vermont, as well as the Mississippi Territory.28 
In some cases, states went beyond bringing exempts back on the 
rolls. Tennessee authorized the governor to enroll volunteer companies 
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of old men, presumably those over forty-five. While service under 
Tennessee's law was optional for those over forty-five, Rhode Island 
organized able-bodied individuals over that age into a "senior class." 
This force, which was to be organized for the duration of the war, was 
in all respects under the same rules as the regular militia. Only minis-
ters of the gospel and the conscientiously scrupulous were to be ex-
cused.29 
In North Carolina, the question was raised whether exempts must 
serve during emergencies. When the British invaded the state in the 
summer of 1813, Col. Nathan Tisdale wrote to Governor William 
Hawkins from New Bern of a problem: "There are in this town," he 
wrote, "a number of persons who are exempt by law from ordinary 
militia duty and who now (I am sorry to say) hold back on that ground 
and I am in some doubt whether I can compel them or not." Hawkins 
responded that "although their conduct in availing themselves of this 
exemption at this period cannot be considered very exemplary, yet I do 
not think you have the power to compel their attendance under the 
present alarm." This incident may have been a factor in the passage of 
a North Carolina law in 1814 limiting exemptions only to judges of the 
Superior Court and ministers of the gospel. Even free blacks were re-
quired to enroll, although the law, perhaps for reporting purposes, re-
quired captains of companies to designate the free blacks in a separate 
column from the rest of the militia. 30 
In one notable case, in Louisiana, with New Orleans facing immi-
nent invasion in late 1814, a traditionally exempt class was conscripted 
for duty during an emergency situation. On December 16 the legisla-
ture, no doubt aware that exemption as a seafaring person was a tradi-
tional refuge for many men wishing to escape militia duty, passed a law 
requiring all seafaring men in Louisiana not currently in the United 
States service to report within twenty-four hours to be enrolled in mi-
litia companies. Those who refused to comply were subject to arrest. 31 
In Louisiana and also in the Mississippi Territory, the question 
was raised about individuals residing in those areas who claimed to be 
French citizens and therefore exempt from the militia service. In Octo-
ber 1812, Governor William c.c. Claiborne of Louisiana informed 
the French consul at New Orleans that every individual residing in 
Louisiana at the time of its admission into the Union who was not ex-
empted by law "was subject to the operation of the militia laws & must 
conform to the same." Governor Holmes took much the same position 
in the Mississippi Territory in 1814, when the French inhabitants of 
Hancock County refused to obey a general order calling men in the 
area into service. Holmes characterized these Frenchmen as "deluded,", 
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but he informed his militia officer, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, that he 
had decided to proceed with "mildness." He instructed Morgan to no-
tify those legally drafted to appear at the rendezvous or to furnish a 
substitute, and he was to inform them of the consequences of disobedi-
ence. Morgan was to use a force sufficient to compel obedience and, if 
necessary, to bring them to trial. "No portion of the community," Holmes 
asserted, "must be permitted to prostrate the laws which are made for 
the security and benefit of the whole, and which are equally binding 
upon every citizen of the Territory."32 
While stiff punishments were often prescribed for militiamen who 
refused to participate, states frequently provided incentives to those 
who did by giving additional pay beyond the nominal pay and allow-
ances given to the militiamen while in United States service (for pri-
vates eight dollars a month). Four New England states authorized extra 
pay. Rhode Island allowed two dollars per month above the normal pay, 
while in Massachusetts a militia private who furnished his own blanket 
and uniform was allowed $3.75 per month and $2.50 per month if not. 
Vermont paid an extra $3.34 per month, and in New Hampshire the 
monthly bonus was two dollars, plus one ration per day (fixed at the 
rate of twenty cents). New Jersey also allowed its militiamen $3 per 
month above the pay and emoluments allowed by the United States, 
and Pennsylvania lavished $10 a month extra on their privates, $11 on 
corporals, and $12 on sergeants.33 
Bounties were also offered on occasion to induce miliiiamen to 
extend their service. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Ohio all responded 
to the crisis of the Northwest army during the winter of 1812-1813 by 
offering their militiamen an incentive to stay beyond their normal terms. 
Pennsylvania and Ohio offered twelve dollars to militiamen who volun-
teered to serve two months beyond their present term. Kentucky au-
thorized a bounty of seven dollars to its militiamen to extend service for 
an unspecified period of time. The number of volunteers was limited to 
1,500. At this same time, some Pennsylvania legislators, apparently 
deeply ashamed of the conduct of some of the state's militiamen in the 
Northwest under Gen. William Hull and on the Niagara frontier un-
der Gen. Stephen Van Rensselaer and Gen. Alexander Smyth who balked 
at crossing over the international border, introduced a measure early in 
1813 to punish militiamen who refused to march to "anyplace or places 
whatsoever within or without the United States." The motion was de-
feated 52-34, apparently because of doubts whether a state could pun-
ish militiamen by court-martial for disobedience of orders while in the 
service of the United States.34 
When the draft was resorted to, these troops were always of low 
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quality, ill disciplined, and ill equipped. Drafted militiamen seldom had 
uniforms (in fact, they wore all kinds of clothing), although many of 
their officers did. The general impression presented by the militiamen 
when they rendezvoused must have mortified veteran soldiers. States 
had laws imposing fines on militiamen who appeared at musters with-
out proper equipment, but the reality was that very few had arms. In 
North Carolina, Maj. Gen. William Lenoir informed Governor Will-
iam Hawkins in May 1812 regarding the 7,000 militiamen who met the 
states quota that "a considerable part of the detachment from the mili-
tia of this State will be unarmed .... how they are to be furnished with 
arms after they are embodied I know not." Fortunately, Hawkins ar-
ranged to obtain from Secretary of War Eustis over 2,000 stand of arms, 
which were counted against North Carolina's quota of arms under the 
Act of 1808; no arms had previously been forwarded to the state under 
the law.35 Even so, the arms were not accompanied by powder, ball, or 
cartridge boxes. 
Lack of equipment remained a vexing problem. Militiamen lacked 
virtually every item necessary to conduct a war. At almost every rendez-
vous, a majority of militiamen could be expected to show up without 
arms or equipment of any kind: no rifles, no muskets, not to mention 
powder, balls, cartridge boxes, rifle flints, blankets, camp kettles, artifi-
cer tools, knapsacks, and so on. Making matters worse, such supplies 
were hard to find, and commanders pleaded with their governors and 
the federal government to make up the shortage. Some state governors 
undertook to secure weapons from private sources. In the fall of 1814, 
for example, Georgia governor Peter Early contracted with Adam 
Carruth, a gunmaker from Greenville, South Carolina, to provide 500 
rifles for the Georgia militia at twenty-two dollars each. Later, when 
the weapons were not delivered, Early wrote Carruth on March 3, 1815, 
that the conclusion of peace ended the need for the guns and canceled 
the order. Carruth objected that this was breaking a contract, but Early 
contended that Carruth himself had conceded he could not deliver the 
arms because of another contract with the state of South Carolina. As 
this account suggests, weapons and accoutrements were, because of the 
demand, expensive. Shopkeepers and businessmen soon refused to for-
ward supplies on credit to federal or state governments. Consequently; 
funds authorized to compensate the militia were often diverted to pay 
for supplies, which led to dissatisfaction among the troops. The short-
age of supplies had unfortunate consequences. It was reported in the 
winter of 1812 that over 300 militiamen in the Northwestern Army 
were suffering from frostbite. 36 
Supplies also included food to feed the army. The federal govern-
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ment preferred to rely on contractors to provide food, presumably be-
cause Congress believed that this method was the cheapest. Contrac-
tors, however, after winning a bid, were sometimes unable to find food 
at the price they had bid and consequently failed to fulfill their con-
tracts, particularly if doing so would cause them to lose money. Through-
out the war there were complaints that contractors either failed to pro-
vide food for the troops or delivered substandard food, such as rancid 
flour and spoiled beef. The daily fare of the troops was spelled out in 
one contract. It specified "a daily ration of 1 ~ pounds of beef or % 
pounds of salted pork, 18 ounces of flour or bread, one gill of whiskey, 
rum or brandy. For every one hundred rations, there were to be distrib-
uted two quarts of salt, four quarts of vinegar, four pounds of soap, and 
1 ~ pounds of candles." Contracts usually called for sugar and other 
spices. While there was usually a shortage of food, at least one group of 
Ohio militiamen was sent home by General Harrison in 1813 because 
they were consuming too much of the food being collected for the in-
vasion of Canada.37 
Once the militiamen had rendezvoused and were organized, camps 
had to be set up and order established. Sanitation and maintaining clean 
camp grounds was essential, and troops were assigned to police the 
camps. Guard duty was crucial, especially on the frontiers, and militia-
men were sternly punished for failure to perform the duty properly. 
Officers were compelled to drill their troops in military exercises. Daily 
fatigue duties were ordered to keep the men active, which included 
working on breastworks, digging trenches, building blockhouses, and 
other activities to keep the camp habitable for large groups of soldiers. 
A typical day began very early, sometimes as early as four in the morn-
ing. The men were assembled and often drilled for an hour before break-
fast. Mornings were spent on fatigue duties, while the officers received 
orders of the day and training for drills under brigade majors. Follow-
ing lunch, details continued until four in the afternoon, when those not 
on guard duty; sick, or otherwise assigned were assembled in a body for 
perhaps another two hours of drill. The evening meal was served be-
tween seven and eight, and the men retired at nine.38 
Unfortunately, deaths in camps due to disease took many more 
lives than the battlefield. Samuel R. Brown wrote in 1814, "For every 
soldier killed, three die of disease." The most fatal disease was dysen-
tery or "flux, or camp distemper," which, he declared, was a disease that 
"every old woman in the country would cure in three days with a decoc-
tion of milk, pine bark and spikenard root." Among the New York mi-
litia camped at Buffalo in the fall of 1812 there were many deaths, a 
problem compounded by the lack of proper medical attention. One 
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report said that an average of eight to nine men died each day. Two to 
three graves were dug daily, with two to four men placed in each, and 
the graves covered two acres. The deaths were attributed to maladies 
such as "fever," pleurisy, dysentery, and measles. 39 
In the fall of 1812, the troops of the Northwest Army under Gen. 
J ames Winchester suffered severely due to a shortage of food and sup-
plies. Private Elias Darnall complained in his journal on December 24, 
1812, that the troops were "deprived of the common necessaries oflife," 
and he related that 100 lives had already been lost. "The sufferings of 
about 800 sick at this time, who are exposed to the cold ground, and 
deprived of every nourishment," he continued, "are sufficient proofs of 
our wretched condition!" Typhus hit the camp and killed an average of 
three or four men a day. More than 300 remained on the sick list daily. 
Many soldiers were practically without shoes and had only skimpy cloth-
ing; frostbite was a common affliction.4o 
Capt. Eleazer D. Wood, who shared many of the rigors of the 
Northwest Army, complained about the lack of proper medical treat-
ment. There was, he noted, no head of the Hospital Department at 
Fort Meigs in northwest Ohio during the winter and spring of 1812-
1813. "Those to whom the important duties of that department had 
been committed were but a young, inexperienced set of men," he wrote, 
"with nothing but the tide of Surgeon to recommend them, or to give 
them the claim to employment, and the principal part of whom had 
been picked up here and there among the militia wherever a person 
could be found with a lancet in his pocket, or who had by some means 
or other obtained the title of doctor." He added, "Such were the persons 
whose duty it became, to say whether the limb of a gallant officer or 
brave young soldier should be lopped off, or preserved."41 
Capt. Robert B. McMee, a member of Col. Richard M. Johnson's 
mounted regiment of Kentucky volunteers observed that whenJ ohnson's 
troops were at Fort Meigs during June and into July 1813, "a most fatal 
epidemic prevailed in the camp, which carried off from three to five, 
and sometimes as many as ten in a day. It was computed that near 200 
fell a sacrifice to it, within the space of six weeks." McMee laid most of 
the blame on "bad water" and "the flat, marshy, putrescent condition of 
all that region of country, [which] was well calculated to destroy an 
army of men, who were alike unused to such a climate, and to the life of 
a soldier."42 
Another tragic example occurred after the British departed the 
North Carolina coast in late summer 1813. Governor William Hawkins 
assigned four companies of militia at FortJohnston, near Wilmington, 
and two companies at Fort Hampton, near Beaufort, to work on the 
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fortifications, which he contended were, "not long since, mere apolo-
gies for forts." Maj. John A. Cameron, in fact, wrote from FortJohnston 
on August 21 that his troops were destitute of all kinds of supplies, 
including medicine, that an average of thirty a day were in the hospital, 
and that there was growing discontent in camp. A month later, WR. 
King, following his return from the camp at Fort Johnston, wrote 
Hawkins that the troops lacked even the most common conveniences. 
A "malignant fever" had killed many, and the morale of those who re-
mained was very low. In their present condition, King declared, the 
men were worse than useless; detaining them any longer at the post 
"would be a sacrafice [sic] of life without any prospect of benefit to the 
country."43 
Such suffering was not an isolated event. Shortages of supplies, 
accompanied no doubt by a rudimentary knowledge of sanitation and 
medicine, killed many more soldiers. During the winter of 1814-1815, 
the death rate among the troops encamped reached new highs. At 
Wilmington, Maj. Edward B. Dudley wrote the new governor of North 
Carolina, William Miller, that militiamen who had thought their terms 
were three months were threatening mutiny and general desertion. Gen. 
William Croom also informed the governor in December 1814 that the 
detached militiamen in the service of the United States at Beacon Is-
land on the North Carolina coast were in a deplorable state. One-third 
were sick and had thin clothes and no blankets. Miller maintained that 
because the troops were in federal service there was nothing he could 
do. Those called into active service, he said, "must expect to endure 
some privations." On January 24, 1815, Maj. Thomas Blount reported 
to Miller that among the men in the camp at Beacon Island there were 
180 effective, 214 sick, and fifty-seven on leave due to serious illness.44 
Miller may have taken solace in the fact that reports of militiamen 
dying in camps in Virginia exceeded even those in North Carolina. On 
January 16, 1815, Col. Duncan McDonald wrote to Miller from Camp 
Peach Orchard near Norfolk, Virginia, where he was purchasing sup-
plies for his brigade. The suffering of the troops there was "almost in-
credible"; "about 160" had died since his arrival. Col. Richard Atkinson 
echoed McDonald's report in a February 1 letter to Miller, from Camp 
Defiance, also near Norfolk. Twenty had died since he arrived, and over 
200 had died since their arrival in camp. That day 282 were reported 
sick, with 40 in the hospital. Measles seemed to be the scourge.45 
Near the end of the war, Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond 
Enquirer, commented on the disparity in health between militiamen and 
regulars. If there were any yet so "completely wedded to the present 
Militia System, as to be opposed to the substitution of a more perma-
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nent and regular force," he wrote, "we beg leave to submit to them the 
following abstract from the official returns of the state of our troops at 
Norfolk ... and see how much fewer lives are wasted in the more regular 
service, than under the militia system." The abstract showed that 250 
of 1,660 regulars were sick; another 21 had died. Of 4,590 the militia-
men had 2,012 sick, 160 deaths, and 290 discharged for "inability"; 691 
having served a tour of duty, were discharged that month, "half sick."46 
When militiamen were healthy, the key to using them was giving 
them training and instilling some form of discipline. Even General 
Harrison, a strong advocate of the militia, declared to the secretary of 
war in late August 1812, "The troops which I have with me and those 
which are coming from Kentucky are perhaps the best material for form-
ing an· army that the world has produced. But no equal number of men 
was ever collected who know so little of military discipline." Most of 
the militiamen were entirely ignorant of the manual of exercise, such as 
marching in time, facing, wheeling, and so forth. On the other hand, 
competence in the military fundamentals was a mixed blessing, as one 
private confided in his diary. His Pennsylvania volunteer militia unit, he 
noted, "received very flattering praise ... , and we were informed that we 
were to be the advance of the army in case of an engagement: thus to have 
the first chance of being shot, which is surely a remarkable privilege."47 
The officers were often little better than their men. Maj. William 
A. Trimble complained to Ohio governor Thomas Worthington that 
"seven tenths of the militia officers are entirely ignorant of military 
discipline and some of them are calculated to promote insubordination 
and mutiny than to instruct and discipline the men under their com-
mand." Trimble asserted that many officers were elected because of 
their "jovial, indulgent, disposition" and consequently were "men who 
would exercise no authority but suffer everyone to do as he pleased." 
There were reports that some militia officers even believed that ser-
geants in the regular army outranked them. Generally speaking, the 
officers were wealthy and prominent members of their community. Quite 
naturally, given the deferential character of American society at that 
time, such men would be chosen for high-ranking militia positions. 
Wealth, of course, did not necessarily equate with military leadership 
abilities. Micah Taul, a future Kentucky congressman, was elected cap-
tain of his militia company even though he completely lacked military 
training. He admitted his name had never been on a militia muster roll. 
In fact, it was not his political prominence that won him the position; 
instead it was his ability to best his opponent in a no-holds-barred brawl. 
According to Taul's account, "After a hard fight, fist and skull, biting, 
gouging, etc., I came off victorious."48 
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Militia officers were frequently as undependable as their men. One 
reason General Hull gave for his surrender at Detroit was that he could 
not count on his officers to obey his orders. Gen. Andrew Jackson had 
little use for officers who did not set an example for their men. He 
court-martialed two officers when the militia they commanded broke 
and fled before a charge by Creek Indians on January 24, 1814. One 
officer was acquitted, but the other was cashiered.49 
In fairness, many militia officers would not give some orders be-
cause they knew that their troops would not obey them and that deser-
tion might ensue. Stern disciplinarians were not popular with their men. 
Private William Thackara, a volunteer in the Pennsylvania militia, was 
critical of Maj. Charles W Hunter, the adjutant general of the First 
Division of the Pennsylvania militia. Hunter, Thackara wrote in his 
diary, "makes everything uncomfortable for us, throws as much trouble 
as possible on the volunteers." Another officer, however, a colonel, was 
characterized as "a great officer, breaks through all rules and despises 
discipline." It should be noted, however, that Thackara later altered his 
opinion of the colonel: "Weak, imbecile, and good natured, though easily 
excited, he is entirely unfit to be lieutenant, let alone a field officer."50 
Militiamen were far more apt to perform creditably when they 
trusted and believed in their commanding officer. They were much more 
unpredictable when they doubted the fighting quality of their superior 
officers. A good example of the unreliability of the militia was the expe-
dition of Maj. Gen. Samuel Hopkins, who led about 1,250 mounted 
riflemen from Kentucky in the fall of 1812 against the Kickapoo and 
Peoria Indians in the Indiana Territory. From the beginning, some of-
ficers expressed doubts about the expedition, but they agreed to go on. 
By the time the men reached Vincennes, the "discontents and 
murmurings" increased, but they abated when the force arrived at Fort 
Harrison and supplies and provisions were freshened. Still, Hopkins 
reported that many troops deserted at this point. Proceeding into In-
dian country, about four days out, the "spirit of discontent" returned. 
The next day, a prairie fire set by the Indians further upset the troops, 
and Hopkins, fearing that his troops were about to desert, called a council 
of his officers and asked them to take the sense of the army. He de-
clared that if 500 would stay with him he would continue the expedi-
tion. The report came back that the troops preferred almost unani-
mously to return. Hopkins asked his officers to march to cover the 
reconnoitering parties rather than take a direct return. When the troops 
were paraded and Hopkins called upon them to follow him, however, 
they marched off in the opposite direction. Hopkins sent his officers to 
turn the troops, but the officers reported that they could not get them 
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to turn, that "the army had taken their course and would pursue it." 
Hopkins had no choice but to follow his troops back home. He had 
failed to engage the enemy, despite coming, as he related to Governor 
Isaac Shelby, within twenty miles of the Indian villages before he was 
forced back. 51 
There were numerous other problems related to the use of the 
militia, including rivalries between militia officers and regular armyof-
ficers. Governor Levin Winder of Maryland wrote to Secretary of War 
John Armstrong in August 1813, for example, about a misunderstand-
ing with Col. Henry Carberry of the Thirty-sixth Regiment, U.S. In-
fantry. Some of Carberry's officers, according to Winder, had "taken up 
an opinion that an officer of the army of the United States cannot be 
commanded by a militia officer of any rank." Winder declared, "In vain 
I have referred them to the information I possessed on the subject and 
amongst others to the ninety eighth article of war which is as explicit, I 
conceive, as language can be."52 
Military rules called for rank to take precedence, and militia offic-
ers often outranked far more competent and experienced regular offic-
ers. One example was Lt. Col. James Miller, Sixth Regiment, U.S. In-
fantry, who marched with General Hull. Upset that Colonels Samuel 
Findley, Lewis Cass, and Duncan McArthur all outranked him, Miller 
told Hull that he "would not consent to be commanded" by them. Hull 
informed Miller that he was outranked. Miller denied later that the 
dispute hurt the service. He stated that with Cass "sometimes he com-
manded; at others I did." He continued, "I was on good terms with all 
the colonels. I thought I ought to rank above them."53 
The most notable dispute between a regular and a militia officer 
concerned Brig. Gen. J ames Winchester and Governor William Henry 
Harrison. After Hull's surrender, Winchester, the ranking officer in the 
regular army in the West, assumed command of the Northwest Army. 
The state of Kentucky, however, reacting to public clamor, gave Harrison 
a commission of major general, a higher rank than WInchesters. Yet 
Winchester retained the command because Harrison's commission was 
only a brevet rank. Also, there were legal questions raised by Kentucky's 
appointment of Harrison. Its state law required one year's residence for 
such an appointment, and the one major general's position authorized 
was already filled. Harrison, perhaps acknowledging the illegality of his 
appointment, deferred to Winchester as the commanding officer of the 
Northwestern Army. At about this time, however, Harrison was given a 
regular commission of brigadier general by the federal government. At 
first he refused the appointment, because by the date of rank he would 
still be outranked by Winchester. Finally, he agreed to accept the ap-
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pointment if he was placed in command of the Northwestern Army. 
Despite this extraordinary condition, the government agreed and gave 
Harrison the command of the army over Winchester. To his credit, 
Winchester, recognizing that Harrison was the popular favorite of the 
government and the people of the West, consented to an arrangement 
generously proposed by Harrison whereby the two men would share 
the command. Winchester's capture by the British at the River Raisin 
on January 22, 1813, technically ended the problem of rank, and the 
appointment of Harrison as a major general on March 2, 1813, offi-
cially terminated the problem. 54 
William Thackara gave an example of the sort of division that 
occurred between regulars and militia. When Brig. Gen. Thomas 
Cadwalader, a militiaman, reached his camp, he was "received with cheers 
to the mortifi.cation of U.S. officers who have taken great airs of late." 
There were even tensions between volunteers and drafted militia. 
Thackara wrote in his diary that the volunteers "form an elegant line 
and have a good band of music," and "the militia do not parade with 
us." One day the volunteers were given orders "to prime and load as 
quick as possible." Several companies hurriedly gathered, and it was 
supposed that the enemy had landed. Instead they were marched to 
surround the militia encampment, which was in "a mutinous state, ow-
ing to the inattention of the quarter master, who had not furnished 
their rations for 48 hours. Having nothing to eat, they refused to do 
their duty." Fortunately, General Cadwalader was able to placate the 
militiamen and avoid violence. 55 
There were occasions when the militia of one state refused to serve 
under an officer from another state. Kentuckians in the fall of 1812 
refused to march under Ohio militia general Edward Tupper. Charges 
were subsequently brought against Tupper for refusing to obey orders, 
but he was acquitted because the militiamen had refused to march. 56 
Perhaps the most serious problem with using militiamen was the 
brevity of their terms. Congress extended the term of militia service 
from three months to six months, bu( even that time was too short to 
muster, organize, equip, train, and employ in the field before the men's 
terms were up. Brig. Gen. Robert Taylor of Virginia, who commanded 
the militia at Norfolk, expressed his frustration. He resigned early in 
1814, stating, "I have lost all hope of being useful in an army, where the 
officers as well as men, are constantly changed. To introduce skill, or-
der and economy into troops thus composed, will require more energy 
and intellect, than have fallen my lot."57 
Nor could the militiamen be expected to remain on duty even a 
day longer than their terms, even in critical circumstances. Capt. Eleazer 
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D. Wood, for example, complained bitterly in his journal about Vir-
ginia militiamen who left Fort Meigs in 1813 when it was in imminent 
danger of attack. "The 2d of April arrived," he wrote, "and away went 
every Virginian belonging to the drafted militia, without the least con-
cern as to what became of those left behind, or caring whether the 
enemy or ourselves were in possession of the camp, so long as they 
could escape from: the defense of it." Wood did note, however, that 150 
Pennsylvania militiamen agreed to stay another fifteen to twenty days. 58 
Brig. Gen. George McClure was left with only about 100 troops 
to defend Fort George on the Niagara peninsula in December 1813 
when his militiamen departed as soon as their terms expired, despite his 
pleas to stay longer. McClure noted that "having to live in tents at this 
inclement season, added to that [ circumstance] of the pay-master com-
ing on only prepared to furnish them with one out of three month's pay 
has had all the bad effects that can be imagined." He noted that his 
militiamen, "finding that their wages were not ready for them, became 
with some meritorious exceptions, a disaffected and ungovernable mul-
titude."59 
Andrew Jackson experienced the same difficulties in keeping a force 
in the field. After his victories against the Creeks at Tallushatchee and 
Talladega in November 1813, he was confronted with a lack of troops 
to maintain his momentum against the Indians. His force was com-
posed of one brigade of militiamen and another of one-year volunteers. 
The volunteers, raised in 1812 and marched to Natchez, commanded 
by Brig. Gen. William Hall, argued that their time spent at home counted 
toward their period of service, which was up on December 10, and they 
intended to go home. As for the militia, part of the problem arose from 
confusion over the terms of service, namely, whether the militiamen 
under his command were state troops (with three-month terms) or fed-
eral militiamen (with six-month terms). Jackson insisted that they were 
six-month troops, but the militiamen, including their commander, Brig. 
Gen. Isaac Roberts, maintained that their term of service was three 
months. On one occasion when the militiamen tried to leave camp, 
Jackson used the volunteers to block them and force them to return to 
camp. Later, the militiamen were deployed to block the departure of 
the volunteers. Hall's volunteers were the first to leave for home. Al-
though Jackson, complaining about the "disorder, mutiny, and delay of 
the expedition, so disgraceful to the state of Tennessee," ordered the 
inspector general of the militia not to muster out the militia, he was not 
supported by the Tennessee governor, Willie Blount, and the militia-
men went home. Jackson wrote to his friend Hugh Lawson White that 
onJanuary4, 1814, the whole brigade of militia, except one small com-
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pany, left him. Worse, the men detached to replace them turned around 
and returned home, "notwithstanding I had condescended to send them 
written assurance ... that their services would be thankfully reed., for 
the term which the[y] had been tendered, viz. 3 months."60 
Jackson court-martialed the officers of the latter group of militia. 
In a letter written jointly by three of these officers, Captains Samuel B. 
Patton, J ames Harris, and James Pickens, they justified their actions by 
arguing that they had bargained with General Roberts to volunteer for 
a three-month tour and that Roberts had agreed to release them from 
their obligation if Jackson did not accept those terms. When they were 
within three miles ofJackson's camp, they learned that Jackson would 
not agree to their conditions, and so they went home. On February 15, 
1814, a court-martial found the three captains and one other officer 
guilty of "desertion, mutiny, and other crimes." Their sentences were 
light, however, because General Roberts was believed to be primarily 
'responsible for the situation. General Roberts was shortly thereafter 
cashiered for his conduct.61 
Jackson's problems mirrored those of many militia leaders. Get-
ting the militiamen into the field and keeping them there was a diffi-
culty that vexed and troubled state leaders throughout the war. The 
quality of the force was another concern of the officers. The lack of 
professionalism, a hallmark of the militia system, far from being a vir-
tue, proved to be a curse during the War of 1812. 
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Chapter 4 
The States and 
Militia Mobilization 
Problems relating to the utilization of state militias by the federal government caused state leaders many frustrations during the War 
of 1812. State governors had to cope with the innumerable details of 
organizing, equipping, and arming their militia-problems compounded 
by a lack of assistance from the federal government. Militiamen called 
out had to be mustered, reorganized, and inspected by a regular officer 
to ensure that they conformed with federal requirements. Often the 
federal government could offer little in the way of arms or equipment 
to meet militia needs and even lacked money to pay those called out. 
Although state cooperation sometimes fell short of what was required 
by the federal government, it was still a remarkable testimony to the 
goodwill of the states that they bore the burden of federal demands and 
performed as creditably as they did. Although often woefully inadequate, 
militias were put into the field. 
Newspaper accounts immediately after the declaration of war in 
June 1812 indicate that there was an enthusiastic response to militia 
callouts and to recruiters for the regular army. The war was greeted 
with particular enthusiasm in the western country. Kentucky held more 
than one-third of the Americans in this region, and its influence on the 
conduct of the war in the West was great. By the fall of 1812, six Ken-
tucky congressmen had donned uniforms, including Samuel Hopkins, 
who served as the major general of the Kentucky militia. More than 
2,000 Kentuckians enlisted in the regular army for five-year terms, and 
perhaps 9,000 more eventually served in militia or volunteer units. Ohio's 
response was nearly as enthusiastic. Governor Return J. Meigss call in 
June 1812 for 1,200 militiamen to march to Detroit was met promptly.l 
Reports from Virginia and New Jersey stated that volunteers more 
than met the state quota for militiamen. Even in New England there 
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were favorable reports. In Concord, Massachusetts, fifty-eight out of 
sixty men in a militia company volunteered to serve. In Vermont, three 
times as many men volunteered for service as were needed to meet the 
state's quota. In New London, Connecticut, three companies were called 
to fill their quota, and all but three men volunteered. Pennsylvania's 
allotment was made up entirely of volunteers, and the same was true for 
Ohio. In Charleston, South Carolina, the share was met by volunteers. 
It was also related that companies were being formed of men over the 
age of forty-five, who were by law exempt from militia duty. Hezekiah 
Niles enthused in his Baltimore-based Weekly Register, "In many parts 
of the United States they are drafting militia-not for service, but to 
ascertain who is to stay at home, many more than is required offering 
themselves." Reports about recruiting were optimistic. Joseph Gales 
bragged in the National Intelligencer on June 2 that recruiting "has suc-
ceeded beyond the most sanguine expectations."2 
As many congressmen predicted, however, raising the regular force 
took a long time. OnJune 6, only twelve days before the declaration of 
war against Great Britain, the adjutant and inspector general, A.Y. Nicoll, 
informed Secretary of War William Eustis that only 1,125 recruits had 
enlisted between January 1 and April 30, but 1,000 had been recruited 
in May. On June 8, Eustis generously estimated to Joseph Anderson, 
chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, that 5,000 had been 
recruited. Two days earlier, Eustis directed the governors of the states 
under the act of April 10 (which called upon the states to make available 
100,000 militia) to furnish detachments of militiamen on the requisi-
tions of the generals charged with the defense of the maritime frontier. 
Most of the militia, as noted earlier, were poorly organized and were 
unable to provide any immediate assistance.3 Thus, on the eve of the 
war, the nation was woefully unprepared to wage war unless it used the 
obviously unreliable state militias. 
As might be expected, with the call for such large numbers of 
militiamen and regulars, problems arose. One complaint by militia of-
ficers was that army recruiters were enlisting and taking away their men 
at critical times after a callout, thereby deranging their companies. In 
New York, Maj. James R. Mullany, commander of the fourth recruiting 
district, defended his recruiters early in the war by stating that they 
were acting upon orders from Col. Alexander Smyth, acting inspector 
general. He asserted on July 12, 1812, that while it may be unpleasant 
for a militia officer to have his men enlisted in the U.S. service, "he 
certainly cannot prevent it, and further he is accountable for every man 
enlisted which he refuses to deliver the United States."4 
An example of a problem created by aggressive recruiters occurred 
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while the Mississippi Volunteers were in Camp Armstrong near Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, inJune 1813, awaiting assignment. Two officers pro-
tested to their commander, Gen. Ferdinand Claiborne, that recruiting 
parties were active in their camp. "Large sums of money have been 
furnished them and almost every seductive means used to decoy our 
volunteers from us," they wrote. "Good order prevailed previous to the 
arrival of these parties," they continued. "The scene is changed into 
riot, intoxication & disorder. In short the honor of the corps is com-
pletely destroyed and we feel disgusted with our situations, being daily 
liable to insults and those kinds of disorders."5 
Another question raised was the status of apprentices and minors. 
Several habeas corpus proceedings during the war produced conflict-
ing results. In Richmond, Virginia, in early June 1812, militia captain 
Samuel G. Adams was called into court because he had accepted two 
apprentices as volunteers in order to meet the state's quota. Adams ar-
gued that he was authorized to receive apprentices, but he would abide 
by the court, which subsequently ruled that he could not. In October 
1812 there was a habeas corpus case in the District Court of Pennsylva-
nia involving a]. Shorner, a minor who had enlisted without his mothers 
approval. The law required parental consent, and Shorner's counsel ar-
gued that the approval of both parents was required; as Shorner's father 
was dead, he was thus unable to give his consent. Judge Richard Peters, 
a Federalist, ruled that the enlistment was invalid.6 
In Baltimore, Maryland, in August 1813, writs of habeas corpus 
were brought on behalf of two apprentices who had been taken into 
custody for failing to obey a militia callout. Capt. John Kennedy, the 
arresting officer, was compelled to appear before Judge Theodoric Bland, 
associate judge of the Sixth Judicial District. Essentially, the question 
was whether a state could infringe on the rights of masters and compel 
apprentices to perform militia duty. Bland observed that the militia laws 
did not exempt apprentices above the age of eighteen. Masters, he said, 
had the right to the service of their apprentices according to the laws of 
the state, but he added, "There was a period at which the state had also 
a right to his services, and that right was paramount to that of the mas-
ter." He then asked, in times of crisis, "could any reasonable man sup-
pose that the legislature intended that judges and courts of justice should 
be employed in uselessly issuing writs of Habeas Corpus when the en-
emy might be at our doors?" Bland remanded both apprentices to the 
custody of Captain Kennedy.7 
There were undoubtedly numerous other habeas corpus cases 
during the war that went unreported in the newspapers. It is also very 
likely that there were more in New England than in other sections. Of 
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the cases that were reported, one involved a Mr. Lamb in Charleston, 
South Carolina, who refused to perform militia service and was arrested. 
He applied for a writ of habeas corpus to be discharged from arrest on 
the ground that under the militia laws he was punishable by a simple 
fine and not confinement. The judge ruled in favor of Lamb. Another 
case in March 1814 involved William Bull, who enlisted at the age of 
nineteen without a guardian's consent (both parents being dead). He 
subsequently deserted and was arrested, court-martialed, and sentenced. 
Ann Powell, his sister, applied for a writ of habeas corpus before the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on the ground that his enlist-
ment was invalid. The court ruled that Bull, being less than twenty-
one, was an infant and could not bind himself and ordered his discharge 
from the service.8 
At least two court cases arose involving the act of Congress of 
December 10, 1814, authorizing the enlistment of minors (eighteen to 
twenty-one) without the consent of parents, masters, or guardians. One 
occurred in Pennsylvania, where Jonas Roop, an apprentice of Abraham 
Polinger, enlisted. Polinger obtained a writ of habeas corpus to secure 
the services of his apprentice. Judge C.]. Tilghman, for the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, declined to act, since personal liberty was not in-
volved, because Roop wanted to remain in the army. Tilghman also 
noted that if Polinger wished to challenge the validity of the law of 
Congress, he should appeal it to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.9 
The act of December 10, 1814, was also challenged by a Con-
necticut law that authorized judges to issue writs of habeas corpus to 
release from military duty minors or apprentices enlisted without the 
consent of parents, masters, or guardians. Hezekiah Niles noted, "The 
United States officers had determined to treat this law with the con-
tempt it so richly deserved, but the intervention of peace prevented the 
consummation of the folly of the fools (or something worse) who made 
it." Niles also cited a Hartford city ordinance, obviously designed to 
discourage army recruiters, that any person carrying a flag or colors, 
drumming or playing any martial instruments within the limits of the 
city, could be fined thirty-four dollars.lo 
The Madison administration's intention to rely on volunteers and 
state militiamen to prosecute the war met with a setback in New En-
gland almost immediately. At issue was not just how the militia was to 
be used, at least in the early months; it was also whether the national 
government could use them at all. The Act of April 10, 1812, gave New 
England as a quota 20,000 of the 100,000 militiamen called for by Con-
gress. Secretary of War Eustis alerted Connecticut governor Roger 
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Griswold on June 12, that his militia might be ordered into service for 
coastal defense on the call of Gen. Henry Dearborn. Griswold replied 
that such a call would be executed "without delay." When Dearborn, 
however, called for two companies each of artillery and infantry on June 
22, "to be placed under the command of the commanding officer at 
Fort Trumbull, near New London; and one company of Artillery, to be 
stationed at the battery, at the entrance of the harbour at New Haven," 
Griswold balked. He queried his Council of State whether militias could 
be legally demanded "until one of the contingencies enumerated in the 
Constitution shall have arisen," and "whether a requisition, to place 
any portion of the militia under the command of a continental officer 
can be executed." The Council predictably replied that none of the 
contingencies had been met, and it declared that placing the. militia 
under the command of an officer of the United States transferred the 
militia to the army of the United States and deprived the state of its 
militia.! 1 
Dearborn and Eustis were duly informed that the requisition was 
not in conformity with the Constitution and that, even if it had been, 
Connecticut objected to placing its militia "under the immediate com-
mand of an officer or officers of the Army of the United States" rather 
than under the command of its state militia officers. Eustiss response 
was that the reasons assigned for noncompliance were "not less extraor-
dinary than the act itself." To remove all doubt, he declared that he had 
been instructed by the president to state that a condition of imminent 
danger "actually exists" and that the requisition of General Dearborn 
should "be forthwith carried into effect." Eustis dismissed the problem 
of officering by simply stating that the militia's company officers "will 
command or be commanded, according to the rules and articles of war." 
Dearborn attempted to conciliate Connecticut, announcing on July 17 
that the command over the companies could be assigned to one of the 
state's majors. The Council stubbornly insisted, when they met on Au-
gust 4 to reconsider, that the militia was being called out to perform 
ordinary garrison duty and not to repel any invasion. Until the circum-
stances stipulated by the Constitution were met, the Council advised, 
the governor should not comply with the requisition. 12 
Griswold informed Eustis on August 13 that Connecticut's posi-
tion had not changed. The phrase "imminent danger of invasion" was 
not the condition expressed in the Constitution authorizing the federal 
government to call upon state militia, and the president's declaration 
was obviously drawn from the mere fact that war had commenced. If 
such a consequence of a declaration of war be admitted, Griswold wrote, 
"it would follow, that every war, of that character, would throw the mi-
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litia, into the hands of the national government-and strip the states, of 
the important right, reserved to them." Griswold declared in a procla-
mation that it was "the prerogative of the state to hold its militia for the 
maintenance of its lawful privileges, and never to permit them to be 
withdrawn from its authority, except in cases expressly mentioned in 
the Constitution." A committee of the legislature argued, among other 
things, that "it is not a defensive, but offensive war," that the use of militia 
for garrison duty converted militiamen into "standing troops of the 
United States," and that the United States was "a confederated, and not 
a consolidated Republic." Finally, it denied that the state's militia could 
be demanded by the president "to assist in carrying on an offensive 
War." 13 
Many of the same issues were raised in Massachusetts, where ten-
sions ran high as a result of the declaration of war. Elbridge Gerry, an 
unpopular Republican governor who defended the national adminis-
tration although he received several threats of assassination, was re-
placed by Caleb Strong, a Federalist. 14 The transition of government 
meant that the federal government's call for militias would be received 
much differently. Dearborn summoned forty-one companies of Massa-
chusetts militiamen, which would entitle a brigadier general to com-
mand, but the highest-ranking officer drafted was a lieutenant colonel. 
In fairness to Dearborn, because the militia was dispersed to so many 
different locations, no detachment rated more than a lieutenant colo-
nel. 
Governor Strong responded by asking the justices of the state su-
preme court, first, whether the governor had the right to determine 
whether the exigencies contemplated by the Constitution existed that 
required him to place the militia in the service of the United States and, 
second, whether the state militia could be commanded by any officers 
but those of the state. The justices replied that the governor did indeed 
have that right. Since the Constitution did not give that power explic-
itly to Congress or the president, it was reserved to the states. Any 
other construction, the justices reasoned, would give the national gov-
ernment the right to call the whole of the militia from the states, sub-
jecting them to the will of the president and Congress "and produce a 
military consolidation of the states without any constitutional remedy." 
On the second question, the justices asserted that placing militiamen 
under regular army command "would render nugatory the provision 
that the militia are to have officers appointed by the states."15 
On August 5, 1812, Strong informed Eustis of his decision not to 
comply with the requisition, which he had based not only on the Su-
preme Court opinion but also on the advice of his Council. There was 
;
r."13
14
68 Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 
no apprehension of invasion, he declared, and thus no exigency under 
the Constitution had been met. He did announce that he had called out 
three companies, commanded by a major, to meet the appeals of the 
people of Passamaquoddy on the eastern border for protection against 
predatory incursions. That he assumed they were in the service of the 
United States is confirmed by his statement that they would remain 
until the president directed otherwise.16 
The Massachusetts House of Representatives claimed that Strong's 
conduct "met [with] the unqualified approbation, not only of this House, 
but of the great body of the People." The Senate, however, which was 
controlled by Republicans, dissented. The senators declared, "The hour 
of danger is not a fit time for abstract speculation, and to decide prin-
ciples by views to political policy, would be hardly more rational than 
satisfactory." They argued further, "If it be denied to the National Ex-
ecutive to decide upon the necessity of a detachment of militia, it will 
render indispensable the support of a standing army."17 
In Rhode Island, where four companies of militia were called for, 
much the same scenario was played out. Governor William Jones asked 
his Council of War on August 12 whether the states militia could be 
drawn by the president except in the cases mentioned in the Constitu-
tion and whether, in the Councils opinion, those exigencies had been 
met. The Council replied that although the president decided in the 
first instance, the governor "has the right ultimately to decide" whether 
to surrender the command of the state militia to the president. Jones 
then informed the federal government on August 22 that he would re-
lease the militia of his state only "when, in my opinion, any of the exigen-
cies provided for by the Constitution ... exists." On September 24, the 
Council of War reaffirmed its advice "that it is not expedient under the 
existing circumstances . . . to order the detached militia of this State 
into the service of the United States."18 
Public opinion, already heated by the dispute between fe-deral and 
state authorities, was further agitated by an inflamatory pamphlet writ-
ten by John Lowell late in 1812. He stated that he expected soon to see 
Massachusetts and Connecticut declared in a state of rebellion, to see 
habeas corpus suspended, "and by commissions to Gen. [William] King 
and the [Maine] volunteers whom he has raised, to coerce the refrac-
tory states." Lowell also predicted "a law placing the militia under the 
orders and lashes of the officers of the standing army, and our papers 
will soon give us another affecting detail of the ceremonies with which 
the deserters from the militia are shot." Beyond the overheated rhetoric, 
Lowell also argued that Madisons interpretation of the use of the mili-
tia would lead to "one vast military consolidation." Lowell actually en-
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couraged the militiaman drafted into service contrary to the Constitu-
tion "to kill his assailant, or to collect his friends to rescue him."19 
Lowell also denounced the use of volunteers, "a mongrel breed of 
soldier citizen and citizen soldier," as an "insidious way of destroying the 
militia." If Congress could raise 50,000, they could raise 500,000 vol-
unteers. The purpose, Lowell argued, was to defeat the intent of the 
Constitution and transfer the whole militia to the control of the presi-
dent. One way to frustrate this plan was for state militia officers to insist 
that volunteers do their state militia duty.20 
Neither New Hampshire nor Vermont presented any immediate 
problems (the problems came later) to the Madison administration. 
Republican governor WIlliam Plumer of New Hampshire, in fact, de-
clared to his legislature on November 18, 1812, "To admit that [the 
President] has power to call upon the Governors of the several states, 
to order a portion of the militia into service, but that those Governors 
can with propriety refuse to carry those orders into effect, would estab-
lish a principle of insubordination incompatible with all military prin-
ciples." He noted that he had complied with Dearborn's requests and 
that five companies were then in the service of the United States. Both 
houses of the New Hampshire legislature endorsed Plumer's sentiments. 
Governor Jonas Galusha of Vermont, a Republican, also cooperated 
with Dearborn. In a message to his legislature on October 9, he 
complimented his militiamen for their prompt response in marching to 
the frontier. 21 
The other New England governors were denounced around the 
country. In a letter published in the Richmond Enquirer in spring 1813 
and widely reprinted, an anonymous author questioned whether the 
United States was dependent upon "indirect and irresponsible agents" 
to execute its call or whether it could have agents "directly responsible" 
to carry out this power. The New England governors' position, the 
author insisted, was the same as the requisition under the old Confed-
eration government, a weakness that paved the way for the writing of 
the Constitution. "We should pause, then, before we adopt a construc-
tion which would thus visit the imbecility of the parent upon the child." 
The spirit of the Constitution, the author said, was that "the nation-
alforce ought to be called out to execute the national will." He added, 
" ... there is nothing better calculated to bring this republican govern-
ment into contempt, to produce mistrust among our citizens and ren-
der us the scorn of Europe, than a successful attempt to paralyze its 
powers." Joseph Gales, in the Daily Nationallntelligencer, declared such 
arguments "conclusive" and insisted that "9/1O's of the intelligent fed-
eralists in the nation will agree with us, that the non-combatant gover-
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nors have shown an entire ignorance or contempt of their constitu-
tional duties."22 
Only in Maryland was there any sympathy or support for the New 
England position on militia. There the Federalist-dominated House of 
Delegates approved resolutions on December 22, 1812, declaring that 
the call for militiamen under the federal law of April 10, 1812, did not 
meet the exigencies stated in the Constitution. Nor was it contemplated 
in the Constitution that the general government, entrusted with con-
trol of the militia in certain emergencies, would, "by perverted inter-
pretations ... use that power in the absence of emergencies." Further-
more, use of militiamen to garrison forts was "an unwarrantable stretch 
of power, which must ultimately lead to a consolidation of these United 
States into a military government." A separate resolution passed two 
days later by a two-to-one margin approved the conduct of the gover-
nors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and stated that 
their action was "constitutional, and merits our decided approbation." 
The Republican-controlled Senate, however, passed a resolution on 
January 2, 1813, supporting the declaration of war and the power of the 
president to call out the militia.23 
In Virginia, Governor James Barbour declared to his legislature 
that the Constitution "placed the whole physical force of the nation 
under the control of the national authority" and that the occasion on 
which the militiamen would be employed, and the manner, was to be 
determined by the federal government. He also argued that it was per-
fectly correct "that a federal officer of superior grade, should take the 
command" of the militia. Governor Arthur Middleton of South Caro-
lina also asserted in his annual message that each state had a duty to 
support the constituted authority even if it doubted or disapproved of 
the policy of war. Opposition would paralyze the war effort and would 
tend to produce defeat and disgrace.24 
President Madison was undoubtedly relieved that no state outside 
New England refused the services of their militia. In his Fourth Annual 
Message on November 4,1812, he asserted that the New England gover-
nors' refusal to release their state militia was "founded on a novel and un-
fortunate exposition of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the 
militia." If the authority of the United States could be frustrated, he said, 
"in a state of declared war and ... under apprehension of invasion ... , 
they are not one nation." He warned that the recourse of the govern-
ment might be "large and permanent military establishments which are 
forbidden by the principles of our free government, and against the 
necessity of which the militia were meant to be a constitutional bul-
wark."25 
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Another problem that arose between the New England states and 
the federal government related to the distribution of arms under the 
law of 1808. The states were plagued by equipment shortages. Gover-
nor Plumer ofN ew Hampshire suggested to his legislature in June 1812 
that it was difficult to know precisely the deficiency of firearms among 
the state's militiamen because of the practice, widespread among sol-
diers, of borrowing arms and accoutrements from each other. He rec-
ommended that all battalion musters be held on the same day. Simi-
larly, Governor Galusha of Vermont informed his legislature in October 
1812 that the state had received 1,000 stand of arms (weapons and ac-
couterments) under the Act of 1808, but it fell "far short of the real 
deficiency." Most of the arms distributed, he noted, were to the de-
tached militia, "who were destitute." He urged the legislature to buy 
more arms, ammunition, tents, and camp equipage.26 
A committee report from the Rhode Island House noted in No-
vember that not a single stand of arms had been delivered to that state 
under the Act of 1808. Why the arms due to the state had been with-
held, the report continued, "the Committee are unable to explain," but 
it appeared to the committee that the southern and western states had 
received "their full complement." Governor Jones related to the legis-
lature on February 16, 1813, that while a thousand stand of arms had 
been delivered, he was still trying to get Rhode Island's full share. In 
June, Jones stated that there was no hope of "being placed in any ad-
equate state of defence, by the United States.'>27 
On February 27, 1813, the Massachusetts legislature asked the 
governor to apply to the national government for that state's propor-
tion of muskets due under the law of 1808. Governor Strong forwarded 
the resolution to President Madison on March 1. Two weeks later, Sec-
retary of War John Armstrong responded that arms received by the 
federal government had been "inconsiderable," and "the President has 
deemed it most conducive to the general interest to supply in the first 
instance the frontier states and the militia who have come forward in 
the service of the country." When the state of the arsenals justified it, 
Massachusetts would receive its proportion of arms under the law. 
AMassachusetts Senate committee report in response to Armstrongs 
letter declared the provisions of the law were "simple, precise, and defi-
nite, admitting neither of a perversion of purpose nor latitude of con-
struction-of the favouritism of partiality, or an indulgence of caprice." 
The committee estimated Massachusetts's fair share of arms at about 
one-tenth of the $1 million that had thus far accrued to the fund. Citing 
a War Department report in December 1812 that showed eleven states, 
the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Illinois receiving arms, 
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the committee declared it was "wholly unable to comprehend, or per-
ceive, even on the alleged principles of distribution, how the withhold-
ing from the State of Massachusetts ... can be justified or palliated." 
The committee recommended the drastic action of withholding from 
the direct taxes paid by the state to the federal government the propor-
tion of funds that was due Massachusetts from the federal government 
to enable the state "to adopt those measures of defence which the gen-
eral government neglect to provide for it." The legislature, however, 
adopted a resolution merely calling upon its senators and congressmen 
to work to obtain Massachusetts's fair share of the arms. If the federal 
government failed to provide arms, the governor was authorized to 
purchase weapons needed for defense. The state treasurer was autho-
rized to borrow $100,000 to meet Massachusetts's defense needs.28 The 
national government's failure to provide arms and other aid for defense 
was one of the grievances that later led to the calling of the antiwar 
protest meeting, the Hartford Convention. 
In the remaining thirteen states and five territories outside New 
England, the militiamen were even less well equipped and less well or-
ganized. The shortage of arms and camp equipage was a common la-
ment even in the better organized states. In New York, Governor Daniel 
D. Tompkins complained to Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn on June 28, 
1812, that the U.S. quartermaster general "has not a tent, camp kettle 
or knapsack in the arsenal ... [and] as to cannon, muskets, ammunition, 
I can find no one here who will exercise any authority over them or 
deliver a single article upon my requisition." Tompkins urged Dearborn 
to furnish the militiamen with weapons and other desperately needed 
supplies.29 
In Pennsylvania, where the militia was supposedly well organized, 
numerous problems arose when the militia was called out in 1812. Gov-
ernor Simon Snyder informed his legislature on December 3, that the 
calling into service of 4,000 Pennsylvania militiamen was "effected with 
as much celerity and completeness as our militia law, fund, and system 
would permit." He noted that the state law did not provide for paymas-
ters or for defraying the expen!!es of marching detachments to the ren-
dezvous. The law provided for the position of quartermaster general 
but not a salary. Also, some regiments and companies had neglected to 
choose officers, and there was no mode for calling classes into service. 
He also urged providing indigent militiamen with blankets and suitable 
clothing. 30 
Maryland Governor Levin "Winder asked his General Assembly 
in December 1813 to improve the states militia system. "In its present 
state," he complained, "it is almost a dead letter." He was particularly 
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upset that "those who understand the defects of the system, contrive to 
avoid the service, [while] others will engage in it with cheerfulness and 
consent to bear an undue proportion of its burthen and sufferings." 
Delaware, in effect, did not have a militia system when the war began. 
A February 2, 1811, law abolished all fines for missing militia drills and 
thereby created a largely moribund system.31 
Elsewhere, despite impressive and detailed militia laws, the situa-
tion was worse. In North Carolina, for example, Governor William 
Hawkins, in order to comply with the call in 1812 for its 7,000-man 
force to be held in readiness, was virtually compelled to organize his 
militia anew. The state militia system remained in a dreadful state of 
organization, even as Hawkins delivered his annual message to the leg-
islature in November. Most militiamen were unarmed, but fortunately 
Hawkins arranged to receive 2,000 stand of arms as part of its quota 
under the Act of 1808. Even so, there was a shortage of powder, ball, 
and cartridge boxes. The supply organization of quartermasters, com-
missaries, and contractors was in shambles and lacked many staff offic-
ers at the lower grades. "It may, with utmost confidence, be said," 
Hawkins asserted, "that our present system cannot be productive of 
anything bordering upon even a tolerable discipline."32 
Eight companies of North Carolina militiamen were called out by 
Maj. Gen. Thomas Pinckney on July 4, 1812, four to protect Fort 
Johnston, near Wilmington, and four to defend Fort Hampton, near 
Beaufort. This experience not only showed how destitute the militia-
men were of all the articles of war, even blankets, but also revealed how 
totally unprepared the supply departments were to provide these items. 
Fortunately, Pinckney was able to release most militiamen by Septem-
ber as new recruits were signed up.33 
In Georgia, Governor David B. Mitchell admitted on the eve of 
the war the weakness of his militia, and he issued a general order in 
January 1812 calling upon the adjutant general to ensure that militia 
trainings were carried out and the militiamen aroused "from apathy 
and indifference." "It is a lamentable truth," he wrote to Gen. John 
Floyd, "that Georgia has never made any provision for the service of 
her militia, unless indeed a few thousand stand of muskets, one half of 
which are hardly fit for service, be considered as such." Mitchell de-
clared that he had no qualms about who should command Georgia mi-
litiamen called into the field; "They will be under the immediate com-
mand of their own officers, but their duty and operations will be directed 
by those of the United States."34 
In his annual message in November 1812, Mitchell called upon 
his legislature to revise the militia laws thoroughly, as well as to pur-
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chase arms and ammunition. He also cited the shortage of artillery, 
especially for coastal defense. When George Jones, the mayor of Sa-
vannah, called upon Mitchell in March 1813 for coastal fortifications to 
protect his city, the governor could only cite the "painful and serious 
truth that the State has not the command of a single piece of artillery, 
neither has she any ammunition except a small quantity of powder." 
Mitchell hoped the city could procure "a half dozen good six pounders" 
from among the prize vessels that might be brought to the city.35 
Although Mitchell promised to cooperate with federal officers, he 
did reserve his right to dispose of the state militia as he saw fit. In Au-
gust 1812, General Pinckney called upon Georgia to send a regiment 
to St. Mary's and four companies to Savannah. Mitchell did not call out 
the companies for Savannah. A year later Mitchell wrote that he con-
sidered this action "one of the most fortunate circumstances that has 
ever occured [sic] to me in the whole course of my public life .... It is 
now evident," he continued, "that the troops if sent down would have 
been entirely useless and by this time probably one half of them dead or 
dying and the balance deserted and gone home." Moreover, the ex-
pense of maintaining them would have consumed the state's resources 
and left nothing to encounter the hostile Indians, who were then wag-
ing war upon the frontier. 36 
In the Mississippi Territory, Governor David Holmes warned Sec-
retary Eustis on the eve of the war that his militia was desperately short 
of arms. He hoped the government would lend a thousand stand of 
arms. When the war began and Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson issued a 
call for Mississippi militia, Holmes responded that while he could fur-
nish any number of men Wilkinson wanted, it was to be regretted "that 
the militia are almost entirely destitute of arms and ammunition. This 
may render our situation truly deplorable," he added, "unless we can be 
furnished, without delay, by the United States." Many militiamen were 
not just unarmed; Holmes informed Eustis that about 200 of the 500 
men called out were also without blankets, many without shoes. In ad-
dition to expenses for subsistence, camp equipage, and medical and hos-
pital stores, Holmes declared he would also obtain blankets and shoes; 
the troops had consented that the amount for the latter two items be 
deducted from their pay. To obtain these supplies, Holmes advised Eustis, 
"I shall draw upon the war department." Wilkinson provided 300 stand 
of arms, but according to Holmes most were "entirely unfit for use."37 
In Louisiana, the situation of the militia was much the same. A 
slave insurrection near New Orleans in January 1811 pointed to the 
need for a better militia organization. Slaves estimated variously at 180 
to 500 in number revolted at Colonel Andres plantation about thirty-
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six miles above New Orleans. At least two whites, including the major's 
son, were killed. The first reports stated that Colonel Andre organized 
armed citizens, killed several of the insurgents, and captured eighteen 
to twenty of them. Eventually, a varied force of regulars under Gen. 
Wade Hampton, volunteer militia, crews of merchant vessels, and even 
a company of "free men of color," commanded by a Major Dubourg, 
were organized and completed the task of subduing the insurrection. 
The leader, one of Colonel Andres slaves by the name of Gilbert, and 
about a dozen other insurgents were put to death. Governor William 
c.c. Claiborne lamented the lax and disorganized state of the militia 
and informed Col. John Ballinger after the insurrection had been put 
down that he hoped the incident would "induce the Legislature to give 
us a more energetic militia system." He also wrote to Colonel Andre, 
"We are now all convinced of the necessity of a well-organized militia, 
and I really will not permit the ensuing Legislature to adjourn until 
they shall have passed a strong militia law."38 
In his message to the legislature on January 29, 1811, Claiborne 
declared that the "lax and disorganized state of the militia" was due to 
the defective militia law. Among other things, he recommended cir-
cumscribing exemptions from militia duty, prescribing specific times 
for musters and greater frequency, and increasing the fines for nonat-
tendance at musters, "so much so as to make the wealthiest of our citi-
zens unwilling to incur them." He also urged vesting the officers with 
more power to "punish the disobedient and disorderly with fines and if 
necessary with imprisonment." The law, passed by the territorial legis-
lature on April 29, did indeed answer many of Claiborne's requests. 
More frequent musters were required (there were, for example, com-
pany musters on the last day of every month except May), and the in-
creased fines for nonattendance ranged from twenty dollars for officers 
to seven dollars for privates. Claiborne forwarded the act to Secretary 
Eustis and called the legislation "sufficiently rigorous," but it was clear 
that he was not entirely happy with the law. He argued that "the con-
trariety oflanguage spoken by the citizens of Louisiana, & the dispersed 
situation of the settlements are great obstacles to rendering the militia 
an efficient force."39 
Claiborne said essentially the same thing on July 30, 1812, to the 
first legislature of the newly created state of Louisiana, declaring that 
the militia "does not exhibit that arrangement, order & discipline which 
can alone render it respectable." Claiborne, however, vetoed the militia 
bill passed by the legislature because of "contradictory" provisions, which 
he insisted "would tend to throw the whole militia into a state of confu-
sion & chaos." The legislature adjourned without acting upon the bill 
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returned to them. Louisiana entered the War of 1812 under an obso-
lete militia law of April 1811.40 
Thus, despite the fact that the basic militia law of 1792 had been 
on the books for two decades, there was still no uniform organization 
of state militia. The problems created by this situation meant that the 
federal government, perhaps contrary to its expectations, found that 
state militias, particularly when they were called out with some urgency, 
were typically unavailable or were so poorly organized, ill equipped, 
and undisciplined as to be practically useless. Moreover, several New 
England states withheld their militias on constitutional grounds, and 
others were reluctant to call out their militiamen without assurances 
from the federal government that the militiamen would be paid. Con-
sequently, the federal government increasingly sought to rely on regu-
lars and volunteers, but it was not always possible to do so. 
40
Chapter 5 
The Militia and the 
War in the West 
W hile Congress debated the merits of militiamen versus regulars 
on the eve of the declaration of war, a spirited discussion on the 
same issue occurred in the Indiana Territory after the Battle of 
Tippecanoe in November 1811 between Col. John P. Boyd, commander 
of the Fourth Regiment, U.S. Infantry, and Governor WIlliam Henry 
Harrison, commander of the forces at Tippecanoe. Boyd was addressed 
by a group of citizens in Vincennes who referred to the "brave Regu-
lars" and called the militiamen "spirited but untutored." Harrison's sup-
porters viewed this as an attempt to take away some of the credit due to 
Harrison. Boyd, perhaps unintentionally, exacerbated the issue when 
he referred to the "dastardly" conduct of the militiamen engaged in the 
Battle of Tippecanoe in a widely reprinted letter to Secretary of War 
WIlliam Eustis on December 11, 1811. Harrison was prompted to re-
spond to the "severe animadversions" in a public statement noting that, 
of the ten volunteer militia units in the battle, only two "abandoned 
their posts." One of the units later rallied and took up "a post of greater 
danger." In effect, Harrison admitted some failings of the militia, but 
he preferred to emphasize the fact that parts of the militia stayed at 
their posts and performed their duties creditably. 1 
The public view of the militia during the War of 1812 was colored 
by perceptions like those described above. Supporters of the militia cited 
the positive aspects of militia conduct during military engagements and 
were prone to overlook incidents that evidenced poor conduct and a 
lack of discipline. Conversely, opponents found fault with virtually ev-
ery aspect of militia performance and tended to overlook creditable 
conduct. In evaluating the performance of the militia during the War of 
1812, it is difficult to assess the numerous reports of incompetence. 
There are far more negative reports than positive ones. No doubt, the 
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reason was partly self-serving officers who transferred blame to militia-
men that more properly belonged to them. Officers who viewed the 
militia favorably, however, like Harrison, also cited improper conduct 
by militiamen. It is perhaps natural that comments about misconduct 
found their way into print far more often than reports that the militia-
men had performed their duties. Obviously, ill behavior gains more at-
tention than good, and the following account reflects the evidence that 
is available. Common sense suggests, however, that militia performance 
could not have been as bad as the reports indicate. Harrison's point that 
we should not overlook the individuals who went about their business 
and did their job should be kept in mind. 
In no part of the country was there greater enthusiasm for war 
than in the West. Western leaders, aware that their militiamen would 
bear the brunt of fighting in this region, were confident that they would 
fight well. Fortunately, the British had few regulars to wage war in the 
West. Western militias often faced an Indian foe as untrained and ill 
equipped as they were. Unfortunately, events did not bear out expecta-
tions, nor did Westerners maintain their initial enthusiasm for war. 
After the Battle of Tippecanoe, citizens of the West predictably 
urged that the militiamen be called out to protect the frontier from 
Indian violence. Resolutions to Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illi-
nois Territory, for example, lamented the failure of the national gov-
ernment to offer aid and support against the Indians on the most vul-
nerable parts of their frontier. Edwards, in fact, informed Secretary of 
War Eustis that he united with other governors in the West in appre-
hending "a formidable combination of Indians and a bloody war." Eustis 
responded by informing Edwards that under a law ofJanuary 2, 1812, 
two companies of rangers would be raised in Ohio, one in Indiana, one 
in Illinois, and one in Kentucky, "competent to protect the frontiers." 
These rangers were to cooperate with a detachment of regular troops 
that was establishing a post at Peoria village. The command was given 
to Col. William Russell (U.S. Army). 2 It should be noted, however, that 
there was very little coordination between the regulars and the volun-
teer rangers, and very little protection was afforded by either. 
Even before the war was declared, the Army of the Northwest was 
formed with approximately 1,500 Ohio volunteer militiamen called out 
by Governor Return J. Meigs, to which the Fourth Regiment of U.S. 
Infantry was added. The force was assembled by Governor Meigs at 
Dayton and was turned over to the command of Gen. William Hull, 
governor of the Michigan Territory, who was designated by President 
Madison to command. Unfortunately, Hull, a Revolutionary War vet-
eran, was past his prime, and his relationship with the militia was tenu-
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ous from the very beginning. At the staging base in Urbana, Ohio, the 
militiamen refused to bend to discipline. Lt. Jonah Bacon of the Fourth 
Regiment noted that the Ohio militiamen "were ... without either" 
subordination or discipline. One evening at Urbana he heard a noise 
and, when he ran out to determine the cause, he was informed that "it 
was only some of the Ohio militia riding one of their officers on a rail." 
Capt. Charles Fuller, also of the Fourth Regiment, testified later at Hull's 
court-martial that orders to the militia to stop promiscuous firing of 
weapons in camp "did not entirely suppress it." Fuller was vague about 
a reported mutiny of some militiamen. He observed that he had heard 
of sentences being passed on "two or three ring-leaders." More likely, 
he was referring to punishment dispensed by courts-martial for spo-
radic insubordination. Fuller was explicit, however, that some volun-
teers refused to march from Urbana and that a "Captain Cooks com-
panywas sent back" by General Hull. Fuller claimed that he only heard 
of posters on trees encouraging men not to march. The lack of disci-
pline in the Ohio militia was such that General Hull placed the Fourth 
Regiment of regulars at the rear of the column marching to Detroit to 
suppress further mutinies and desertions. Lt. Col. James Miller quoted 
Hull as saying, "By God, Sir, your regiment is a powerful argument. 
Without it I could not march these volunteers to Detroit."3 
Such evidence raises questions at least about the validity of asser-
tions by such individuals as Col. Lewis Cass, who commanded one regi-
ment of Ohio militia, when he wrote to Secretary Eustis in September 
1812 that "had the courage and conduct of the general been equal to 
the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant 
and successful as it now is disasterous [sic] and dishonourable."4 
"When Hull crossed the Detroit River to assault the British post of 
Malden, the Michigan militia (approximately 200 men) did not cross. 
Hull did not explain why, but presumably, based on their later conduct, 
it was because they were considered unreliable. Also, a large number of 
Ohio militiamen refused to cross into a foreign country for constitu-
tional reasons. The exact number declining to cross is unclear. At his 
trial, Hull stated, "This number was about one hundred and eighty." 
Cass claimed that "about 100" Ohio militiamen did not cross, but he 
also added that 30 to 40 of them "made off and returned home in safety." 
Lieutenant Bacon stated that on one occasion 30 to 40 refused to cross, 
and on another about 100. Still another source, Maj. John "Whisder, 
believed that there were 68 Ohio militiamen in the fort who refused to 
cross, but he added, "I do not know how many were in the town."5 
Hull's conduct was no doubt influenced by his perceptions of the 
low quality of the militiamen who did cross. It was clear that he had no 
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confidence in the militiamen he commanded. As he said at his trial, 
"What proportion of the militia, which I had with me at Sandwich, 
would have been effective to lead against the enemy, the Court may 
judge from general experience." He claimed to have only 1,300 effectives, 
and only Lieutenant Colonel Miller's 300 regulars "had seen any ser-
vice." He added that the militiamen although "very ardent and patriotic 
in their expressions had had no experience, and neither men nor offic-
ers had ever been tried." He then asserted, "It is not extraordinary, that 
I should have felt some want of confidence in these raw troops." Hull 
confessed that his experience during the Revolutionary War "had fixed 
in my mind a mistrust of the services of the undisciplined militia .... 
Indeed the organization of the militia corps I had with me was particu-
larly calculated to create distrust with respect to them." Another reason 
for distrust of militiamen was that "all their officers held their commis-
sions in virtue of an election ... of the men whom they were the nomi-
nal commanders." Elected officers, he npted, would be unwilling to 
incur the displeasure of their men and would instead court their troops' 
favor, which was "totally incompatible with military discipline." He also 
argued that he was not bound, as some of his junior officers seemed to 
think, by a majority vote. Many of the officers, he added, "have not yet 
learned even military language," and most of them, "when they joined 
my army, knew no more of the duties of a soldier than was to be learned 
from militia musters and parades about their own homes."6 
Hull denied that the affair at the Aux Canard Bridge on July 16 
was anything but a "skirmish"; in fact, it "could hardly be a test either of 
courage or discipline." In truth, little was achieved in this skirmish ex-
cept to give American troops under Colonel Cass their first baptism of 
fire. After momentary confusion following the first clash, the American 
troops reformed and, Cass reported, "moved on with great spirit and 
alacrity" to drive the British off. Two prisoners were capturedJ 
On the other hand, Hull believed that the conduct of the militia-
men under Maj. Thomas Van Horne in another engagement was more 
representative of its fighting capabilities. Van Horne was sent by Hull 
on August 4 to connect with a supply column that had reached the 
River Raisin and wanted an escort. Van Horne's force was composed of 
some 150 riflemen and "a number of militia-men who had refused to 
cross into Canada." When Van Homes force was attacked on August 5 
by about 40 British and 70 Indians, the militia, Van Horne recalled, 
"retreated in disorder by squads." Of those reported missing, 70 later 
showed up at the fort. Among the 17 dead from Van Horne's encounter 
in the Battle of Brownstown were 5 officers, most killed "attempting to 
rally their men." Hull denied that Van Horne's force had been inad-
,
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equate. Had the militiamen not "fled in the first moments of an attack; 
with the utmost disorder and precipitation," he asserted, " ... the de-
tachment was sufficient."g 
Hull also argued that the troops were loyal to their state leaders 
and not to him. If he had had Gen. Duncan McArthur arrested, he said, 
"I have no doubt his men, who had elected him, would have turned 
their arms against me, with as much alacrity as they professed to use 
them against the enemy." It may well be that it was a combination of 
both loyalty to their state leaders and a lack of confidence in their com-
mander. Hull lost all the confidence of the troops when he gave up a 
promised attack on Malden and retreated to Detroit. Hull was alarmed 
by the news at the end of July of the fall of the American fort on the 
island of Mackinac. He believed he would soon be overwhelmed by 
hordes ofIndians. Rather than retreat to Detroit, as he did on August 7 
and 8, he admitted later that had he followed "the dictates of his con-
science" he would have retreated to the Miami. That he did not do so 
was perhaps because Colonel Cass had declared that "the Ohio militia 
would desert him to a man." The disloyalty of the militiamen went 
beyond words. At the critical moment of the siege of Detroit by British 
Gen. Isaac Brock, at least two companies of the Michigan militia de-
serted to the enemy. Moreover, Hull claimed he received information 
"that a larger body were about to join him [Brock]." Lieutenant Colo-
nel Miller confirmed Hull's view. He recalled hearing Col. Elijah Brush, 
commander of the First Regiment of Michigan militia, exclaim, "By 
God, he believed his men would have run away to a man."9 
While Hull's surrender of Detroit may have been militarily inex-
cusable, it is nevertheless not difficult to understand the frame of mind 
that led him to do so. At his trial he was adamant that he had had no 
choice. Regarding Cass's reference to the tears of the troops when he 
surrendered, Hull stated cynically that it was obviously not the Michi-
gan militia, "because a part of them deserted, and the rest were dis-
posed to go over to the enemy rather than fight him." Perhaps, he con-
tinued, it was the Ohio volunteers, "who mutinied in the camp at Urbana, 
and would not march till they were compelled to do so by the regular 
troops." Or perhaps it was those who refused to cross into Canada and 
at Brownstown under Major Van Horne "ran away at the first fire, and 
left their officers to be massacred." In conclusion, Hull stated, "With 
one third of the residue of my force absent, and with nothing to rely 
upon out of the fort, but untried and undisciplined militia, officered by 
men, most of whom were in hostility to me, and had even conspired 
against me, what was I to expect from a contest?"l0 
Hull's surrender of Detroit to the British on August 16 aroused 
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mingled sentiments of apprehension and anger in the western country. 
One of the consequences of this event was the emergence of WIlliam 
Henry Harrison to lead the effort to retake Detroit from the enemy. 
Harrison, the governor of the Indiana Territory, had previously been 
designated by the War Department to defend the western frontier from 
Indian depredations. He was authorized to call upon Kentucky to aug-
ment his troops from the Indiana and Illinois territories. When news of 
Hull's surrender was received in Kentucky, Harrison was there, arrang-
ing for Kentucky militiamen to join an expedition against Indians in the 
Illinois Territory. Leaders in Kentucky, acting on popular sentiment, 
recommended to Governor Charles Scott that Harrison be appointed a 
major general of the Kentucky militia to lead the force to recapture De-
troit. The legal obstacles that Harrison was not a citizen of the state, that 
only one major general was authorized, and that the position was already 
filled were overcome by making Harrison a brevet major general. II 
Kentucky's action, as noted earlier, set up a problem of command 
of the Northwestern Army, but the Madison administration, which had 
designated Brig. Gen. James WInchester of Tennessee to command the 
Kentucky and Ohio forces against Detroit, bowed to western pressures 
and placed Harrison in command of the Northwestern Army. 
While Harrison was raising his force to recapture Detroit, he sent 
out two expeditions against hostile Indians. One under Col. Allen 
Trimble with about 500 Ohio militiamen got as far as Fort Wayne when 
half the troops refused to proceed farther, presumably for many of the 
same reasons that General Hopkins's men cited, namely, lack of sup-
plies and lack of confidence in the leadership. Trimble's only accom-
plishment was to destroy two small Indian villages. A second force com-
manded by Lt. Col. John B. Campbell was a combined force of regulars 
and militiamen. The latter group included a Pennsylvania rifle com-
pany and a company of one-year volunteers known as the Pittsburgh 
Blues. This expedition advanced into the Indiana Territory about eighty 
miles west-northwest of Greenville, Ohio, and captured one Indian vil-
lage, killing 8 and taking 42 prisoners. Three other villages evacuated 
by the Indians were burned. In the early morning of December 18, 
1812, while encamped near the Mississinewa River, which flowed into 
the Wabash, an Indian force of approximately 300 launched a surprise 
attack. After an hour of desperate fighting, the Indians were driven back 
with an estimated loss of 100 killed and wounded. Campbell's loss was 8 
killed and 45 wounded, 4 of whom died later. In his report on the Battle 
of Mississinewa, Campbell singled out the Pittsburgh Blues for praise: 
"They fought with the coolness and intrepidity of veterans." 12 
Meanwhile, General WInchester's troops on the left wing of the 
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Army of the Northwest, suffering greatly from exposure, disease, and a 
lack of supplies, finally managed in early January 1813 to move to the 
rapids of the Maumee, which flows into the west end of Lake Erie. 
General Harrison intended to use the post as a rendezvous point for 
some 4,000 men as well as a collection point for supplies and a staging 
base for an assault upon Detroit and the British post of Fort Malden. 
Harrison was beginning to express doubts to his government about con-
tinuing the operations. Expenses were mounting alarmingly, and he 
hinted broadly that the campaign should be abandoned until spring. 
J ames Monroe, temporarily heading the War Department after the res-
ignation of Eustis, declined for political reasons to assume that respon-
sibility, no doubt because he feared that his and the Madison 
administration's reputation would suffer in the West if the campaign 
were called off. Harrison vacillated and worried that the terms of most 
of his militiamen ran out in FebruaryP 
While collecting his troops and forwarding supplies to the rapids, 
Harrison instructed WInchester to make no advances. WInchester, how-
ever, failed to obey his orders. He was induced to do so by pleas for 
protection from Indians by inhabitants of Frenchtown (now Monroe, 
Michigan), on the Raisin River about thirty-five miles from the rapids. 
No doubt, the report of a considerable quantity of corn and flour at 
Frenchtown destined for Fort Malden entered into WInchester's calcu-
lations. Accordingly, on January 17,1813, approximately 650 Kentucky 
militiamen under Lt. Cols. WIlliam Lewis and John Allen were sent to 
Frenchtown. As they arrived the afternoon of the next day, theyen-
countered and drove off a force of about 50 Canadian militiamen and 
200 Indians. American casualties in this skirmish amounted to 12 killed 
and 55 wounded. The militia performed admirably in this engagement. 
Pvt. Elias Darnall recalled, "In this action the Kentuckians displayed 
great bravery, after being much fatigued with marching on the ice. Cow-
ardice was entirely discountenanced. Each was anxious to excel his fel-
low-soldiers in avenging his injured country."14 
WInchester rushed additional troops to Frenchtown, including 
2 5 a regulars under Col. Samuel Wells, and personally joined his troops, 
which now numbered about 1,000 men. Unfortunately, Gen. Henry 
Procter, the British commander at Fort Malden, dispatched an even 
larger force to Frenchtown. WInchester failed to take proper defensive 
precautions and left his troops in an exposed position. When Procter 
attacked on January 22, the regulars took the brunt of the first assault. 
When militiamen were sent to their support, both were outflanked by 
Indians and Canadian militia. The American regulars and militiamen 
fled in panic, but they were pursued and cut off, and most were killed. 
;
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The remaining American militiamen, although in a defensible position, 
were surrounded and short of ammunition. Also, General WInchester 
and Colonel Lewis had been captured. Maj. George Madison, the Ameri-
can militia leader, was persuaded to surrender upon Procter's assur-
ances of protection from the Indians and proper treatment as prisoners 
of war. Unfortunately, Procter left behind some 80 wounded Kentuck-
ians, many of whom were killed and scalped by drunken Indians. Other 
prisoners were killed or carried off on the march to Malden. Altogether, 
as many as 400 American troops were lost at the disaster on the River 
Raisin at Frenchtown, giving the Westerners a new battle cry, "Re-
member the Raisin!"!5 
The disaster at Frenchtown was not a consequence of a failure of 
the militia. In this instance, they fought bravely until they were over-
whelmed by a superior force. The blame must be attached to WInches-
ter, who foolishly extended his forces deep into enemy territory and 
then failed to take proper defensive precautions, thereby allowing his 
entire force to fall to the enemy. 
After the disaster at Frenchtown, Harrison moved his remaining 
forces of approximately 3,000 to the rapids. He briefly considered an 
offensive operation against Malden, but because of uncertain weather 
and the approaching expiration of the terms of service of a large num-
ber of his Kentucky and Ohio militia, he abandoned what had been an 
extremely expensive and unproductive winter campaign. The troops 
spent their remaining time productively, building a defensive fortifica-
tion near the foot of the rapids on the Maumee River, eventually named 
Fort Meigs. Designed by Capt. Eleazer Wood, a graduate of West Point, 
the nine-acre fort was located on an elevation about 150 yards from the 
river. Harrison proposed to use the fort as a staging base for his assault 
on Canada in the spring.!6 
The government's attitude changed when John Armstrong, Jr., of 
New York replaced James Monroe as secretary of war in February 1813. 
Armstrong took a particularly intolerant stance toward the excessive 
use of militiamen in the West. His attitude was revealed in a private 
letter to the publisher of the Philadelphia Aurora, WIlliam Duane. Al-
luding to the waste in the West, he expressed astonishment that Ken-
tucky governor Isaac Shelby had wanted 15,000 men for the 1813 cam-
paign "and that they must be mounted like Asiatics, and to do what? To 
take a work defended on three sides by pickets! To fight an enemy, not 
more than two thousand, of all colors and Kinds."!7 
Faced with a shortage of funds and appalled at the waste of money 
he perceived in the West, Armstrong reordered the priorities and 
switched the emphasis to the Niagara and St. Lawrence frontiers. He 
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"William Henry Harrison, by Rembrandt Peale. Courtesy of the National 
Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution. 
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informed Harrison that vessels were being built to win control of Lake 
Erie and that Harrison and his troops would be transported across the 
lake to Malden. In the meantime, Harrison was to hold his position. If 
there was a "want of force," he should "retire to the frontier settle-
ments" and place the wilderness between himself and the enemy. 
Harrison was also instructed to avoid additional calls for militias and to 
encourage the recruiting of troops for the three regular regiments to be 
assigned to his command.18 
Harrison was dismayed. "1 must confess," he wrote Armstrong on 
March 27, "that the Idea never occurred to me that the Government 
would be unwilling to keep in the field at least the semblance of an 
army of Militia until the regular troops could be raised." He doubted 
regular regiments could be raised in the West, citing a "disinclination 
to the service which appears to prevail in the western country." He 
suggested "a large auxiliary corps of Militia," and he informed Armstrong 
that prior to receiving Armstrong's letter he had called for 1,500 Ken-
tucky militiamen to protect the stores at Fort Meigs. 19 
In a private letter, Harrison explained his concerns to Armstrong. 
He too had little use for militiamen and much preferred to use regulars. 
"Militia can only be employed with effect, to accomplish a single dis-
tinct object, which will require little time and not much delay, on the 
way." He admitted that thousands had been rushed into the field with 
little thought that they would require subsistence, ammunition, and 
artillery. These items were now abundant, and he asserted that a large 
force was necessary to impress the Indians. "It is decidedly my opin-
ion," he wrote, "that the employment of a large force would not only be 
the most certain, but in the end most economical." He again expressed 
doubts that a large regular force could be raised in the western country, 
and he urged instead that a large volunteer force be called out "to serve 
forty or fifty days after their arrival at the Rapids" and move towards 
Malden. Harrison argued that "the Indians who may not have joined 
the British standard will suspend their operations against our frontiers 
until they see the result." While command of Lake Erie would greatly 
facilitate operations, what if naval superiority was not gained? "What 
will be our situation unless we are prepared to take the other course?" 
He urged Armstrong to release the balance of the 3,000 men organized 
in Kentucky for the protection of the western posts, and he warned 
ominously, "if any disaster happens to any of the posts for the want of 
troops to protect them, the popularity of the administration in the west-
ern country will receive a shock [from] which it will never recover."20 
Indeed, fearing threats to Fort Meigs, Harrison issued a call on 
April 9 to Governor Shelby for 1,500 additional troops on the grounds, 
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as he informed Shelby, "our force should be treble theirs; at present it is 
inferior." Harrison assured Armstrong that once the circumstances were 
understood, he was certain that it would "meet your approbation." In 
Kentucky, despite its early enthusiasm, judging from Governor Isaac 
Shelby's letters to General Harrison and messages to his legislature, a 
major concern was getting the militia to perform its duty. By early 1813 
it was difficult to raise militiamen to replace those who had initially 
volunteered. Perhaps the setbacks suffered by Kentuckians, particularly 
at the River Raisin, affected the enthusiasm for military service. In fact, 
the state had to resort to the draft to fill their complement of troops. 
Shelby wrote to Harrison after inspecting a regiment to be commanded 
by Gen. Green Clay that the "great part of them appeared to be men 
under size and in other respects hardly Kentuckians." Moreover, the 
"better kind of people" hired substitutes.21 
Armstrong discounted the possibility of an attack on Fort Meigs, 
characterizing the clamor for troops as "artificial alarms." He wrote 
smugly to Samuel Huntington of Ohio that there would soon be a regular 
force in the West "competent to the whole service of offence or de-
fence," leaving the militiamen "to their civil pursuits."22 
Armstrong probably never appreciated that but for Harrison's 
prompt action the West might have suffered yet another disaster. In 
fact, the British commander, Gen. Henry Procter, with about 2,400 
men, including about 1,200 Indians led by the renowned Tecumseh, 
attacked Fort Meigs on April 30. Fortunately, Harrison was prepared 
and had on hand about 1,200 effectives, mostly militia, in the fort, and 
General Clay was on the way to the fort with about 1,400 reinforce-
ments. Heavy rain hampered the British seige, but Harrison and his 
men endured a severe bombardment with light casualties (sixteen 
killed).23 
Clay's Kentucky militia arrived at the fort on May 5, while it was 
under siege by the British. Harrison had managed to contact Clay and 
arranged a concerted plan of attack. A force of about 800 under the 
command of Lt. Col. William Dudley would land on the north bank of 
the Maumee, opposite the fort; spike the guns that were bombarding 
the fort; and then retreat across the river to the safety of the fort. A 
second force under Clay would land on the south bank and join with a 
sortie from the fort to disable the British guns on that side of the river 
and then withdraw into the fort. Unfortunately, the attack did not go as 
planned. While Dudley's force captured and spiked the British guns, 
his undisciplined militia, despite orders to withdraw, pursued the en-
emy into the woods only to be met by a counterattack. Three-quarters 
of Dudley's regiment were either killed or captured. Among those killed 
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was Dudley himself, who was attempting to recall his men. On the south 
side, Clay's force landed too close to the fort and came under British 
fire. A sortie from the fort commanded by Col. John Miller, however, 
that was composed of about 350 regulars, volunteers, and militiamen 
successfully spiked the British guns and retreated safely to the fort with 
Clay's men and forty-one prisoners.24 
After the battle on May 5, on May 9, Procter abandoned his siege 
of Fort Meigs and withdrew. Tecumseh reportedly said after the with-
drawal, "It is hard to fight people who live like groundhogs." Harrison 
remarked in general orders on May 9, referring to Dudley's men, "It 
rarely occurs that a general has to complain of the excessive ardor of his 
men, yet such appears always to be the case whenever the Kentucky 
militia are engaged. It is indeed the source of all their misfortunes. They 
appear to think that valor can alone accomplish any thing." While la-
menting the loss of Dudley's men, Harrison's official letter to Armstrong 
on May 13 also cited positive conduct by other militia. It was not sur-
prising that the Pittsburgh Blues and the Petersburg (Virginia) volun-
teers behaved well, he wrote, but that Capt. Uriel Sebree's company of 
Kentucky militia, which fought under Colonel Miller on May 5, "should 
maintain its ground against four times its numbers," he said, " ... is 
astonishing. "25 
Neither Harrison nor Clay was blamed for the loss of Dudley's 
men. Rather, the blame was generally leveled at the militiamen them-
selves. The influential editor Hezekiah Niles published approvingly a 
letter from a correspondent in the West: "The want of discipline and 
subordination in the militia, is indeed truly lamentable," the author 
wrote, "It is most clear that it is owing to this cause we have now to 
lament the loss of so many brave countrymen." Niles also published an 
extract from a letter by William Creighton, Jr., a future Ohio congress-
man, saying that Dudley's men, "in spite of the repeated calls which 
were made from the fort to bring them back to their boats, [they] suf-
fered themselves to be amused and drawn into the woods by some feint 
skirmishing, while the British troops and an immense body of Indians 
were brought Up."26 
In the meantime, as Harrison predicted, recruiting of the regular 
regiments lagged. Armstrong blamed Harrison, who had ordered Briga-
dier General McArthur early in April to Fort Meigs to assist in its de-
fense. McArthur and Brig. Gen. Lewis Cass were assigned to recruit 
the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Regiments in Ohio, and Col. 
Thomas D. Owings the Twenty-eighth Regiment in Kentucky. By July 
1813, Owings and Cass had each raised about 700 recruits each, and 
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McArthur fewer than 500. Harrison argued that considering the situa-
tion the rebuke was unmerited.27 
Ironically, Armstrong perhaps inadvertently contributed to the lack 
of success in recruiting regulars. On February 26, 1813, he authorized 
Congo Richard M.Johnson of Kentucky to raise a regiment of mounted 
volunteers. Colonel Owings noted that his recruiting was hurt by 
Johnson's proposition to give his recruits a dollar a day for four months. 
Moreover, he added, Kentuckians were partial to cavalry service. He 
claimed he could have filled a regiment of cavalry in four weeks.28 
Johnson's mounted riflemen were destined to play an important 
role in the 1813 campaign in the West. Armstrong intended to assign 
Johnson's force to defend the frontier from Indian attacks, but Johnson 
had other ideas. He informed Armstrong on April 13, 1813, that his 
troops would be able to take the field by May 10 and that they had 
volunteered only for invading purposes. Armstrong, however, decided 
that Johnson's troops would probably not be needed, and he wrote 
Johnson on May 5 to inform him of the fact. Johnson, however, had 
called out his volunteers in response to the attack on Fort Meigs. Cit-
ing this crisis, as well as public sentiment and the advice of Governor 
Shelby, Johnson informed Armstrong on May 12 of his action, declar-
ing, "We fondly hope to meet your approbation & sanction."29 
Harrison met with Johnson in Cincinnati, where Johnson's force 
was gathered. By this time the crisis was over. Harrison agreed with 
Johnson that it was probably not wise to disband the mounted volun-
teers, as they "could never again be brought into the field." Harrison 
and Johnson decided that the regiment would sweep the frontier, and 
in early June they moved about 180 miles in six days toward the mouth 
of the St. Joseph River on Lake Michigan, encountering few Indians. 
Then they moved to assist Gen. Green Clay at Fort Meigs, threatened 
by another British force. The threat failed to materialize, and Harrison 
ordered Johnson's regiment to march to Lower Sandusky, where he 
anticipated an attack. Johnson remained hopeful; as he informed 
Harrison, "To be ready to move with you to Detroit and Canada against 
the enemies of our country, is the first wish of our hearts. "30 
Secretary Armstrong, however, ordered Johnson's regiment to 
proceed to Kaskaskia, Illinois, to assist in the defense of the Illinois and 
Missouri Territories. Johnson argued to Harrison that this movement 
would consume most of the time remaining of their service and that 
they should stay where they could be of some use to Harrison. Harrison, 
nevertheless, instructed Johnson to proceed as ordered. Armstrong, 
however, changed his mind and proposed using Johnson's men in the 
invasion of Canada. They would, he suggested, "be useful in making 
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demonstrations by land while you go by water." Johnson's regiment 
had only just arrived at Urbana, Ohio, when it was called back.31 
By early July, Armstrong recognized that a sufficient number of 
regulars was not going to be raised for offensive operations against 
Canada. He authorized the use of Johnson's force and instructed 
Harrison to make up the deficiency of regular troops with militia. 
Harrison quickly appealed to Governor Shelby to send "as many good 
men as you can conveniently collect," up to 2,000 men. He also invited 
the Kentucky governor to accompany the men personally to "be the 
guiding Head and I the hand." Harrison also called upon Governor 
Meigs for two regiments of militiamen and invited him to take the field 
with his militia.32 
In late July, General Procter returned to Fort Meigs and again 
laid siege. Harrison informed Armstrong that the fort was "in every 
respect in a better situation for defence than when besieged before." 
He suspected that the attack was a diversion and that Procter's real 
object was likely the fort at Lower Sandusky, which Harrison admitted 
was "untenable," but he added that "there is nothing in it of any value 
but two hundred barrels of Flour and I have made arrangements for 
withdrawing the garrison and leaving the Fort."33 
Maj. George Croghan of the Seventeenth Infantry, however, a 
nephew of George Rogers Clark who was only twenty-one years old, in 
command of a little over 200 men in Fort Stephenson at Lower Sandusky, 
was determined to hold onto the fort. Harrison took exception to 
Croghan's insubordination, but after explanations were offered he re-
lented and allowed him to stay in command. Croghan was still ordered 
to retreat if possible when the British approached. He did not retreat, 
however, and refused demands for surrender when the British appeared 
before the fort on August 1. The following day a British assault of about 
500 regulars and 700 to 800 Indians was repulsed with heavy casualties, 
inflicted particularly by Croghan'S one artillery piece, a six-pounder 
called "Old Bess." The gun was ably managed by Sergeant Weaver of 
the Virginia volunteers and six members of the Pittsburgh Blues who 
were accidentally in the fort at the time of the attack. The British then 
withdrew. Croghan suffered only one killed and seven wounded, while 
Procter reported twenty-six killed, twenty-nine taken prisoner, and forty-
one wounded. Croghan was voted the thanks of the nation by Con-
gress, was awarded numerous swords and medals, and was brevetted a 
lieutenant-colonel for his heroic defense of Fort Stephenson.34 
On August 11, Harrison informed Armstrong 4,000 militiamen 
would be needed for the campaign. He announced that Commodore 
Oliver Hazard Perry was ready to sail in pursuit of the enemy. Lacking 
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seamen, Perry took volunteers from a Pennsylvania militia regiment. 
The remainder of the regiment, Harrison noted, would join his army 
"provided they get two months pay beforehand." Perry needed more 
volunteers for his little navy, and Harrison gave him 100 of his best 
men. Efforts were made to get every qualified seaman. Meanwhile, 
Harrison prepared to cross the lake as soon as Perry delivered a victory. 
He informed Armstrong that he would have approximately 2,000 regu-
lars and 3,000 militiamen ready to embark between the tenth and fif-
teenth of September once Governor Shelby and the Kentucky volun-
teers arrived. 35 
On September 10, Perry finally engaged the British fleet near Put-
in-Bay and destroyed it after a desperate struggle. He then penned his 
famous letter to Harrison, "We have met the enemy and they are ours," 
which permitted Harrison to plan his assault on Canada. Perry carried 
Harrison's force to Fort Malden, which surrendered on the twenty-
third without opposition; nearby Amherstburg was taken four days later. 
Harrison wrote Armstrong that Procter had retreated to Sandwich and 
that he would pursue him, but there was "no probability of overtaking 
him as he has upwards of 1,000 horses and we have not one in the 
army." Harrison's force amounted to about 5,000 men, approximately 
60 percent of whom were Kentucky militiamen with no constitutional 
scruples about going into Canada, unlike the approximately 500 Penn-
sylvania militiamen who "with the exception of about 100 refused to 
cross the line."36 
Harrison fretted that already his militiamen had "become restless 
and desirous of returning home." They were willing to stay as long as 
there was "a prospect of overtaking the enemy but no human influence 
will keep them any longer." Fortunately, ColonelJohnson, going around 
by land, arrived in Detroit with about a thousand of his mounted regi-
ment on September 30. They began the chase of Procter and caught 
him approximately fifty miles east of Detroit. On October 5, ] ohnson's 
troops played a crucial role in breaking through the British lines with a 
cavalry charge, then wheeling about and catching the British and the 
Indians in crossfire. The remaining Kentucky militiamen played only a 
minor role in the battle. Harrison won a great victory at the Battle of 
the Thames. In his report to Armstrong, Harrison gave credit to 
Johnson'!> force: "Veterans could not have manifested more firmness."37 
Although the British suffered only twelve casualties, another 600 
were taken prisoner at the Thames. The Indians lost at least three dozen 
killed, and others were undoubtedly carried away. Most important, 
Tecumseh was killed in the battle, reportedly by ColonelJohnson him-
self. With the death of Tecumseh and the loss of his marvelous leader-
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ship qualities, the Indian confederacy collapsed. The war was effec-
tively over in the West. Moreover, the American militiamen had re-
deemed their reputation. An article published in the Daily National 
Intelligencer noted that only about 140 regulars were among Harrison's 
force during the battle. The militia, "uninfected by constitutional 
scruples," gave a veteran enemy a "lesson on backwoods tactics." This 
was another "specimen of the enterprise and spirit of the yeomanry of 
the country, when properly organized and brought into action," which 
·was quite different from the Boston militiamen, "who show their valor 
and prowess only in empty bravadoes and ridiculous menaces against 
the constituted authorities of the country!"38 
Harrison's continuing troubles with Armstrong resulted eventu-
ally in his resignation. After his troops were directed to Sackets Harbor 
for defensive purposes on November 3, 1813, Harrison, with nothing 
further to do, asked for permission to return to his district. At a public 
dinner held in his honor at Philadelphia in December 1813, he was 
called upon to make a toast, and he responded by obliquely attacking 
Secretary of War Armstrong and those calling for reliance upon regu-
lars to prosecute the war. He prefaced his toast by stating, "Believing, 
as I do, that a sentiment is gaining ground unfriendly to republicanism 
and injurious to the nation, and knowing from my own experience, that 
the sentiment is not well founded," he gave his toast: "The militia of 
the United States-they possess the Roman spirit, and when our gov-
ernment shall think proper to give them that organization and disci-
pline of which they are susceptible, they will perform deeds that will 
emulate those of the legions led by Marcellus, and Scipio."39 Relations 
between Harrison and Armstrong, never good, deteriorated even more 
in the months that followed. 
When Armstrong bypassed the chain of command and sent or-
ders directly to Brig. Gen. Benjamin Howard to remain in charge of 
frontier defense rather than assuming command at Detroit as Harrison 
had ordered, Harrison wrote indignantly to Armstrong, "I think, Sir, I 
have a right to complain of that order, both as to its matter and man-
ner." He hinted broadly that he might retire if he did not receive more 
consideration.4o 
Sending orders directly to an officer, bypassing his superior, was 
not an uncommon practice in the War Department. The justification 
was that delays would occur by sending such orders through military 
channels. The commanding officer was usually sent a copy of the order 
as a courtesy. Armstrong's response to Harrison was not conciliatory. 
"As a general principle," he wrote, "it cannot be doubted but that the 
Government has a right to dispose of the Officers of the Army as they 
'
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may think best for the public interest." Shortly afterward Armstrong 
ordered Maj. Andrew H. Holmes to lead an expedition against Mackinac. 
At the same time, however, he sent a courtesy copy of his letter to 
Harrison. Col. George Croghan, Holmes's superior, refused to allow 
Holmes to leave without orders from Harrison. Croghan wrote 
Harrison, "Were I a general commanding a district, I would be very far 
from suffering the secretary of war, or any other authority, to interfere 
with my internal police."41 
Eventually, the matter was resolved, with President Madison's in-
tervention, by enlarging the scope of the expedition and by Armstrong's 
placing Croghan in command. This incident was apparently the last 
straw for Harrison, who submitted his resignation to Armstrong on 
May 11, effective May 31, 1814. Harrison may have hoped that the 
president would encourage him to stay in the army and would perhaps 
rein in Armstrong, but Armstrong did not give Madison time to reflect. 
When Madison returned to Washington from his home in Virginia, he 
learned that Armstrong had not only accepted Harrison's resignation 
but had also filled the vacant major general slot with Andrew Jackson. 
Madison was furious, but he accepted Armstrong's action. This inci-
dent, however, triggered an investigation by Madison into Armstrong's 
conduct that would lead to a reprimand several months later.42 
Croghan s combined force of approximately 700 regulars and Ohio 
militiamen left Detroit on July 3 on his expedition against Mackinac 
Island. Bad weather and other factors delayed his assault until August 4, 
but the well-entrenched British repulsed his attack with heavy casual-
ties. Croghan gave up the assault and returned to Detroit. In his ac-
count of the battle, Croghan was generous in his praise of the Ohio 
militia, who were "wanting in no part of their duty. Col. [William] 
Cotgreave, his officers and soldiers, deserve the warmest approbation. "43 
Brigadier General McArthur replaced Harrison as commander of 
the Eighth Military District and was instructed to assist Maj. Gen. Jacob 
Brown on the Niagara peninsula. By the time he raised a force of 1,000 
men in late July 1814 and was ready to move from Cleveland to Buffalo, 
the Battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane had already taken place. 
McArthur was concerned that his movement would be too late, and he 
worried that the British might move against Detroit during his absence. 
He therefore called out 1,000 militiamen from Kentucky and 500 from 
Ohio to march to Detroit immediately. McArthur joined Brown on 
August 8, but such was his concern that Brown released McArthur and 
some of his force to return to Detroit. McArthur's fears proved to be 
groundless.44 
McArthur's call for militiamen upset Governor Shelby. He wrote 
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Armstrong that it was "a matter of surprise" that Kentuckians should 
be called to march through the populous state of Ohio to garrison a 
post on their frontier. Shelby stated that he would comply with the 
callout, but he declared that the troops should be given one or two 
months' pay in advance. It was clear that the burden of the war was 
testing Kentucky's resolve.45 
The war wound down in the West without any more major en-
gagements. One of the last expeditions, carried out in November 1814 
by General McArthur, was a sweep toward Burlington on the Grand 
River. McArthur's account of the campaign, which had no significant 
results, noted the usual problems and the mixed results in using militia. 
Only twenty Michigan militiamen agreed to accompany his movement, 
he wrote, but six deserted, and the remainder were sent back. On the 
other hand, his volunteer rangers performed wel1.46 
The military successes in the West during the War of 1812 were 
attributable to the militia. Overall, however, the record was undistin-
guished. Victories at the Thames and the successful defense of Fort 
Meigs and Fort Stephenson were offset by defeats at Brownstown, De-
troit, and the River Raisin. Innumerable problems were caused by the 
use of militia, and greater success would undoubtedly have been pos-
sible with a well-equipped, disciplined regular force. Nevertheless, the 
Indians were defeated and, with the success of Commodore Perry, the 
British were expelled from the West. 
5
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Chapter 6 
The Militia and the 
War on the Northern Front 
T he northern front, the St. Lawrence and the Niagara peninsula, 
was the most active and critical front during the War of 1812. 
Here the British contested Americans more severely and over a longer 
period than in any other region. Here also, more than in any other area 
of the country, the mettle of the militia was tested. Sadly, the perfor-
mance of the militia reflected in microcosm its general lack of effective-
ness throughout the war, weak discipline, poor leadership, and lack of 
supplies. Occasionally, when the circumstances were right, the men per-
formed adequately when they were properly motivated and properly led. 
The Niagara region was bounded on the north by Lake Ontario 
and on the south by Lake Erie. The peninsula that separated the two 
protagonists was bisected by the north-flowing Niagara River (and its 
famous falls). To the west was Upper Canada, to the east New York. At 
the southern or Lake Erie end of the river was Fort Erie in Canada. 
Not far away on the American side lay Buffalo and Black Rock, the only 
sizable towns in the region. Down the river, below Grand Island, Fort 
Schlosser in New York and Fort Chippewa in Canada guarded each 
other. Below the falls, the small American village of Lewiston faced 
nearby Queenston on the Canadian side. Facing each other across the 
river on the Ontario shore were the British Fort George and the Ameri-
can Fort Niagara. The Niagara frontier was unprepared, even for de-
fense, on the eve of the declaration of war in 1812. Citizens of Black 
Rock, alarmed by the military activity on the Canadian side, warned 
New York congressman and militia quartermaster general Peter B. Porter 
on April 15, 1812, about the lack of arms and ammunition. A volunteer 
militia force had been organized to stand sentry at Lewiston, Slosser, 
and Black Rock, but, they added, "there is not five muskets that is fit to 
use in this place & they are not to be had in this quarter."j 
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New Yorks militia quota under the act of April 10, was 13,500, 
and Governor Daniel D. Tompkins was well aware that his militia com-
panies called out were destitute of arms, camp equipment, blankets, 
and other items. He suggested, hopefully, to Porter that as u.s. volun-
teers were entitled to two months' pay and an allowance of sixteen dol-
lars for clothing under the Act of February 6, 1812, "Perhaps the whole 
[militia] will now sign as Volunteers considering the advantages of that 
act." A week after the war began, Tompkins, warned that Fort Niagara 
was endangered, hastily authorized the movement of two cannons, with 
balls, powder, and other supplies, to the Niagara frontier, and he ap-
pointed Brig. Gen. William Wadsworth to command the militia at Black 
Rock. Wadsworth, however, confessed that he lacked military experi-
ence and was "ignorant of even the minor duties of the duty you have 
assigned me," and accordingly he asked for a "military secretary." 
Tompkins complied with Wadsworth's request, but he also assigned Brig. 
Gen. Amos Hall to overall command until Maj. Gen. Stephen Van 
Rensselaer could assume the post in mid-July.2 
Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, the regular army officer command-
ing the northern front, mobilized the militia to protect Fort Niagara. 
Militiamen flocked to the frontier in such numbers that they quickly 
exceeded the quartermaster's ability to meet their supply needs. Gen-
eral Hall informed Governor Tompkins on July 4 that his force at Black 
Rock amounted to 2,800, including 300 regulars. Some 1,000 militia, 
however, could "remain but a short time in service. They have left their 
farms, their crops, their all, and will be ruined if they cannot soon re-
turn to their homes." They could not be accommodated anyway, due to 
shortages of tents and camp equipage. Hall added, "The disorders inci-
dent to camps thus formed of citizens will prove more fatal in one sea-
son that [sic] two campaigns of hard fighting."3 
After taking command, General Van Rensselaer wasted little time 
before he projected offensive operations. A planned attack on a ten-gun 
British schooner at Prescott (opposite Ogdensburg) on the St. Lawrence 
was aborted, however, when only sixty-six men volunteered for the ser-
vice.4 It seems that Van Rensselaer had failed to check first with his 
militiamen as to who would volunteer to cross into Canada. Nor does 
he seem to have learned from this experience, for he repeated the mis-
take later, with infinitely greater consequences. 
Van Rensselaer complained constantly to General Dearborn about 
the condition of his troops. Some were without shoes; they lacked all 
types of supplies, including ammunition. Many were sick, and morale 
was low. Hull's troops, taken prisoner at Detroit, were marched through 
Queenston, on the opposite side of the Niagara River, "in full view of 
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my camp," Van Rensselaer wrote. "The effects produced by this event 
are such as you will readily imagine." The effect obviously produced on 
Van Rensselaer was one of foreboding, for he wrote, ""While we are 
thus growing daily weaker, our enemy is growing stronger," and he 
warned Dearborn that he could act only on the defensive. Dearborn 
gave contradictory advice in response. He encouraged Van Rensselaer 
to retaliate, to avenge the misfortunes of Detroit at '~the earliest oppor-
tunity," and to "be prepared to make good a secure retreat, as the last 
resort. "5 
Van Rensselaer was senior officer of the New York l1}ilitia, and as 
a Federalist (he was the partys candidate for governor in 1813), it was 
hoped that he would bring other Federalists to support the war. He had 
no previous military experience, but he was assisted by his kinsman Col. 
Solomon Van Rensselaer, who had fought under General Anthony 
Wayne in the Indian Wars of the 1790s. Solomon complained that 
General Van Rensselaer's usefulness was being undermined by Quar-
termaster General Porter, John C. Spencer, and others "to answer party 
purposes ... He cannot enforce that subordination which is so neces-
sary to the safety and the glory of the troops he commands."6 
Governor Tompkins indeed received complaints that the militia-
men lacked confidence in Van RensselaerJ The general admitted later 
that criticism about his lack of action prompted him to plan an attack 
across the Niagara River at Queenston Heights. The assault was sup-
posed to begin on October 11, but it had to be aborted when a boat 
with all the oars mysteriously disappeared down the river. The invasion 
began on October 13 when a small force of about 200 regulars and 
militia, led by Col. Solomon Van Rensselaer, began the attack against 
withering fire from the British. After Colonel Van Rensselaer was 
wounded, Capt. John E. Wool of the regulars rallied the troops to scale 
the heights. Initial attempts by the British to counterattack, which led 
to the death of their commander, Gen. Isaac Brock, were rebuffed. 
General Van Rensselaer called for reinforcements, but the New York 
militia, on the American shore, observing the dead and wounded being 
carried across the river, refused to cross, despite everything Van 
Rensselaer could do to stir them. 
In his report to General Dearborn the next day, Van Rensselaer 
asserted, "I can only add that the victory was really won; but lost for the 
want of a small reinforcement. One third part of the idle men might have 
saved all." Historians have generally followed Van Rensselaer's lead in 
laying the blame for the loss at Queenston Heights on the militia. It 
should be noted, however, that about 500 militiamen did volunteer to 
cross. Among the approximately 950 American prisoners, there were 
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378 militia. Those who crossed apparently behaved well, at least until 
attacked by Indians, whose war whoops precipitated a rapid flight by 
many to the bank of the river where, one observer noted, many "regu-
lars and militia" hovered. When General Van Rensselaer, who had 
crossed to the Canadian side, returned to gather reinforcements, he 
had to share his boat back to the American shore with soldiers fleeing 
the battle. The effect of this retreat on the militiamen can easily be 
imagined. They had flocked to the shore when the battle began, under 
no discipline or any particular command by militia officers. When they 
were belatedly asked to volunteer by General Van Rensselaer, the battle 
was going badly; not surprisingly they refused.8 
Unfortunately, Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth's 1,500 regulars were 
not used for the attack. Smyth was given command of the regular forces 
on the Niagara frontier on September 13, 1812, and it became clear 
that he did not want to serve under a militia officer. He arrived in Buf-
falo and reported by letter to General Van Rensselaer on September 
29. Smyth declined a personal interview, stating that in his opinion the 
best place for an offensive was between Fort Erie and Chippewa, so he 
was encamping near Buffalo to prepare for such operations. Van 
Rensselaer responded to this display of arrogance by declaring that he 
had studied the situation carefully and was determined to adhere to his 
plan for a crossing at Queenston Heights.9 
Smyth's letter suggested that unless compelled to do so, he in-
tended to operate separately rather than place his force under a militia 
officer. Van Rensselaer, in fact, entertained the idea that the two forces 
might operate separately, with the regulars attacking Fort George, near 
Lake Ontario, while his militia force took Queenston. Despite Van 
Rensselaer's efforts to effect a meeting, Smyth stalled. Van Rensselaer 
thus failed to have a council of war, but he determined to attack anyway. 
He explained to Secretary of War Eustis, "Such was the pressure upon 
me from all quarters that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might 
involve me in suspicion and the service in disgrace."lo 
On October 10, Van Rensselaer ordered Smyth to strike his tents 
and march to Lewiston (twenty-seven miles from Buffalo). The intended 
assault was aborted on the eleventh, however, and Van Rensselaer, for 
reasons that are unclear, countermanded his order and instructed Smyth 
to return to his camp. The next day, October 12, Van Rensselaer again 
placed Smyth's force on alert for another march. Smyth's troops even-
tually made it to Lewiston after the battle was over. Smyth's assessment 
was that had he been ordered down in time to assist in the assault, "all 
would have been well." He faulted Van Rensselaer for attacking prema-
turely, for crossing at the most difficult part of the river, and for failing 
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to ascertain beforehand whether the militia would cross over. Still, 
Smyth's account does not excuse Smyth's reluctance to cooperate be-
forehand. II 
Governor Tompkins informed the New York legislature after the 
Battle of Queenston that "reverses are to be expected in the first outsets 
of inexperienced troops." He also called attention to the inequities of 
the militia draft. Those over forty-five years old, he noted, presumably 
the wealthiest part of the community, were exempt from militia duty 
and were subjected to no contribution or duty in time of war. More-
over, because the penalty for disobeying calls for service was "pecuniary 
only," the eligible wealthy, by paying "a trifling amount," escaped the 
dangers and burdens of service. The indigent alone were required to 
make the sacrifices of defending their fellow citizens and for a compen-
sation that was "a mere pittance." Tompkins urged that "the hardships 
and perils of defending the country shall be more equitably diffused."12 
It is unlikely that Tompkins was pandering to the public for political 
gain. What he said was true, but changing the militia system during a 
war was questionable. 
In the aftermath of the Battle of Queenston, Van Rensselaer asked 
to be relieved of his duties. Smyth assumed the command, but he inher-
ited the same undisciplined and discontented militia, and his regulars 
were little better than raw militiamen. Capt. William King reported 
that the Twelfth and Fourteenth regular regiments lacked arms and 
equipment, as well as clothing, tents, and medical supplies. The 
Fourteenth's arms were in "infamously bad order," and the troops were 
"ignorant of their duty." He added, "They are mere militia, and, if pos-
sible, even worse; and if taken into action in their present state, will 
prove more dangerous to themselves than to their enemy."13 
Smyth wrote Secretary Eustis on October 20, 1812, asking for 
more regular troops. "Place no confidence in detached militia," he wrote, 
"they have disgraced the nation." In fact, Col. Thomas Parker advised 
Smyth to call off the campaign, citing the lack of discipline in the regu-
lars and the little confidence that could be placed in the militia. Parker 
asserted that the militia at Buffalo included only one company "that 
would not corrupt any regular troops that they might be associated with." 
Even that company would not be willing to be subjected to regular 
discipline. The militiamen and volunteers, he wrote, should be formed 
into a distinct brigade and "put under strict drill. If they will not bear 
this, they had better be at home."14 
While Smyth awaited the arrival of about 2,000 Pennsylvania mi-
litia, a mutiny broke out in Brig. Gen. Daniel Miller's brigade in Buf-
falo on November 1. At least 100 militiamen stacked their arms and left 
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camp, while another 100 stacked their arms and stood by them. No 
effort was made to return those who left, but those who remained were 
placated by General Miller with a promise of better quarters. Lt. Col. 
].W Livingston, aide to Governor Tompkins and acting deputy adju-
tant general, inspected General Miller's brigade on November 4, after 
which he declared that the brigade was "little better than an undisci-
plined rabble." The want of order, he believed, was due to "the igno-
rance of the officers and the great familiarity which exists between them 
and their men." Nor was it likely to change, he noted, "while such ma-
terials are employed for officers."15 
At least four militiamen were shot for desertion and one for mu-
tiny. One officer, Capt. John Phillips, was court-martialed but was found 
not guilty for not using his "utmost endeavors to stop a mutiny." Gen-
eral Smyth approved the decision; yet he also declared that "an officer 
present at a mutiny, who never draws his sword and uses only words, 
cannot be said to use his utmost endeavors to suppress it." General 
Miller and several of his officers were dismissed and the remaining 
members of his brigade consolidated with other units. 16 
On November 9, Smyth informed General Dearborn that two 
militia regiments, one at Utica and another at Manlius (near Syracuse), 
as well as a volunteer company at Buffalo, had mutinied because they 
had received no pay. Also, another volunteer militia company threat-
ened not to cross into Canada unless it received pay and a clothing 
allowance. To add to his laments, Smyth noted a great amount of sick-
ness in his camp.17 
Meanwhile, 2,000 Pennsylvania militiamen called out by Gover-
nor Simon Snyder on August 25 to rendezvous at Meadville on Sep-
tember 25 moved tardily toward Buffalo. Governor Snyder pointedly 
noted in his call that the patriotism of the volunteers was "too sincere 
and ardent to permit them to make any objections to crossing the bound-
ary line of the United States; otherwise they will render no service to 
their country." Smyth asked General Dearborn on November 9 whether 
the Pennsylvania militiamen could be forced to cross the line. "I am 
told they will refuse." When the Pennsylvania militiamen finally ar-
rived in Buffalo on November 18, Smyth quickly queried their com-
mander, Brig. Gen. Adamson Tannehill, on this point. Tannehill re-
plied that 413 of the approximately 2,000 troops had volunteered. IS 
On November 10, Smyth issued a bombastic proclamation calling 
for volunteers, declaring that his troops would soon "plant the Ameri-
can standard in Canada." Nevertheless, Smyth twice embarked his 
troops, and twice disembarked them, without making a crossing. It did 
not appear that the British would have offered much opposition to a 
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landing. In fact, while the troops were on board ships after the first 
embarkation, three American sailors crossed over to the opposite shore 
and spent two hours burning houses and stores, shooting "fowls, ducks, 
and pigs," and returned unmolested with loot taken from the houses. 19 
Smyth s defense was that he had been ordered by General Dearborn 
to make the assault with 3,000 men and that on the first occasion he had 
only 1,465 men and on the second only 1,500. Although as many as 
7,000 troops were in and around Buffalo, many were physically in no 
condition to cross over, others were in such a state of discipline that 
they would have been totally unreliable, and some, such as the Pennsyl-
vania militia, simply refused to cross into Canada. Smyth gave a hint of 
his feeling in a statement to a committee of citizens on December 3. 
"The affair at Queenston," he wrote, "is a caution against relying on 
crowds who go to the bank of the Niagara to look on a battle as on a 
theatrical exhibition, who if they are disappointed of the sight break 
their muskets, or if they are without rations for a day, desert."2o 
Smyth supposedly said after the second debarkation that he "could 
not depend on the militia and had not regular troops sufficient." The 
outraged militiamen reportedly offered $1,500 for his person (presum-
ably alive), and they "fired off all of their ammunition and disembodied 
themselves." Smyth was "universally denounced as a coward and a trai-
tor; he was shot at several times, and was hooted through the streets of 
Buffalo. He was shifting his tent in every direction in order to avoid the 
indignation of the soldiers." Reportedly, "every tavern keeper in and 
near Buffalo, declined the infamy of his company."21 
Among those harshly critical of Smyth was Brig. Gen. Peter B. 
Porter, who embarked with volunteer militiamen and was bitterly dis-
appointed when they were disembarked. He openly denounced Smyth 
as a coward and a traitor. In a letter to the editor of the Buffalo Gazette 
on December 8, he ascribed the "late disgrace ... to the cowardice of 
General Smyth," and he promised to submit "a true account" of those 
events. Smyth, who had not responded to taunts heretofore, now chal-
lenged Porter to a duel, and the two met on the fourteenth on Grand 
Island. Shots were exchanged without damage, and after "mutual ex-
planations" a reconciliation was effected. The next day, Porter's account 
of the events appeared in the Buffalo Gazette. He stated that he had 
received assurances from General Smyth, which "as a man of honor I 
am bound to believe," that he was following instructions from the sec-
retary of war and General Dearborn. Still, Porter estimated a force of 
between 2,000 and 2,600 in the first embarkation. "The men," he de-
clared, "were in fine spirits and desirous of crossing," so the order to 
disembark produced "great discontent and murmuring." After the sec-
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ond order to disembark on December 1, Porter wrote, "A scene of con-
fusion ensued which is difficult to describe, about 4000 men, without 
order or restraint, discharging their muskets in every direction."22 
Smyth disputed Porter's figures and again asserted that only 1,500 
men were willing to cross the river. He added, "It is an error to rely on 
troops except those who are bound to obey." He asserted that only 360 
Pennsylvania militiamen were prepared to cross. It was true the re-
mainder went to Black Rock but, he said sarcastically, "I presume to be 
spectators."B 
Obviously, Smyth did not assault Canada because he lacked faith 
in the militia and believed his force inadequate not only quantitatively 
but also qualitatively. In fact, the militiamen on hand gave literal mean-
ing to the word "mob." A dispute arose between a Mr. Pomeroy, a well-
known Federalist who kept a hotel in Buffalo, and certain volunteers, 
particularly those from Baltimore (some of whom may have partici-
pated in the riot there in July) and the so-called Irish Greens from Al-
bany and New York City. On November 25 a mob of some forty or so 
from these companies stormed the hotel, broke furniture, damaged the 
hotel, and actually set it afire three or four times. Each time the fire was 
put out by local citizens for fear it would consume the village. A citizen 
who tried to intervene was bayonetted but not mortally. An artillery 
company was brought in to clear the house. The mob resisted with 
fury; at least two were killed, and others were wounded. Several went to 
get their weapons, intending to return and engage the artillery com-
pany, but they were dissuaded by their officers. The artillery company 
had to place its encampment under guard to deter any assault. About 
300 regular troops were posted to protect the village of Buffalo.24 
In the aftermath of Smyth's cancellation of the invasion, large 
numbers of militiamen deserted. Some 600 Pennsylvania militiamen 
deserted within twenty-four hours, and nearly that many left in the 
next few days. Discontented since their arrival, the Pennsylvanians, liv-
ing in tents, had been much exposed to the weather and sickness. Gen-
eral Tannehill lamented that a large number of officers joined their 
troops in deserting. He hinted to Smyth that his remaining force (267 
privates, plus officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians) should 
be dismissed before they added to the exodus. He argued that to hold his 
force any longer, raising expenses without any benefits, "would only be 
an accumulation of the same evil." General Smyth organized the remain-
ing force into a battalion under one of the majors and dismissed General 
Tannehill and the other field officers. This battalion, however, was dis-
banded within two weeks.25 The Pennsylvania militiamen contributed 
nothing to the campaign; their presence was in fact a disruptive element. 
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Much chagrined by his failure to invade Canada and perhaps fear-
ing for his safety, Smyth asked for and was granted permission to retire 
from the army.26 He turned over the command to Col. Moses Porter, 
who presided over a much diminished force as the year drew to a close. 
Elsewhere, Maj. Gen Henry Dearborn finally began his belated 
march toward the Canadian border near Lake Champlain in Novem-
ber 1812. He included in his army of 5,000 approximately 2,000 New 
York and Vermont militia. Not only was the season late and the weather 
bad, but the army was short on supplies and tents. When Dearborn 
learned that only about half of the militiamen would cross the border, 
he called off his campaign. No additional fighting occurred during the 
winter of 1812-1813, as both sides waited until spring to renew the 
conflict.27 
Thus the first year of war had passed, and the nation was reeling 
from unanticipated military failures. A war had been declared, but the 
nation was unprepared to fight. The militia, which was to be the pri-
mary force for waging the war, was simply not organized, trained, disci-
plined, equipped, armed, or ready. The failures of the first year, in fact, 
revealed that militias were unlikely to be useful at all for conducting 
any offensive operations-and only marginally useful for defensive pur-
poses. 
Editor Joseph Gales reluctantly concluded in the National 
Intelligencer in December 1812 that the war was not going well for the 
Americans. "Every day's experience," he wrote, "tends to force on our 
minds a conviction we are unwilling to receive, that the volunteer mili-
tia are not precisely the species of force on which to rely for carrying on 
war, however competent they may be to repel invasion." The doctrine 
that they could not be ordered beyond the limits of the United States 
contributed to "the disastrous events of Queenston and the disgraceful 
scenes recently exhibited at Black Rock."28 
The wet spring of 1813 delayed the planting and made farmers 
reluctant to respond to calls to volunteer. A friend informed Peter B. 
Porter on May 10, 1813, "Nothing short of a cannonading will start 
them." After planting was done, he said, "all say they will then turn out 
for ten or twelve days."29 
In the meantime, John Armstrong, Jr., ofN ew York replaced Eustis 
as secretary of war in February 1813. Armstrong had useful insights 
into how to prosecute the war, but he lacked the resolve to persevere 
with his plans and allowed others to modify his proposals. His weakness 
was shown shortly after he took office. He recommended offensive op-
erations, proposing first that General Dearborn attack Kingston, the 
British naval station at the head of the St. Lawrence, then move against 
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York (present-day Toronto) and the ships being built there, and then 
proceed against Forts George and Erie, at each end of the Niagara pen-
insula.30 Dearborn, however, supported by Comm. Isaac Chauncey, 
commander of the U.S. fleet on Lake Ontario, persuaded Armstrong to 
alter the plan by attacking York first, then Forts George and Erie, be-
fore moving against Kingston. 
While the Americans were occupied in the successful attacks upon 
York and Fort George, the British assaulted Sackets Harbor, the Ameri-
can naval headquarters at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, on May 29, 
which was lightly defended by about 400 regulars and approximately 
500 militiamen led by militia generalJacob Brown. The militiamen fired 
prematurely, broke ranks, and fled. Lt. Col. John Mills of the Albany 
volunteers was killed trying to stop the flight of his troops. In his battle 
report, Brown was critical of the militia, which he described as "raw 
troops unaccustomed to subordination." Fortunately, with support from 
the regulars and some militia, Brown drove off the British. He was re-
warded with a commission of brigadier general in the regular army.31 
W'hile approximately 2,000 Americans occupied Fort George, the 
British operated nearby, successfully harassing the troops inside and 
still menacing Americans along the Niagara peninsula. Thus free to 
carry out offensive operations, a British force of about 300 regulars and 
forty militia, commanded by Lt. Col. Cecil Bisshopp, landed on the 
morning ofJuly 11 below Black Rock. Raw American militiamen acting 
as pickets fled without giving an alarm. Maj. Parmenio Adams, com-
manding about 200 militiamen at Black Rock, although surprised and 
called upon to surrender, was able to retreat in good order. The British 
set fire to the military barracks and blockhouse and ate breakfast at the 
home of General Porter, who fled before their arrival. The British also 
plundered public stores and the houses of some inhabitants. 
Porter went to Buffalo, rallied Adams's men, added another mili-
tia company and some thirty to forty Indians from the Six Nations, and 
led them back to Black Rock. He routed the British, who fled in boats. 
As the British floated down the Niagara River, the American militia-
men and Indians followed along the bank and laid down a murderous 
fire. At one point the British hoisted the flag of surrender, but it was a 
ruse to escape, which they accomplished. Among those wounded on 
the boats was Colonel Bisshopp, who subsequently died. Altogether, 
the entire British loss (killed, wounded, and prisoners) amounted to 
nearly 100. American losses were minimal, with four killed and as many 
wounded. Two Indians were also wounded. This was the first battle in 
which Indians were used on the American side. Porter praised their 
gallantry in his letter to General Dearborn, and he added that they 
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"committed no acts of cruelty." It was true they asked permission to 
scalp the slain, but they "evinced no displeasure" when this was refused. 
Porter also praised the militiamen, whose conduct "would have reflected 
credit on veteran troops," but he tempered this praise by saying, "and it 
is not less creditable to them as soldiers and citizens than that of their 
companions who basely deserted them, is disgraceful."32 
The Battle of Black Rock marked the emergence of Peter B. Por-
ter as the quintessential militia leader of the war. A friend and ally of 
Daniel D. Tompkins, Porter had served in the state legislature and Con-
gress. He actively supported war and was one of the "War Hawks." His 
brother, Augustus, headed the firm of Porter, Barton, and Company, 
the main contractor for U.S. forces in the Northwest, headquartered in 
the town of Black Rock, now a part of Buffalo. Part guerrilla leader and 
part military chieftain, Porter played an important role on the Niagara 
frontier for the remainder of the war. He never received a regular com-
mission, which he richly deserved, perhaps because he never secured an 
independent command that allowed him to gain distinction. Still, he 
was extremely successful in getting the most out of his troops, and he 
demonstrated persuasively that militiamen, capably led, were effective 
fighters. 33 
Porter was concerned that the government was focusing on other 
places to the neglect of the Niagara frontier. He was provoked to write 
a bitter letter to Secretary of War Armstrong. Every man of common 
sense, he asserted, knew that for the past two months "a vigorous and 
well-directed exertion of three or four days" would have defeated the 
whole enemy force on the Niagara frontier. Instead, the frontier was 
exposed, and the American force at Fort George "lies panic-struck, shut 
up and whipped in by a few hundred miserable savages." Brig. Gen. 
John Boyd, commander of the American forces at Fort George, even 
urged Porter to induce 200 Indians to join the Americans at Fort George 
to "punish the temerity of the scouting parties of the enemy."34 
Porter instead proposed an offensive, with about 1,200 men, com-
posed equally of regulars, volunteers, and Indians crossing the river, 
attacking Chippewa, and then moving toward Fort George, while Boyd 
would send a force in the opposite direction and catch the British in a 
vise. Porter believed a "united force of 3000 men" could easily capture 
all the British stations to the head of Lake Ontario and "disperse the 
whole of their army." Boyd responded that he was barred "from under-
taking any enterprise when the hazard is not more than counterbal-
anced by the probability of success."35 
Apparently anticipating a negative response, Porter, with about 
200 Indians joined to 200 regulars and volunteer militia, crossed the 
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Niagara River near Fort Erie on August 3 and captured a considerable 
quantity of livestock and public and private stores. The Indians, Porter 
related, were "active and expert" in taking prisoners and were generally 
well behaved. While cattle and horses were being transferred across the 
river, however, "a few unprincipled rascals from our shore crossed the 
river and with a few Indians strayed off, unknown to the officers, and 
plundered several private homes." Porter and "respectable" Indian lead-
ers undertook to restore the ill-gotten plunder, but he informed Gen. 
Boyd that he could not with propriety ask the Indians to return cattle 
and horses that were private property. The value of the property was 
about $1,000, and Porter suggested that perhaps it would "be best for 
the Government to pay for it than to take it away." Boyd responded that 
since the expedition "was intended to effect a desirable public object," 
he approved selling the cattle and horses and dividing the proceeds 
among the Indians.36 
For various reasons, lack of control of Lake Ontario, a change in 
command with Maj. Gen. James Wilkinson taking over, and other cir-
cumstances, the proposed attack on Kingston was delayed. When the 
British fleet appeared offshore near Fort George in early August, Boyd, 
fearing an attack, urged Porter to bring on his force immediately. They 
arrived on August 14, but by then the scare had abated. Porter's volun-
teers and Indians, impatient to engage the enemy, gained Boyd's ap-
proval to assault British pickets near Fort George. On the morning of 
the seventeenth, Maj. Cyrenius Chapin, Porter's second in command, 
led about 300 volunteers and Indians, with 200 regulars under Maj. 
William Cummings, against the British pickets. A heavy rain kept the 
enterprise from being totally successful. The enemy escaped but suf-
fered heavy casualties, and at least fifteen were captured. Americans 
lost two Indians killed and a few wounded. Despite a taste of battle, 
Porter's volunteers feared their absence left Buffalo exposed to British 
depredations. Boyd permitted Porter's force to leave on August 29, but 
the British fleet reappeared offF ort George the next day. Porter stopped 
his troops at Lewiston and advised Boyd that he had sent Major Chapin 
on to Buffalo to raise more troops and that he would await ordersY 
Once again a threatened attack failed to materialize. 
In anticipation of a movement of regulars from Fort George, 2,000 
militiamen were called out for three months' service on August 25. Those 
who had served in 1812 were specifically exempted. Governor Tompkins 
assigned the command to Brig. Gen. George McClure and reminded 
him that the defense of the frontier might be left to the militia. The 
usual problems were encountered in gathering the troops; arms were 
short and only half of the camp equipment arrived. McClure assured 
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Tompkins on September 10 that he would establish military discipline. 
That same day, McClure called upon his troops in the bombastic fash-
ion of Smyth, to support their country and yield to discipline, for "with-
out it an army is no better than a mob ... useless to their country and a 
plague to themselves. "38 
McClure continued to issue embarrassing, melodramatic procla-
mations. On October 2, he urged the militiamen to accompany him 
across the Niagara, and he ridiculed those who cited the injunctions of 
the Constitution. "The General desires no faint-hearted effeminate 
poltroons, who cannot bring their courage to the sticking point to go 
with him," he declared. "The path of duty, of honor and glory is before 
you." McClure also appealed for 1,000 volunteers to join him.39 
At this same time, General Harrison's defeat of the British at the 
Battle of the Thames enabled Secretary Armstrong to bring Harrison's 
regulars to the Niagara frontier for defensive purposes. About 1,300 
arrived in Buffalo on October 24 on their way to Fort George. McClure, 
now at Fort George, persuaded Harrison that offensive operations were 
appropriate to dislodge a British force at Burlington Heights, about 
fifty miles to the west. Early in November, McClure informed Gover-
nor Tompkins that Harrison had authorized a further requisition of 
1,000 militiamen to repair to Fort George by November 12. With a 
reinforcement of 1,500 volunteers and militia, McClure wrote, "I will 
undertake to obtain possession of Burlington Heights." He added that 
his men were "under good discipline and perfect subordination; an equal 
number of the enemy cannot, I am confident, stand before them." 
Harrison also wrote Tompkins that it was urgent for the attack to be 
made before the enemy strengthened its position.40 
Secretary Armstrong, apparently unaware of the plans at Fort 
George, issued orders to General Harrison on November 3 to send his 
troops to reinforce Sackets Harbor. Harrison protested that this would 
leave Fort George practically defenseless. McClure implored Harrison 
not to abandon the expedition, but Harrison had no alternative. His 
troops embarked for Sackets Harbor on November 15, which "knocked 
in the head" the proposed Burlington expedition.41 
McClure apparently believed he had to use the volunteers for some 
purpose or they would return home. On November 21, he informed 
Governor Tompkins of a projected "movement towards the enemy," 
but he mentioned only raiding some mills for flour. He also noted with 
some concern that the term of service of his regular militiamen was 
growing short. In fact, Armstrong authorized McClure on November 
25 to call 1,000 militiamen to replace those whose terms were expiring. 
Tompkins immediately alerted Maj. Gen. Amos Hall to organize the 
l es."3
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requisite number of men and march them to the frontier as quickly as 
possible.42 
Meanwhile, on November 26, McClure marched about 1,300 men 
out of Fort George toward Burlington. After about twenty miles, con-
fronted by bad roads, bad weather, and evidence that the enemy was 
preparing to meet their advance, McClure chose, upon the "advice of 
every field officer in the brigade," to retire to the safety of the fort. Still, 
he claimed, 400 barrels of flour had been seized, and the attention of a 
large British force was diverted from employment elsewhere. With mi-
litia terms running out, he urged the volunteers to stay. "The situation 
of Fort George," he declared, "will be truly precarious if left to be de-
fended by but a small force." On December 6, he informed Tompkins 
that when the militia left he would have only 200 regulars and 100 
Indians. He hoped to induce 200 to 300 militiamen to stay by giving a 
bounty of two dollars per month for two months.43 
The situation was worse than McClure anticipated. On Decem-
ber 10 he had present for duty only sixty regulars and about forty vol-
unteers. The militiamen left him "almost to a man." !twas no use offer-
ing bounties; "A very inconsiderable number were willing to engage for 
a further term of service on any conditions." Learning the enemy was 
approaching, a council of the principal officers deemed the fort unten-
able, and McClure ordered an evacuation. He noted in a letter to 
Armstrong, almost matter-of-factIy, that the village of Newark was then 
in flames, "in conformity with the views of Your Excellency disclosed to 
me in a former communication." He added that the conflagration would 
deprive the enemy of winter quarters in the vicinity of Fort George.44 
McClure's burning of Newark was a misunderstanding of 
Armstrong's instruction that the defense of Fort George "may render it 
proper to destroy the town of Newark." President Madison was forced 
to explain to the outraged British that the action was the result of "a 
misapprehension of the officer & not an order from the govt. "45 
McClure understood his action might bring retribution against 
Americans along the Niagara frontier. He wrote Armstrong that the 
enemy was "much exasperated, and will make a descent on this frontier 
if possible." On December 18, he called the militiamen of Niagara county 
out en masse. But it was too late. After reoccupying Fort George, the 
British crossed the Niagara on December 19 and surprised and over-
whelmed the Americans at Fort Niagara. Sixty-five were killed and 422 
taken prisoner. The British suffered only 6 killed and 5 wounded. 
Lewiston was also burned, as well as a Tuscarora village nearby.46 
Brig. Gen. Timothy Hopkins, in Buffalo, reported to Governor 
Tompkins that he had called out his brigade and that he hoped for the 
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aid of the militia from Genesee. His men, however, were unwilling to 
come under the command of General McClure, whose conduct had 
"disgusted the greater part of the men under his command and they 
have no confidence in him." Hopkins advised the governor that "the 
militia of this country have stood so many drafts and have been so much 
absent from their homes and business it will be very difficult to keep 
them out any length of time." The destruction of Newark, he said, had 
"incensed the people of Canada," and he warned "nothing will save any 
part of this frontier but a respectable force." Only 400 men answered 
McClure's call for militia. The men were more concerned about "tak-
ing care of their families and property by carrying them into the inte-
rior than helping us to fight." McClure added that he had ordered Colo-
nel Chapin confined for treason. "There is not a greater rascal exists 
than Chapin," he wrote, "and he is supported by a pack of tories and 
enemies of our Government. Such is the men of Buffalo. They don't 
deserve protection." McClure denounced Chapin as "an unprincipled 
disorganizer" who "headed a mob for the purpose of doing violence to 
my feelings and person" and, he noted, "five or six guns were discharged 
at me by his men."47 
John C. Spencer, son of the prominent New York jurist and a 
future congressman and cabinet officer, wrote Governor Tompkins that 
the "infamous Chapin" and his company refused to consider themselves 
under McClure's command. Chapin had been placed in confinement 
but was released "by force by the Buffalo tories." Spencer believed 
McClure a "good officer" but added, "He is wholly incompetent to the 
command of this frontier. At all events, you may rest assured that he is 
universally detested by the inhabitants; that his soldiers have no confi-
dence in him, and that his officers unanimously concur in the opinion 
of his unfitness to command." Spencer recommended that Tompkins 
himself raise a force and lead them into Canada or that he ap'point a 
popular man fit for the station, such as Peter B. Porter.48 
McClure wrote Lt. Col. Erastus Granger from BataVia on Christ-
mas Day that he would not go again to Buffalo unless he was convinced 
he would be treated differently. He advised Granger that Maj. Gen. 
Hall was in command of the militia and volunteers in Buffalo. Three 
days later, McClure informed Granger that he was going to visit his 
family. "The gross insults which I have received from many in Buffalo 
will apologise for my absence," he wrote. "When I return again with 
the regular troops I will be able to do myself justice."49 
Clearly, McClure blamed the militia. On December 2 5 he ap-
pealed to Secretary Armstrong for more regular troops. "The militia 
will do to act with regulars, but not without them," he stated. "In spite 
a
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of all my exertions to insure subordination, my late detachment ulti-
mately proved to be very little better than an infuriated mob." He at-
tributed the fault to officers "seeking popularity; and who, on that ac-
count, were afraid of enforcing subordination and introducing strict 
discipline."5o 
General Hall informed Tompkins that he had gathered 2,000 mi-
litiamen by the twenty-sixth in Buffalo, mostly volunteers. They could 
be kept "but a few days." About 200 men were also gathered at Black 
Rock where, on the evening of December 29, the British attacked. Colo-
nel Chapin rushed to the scene with about 400 militia, but they were 
green and undisciplined and fled in great disorder when the first shots 
were fired. Chapin, trying vainly to stop them, was captured. Hall ar-
rived later with about 1,500 men. At first they laid down a "smart fire," 
but they soon broke ranks and retreated in disorder, and "neither en-
treaties nor threats" could stop them. HallS Indian allies did not give the 
expected support, and as for the Chautauqua militia, "terror ... dissi-
pated this corps." Every effort to rally the troops, Hall informed Tompkins, 
"proved ineffectual and experience proves that with the militia retreat 
becomes a flight, and, a battle once ended, the army is dissipated."51 
The British looted and burned both Black Rock and Buffalo the 
following day. Gen. Lewis Cass, observing the ruins of Buffalo shortly 
after the attack, called it "a scene of distress and destruction such as I 
have never before witnessed." He was harshly critical of the militia, 
who although greatly outnumbering the British, "behaved in the most 
cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket." The Manlius 
Times editor agreed: "To the want of discipline, of subordination and 
proper concert is to be attributed the fate of Buffalo and Black Rock. 
Our forces were not only sufficient to have repelled but to have cap-
tured the invaders." Even worse, some American militiamen were seen 
plundering what the enemy did not take.52 
The assistant deputy quartermaster general, John G. Camp, de-
nied that there was a scarcity of arms and ammunition. He insisted that 
all who applied got them and that an additional 7,000 rounds of musket 
cartridges were available for distribution on the day of the battle. Un-
fortunately, he noted, many militiamen did not use the arms distributed 
to them. At least 300 stand of arms, he observed, were destroyed in 
houses where they were left by militiamen who deserted their arms as 
well as the village of Buffalo. "If one-half of the troops that were on 
duty the day previous to the action," he exclaimed, "had made use of 
half the means Government had provided for them the villages of Buf-
falo and Black Rock would still have been flourishing."53 
Thus, at the end of another year, disaster had again befallen the 
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Niagara frontier, and great suffering was visited upon the inhabitants. 
Again the blame was placed on the militia. The federal government 
might reasonably have expected the New York militiamen to be capable 
of defending the frontier, but the glaring failures of leadership and lack 
of discipline among the drafted militiamen made it painfully obvious 
that they were not. As James Wadsworth wrote Governor Tompkins, 
the disaster at Buffalo had "spread fright and consternation among all 
ranks, broken down the ardor and spirit of the militia, and it will re-
quire some time for it to recover." He added, "The frontier will remain 
defenseless until a regiment of regulars is sent on."54 
The situation elsewhere in the northern New York-Lake 
Champlain region in the summer and early fall of 1813 was particularly 
unsettled because of frequent raids by Canadian militia. Typically, the 
American militiamen called out in response were from rural areas and 
always arrived too late to engage the raiders, who had retired back into 
Canada. In late July 1813, for example, a British raiding party led by Lt. 
Col. John Murray looted and burned considerable property in and 
around Plattsburgh, New York, on Lake Champlain. Brig. Gen. Ben-
jamin Mooers, the New York militia commander, with his troops so 
disorganized, wisely refused to engage the British raiders. The raids 
and frequent militia callouts were demoralizing not only to the people 
who suffered from the attacks but also to the militiamen, who resented 
the disruption of their lives.55 
The regular American army in this region was commanded in 1813 
by Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, who chose not to be diverted by the 
raids, leaving the people along Lake Champlain to deal with the prob-
lem themselves. His decision was met with only grudging acceptance. 
When Governor Jonas Galusha ordered the Vermont militia to assist in 
the defense of Plattsburgh in September 1813, the order was effected 
only "at the point of the bayonet," according to one observer. This action 
perhaps contributed to the subsequent election of a Federalist gover-
nor, Martin Chittenden. In his first message to the legislature on Octo-
ber 23,1813, Chittenden spoke of the intent of the framers of the Con-
stitution. They had not, he said, contemplated that "the whole body of . 
the militia were, by any kind of magic, at once to be transformed into a 
regular army for the purpose of foreign conquest." Rather, the militia 
was designed "for the service and protection of the respective states."56 
On November 10, Chittenden issued a proclamation summoning 
his militiamen home, declaring that the militia of Vermont "must be 
reserved for its own defence and protection exclusivery-excepting in 
cases provided for, by the Constitution of the United States-and then 
under orders derived onry from the commander in chief." His order, 
5
, 18
'
114 Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 
however, backfired. Vermont militia officers refused to comply, declar-
ing the proclamation "a gross insult to the officers and soldiers" and an 
"unwarrantable stretch of executive authority, issued from the worst of 
motives, to effect the basest purposes." Brig. Gen. Jacob Davis, sent to 
Plattsburgh to bring the militia home, was arrested and was released 
only after he had posted $5,000 security to appear at the next session of 
the u.s. District Court in New York City.57 
Chittenden was vigorously denounced in Republican newspapers 
and resolutions of state legislatures. The New York Columbian charac-
terized his proclamation as the "most scandalous and unwarrantable 
stain on the political history of America that ever disgraced its annals" 
and urged that he be tried for treason. The only question was whether 
a civil court or a court-martial was the proper tribunal. Governor WIl-
liam S. Pennington of New Jersey asserted to his legislature in Novem-
ber 1813 that the Constitution gave the command and disposal of the 
militia to the federal government, "not by implication, and construc-
tion, but by clear, unambiguous and express provisions." Otherwise, 
the caprice of state executives in denying the state militia to the federal 
government during emergencies could defeat and paralyze the opera-
tions of the general government. This doctrine, he said, was "fraught 
with incalculable mischief, and ... it carries in its bosom the seeds of 
national dissolution." The legislature adopted a resolution denouncing 
"the ravings of an infuriated faction, either as issuing from a legislative 
body, a maniac governor, or discontented or ambitious demagogues."58 
Chittenden was criticized in Congress by Solomon Sharp (Ky.), 
who introduced a resolution declaring that the attorney general of the 
United States should prosecute Chittenden for violating the statute 
against enticing soldiers in the service of the United States to desert. 
J ames Fisk of Vermont stated that very few persons in Vermont and 
none of the states delegation approved of the proclamation, but he be-
lieved the House had no right to influence courts of justice and that the 
resolution was improper. After cursory debate, in which Chittenden's 
action was characterized as treason, the resolution was tabled. 59 
Hampton was meanwhile trying to raise a force to menace 
Montreal and, perhaps, if events were auspicious, to assault the city 
itself. In October 1813, Secretary Armstrong ordered Hampton to move 
his force down the Chateaugay River to meet an army proceeding down 
the St. Lawrence led by General WIlkinson. Fifteen hundred militia-
men refused to cross the line. This development undoubtedly came as 
no surprise to Hampton, for he had already informed Armstrong of the 
possibility that a large percentage of Brig. Gen. Elias Fassets Vermont 
militiamen would not cross the line.60 
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Hampton was repulsed by a smaller British detachment before he 
ever reached the mouth of the Chateaugay, and he was forced to re-
treat. Learning that Armstrong had given the quartermaster general 
orders to construct huts below the border on the Chateaugay River, 
Hampton informed Armstrong that in "fulfillment of the ostensible views 
of the Government," he considered the campaign "substantially at an 
end." Armstrong asserted later that this order was merely a contingency 
plan, but in any event Hampton was not in position to effect a junction 
with Wilkinson's army when it came down the St. Lawrence. Bitter 
recriminations followed, as Wilkinson seized this pretext to call off an 
assault on Montreal that he had not wanted to make anyway.61 Hamp-
ton took his army back to Plattsburgh, placed the men in winter quar-
ters, and hastily left the military district, no doubt to avoid arrest and 
court-martial at the hands of his bitter enemy Wilkinson. 
As the year 1813 drew to a close, the government could point to 
mixed results on the northern front. Along the Niagara, early successes 
were marred by devastation and defeat at the end of the year, and the 
vital waterway, the St. Lawrence, had not even been threatened. Large 
numbers of militiamen still refused to cross the international boundary, 
and they continued to display a lack of discipline and retreat before the 
enemy. The country faced the next campaign still relying on militias to 
bear a large part of the burden of military action. 
Armstrong relieved Wilkinson from his command in March 1814 
and announced a court of inquiry. The order came too late to stop an 
ill-advised attack across the border at La Cole Mill. A British force 
outnumbered eight to one inflicted 150 American casualties. When 
Hampton was also allowed to resign on March 16, both commanders 
on the northern front had to be replaced. Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown was 
assigned to the Niagara frontier, and Maj. Gen. George Izard was given 
command along Lake Champlain. Brig. Gen. Alexander Macomb, soon 
to make a name for himself on this frontier, was the ranking officer 
under General Izard.62 
Macomb was temporarily in command when he called upon Gov-
ernor Chittenden in Apri11814 for 500 men at Burlington and 1,000 at 
Vergennes. Both were within the state of Vermont and not subject to 
the strictures of Chittenden about the use of militiamen outside the 
state. When federal officials attempted to organize the militiamen into 
100-man companies, however, many militiamen simply refused to be 
mustered and returned home. Macomb lamented: "The difficulties made 
by them on being collected for muster was truly ridiculous & I deem it 
my duty to say that no reliance can be placed on them as a source of 
defense." Later he wrote, "They did not give us even an opportunity of 
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mustering them and they very soon discharged themselves."63 
Macomb was also in charge of the defense of Plattsburgh when 
the British attacked in September 1814. Secretary Armstrong had or-
dered General Izard and 4,000 troops to join the American forces on 
the Niagara. Despite Izard's protests that this move would leave 
Plattsburgh vulnerable to the enemy, Armstrong, who had heard exag-
gerated claims of enemy forces on the frontier before, insisted on Izard's 
march. Shortly after Izard left, however, Gen. George Prevost appeared 
before Plattsburgh in early September with approximately 10,000 troops. 
Macomb had only about 1,500 regulars to face a force, as Macomb 
styled them, "the conquerors of France, Spain, Portugal, and Indies, 
led by the most experienced generals of the British Army." He called 
upon New York militiamen to turn out en masse.64 
Macomb also asked Governor Chittenden for militia. He did not 
give any specific number of troops, but Chittenden replied that atten-
tion would be paid to his request and aid would be afforded "as should 
be found necessary, and in my power constitutionally to grant." When 
no troops materialized, Macomb urgently renewed his request on Sep-
tember 1. Chittenden replied that he would ask for volunteers, despite 
the plea of the commander of the Vermont militia, General] ohn Newell, 
that he and his militiamen would cheerfully obey any call to repair to 
Plattsburgh. Chittenden informed Newell that he did not consider him-
self authorized by the constitution or law to order militiamen out of the 
state. He believed, he said, a request for volunteers "would have more 
effect than an attempt to assume unauthorized power." Eventually, Gen. 
Samuel Strong led Vermont volunteers to Plattsburgh in great number, 
reaching perhaps 2,500 men.65 
By September 4, General Mooers had gathered about 700 New 
York militiamen to protect a northern approach to Plattsburgh. They 
were joined by 250 regulars commanded by Maj. John Wool. On the 
sixth the British approached the American line. The militiamen skir-
mished briefly with the British advanced party but broke and fled pre-
cipitously, despite their officers' efforts to make them stay and fight. 
Many militiamen returned to their homes. Wools regulars contested 
the enemy approach, but they were compelled to retire. A mitigating 
circumstance explaining the militia reaction was that New York dra-
goons, who wore red coats, were on the heights watching the enemy, 
and the militiamen mistook them for the enemy attacking in their rear. 
General Mooers was disgusted with the performance of his militia, as 
attested in his general orders on September 8. "The general regrets 
that there are some who are lost to patriotism and to honor ... , fled at 
the first approach of the enemy, and afterwards basely disbanded them-
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selves and returned home; thereby disgracing themselves, and furnish-
ing to their fellow soldiers an example of all that brave men detest and 
abhor. "66 
The British captured most of Plattsburgh that first day of fight-
ing, but they paid a price. Three officers were killed and their soldiers 
suffered about 100 casualties. The Americans had about forty-five ca-
sualties.67 The American forces took refuge on the east and south side 
of the Saranac River and destroyed the two bridges leading to their 
side. Here the remaining militiamen helped to drive the British back. 
Fortunately for the defenders of Plattsburgh, Lt. Thomas Macdonough 
and his fleet on Lake Champlain destroyed the British fleet on the 
morning of September 11. Prevost, without assured supply lines, gave 
up the siege of Plattsburgh and withdrew. 
Afterward, General Macomb generously bestowed accolades on 
his militia. His general orders of September 14 declared that their zeal 
reflected "the highest lustre on their patriotism and spirit ... They 
have exemplified how speedily American citizens can be prepared to 
meet the enemies of their country." In his report of the battle, Macomb 
wrote, "The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day .... The 
Militia of New York and the Volunteers of Vermont have been exceed-
ingly serviceable, and have evinced a degree of patriotism and bravery 
worthy of themselves and the states to which they respectively belong. "68 
General Mooers, however, was not so generous. His general or-
ders of September 13 showed that he had not forgotten the actions of 
some of his men. In discharging the militia, he expressed the hope that 
the individuals who had basely deserted "will meet their reward by be-
ing despised as cowards, not deserving to be free men." Mooers, how-
ever, praised those who had stayed behind; they had shown "to their 
country and to the enemy what may be expected in case of any future 
invasion of this frontier."69 
Even Governor Chittenden, displaying his flexibility; hailed the 
victories of Macdonough and Macomb, "supported by our patriotic, 
virtuous and brave volunteers." He seemed to offer an olive branch, 
declaring that "the conflict has become a common, and not a party 
concern," and he exhorted everyone in the state to unite for the com-
mon defense of the country. The new attitude did not extend, however, 
to allowing the states militiamen to be commanded by regular officers. 
Late in October 1814, the Vermont council reaffirmed unanimously 
that the state's militia, when detached to the service of the United States, 
were to be commanded only by an officer appointed by the state, "or by 
the president in person. "70 
On January 31, 1814, Governor Tompkins recommended to the 
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New York legislature that two regiments of volunteer infantry and a 
battalion of mounted riflemen be organized to relieve the detached 
militia. He also recommended that the volunteers receive additional 
pay and that they be allowed to choose their own officers. Obviously, 
the failures of the militia in 1812 and 1813 convinced him that a more 
permanent and substantial force was needed. Fortunately, the federal 
government authorized a volunteer militia regiment. Tompkins selected 
Gen. Peter B. Porter and Col. John Swift, a prowar Federalist, as com-
manders. Porter and Swift issued a broadside on March 25 calling for 
six-month volunteers. They noted that the legislature was considering 
appropriating additional money for volunteers. The rendezvous was set 
for May 1 at Canandaigua'?' 
Porter was warned that it would be difficult to raise troops unless 
a bounty was offered. He was also apprised that opponents of the war 
were openly discouraging enlistments. But enlistments were slow for 
other reasons. Many complained that the militiamen had not been paid 
for their last service. Also, Capt. William B. Rochester informed Porter 
that many complained the state had been already "too much oppressed 
by repeated drafts of militia. Appeals to patriotism are unavailing," he 
said, and he lamented the "noxious influence of peace men."72 
Unfortunately, the legislature failed to approve the bounty for 
volunteers. One of Porter's officers who had enrolled thirty men condi-
tionallyupon the anticipated bounty was forced to discharge them. Other 
problems arose. May 1 had been set as the date for the rendezvous, but 
lack of tents and camp equipage forced Porter to halt the march of 
troops to Canandaigua. On a positive note, Porter declared to Gover-
nor Tompkins that about 1,000 recruits had been engaged, and he in-
tended to collect his force by the twentieth, providing that he received 
the promised camp equipment. Porter added that approximately 500 
Indians would join his force, providing they received their pay and an-
nuities or gifts from the federal government. 73 
Tompkins declared that supplies had been sent on and that those 
who had not been paid when they were discharged last year would be 
paid. The problem was that many commanders had neglected to have 
the muster rolls certified by regular officers as required. As for the troops 
called out under state authority, the legislature had simply failed to ap-
propriate the money; but Tompkins hoped that the next legislature would 
make up for the omission. Despite Tompkins's efforts, Porter declared 
that he was "egregiously ... disappointed" with respect to supplies. As 
late as July 3, he had "not yet received a rifle, sabre, bayonet, blanket, 
and but a partial supply of tents." He added wistfully; "Had I foreseen 
the situation in which I was to be thrown, nothing would have induced 
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me to have undertaken the task I did. But I embarked, and if! have but 
ten men I will persevere. "74 
With all of the recruiting problems, supply difficulties, and orga-
nizational concerns, Porter was not able to rendezvous his volunteers 
until June 29, nearly two months later than planned. He was able to 
gather about 1,000volunteers and 500 Indians. Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown, 
commanding the regulars on the Niagara frontier, agreed to add a regi-
ment of Pennsylvania volunteer militiamen to Porter's command. Por-
ter informed Tompkins that with this force and the support of General 
Brown, "I hope to gain some credit for the volunteers."75 
On July 3, Brown crossed the Niagara with 3,500 men and in-
vested Fort Erie, which quickly surrendered. The next day, Porter's 
volunteers and Indians, about 1,500 in number, joined Brown's army 
moving north in search of the British army. Porter's troops were as-
signed the task of clearing the woods of British militiamen and Indians 
sniping on Americans encamped near Street's Creek, two miles south 
of the Chippewa (or Welland) River. About three o'clock on the after-
noon ofJuly 5, they advanced single file at a right angle to the Niagara, 
extending about three-quarters of a mile from the river. Encountering 
a small British and Indian force, Porter's volunteers engaged and routed 
them. Pursuing them into the woods, they reached a clearing in front of 
the Chippewa and there met the main force of the enemy. General 
Brown's account was not flattering. Porter's force, he reported, gave 
way "and fled in every direction, notwithstanding his personal gallantry, 
and great exertions to stay their flight. The retreat of the Volunteers 
and Indians caused the left flank of Gen. Scott's brigade to be greatly 
exposed." Perhaps aware that his account was damaging to the volun-
teers, Brown tempered his criticism but not very successfully. The vol-
unteers, he added, could not be expected to contend with British regu-
lars, so it had not surprised him to see them "retire before this column."76 
Porter complained to Brown that while his report was compli-
mentary to Porter, it did "great injustice to the troops under my com-
mand." Porter asserted that his troops retreated in good order after 
encountering the main British force, but "the rapidity of the pursuit, 
became on our part, a flight, & presented that part of our movements 
which alone could have met your view, and undoubtedly led to the re-
marks in your report." He asserted that his troops did regroup and par-
ticipate in a counterattack. Years later Porter wrote, "My error ... was 
remaining too long under an unequal fire, or possibly in attempting to 
rally at all, for I lost by it besides other valuable men the three principal 
officers of the Pennsylvania Volunteers." He also contended that Gen. 
Winfield Scott's brigade was supposed to have crossed Street's Creek to 
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Above, JacobJennings Brown, by an unknown artist (afterJ.W.Jarvis). Cour-
tesy of the the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution. Below, 
Peter B. Porter, by e.G. Crehen. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County 
Historical Society. 
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support the volunteers, but that force was only crossing the bridge as 
the flight of the volunteers was taking place. "Had General Scott been 
at hand to support the volunteers when they first met the British line," 
he argued, the Battle of Chippewa "would doubtless have presented 
quite a different aspect." In a draft of this letter, Porter made the point, 
no doubt seriously, that his volunteers contributed to the American vic-
tory, because the British became deranged in their pursuit and were 
never quite able to reorganize in battle formation.77 
The Battle of Chippewa showed that American regulars, well 
drilled, disciplined, and competently led, could defeat a comparable force 
of British regulars. Scott's brigade in particular performed brilliantly. 
Porter believed the most essential ingredient was leadership. The com-
mon soldier, he claimed, identified with his commanding officer. "If an 
officer prove recreant in battle, his example will poison & make cow-
ards of the whole corps to which he belongs." He also argued, not very 
plausibly, "a farmer fresh from the plow, may by a drill of six weeks, 
under proper officers, be rendered as efficient in all the duties of the field 
as a soldier of ten years standing."78 
The volunteers still lacked discipline. Shortly after the Battle of 
Chippewa, Porter sent Lt. Col. Isaac W Stone with a small force to 
dislodge enemy troops at St. Davids (about three miles from Queenston). 
After driving the British out, Stone returned to find the village plun-
dered and in flames. He denied any knowledge of the perpetrators, but 
it was known that American militiamen and Indians were responsible. 
General Brown dismissed Stone on the grounds that the senior officer 
was responsible.79 
On July 25 another clash with the British occurred near Niagara 
Falls at Lundy's Lane. Porter's volunteers participated, but their num-
bers had been reduced to about 300. (Four companies had been sent to 
Buffalo, and two companies were retained by General Brown to guard 
the camp at Chippewa. The Indians had left.) In the battle, as Porter 
informed General Brown, his troops were "conspicuously engaged with 
part of the regular troops in successfully repelling those desperate charges 
of the enemy's line to regain their artillery." He further asserted, "They 
fought with the coolness & discipline of regular troops." General Brown, 
reporting to Secretary Armstrong, complimented Porter's militia vol-
unteers, who "stood undismayed amidst the hottest fire, and repulsed 
the veterans opposed to them."80 
Porter's report bared his frustrations to Governor Tompkins. In 
proportion to those engaged, he wrote, "we lost more than any other 
corps" and, he believed, more officers as well, for a total of sixty-five. "I 
mention this not to boast," he stated, "but to show how unequally the 
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policy observed towards volunteers bears upon them." Moreover, vic-
tory had been turned into defeat by General Brown's order to retreat. 
According to Porter, Brig. Gen. Eleazer W Ripley, who commanded, 
"ought not to have been dictated to by a wounded man four miles from 
the scene of action." Porter asked permission to retire from service, be-
cause his force did not "warrant a Brigadiers command." He wrote bit-
terly that he was certain no militia general would "gain any military fame 
while united to a regular force and commanded by their officers." The 
militiamen would always be "the tools and drudges of the regular troopS."81 
Tompkins encouraged Porter not to relinquish his command. He 
had written to Washington on the subject of Porter's rank, presumably 
to see whether he could be offered a regular commission. Tompkins 
asserted the federal government would probably agree to the states' 
raising their own armies and "officering them with officers of the same 
grade in the army." If he persuaded the state legislature, Porter would 
be prominent in those plans.82 
General Brown also urged Tompkins to increase Porter's com-
mand, stating .that he was "a brave and efficient officer. In the midst of 
the greatest danger I have found his mind cool and collected, and his 
judgment to be relied upon. These are rare qualifications, and there-
fore it is that I desire all the militia force may be continued under his 
command." Brown had called for 1,000 additional militia. "This State 
has suffered in reputation this war," Brown wrote, " ... I find the inhab-
itants of this frontier more disposed to skulk from the danger which 
threatens them than to arm in defense of their country and her rights."83 
After the Battle of Lundy's Lane in early July, the Americans re-
tired to Fort Erie with Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines in command while 
Brown recuperated from his wounds. On the morning of August 15, 
about 2,000 British attempted to dislodge the Americans. Porter's New 
York and Pennsylvania volunteers, about 300 men, closely engaged a 
British column for two hours. The British were repulsed, and those 
killed included. their commander, Col. Hercules Scott. A tremendous 
powder magazine explosion set off by an American soldier accounted 
for most of the 920 British killed, wounded, missing, and captured. Porter 
termed the battle a "brilliant action" and declared himself "satisfied 
with the conduct of the whole of my Brigade." Gaines's report to Secre-
tary Armstrong praised Porter for his "military skill and courage in ac-
tion, which proves him worthy the confidence of his country and the 
brave volunteers who fought under him."84 
After the August 15 battle, General Gaines called out 4,000 New 
York volunteers for one to three months. Porter, chosen to raise and 
organize this force, hastened to Canandaigua. The response was en-
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thusiastic but tardy. General McClure declared, "Unless some effectual 
mode of punishing delinquents is speedily adopted, future calls on mi-
litiamen will be useless, such is the language of those who have, and are 
still willing to do their share of duty." Nevertheless, Porter received 
reports that militiamen were "flocking in by companies" and that the 
turnout was "more liberal than possibly could be expected." Still, he 
was "apprehensive there will be a deficiency of arms and other imple-
ments ... I observe they nearly all pass without any."85 
A problem was created when Brig. Gen. Daniel Davis of Genesee 
County ordered out his whole brigade without authority. If regularly 
ordered out he would take the command from General Porter, which 
Governor Tompkins's aide, Lt. Col. ].B. Yates, said "would occasion 
very general dissatisfaction." Yates suggested that Porter be given a brevet 
rank of major general "to obviate any difficulty that may occur." Gen-
eral Davis, however, willingly served under Porter, who in fact had been 
given the rank of major general on August 22, although the announce-
ment did not arrive until mid-September.86 
While Porter was gathering this force in Buffalo, his old volun-
teers at Fort Erie engaged in another clash with the British on Septem-
ber 4. About 100 volunteers led by Lt. Col. Joseph Willcocks and Maj. 
Abraham Matteson sallied out and assaulted a British breastwork. After 
a sharp engagement of fifteen to twenty minutes, the Americans with-
drew in good order, having inflicted heavy losses on the British. Unfor-
tunately, Colonel Willcocks, a lieutenant, and three others were killed. 
Major Matteson in his report to General Ripley declared that the vol-
unteers had "behaved in Spirit and manner characteristic of spartan 
bravery." Matteson added in a cover letter to Porter that General Ripley 
had "expressed great satisfaction and remarked that it was a brilliant 
action." Porter announced the engagement to his assembled militia-
men in a general order. He concluded with pride, "The New York Vol-
unteers have on this occasion, as well as every other that has occurred 
during the whole campaign, reflected honour on the State."87 
His health restored, General Brown was back in command at Fort 
Erie. He urged Porter on September 8 to hurry his troops across the 
Niagara, "the more the better." Porter crossed on September 11 with 
. approximately 1,000 men; another 500 came later. Brown hoped to 
mount an offensive operation against the British commander, besieg-
ing his position. He also urged Maj. Gen. George Izard, who was bring-
ing troops from Plattsburgh to the Niagara frontier, to join him in an 
offensive. There were few British regulars between Kingston and Fort 
Erie, he wrote, and their militiamen "are worse than ours, they are good 
for nothing."88 
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Brown wasted no time in launching an offensive. On September 
17, in a heavy rain, American forces attacked enemy batteries. In a se-
vere engagement, the batteries were carried, the principal work was 
blown up, the guns were spiked, and the Americans retreated to the 
fort. British killed, wounded, and missing numbered around 800; the 
American total was 511. Four regular officers were slain, and five of 
Porter's officers were killed, including General Davis. Porter praised 
his veteran volunteers, who added "a new lustre on their former bril-
liant achievements." He also lauded his recently recruited militia vol-
unteers. "They were not surpassed by the heroes of Chippewa and 
Niagara in steadiness and bravery;" he declared. Brown also praised the 
militiamen to Tompkins: "The militia of New York have redeemed their 
character, they behaved gallantly."89 
Porter had a narrow escape in the engagement of the seventeenth 
in which he suffered a slight wound to his hand. During the battle he 
moved with two or three of his aides from one of his columns through 
some woods to make contact with the other column. In the woods, 
however, he encountered sixty to eighty of the enemy, who were appar-
ently confused about which way to go. They knew the Americans were 
operating to the rear, and they were now confronted by Porter and his 
staff. Porter coolly approached the soldiers, called upon them to sur-
render, seized a musket from one of the soldiers, threw it upon the 
ground, and called upon the others to do the same. Some voluntarily 
did so, but suddenly one soldier put his bayonet to Porter's breast and 
demanded his surrender. Porter grabbed the musket, but was wrestled 
to the ground by several of the soldiers. Fifteen or twenty now aimed 
their guns at him and called for his surrender. At that moment, how-
ever, more Americans arrived on the scene. Porter calmly called again 
for their surrender. When they refused, the Americans opened fire, kill-
ing several and taking the remainder as prisoners. Porter escaped with 
only a sword cut to his hand, which he declined even to mention in his 
report.90 
Porter's courage and coolness amply demonstrated his leadership. 
If, as Porter argued, troops took the hue of their commander, then this 
incident illustrates why he was such a successful leader of militiamen 
and why they performed well for him and not for others. At a public 
gathering in his honor at Batavia near the end of October as his force 
was being disbanded, he said modestly, "If I have been more fortunate 
than the commandants of militia who have preceded me on this fron-
tier, the whole credit is due to the brave officers who now surround 
me."91 
The engagement of the seventeenth of September was the last 
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heavy fighting on the Niagara frontier that year. Unable or unwilling to 
mount an offensive, General Izard, now commanding on the Niagara, 
discharged Porter and his volunteers late in October, and the remain-
ing regulars evacuated and blew up Fort Erie on November 5. 
The New York legislature in October 1814 approved giving vol-
unteers an additional five dollars a month above the pay and allowances 
from the national government. Unfortunately, the deputy paymaster 
for the northern frontier,J.L. Richardson, informed Porter on October 
28 that he had no funds. In a general order of November 2 discharging 
his force, Porter advised those badly needing money that he and three 
of his officers had obtained a loan, "a small sum of money which will be 
distributed among this corps &, it is hoped, will enable them to meet 
their present necessities." The settlement of volunteer pay took a year, 
but claims for invalids and troops improperly mustered and pay for court-
martial boards lingered for decades.92 
Virtually no additional fighting occurred on the Niagara frontier 
for the remainder of the war. After all the fighting and suffering, no 
military objective had been gained, and the situation remained fixed. In 
retrospect, after the humiliations and defeats suffered in 1812 and 1813, 
the 1814 campaign did restore the pride of American regulars and some-
what redeemed the reputation of the New York militia. In recognition 
of their achievements during the War of 1812, Congress voted to strike 
gold medals for Generals Brown, Jackson, Scott, Ripley, Gaines, 
Macomb, and Miller of the regulars. Peter B. Porter was the only mili-
tia officer recognized.93 His honor was a fitting and symbolic recogni-
tion that the militiamen had, after all, contributed to the war effort. 
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Chapter 7 
The Atlantic Front and 
the Battle of Bladensburg 
T he entire Atlantic coast lay open to British incursions during the War of 1812. The American government, lacking money, did virtu-
ally nothing to raise fortifications for the protection of the inhabitants. 
The tiny American navy was spread too thin to offer much resistance or 
protection. Nor were the state militias much of a deterrent to British 
raids along the coast. During the war great turmoil was caused by the 
frequent threats, which necessitated militia callouts to respond to a men-
ace that often failed to materialize, and the militiamen were sent home. 
When the attack proved real, the militiamen almost always seemed to 
be disorganized and poorly equipped, and they usually fled when con-
fronted by the enemy. 
The British were very active along the Atlantic coast and in the 
Chesapeake Bay in 1813. Under the command of Admiral Sir George 
Cockburn, they made several raids upon the largely unprotected com-
munities on the Upper Chesapeake Bay. Havre de Grace, Fredericktown, 
and Georgetown, Maryland, were looted and burned in early May. The 
militiamen at these places put up little resistance, save for one lone, he-
roic militiaman,]ohn O'Neill (or O'Neale), a naturalized Irishman, who 
stood his ground at Havre de Grace. He was captured by the British 
while trying to rally militiamen to fight. O'Neill was subsequently re-
leased and became a celebrity. He was voted a sword by Philadelphians. 1 
Maryland clearly felt imposed upon. Maryland, the most Federal-
ist state outside New England, adopted the attitude that the national 
government, having declared war, now had the responsibility not only 
of providing for the defense of the states but also of compensating states 
for any expenses incurred by them in providing for their defense. The 
British navy hovering off the coast raised the anxiety of Marylanders 
about their vulnerability. Governor Levin Winder wrote on March 20, 
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1813, to recently appointed Secretary of War John Armstrong to ascer-
tain "in the event of the militia of the state, being called out for its 
defence, whether the expense will be defrayed by the United States." 
Winder obviously knew the answer to the question, for he wrote a com-
mittee appointed by the town of Easton nine days later, informing them 
that the laws of Maryland vested full power in the militia commander to 
call out the troops in the event of invasion. If this exigency occurred, he 
explained, an application should be made to the president, who was 
authorized to place the militia in federal service, and the expense would 
then be borne by the national government. He advised the committee 
that he would forward their memorial to the secretary of war, and "if he 
thinks it advisable to station a force at Easton, it may be under the 
direction of the President of the United States and paid by the general 
government."2 
In fact, President Madison authorized 500 troops for the defense 
of Annapolis on March 24 and 2,000 for Baltimore on April 16. Winder, 
still not satisfied, wrote Madison on April 26 that the enemy had visited 
Sharps Island and taken the supplies it needed. He lamented the fact 
that Maryland had only limited means for its defense and argued that 
the national government had a responsibility to protect states against 
invasion and defray all the expenses of a national war. "To us it is a 
painful reflection," he concluded, "that after every effort we have made, 
or can make for the security of our fellow citizens and their property, 
they have little to rely on, but the possible forbearance of the enemy."3 
Winder informed the Maryland legislature on May 17 that re-
quests for aid from the national government had not been answered. If 
the federal government failed to provide for the common defense, he 
asserted, "the law of self preservation ... would demand that every 
effort ... should be made for the safety of the State." He asserted, 
however, that ultimately "all expenses incurred in affording protection 
... ought to be reimbursed by the United States," and he urged the 
legislature to create an officer to keep accounts and vouchers of ex-
penses to submit, eventually, to the national government.4 
A deputation was sent from the Maryland Council to President 
Madison in the spring of 1813 carrying a resolution of the state, but 
Madison remained firm that he would pay only militiamen called out 
by the national government. Winder, faced with the obstinacy of the 
federal government, cautioned his militia officers about the need for 
careful expenditure of state funds. He wrote Gen. Thomas M. Forman 
on June 1, 1813, for example, "it becomes us all to be as sparing of 
expense as we possibly can be, as well as to expose the militia to as little 
inconvenience as possible." As the enemy had gone down the bay, he 
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suggested, it would serve no good purpose to keep the militiamen called 
out in service. 5 
On June 22, the British assaulted Craney Island (at the approach 
to Norfolk, Virginia) with about 2,500 men. They were driven off, how-
ever, by American guns. British casualties may have amounted to 200, 
while the American force of perhaps 700 men had none. Three days 
later, about 2,000 British attacked Hampton, Virginia. Although one 
account stated that the American militia ofless than 450 men "put up a 
spirited defence," they were forced to retreat before overwhelmingnum-
bers. Hampton was then subjected to many acts of rape, murder, and 
pillaging.6 . 
With the British navy operating along the Atlantic coast, nervous 
inhabitants of seacoast towns in North Carolina, calling themselves 
defenseless, petitioned Governor William Hawkins for assistance. Gen-
eral Pinckney had given Hawkins authority to call out the state militia, 
"so many ... as the occasion may require," in the event of actual or 
threatened attack, but as Hawkins well understood, militiamen without 
firearms and equipment would do little to deter a British attack. In June 
1813, Hawkins wrote his two U.S. senators, James Turner and David 
Stone, enclosing petitions for assistance from inhabitants in Wilmington 
and Beaufort. "I deem it unnecessary to mention to you," Hawkins said, 
"that the State is destitute of munitions ofwar."7 
AroundJuly 1, a British force landed on the North Carolina coast 
in Carrituck County, near the Virginia border. Maj. Caleb Etheridge 
summoned two companies of the state militia, but they lacked weapons 
and Etheridge urged Governor Hawkins to send supplies. Hawkins re-
plied that none were to be had immediately, or else he would have been 
disposed to purchase them on his own responsibility. He urged 
Etheridge, "With the aid of the patriotic citizens on your frontier, whose 
property is most in danger," to procure whatever supplies they needed 
and rely upon the government to compensate them later. "They are 
called out upon a requisition of General Pinckney," he added, "and the 
United States are bound to remunerate them."8 
OnJuly 12, British forces commanded by Adm. George Cockburn 
took possession of Portsmouth Island, near Ocracoke Inlet. North Caro-
lina militiamen were hastily collected, and as usual, there were short-
ages of all kinds of supplies. Hawkins was besieged by requests for arms 
and ammunition. Typical of these was a letter from Col. Thomas Banks. 
Banks noted that on July 15 he ordered his troops to assemble at Eliza-
beth City. By noon the next day, he reported, he had gathered over 500 
men, "but melancholy to say we had not more than 150 shot guns which 
could be depended upon & no ammunition." Fortunately, a schooner, 
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Globe, was in port and was willing to lend arms and cannon. According 
to Banks, reliable sources indicated that the British had returned to sea, 
and he had discharged his troops. He asked that the governor "direct in 
what manner the men are to be paid, for if this should be neglected, we 
may not be able to command men at any future time upon any sudden 
emergency." Another letter from Joseph H. Bryan, a quartermaster at 
Edenton, indicated that he had taken the initiative of going to Norfolk, 
Virginia, and buying 1,000 pounds of lead and powder, plus flints and 
cartridge paper on credit. He enclosed a bill amounting to less than 
$1,000, stating he hoped he had done the right thing.9 
The excitement created by the British incursion generated many 
offers of support, which were often of the good news-bad news cat-
egory. Maj. General Duncan Cameron, for example, wrote to Hawkins 
on July 23, that a battalion muster had just been held at Hillsborough, 
and "a very respectable company of volunteers was raised to be placed 
at the discretion of the Governor." He added that they would be armed 
with rifles, but he noted "the number of those I fear will be few; and 
indeed I am apprehensive that they will be very deficient in arms-of 
ammunition they will have not to carry from home; and if called into 
service must be furnished elsewhere."lo 
Many of the militiamen gathered at Wilmington were quartered 
in the houses of private citizens, in part because of a lack of camp equip-
ment, while other militiamen were loaned camp kettles by inhabitants. 
It was obvious, however, that many of the militiamen found conditions 
not to their liking. Capt. Abner Pasteur, the commander at Fort Hamp-
ton, related to Hawkins that when one company arrived during the day 
on August 11, twenty deserted in the evening. ll 
The British were also active along the northern Atlantic coast, 
particularly the Maine coast in the fall of 1814. Eastport was seized in 
July, and in September, Castine was captured. Capt. Charles Morris, 
commander of the U.S.S.Adams, a twenty-eight-gun corvette, took ref-
uge up the Penobscot at Hampden, where he hoped to fend off a Brit-
ish land force of 350. Learning of the approach of the enemy, Morris 
prepared his defenses and called upon the local militia to assist. Lieu-
tenant Lewis of the U.S. Artillery arrived from Castine with twenty-
eight men, and about 370 militiamen showed up. As Morris noted, how-
ever, "Many of the militia were without arms and most of them were 
without ammunition." Morris distributed muskets and ammunition from 
his ship to the militia. On October 3, three more companies of militia-
men arrived. "When the British made their first assault, however, the 
militiamen broke and fled in great confusion. Morris was forced to spike 
his guns, burn his ship, and retreat.12 
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When the British attacked near New London, Connecticut, in 
August, however, the local militiamen did not turn and flee. Instead 
they behaved bravely and repulsed the British attack. The British sus-
tained fifteen killed and sixty-two wounded. No Americans were killed, 
and only five or six were wounded.13 
The focus of the war shifted in the late summer and fall of 1814 to 
the Chesapeake Bay and Gulf coastal region. Again, the mettle of the 
militia would be tested, and the results were mixed. Washington's citi-
zens were also alarmed by the British activity along the Atlantic coast 
and in the Chesapeake. The previous year, in mid-July 1813, some 300 
volunteers responded to an alarm and were accompanied down the 
Potomac by both Secretary of War Armstrong and Secretary of State 
J ames Monroe. Many demanded fortifications for the defense of Wash-
ington. According to Maj. Gen. John P. Van Ness, commander of the 
District of Columbia militia, Armstrong "appeared rather indifferent, 
and expressed an opinion that the enemy would not come, or even seri-
ously attempt to come to this District." In truth, Armstrong, under 
severe fiscal constraints, doubted that the District, given its remote-
ness, could be made safe physically by fortifications. The numerous 
points needing protection, he argued, would have "exhausted the Trea-
sury." Rather, he said, "bayonets are known to form the most efficient 
barriers."14 
Armstrong was undoubtedly correct, but his attitude, to say the 
least, disconcerted the residents of the District. Under pressure, he 
agreed to a proposition by District bankers to lend the government 
$200,000 to be used for the protection of the District. The money, 
however, was to be paid into the Treasury on August 24, 1814---the 
very day the British captured Washington. "The events of that day," 
Armstrong declared, "put an end to the business, and at the same time 
furnished evidence of the fallibility of the plan, had it even been ex-
ecuted, by showing that no works on the Potomac will, of themselves, 
be sufficient defence for the Seat of Government." 15 
President Madison was more sensitive to the concerns of the people 
of the District. No doubt he was also alarmed by the increased activity 
of the enemy in the Chesapeake in the early summer of 1814. Conse-
quently, he met with his cabinet on July 1, and he created a new Tenth 
Military District on the Potomac. The next day, without consulting 
Armstrong, Madison named Brig. Gen. William Winder to command 
the District. Winder's chief qualification was that he was a nephew of 
Levin Winder, governor of Maryland. Obviously, Marylands coopera-
tion was critical to the defense of the District. About 1,000 regulars 
were assigned to the District, and 10,000 militiamen were to be held in 
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readiness by neighboring states and the District of Columbia for a call 
from General Winder. 16 
Winder immediately suggested to Armstrong that a force of 4,000 
militiamen be assembled "for one, two or three months." Armstrong, 
ever mindful of expense and convinced that militiamen who were not 
fighting would drain the Treasury, disagreed. He argued that militia-
men could be used most advantageously "upon the spur of the occa-
sion, and to bring them to fight as soon as called out." Winder insisted, 
quite correctly, that if the enemy did come to the District, it would be 
nearly impossible to collect a force upon the spur of the moment and 
bring them to bear upon the enemy. They would be little better than "a 
disorderly crowd, without arms, ammunition, or organization, before 
the enemy would already have given his blow." Armstrong remained 
adamant. He instructed Winder on July 12 to call out militiamen only 
"in case of actual or menaced invasion of the District," to avoid unnec-
essary calls, and "to proportion the call to the exigency." Winder did 
not appear to be mollified. On July 16, he wrote Armstrong that al-
though the governor and Council of Maryland had taken steps to com-
ply with the government's requisition for militia, "I fear, from my re-
cent experience, it will be in vain to look for any efficient aid upon a . 
sudden call upon the militia."17 
In fact, the president shared Armstrong's view on the use of the 
militia. InJune the British arrived about forty miles below Washington 
at the mouth of the Patuxent River. The Georgetown and Washington 
city militiamen were mobilized and marched down the river, and the 
British withdrew. Madison wrote Governor James Barbour of Virginia 
that with the objects of the enemy uncertain an immediate callout of 
the state's militia would waste resources, would exhaust the government's 
means, and would hazard everything. Once the enemys object was clear, 
the resources and militia could be used effectively.18 
On July 17 the British again reappeared on the Patuxent River. 
Three companies of the district militia were dispatched by General 
Winder toward the Patuxent. When they arrived at Woodyard, about 
ten miles from Washington, they learned that the British had retired 
down the river. Despite his earlier protests about needing to have mili-
tiamen readily available, Winder dismissed the militiamen rather than 
retain them to prepare defenses or for training. In fact, he declared, in 
terms that Armstrong no doubt approved, "The facility with which they 
can turn out and proceed to any point, renders them nearly as effective 
as if they were actually kept in the field; and the importance of them 
individually attending to their private affairs, decides me, even in doubt 
of the enemy's probable movement, to give this order."19 
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During the first month, Winder was constantly on the move and 
paid little attention to organizing his command. Not until July 23 did 
he designate Bladensburg, four miles north of Washington, as the ren-
dezvous for the Maryland militia. He did not inspect the regulars of the 
Thirty-sixth and Thirty-eighth Regiments under his command until 
July 27, and he did not establish his headquarters in Washington until 
August 1.20 
Winder inspected the militia of Washington on August 2, and he 
reported to Major General Van Ness, their commander, that the fire-
arms of the uniformed companies were in order and ready for service. 
The remainder of the corps, while not to the standard of regulars, were 
"still effective and in better order than the army of militia usually are, 
or indeed, can reasonably be expected." The volunteer rifle companies' 
firearms, however, were "altogether unfit for service."21 
The matter of arms, or rifles, for the volunteer company became 
an issue later on in the charges brought against Secretary Armstrong by 
the Washington community. According to J.I. Stull, captain of the 
Georgetown Rifles, a force of approximately 120 men, he appealed to 
Armstrong to release some of the rifles in the Washington arsenal. 
Armstrong refused, insisting that the rifles were intended for the north-
ern army and could not be spared. Consequently, when the rifle com-
panies were called out after the British landed, they were forced to take 
muskets, and they were further delayed in procuring ammunition and 
flints. As for the rifles that Armstrong refused to release, Stull noted, 
"It was understood and believed that those very arms ... were destroyed 
by the British on the 25th August."22 
Winder confronted many problems raising the Maryland militia-
men for his command. On July 27 he informed Armstrong that the 
governor of Maryland "has been, in vain, endeavoring to assemble the 
neighboring militia at Annapolis; he had called on Frederick county, 
and some militia were coming in from thence." He added, however, 
"All this force is ... called out by the authority of the State laws, and is 
not under my command. But they do and will cooperate toward the 
general defence." Problems persisted in raising the Maryland militia. 
On August 13, Winder wrote Armstrong from Baltimore that because 
the 2,000 militiamen called out in April counted as part of the July 4 
quota, and because the Eastern Shore militia were needed for local de-
fense, the Maryland militiamen to be assembled at Bladensburg, "in-
stead of being three thousand, will not exceed as many hundred." Winder 
stated that he would have the governor summon all drafts from the 
western shore, but because they would amount to no more than 1,500, 
"I apprehend that, after all shall be assembled ... , they will not exceed 
20
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one thousand men." In the aftermath of the Washington debacle, Winder 
attributed the inefficiency in collecting the militiamen to "the incredu-
lity of the people on the danger of invasion" and "the perplexed, bro-
ken, and harassed state of the militia" in various Maryland counties.23 
Winder also intended to incorporate Pennsylvania militiamen into 
his command. On July 23 he proposed to Armstrong that as the Penn-
sylvania militiamen assigned to his district were in remote locations 
and could not be gathered quickly in an emergency, "might it not be 
expedient to draw from the remotest points, leaving that portion of the 
militia nearest the probable scene of action, to be called out on the spur 
of the occasion?" As late as August 13, Winder was still counting on a 
regiment of militia from Pennsylvania.24 Because its militia was being 
reorganized, however, Pennsylvania was unable to comply with Winder's 
request. 
On August 13, Winder issued general orders declaring that he 
had learned "with great pain" that a large number of Maryland's drafted 
militiamen had refused or neglected to go to Bladensburg as ordered. 
He suggested that many were "under the mistaken impression that there. 
is no legal power to compel their compliance." He announced to all 
who neglected to attend that he would institute a court-martial with 
the power to impose a fine of eighty dollars upon each delinquent or 
one month of imprisonment for each five-dollar fine imposed. Unfor-
tunately, Winder gave the militiamen until August 27 to rendezvous 
before steps would be taken to enforce the law. By that time the British 
had already burned Washington.25 
As it developed, only 250 militiamen were at Bladensburg on Au-
gust 18, the day the British landed at Benedict on the Patuxent with a 
force of about 4,500 regulars. This event, seemingly so unexpected, 
aroused a frenzy of activity. The militiamen of the district were called 
out en masse, and dispatches were sent to Maryland and Virginia for 
additional militiamen. Winder predicted to Armstrong, "The result of 
all these operations will be certainly slow, and extremely doubtful as to 
the extent of force produced."26 
Confusion abounded. Secretary Armstrong even roused himself 
from his lethargy regarding affairs of the district. Heretofore he had 
largely ignored Winder. Perhaps he was overly sensitive because Madi-
son had dictated affairs in the Tenth District and had selected Winder 
as commander of the district without consulting Armstrong. Perhaps it 
was also because Madison, after concluding his months-long investiga-
tion into Armstrong's conduct of his office, delivered a reprimand on 
August 13. The secretary was chastised for exceeding his authority and 
failing to consult Madison before exercising the powers of his office. 
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Now, after being exceedingly reticent about giving unsolicited advice, 
Armstrong urged Winder to obstruct the march of the enemy and to 
"drive off all horses and cattle, and remove all supplies of forage, and 
etc., on their route." He later recommended placing a force at the rear 
of the British to threaten their communications or, alternatively, with-
drawing to the Capitol and placing artillery to induce them to engage 
in a siege operation, for which they were unprepared.27 
No doubt Winder received plenty of advice during this confusing 
period. Madison wrote on August 21 to Monroe, who had gone off to 
scout the British movement, that "extensive & pressing calls have been 
made for militia, and we hope they will be prompt." Madison's opinion, 
which he no doubt shared with Winder, was that "as our troops will in 
general be raw, tho' numerous, the true course will be to pelt the En-
emy from the start with light troops, taking advantage of grounds & 
positions for artillery, and throwing in all sorts of obstructions in the 
routes." Winder, totally perplexed by the movement of the British, was 
indecisive and unable to devise any plan to oppose their march. He 
envisaged numerous possible objectives. On August 22, the British 
camped at Upper Marlboro. From there, Winder later explained, "he 
could take the road to Bladensburg, to the Eastern Branch bridge, or 
Fort Washington, indifferently, or it might be to cover his march upon 
Annapolis."28 
By August 23, Maj. Gen. Robert Ross, the British commander, 
had marched his troops, virtually unscathed, to within nine miles of the 
Eastern Branch bridge leading into Washington. Winder withdrew to 
the bridge with about 2,500 men. From this point, he explained later to 
a congressional investigative committee, he could harass the enemy if it 
moved toward Fort Washington or could follow if the enemy reversed 
its march and moved toward Annapolis, or he could rush to Bladensburg, 
five miles to the north, where he had a force about the same size, if it 
moved in there. A group of 700 Virginians led by Lt. Col. George Mi-
nor arrived that evening in Washington. They had no arms or ammuni-
tion, however, and Minor alleged that they spent the morning of the 
twenty-fourth collecting these items from the government arsenal, each 
flint painstakingly counted by a young armorer at the arsenal. As a con-
sequence, just as they were ready to march to Bladensburg, they were 
met by the troops retreating from the battle.29 
As soon as Winder received positive information that the enemy 
was on a march toward Bladensburg on the morning of the twenty-
fourth, he hastened to that place with his troops. The American force, 
including Winder's, amounted to perhaps 7,000 men, while the British 
numbered no more than 4,500. Still, there was a vast difference in the 
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quality of the two forces. In fact, Armstrong was quoted as saying inju-
diciously prior to the engagement that "as the battle would be between 
Militia and regular troops, the former would be beaten." In the after-
math of the battle, Winder candidly stated much the same to a corre-
spondent of the Baltimore Patriot. He regretted that his force had not 
put up a stronger resistance, he said, but he believed that the British 
force outnumbered his. Moreover, "our force was principally militia, 
and that of the enemy all regulars and picked men."30 
There was also a vast difference in the leadership of the two forces. 
In his statement to the congressional investigating committee, Winder 
complained of having to work with "raw, undisciplined, inexperienced, 
and unknown officers and men." The situation at Bladensburg when 
Winder arrived was that no one was really in charge. Brig. Gen. Tobias 
E. Stansbury, commander of the Maryland militia, was nominally in 
charge, and he made the initial deployment of the troops facing the 
British. Without Stansbury's knowledge and without authority, how-
ever, Secretary Monroe redeployed the troops in such a way that the 
second line could not support the first. Armstrong characterized Mon-
roe later as a "busy and blundering tactician." Monroe no doubt thought 
he was helping, which is hardly a defense. Perhaps unaware of his blun-
der in positioning the troops, he proudly wrote his son-in-law shortly 
after the event that he had "formed the line, and made the disposition 
of our troopS."31 His action vividly demonstrates the lack of command 
at this critical time. 
Winder arrived just before the British offensive began, and he had 
little time to inspect the line of battle. He hardly inspired his men with 
the will to fight. Instead, he instructed the troops that when-not if-
they retreated, they should do so by the Georgetown road. The battle 
began on August 24 between 12:30 and 1:00 P.M. when British light 
infantry moved across a small bridge over the Eastern Branch of the 
Potomac. American artillery and riflemen contested their movement, 
but the British soon flanked them and forced them to retreat. General 
Stansbury's force, about 400 yards to the rear, rather than closing in, 
recoiled from British rocket fire. When Stansbury's right wing, exposed 
by Monroe's positioning, gave way, "a general flight of the two regi-
ments" threatened to precipitate a rout. One group held firm, but Winder 
ordered them to retreat and reform in the rear. The first line, however, 
soon broke into disorder and confusion. The road from Bladensburg 
forked in three directions. In their panic the troops, forgetting Winder's 
instructions, streamed in all three directions: some toward Washing-
ton; some toward Tenleytown; and some toward Georgetown.32 
The second line, although positioned too far to the rear to assist 
s
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the first line, was prepared to stand finn, but Winder ordered the line 
to retreat and fall back a mile and a half and reform. When it did so, the 
troops were joined by Colonel Minor's Virginians, and they began to 
form a new line. Winder came up and soon gave orders to retire back to 
Capitol Hill. When this maneuver was performed, Winder consulted 
with Monroe and Armstrong on Capitol Hill to advocate a further re-
treat back to Georgetown. Given the diminished size of Winder's force 
and the general confusion, the commanders agreed that the recom-
mendation to withdraw was probably wise. The order to retreat farther 
ended all discipline, and the defending force simply melted away. The 
city was left defenseless before the advancing enemy.33 
The only serious resistance that the British met came from Comm. 
Joshua Barney's sailors. Barney's flotilla, which had been drawn up the 
Patuxent River for safety, had been the original objective of the British. 
But when he blew up his ships rather than allow them to fall into enemy 
hands, the British altered their objective to assault Washington. Barney 
and his sailors joined Winder and followed him to Bladensburg. Their 
guns delivered a devastating punishment to the British before they were 
eventually flanked and Barney was captured. In fact, the British, largely 
because of Barney's sailors, suffered greater casualties than the Ameri-
cans, approximately 250 to 70.34 
In the aftermath, Hezekiah Niles in his Weekly Register called the 
battle "this lamentable and disgraceful affair." The militia, he noted, 
"generally fled without firing a gun, and threw off every incumbrance 
of their speed!"35 The fleetness of foot of American militiamen was 
memorialized in a satirical piece called "The Bladensburg Races." 
While the militia system failed miserably in this instance, the blame 
must ultimately rest on the almost total incompetence of General 
Winder. Throughout the course of the battle he thought only of re-
treat. Every time the lines were reformed for battle, he called for fur-
ther retreat. In fairness, he had little to do with the initial formation of 
the troops for battle, and he did not have the opportunity, as did Gen-
eral Andrew Jackson at New Orleans, of drawing his forces behind a 
barricade. Nonetheless, it is still difficult not to conclude that if the 
Americans had had a general who was willing to fight that day, they 
could have repulsed the British, who were, after all, taking a consider-
able risk by extending themselves deeply into enemy country. General 
Ross was well aware of the potential danger of his situation, and he did 
not tarry long in Washington after burning the public buildings of the 
city. He withdrew on August 25 after about thirty hours in the city. 
The British next turned their attention toward Baltimore. Sir Pe-
ter Parker, captain of the British ship Menelaus, was already operating 
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on the upper Chesapeake. On August 30, he learned of an American 
militia force of about 160 encamped near Chestertown, Maryland. The 
next day, Parker led a force of about 100 men in pursuit of the Ameri-
cans, commanded by Lt. Col. Philip Reed. The American militia re-
treated some five miles inland, when Reed stopped his men and formed 
a defensive line. Parker charged the American line, forcing a retreat, 
but the militia reformed and drove the British off. Parker was killed 
trying to rally his men. In addition, ten of the British were killed, while 
the Americans suffered only three wounded.36 
After the Chestertown affair, the British lost another leader when 
they attempted to repeat their success at Washington by capturing Bal-
timore. Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith of the Maryland militia outranked 
General WInder, and he raised a force of approximately 15,000 men to 
defend the city. When the British landed east of Baltimore at North 
Point with about 4,500 men, Smith sent Brig. Gen. John Stricker with 
3,200 men to contest their approach. Stricker deployed and waited on 
the British, but his advance troops, about 150 riflemen, broke even be-
fore the British made contact early in the afternoon of September 12. 
Also, 700 men under Lieutenant Colonel Amey, posted to protect 
Stricker's left flank, as Stricker wrote later, "forgetful of the honour of 
the brigade, and regardless of its own reputation, delivered one random 
fire and retreated precipitately, and in such confusion, as to render ev-
ery effort of mine to rally them ineffective." The flight caused confu-
sion among the militia, and Stricker was forced to withdraw toward 
Baltimore.37 
One consequence of this engagement, however, was the death of 
General Ross, shot while reconnoitering the enemy, reportedly by a 
boy from behind a tree. Col. Arthur Brooke assumed command and 
pushed the Americans back toward Baltimore. He was prepared to as-
sault the city, when Admiral Alexander Cochrane informed him that 
because of obstructions in the city harbor (and of course the obstinacy 
of the defenders of Fort McHenry), he was calling off the attack on 
Baltimore.38 The British then retired and the city was saved. Given the 
size oEthe defending force, it is unlikely that the British would have 
succeeded in any event. 
After the British withdrew from Baltimore and the Chesapeake 
Bay area, they shifted their focus to the southern theater along the Gulf 
of Mexico. Fortunately for the reputation of the militia, the militiamen 
in the South performed better than their counterparts along the Atlan-
tic seaboard. The Battle of Bladensburg represented probably the worst 
example of militia performance in the war. It illustrated in microcosm 
all of the things wrong with the militia in the War of 1812. The govern-
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ment was forced to rely oil state militia, which could not easily be gath-
ered. "When the militiamen were collected, there was a lack of organi-
zation, caused by mixing militias from different states, so that it was 
difficult to establish lines of command. As usual, most militiamen ap-
peared without weapons, accouterments, or supplies. Had the militia-
men not been called out so hastily, many of these problems might 
have been worked out; the troops might have borne a resemblance to 
a real military force and not a group of strangers unprepared to act as 
soldiers. 
Wh
Chapter 8 
Federal-State Relations 
T he very nature of the militia system, as discussed earlier, depended 
upon cooperation between the state and federal governments. 
Given state wariness about federal intrusion in the constitutional divi-
sion of responsibility over the militia, it is perhaps not surprising that 
federal-state relations during the first declared war under the Constitu-
tion should have been strained. Clearly, however, there was a political 
element in the objections of the New England governors to the federal 
use of their militia. In the other regions there was willing cooperation, 
but state leaders confronted with innumerable problems in meeting fed-
eral requisitions of militia, like their counterparts in New England, be-
gan to address their situation in ways not contemplated by the Consti-
tution, for example, by forming state armies and suggesting, at least, 
that taxes might be withheld from the federal government to meet the 
needs of the states. 
As late as 1814, militia organization and the powers of regular 
officers over the militia created a controversy in Pennsylvania that re-
sulted in a widely noticed court-martial. In late August, after the British 
burned Washington, Governor Simon Snyder, fearing an attack up the 
Delaware River, called out volunteer militiamen to defend Philadel-
phia. Among those volunteering was a detachment organized under Lt. 
Col. Louis Bache. Eventually, the Pennsylvania militia force was merged 
with regulars and was placed under U.S. Brig. Gen. Joseph Bloomfield, 
who commanded the Fourth Military District. Bache's force was or-
dered to join other troops assembling at Marcus Hook, on the Dela-
ware about fifteen miles below Philadelphia. At the camp, however, 
because many militia companies were undermanned, Col. William 
Duane, adjutant general of the Fourth Military District, was forced to 
merge companies to comply with War Department orders that the com-
panies in federal service must have 100 men. He combined units and, 
when a surplus of officers resulted, allowed the companies and the of-
u. .]
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ficers to work out their command arrangements. When they could not, 
lots were drawn, and some officers had to go home. 1 
Bache and his detachment of 3 51 men arrived in the camp in early 
October 1814, announcing that they were an auxiliary force, subject to 
orders from Governor Snyder, and that they would not be reorganized 
and would not serve under any but their own officers. Duane consulted 
with the new commander of the Fourth Military District, Maj. Gen. 
Edmund P. Gaines, who ordered Duane to comply with his orders to 
arrange the troops in compliance with War Department regulations. 
Duane paraded Baches force on October 14, divided them into regula-
tion-size companies, and instructed Bache to assign the due proportion 
of officers to each platoon, which meant that many officers would be 
sent home. Bache refused, stating that the "detachment under his com-
mand would be commanded by none but their own officers; that the 
men under his command would never submit to any consolidation of 
the companies."2 
Bache was arrested, and five subordinate officers were successively 
ordered to comply; when they refused, all were arrested and ordered to 
leave the camp. Late that same afternoon, however, having received 
orders from Major General Worrell of the Pennsylvania militia, Bache 
returned to the camp. According to Duane a "tumultuous and disor-
derly" mob of about 500 men gathered that was "very rude and menac-
ing." Although they were dispersed, "discipline and subordination in 
the camp were at an end."3 Duane left the camp and informed General 
Gaines, who ordered the court-martial, which began at Chester on 
October 20 and moved to Philadelphia four days later. 
Baches defense was that "my detachment was secured against any 
change, having volunteered under the general orders of the governor, 
of the 27th August." Bache asserted that General Bloomfield had agreed 
with the governor that Bache's force was not to be reorganized. Colo-
nel N.B. Boileau, aide-de-camp to Governor Snyder, confirmed that 
the governor stated to General Bloomfield that Bache's force was not to 
be reorganized and, furthermore, that the men were entitled to be com-
manded by their own officers because they believed they had been re-
ceived into the service of the United States "under that understand-
ing."4 
Although General Bloomfield was not called to testify, he did write 
two letters to Duane, dated October 26 and 29, 1814, denying that he 
had made such an agreement. Duane's position was that once Baches 
forces arrived in the camp, they were under the command of a U.S. 
officer; the camp commander was a Pennsylvania militia officer in U.S. 
service; the food and forage in camp was paid for by the United States; 
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and the camp was formed by the United States. When Gaines took 
command, he stated his position to Duane that the troops were called 
out "to fight the enemy, with which the governor had no right to inter-
fere; two commanders in a camp was a military monster."5 
In his closing remarks, Bache argued that the attempt to reorga-
nize was "unjust, inexpedient, and wholly ruinous to the service." Many 
young men were allowed to volunteer only because their parents knew 
and trusted their officers. Reorganization would "produce general dis-
gust and dissatisfaction among the men ... no men will volunteer when 
it shall be known that neither the word of the governor, nor the solemn 
agreement of the U. States officers can afford either security or protec-
tion."6 
In his summation, Duane observed that the case had roused pas-
sions, "tainted by the breath of faction, and held up to the public in the 
most distorted and extravagant forms." He declared that "the scandal-
ous and humiliating paradoxes which excited so much odium in 1809, 
have been renewed." He was referring to the Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Peters and General Bright's defense that he was obeying 
orders from the governor and state law. Now, Duane said, the same 
doctrine was asserted, that the regulations of the government, the army, 
and military institutions were "to be overwhelmed by the same author-
ity." But, he said, the state could not sanction resistance to the authority 
of the United States or permit subversion of subordination and disci-
pline. "An army," he added, "must be governed like the human body-
by one head and mind-one spirit and one wil1."7 
Bache was found guilty of all charges (but not in every specific). 
The court was lenient, perhaps because it was sensitive to the political 
situation, or possibly because it was influenced by Duane's statement 
that he believed Bache did not understand the seriousness of his ac-
tions. The court ruled it was sensible of the "purity of the motives that 
actuated [Bache], resting as they did upon an honest misconception of 
his duties." Bache was dismissed from the service of the United States 
which, as he was a militia officer, was essentially no punishment. 8 
The Bache case was only one of many vexing problems of state-
federal relations. Another difficulty was finance, namely, who was to 
pay the drafted militia. WIth only limited means, the national govern-
ment understandably tried to curtail excessive state use of militiamen 
by refusing to pay for them unless they were called for by the federal 
government and inspected by a regular army officer. In fact, numerous 
claims for payment for militia drafts were denied when established rules 
were not followed. There were occasions, however, where states had to 
respond promptly to invasion by the enemy before the federal govern-
;
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ment authorized them. Governor James Barbour of Virginia expressed 
his anger and amazement when Secretary of War John Armstrong re-
fused to pay for militiamen summoned by the governor to protect N or-
folk early in 1813. Instead of "generous and unsuspecting confidence" 
in furthering the wishes of the government, Barbour declared, states 
would adopt "the close suspicion of the miser, who before he acts de-
mands solid and unquestionable pledges." To appease Virginia, the ad-
ministration paid that state's militia expenses. This step, however, an-
gered Maryland, which had also been refused compensation for 
unauthorized militia drafts. A committee report of the Executive Council 
of Maryland accused the Madison administration of partiality in assum-
ing Virginia's militia expenses while denying Maryland's. The Council 
adopted a resolution denouncing the administration's action as "partial, 
unjust, and contrary to the spirit of our constitution."9 
Even when the states conformed to all of the federal requirements, 
such as getting the militia mustered and inspected by a regular officer, 
the national government was unable, or unwilling, to pay the militia 
because of a lack of funds. The shortage of money was due to the diffi-
culty that Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin had in borrowing 
capital from the financial markets, particularly in New England. Con-
sequently, Secretary Armstrong opted to divert most War Department 
funds to the northern front. As a result, money to pay militia, build 
fortifications, and reimburse states was simply not available. The bu-
reaucracy was also overwhelmed by bills forwarded for payment, of-
ten accompanied by improper or inadequate paperwork, and it refused 
to pay without adequate documentation. lo 
While the federal government adopted a parsimonious stance, 
many states went to extraordinary lengths to get the federal govern-
ment to pay for militia calls. Governor Peter B. Early, for example, 
expressed this view candidly in a May 1814 letter to Maj. Gen. John 
McIntosh of the Georgia militia: "In every expenditure to which the 
crisis may give rise, we ought constantly so to manage that the United 
States may be made to bear it immediately if we can, ultimately if we 
must. "11 Such parsimony would have been commendable if the national 
government had had money to pay these claims. In fact, the lack of 
funds meant that virtually no claims were paid, even those that were 
admittedly valid. 
In his December 1813 message to the Maryland legislature, Gov-
ernor Levin Winder complained, "If the expenses of a war waged by 
the national authorities are to be borne by the States, it is not difficult 
to foresee that the state treasury will be soon exhausted and the annihi-
lation of the state governments must follow." Winder indicated that the 
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states expenses had exceeded $175,000, with a considerable sum yet 
due. Despite his concern about expenses, Winder recommended that 
the legislature pay militia volunteers who had come from adjoining states 
in the spring of 1813 to assist in Maryland's defense. 12 
The question of federal compensation to Maryland militiamen 
was raised again in the fall of 1814 when they were called out for the 
defense of Washington and Baltimore. Although he was assured that 
Maryland would be reimbursed for expenses, William B. Martin, presi-
dent of the Executive Council, reported to the legislature on December 
10 that the national government had failed to respond despite repeated 
requests. He noted that the state had obtained loans amounting to 
$436,000, which was believed to be inadequate to meet militia claims 
already allowed.13 Thus Maryland was forced to accept a substantial 
portion of its militia costs and undoubtedly believed it was being dis-
criminated against. In fact, Maryland was simply one state of many that 
had to bear the burden of their own defense. 
Governor Daniel Rodney of Delaware complained to his legisla-
ture on January 18, 1814, that an application should be made to Con-
gress for reimbursement of expenses. It was unreasonable for a state to 
be burdened exclusively for the defense of the state, he argued. Accord-
ing to Secretary Armstrong, replying to a resolution of the U.S. House 
dated January 15,1814, the problem was that states were not submit-
ting proper claims for expenses. Virginia was the only state that had 
done so. Its claims had been adjudicated in the accountant's office, and 
disallowed expenditures had been returned to Virginia. Armstrong fol-
lowed with another letter to House Speaker Langdon Cheves recom-
mending more paymaster generals and deputies and setting up a special 
office to receive war claims.14 
The fact remains that the states were not promptly remunerated 
for expenses, and by late 1814 the government had no money for reim-
bursement. This situation did not reduce the number of complaints. 
Governor William Miller of North Carolina, for example, informed his 
legislature in December 1814 that none of the troops or individuals 
who had furnished them supplies in 1813 had received payment. He 
asserted bluntly that "patriotism alone cannot be relied upon as a suffi-
cient incentive to endure the hardships and privations of war. Men must 
be paid or they cannot be expected to fight." Unfortunately, the North 
Carolina militia called out in July and August 1813 did not comply with 
the War Department rules that it be inspected and placed on the rolls 
by a regular army officer. A resolution was adopted appointing a board 
of auditors to examine and pass on claims, and the legislature autho-
rized $25,000 to settle the accounts. Not until 1916 was North Caro-
t '
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lina reimbursed by the federal government for all of the expenditures 
incurred during the War of 1812.15 
Similarly, Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky admonished 
Armstrong in August 1814 for the government's failure to pay the state's 
militia for past service. Shelby complained particularly about the treat-
ment of the men who had marched with him into Canada in 1813. 
Because the government was withholding their pay, it had become his 
duty "to be more cautious in future, in complying with demands on this 
State for troops; and to come to an explicit understanding with the War 
Department on this subject." Noting that the failure to pay his troops 
was "damping the ardour of our Citizens," he added that those who 
served under ColonelJohnson "have long since been paid off in full. ... 
The striking contrast presented by the different treatments of these 
two corps has been observed & remarked upon by every class of our 
Citizens." In fact, Armstrong's objection was that Shelby's militiamen 
cost about $300,000 more than a regular force, because they had enough 
officers for twelve regiments but had fewer bayonets than four regi-
ments of regulars. 16 
Nor were the states willing to bear more than their fair share of 
expenses. Governor Early himself denied payment to some Georgia 
militiamen called out on state duty. In regard to paying militiamen or-
dered to serve at St. Mary's, Early stated to General Floyd late in June 
1814, "where the term of service was short like this, I have declined 
making payment, giving for reason that to do so in all cases would ex-
ceed the means at my command, and that the service should be consid-
ered as a contribution due from every man to his Country, the more so 
especially as it was for the immediate purpose of defending his own fire 
side."17 
Governor Early stated that he had secured an interest-free loan 
from a Savannah bank to assist the city in providing for its defense. Less 
than a month later, he reminded the legislature that the embarrass-
ments of the general government meant that no funds had been depos-
ited with the quartermaster department and, unless the legislature pro-
vided funds, the militia force called out to defend Savannah would not 
be able to march there. He urged the legislators to authorize a loan of 
$20,000 for that purpose. IS Georgia was thus also forced to rely on its 
own resources to carry on the war and to provide for its defense be-
cause the barikrupt national government could not. 
In February 1815, Governor David Holmes informed Acting Sec-
retary of War James Monroe that he had drawn bills on the federal 
government of over $3,000. In March, Holmes complained that since 
the beginning of the war, the Mississippi Territory had kept in the field 
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a considerable part of its effective force. Only two companies had re-
ceived any remuneration and it had come in pursuance of orders from 
General Andrew Jackson. InJune, Holmes reiterated his plea. "Almost 
every man in this Territory liable to perform military duty has served a 
tour of six months during the late war, either in person or by substitute. 
Very few have received any compensation." The problem, as in so many 
other cases, was that the Mississippi militia had not been properly in-
spected by a regular army officer. In January 1816, a committee of the 
U.S. House of Representatives recommended payment to Mississippi 
Territory militia, asserting that muster rolls were sufficient evidence, 
especially when they were operating so far from any regular COrpS.19 
In New England, the tensions between federal and state officials 
raised in 1812 persisted in 1813. During the summer of 1813 the Mas-
sachusetts legislature investigated the actions of William King of Maine, 
who apparently raised a volunteer force without state authority. The 
legislative committee sought to determine whether King held any mili-
tary commission under the United States or had accepted arms from 
the federal government. King responded that he held no commission 
and had distributed no arms. He admitted, however, that when the state 
withheld militia from the federal government, he aided the War De-
partment in organizing volunteer corps for the defense of the Maine 
District. Two regiments were organized, and others had to be turned 
down. Arms had been distributed to these volunteers. Emphasizing that 
he had received no compensation for his services, King added that he 
had exercised his duties as a citizen of the United States as well as a 
citizen of the state.20 
The British blockade along the New England coast in the spring 
of 1814 raised anxiety levels, and state officials, insofar as their prin-
ciples permitted, attempted to cooperate with the federal government 
for their defense. In Massachusetts, an arrangement was worked out 
with the district commander, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Cushing, who 
promised to keep the militiamen and regulars separate and to place no 
regular officer between himself and the militia. Cushing was soon re-
placed by Gen. Henry Dearborn, however, who promptly violated the 
agreement when he called out 1,300 militiamen in July. Not only did he 
consolidate some companies, thereby depriving some militia officers of 
their command, but he also placed a regular officer over the militia.21 
In the meantime, Cushing was transferred to Connecticut, where 
he expected to exercise the same type of control over the militia that he 
had in Massachusetts. There, however, the situation had developed dif-
ferently. When two militia regiments were called out in 1813 to protect 
New London, Connecticut, officials placed the militia under a major 
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general who outranked the regular army officer. Although the militia 
force was nominally in federal service and was paid and supplied by the 
federal government, Connecticut effectively retained control over its 
militia. State officials tried the same tactic in September 1814, how-
ever, when a brigade of militia was called out to protect New London, 
and Cushing obstinately refused to cooperate. Governor John Cotton 
Smith, supported by his council, assigned a major general over the states 
militia. When the state militia refused to follow his orders, Cushing 
declared that the militiamen had been withdrawn from federal service 
and cut off the flow of supplies to them. Connecticut was thus forced to 
assume the financial burden for these militiamen.22 
In Massachusetts a slightly different set of circumstances led to 
the same result. Militiamen called out in September to defend Port-
land, in the Maine district, objected to serving under a regular officer 
and demanded their own militia officer. Eventually, all the militiamen 
were placed under a state commander, and thus, in the view of the fed-
eral government, they too had been withdrawn from federal service, so 
that Massachusetts had to assume the financial liability for them.23 
The result was the same in Rhode Island, but the circumstances 
were different. When Governor WtlliamJones called out the state mi-
litia in the summer of 1814 to protect Newport, the troops were put 
into federal service to gain financial support. Federal agents had no 
funds to supply the militia, however, and the state had to bear the costs 
anyway. Rhode Islands eventual expenses amounted only to $50,000, 
far less than the $850,000 for Massachusetts and $150,000 for Con-
necticut. Nevertheless, all three states expected the federal government 
to make restitution for their sacrifices.24 
On September 7,1814, Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts 
wrote the secretary of war and asked explicitly "whether the expenses 
thus necessarily incurred for our protection will be ultimately reim-
bursed to this State by the General Government." Acting Secretary 
Monroe responded on September 17, explaining the views of the gov-
ernment: "The measures which may be adopted by a State Govern-
ment for the defence of a State must be considered as its own measures, 
,and not those of the United States. The expenses attending them are 
chargeable to the State, and not to the United States." Monroe's added 
gratuitous remarks did not soften the blow. He pointed out that any 
other policy would have "pernicious consequences." Allowing states 
to undertake their own defense and to call out their militia at will 
and at federal expense would undermine national authority, he con-
cluded, and would introduce a policy "the tendency of which I forbear 
to comment. "25 
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One consequence of this correspondence was that a Massachu-
setts legislative committee, headed by Harrison Gray Otis, determined 
that Massachusetts, faced with increased national taxes, deprived of its 
commerce, harassed by the enemy, and required to provide for its own 
defense, must either submit or control its own resources. The commit-
tee complained about the men and measures that had brought on this 
situation and called for a conference of New England states with simi-
lar grievances. From this report grew the Hartford Convention to re-
vise the Constitution.26 
The above report was not gained without vigorous dissent in both 
houses of the Massachusetts legislature. A Senate minority report signed 
by thirteen members denounced the Hartford Convention as unwise 
and illegal. It also argued "that a separate army comports too well with 
a separate sovereignty, and that these men may at some future period be 
employed to settle domestic quarrels or enforce local interests." The 
minority attack in the House of Representatives was considered so strong 
that the majority declared it disrespectful and refused to enter the pro-
test in the journal. In truth, the stance of the House minority was rela-
tively moderate. It even agreed that the "sudden detachments of militia 
for short periods of service, has left no doubt of the preference for a 
permanent corps." But the minority also asserted that these troops must 
be raised under the provisions of the Constitution, with control given 
to the national government. They warned prophetically, "If this com-
mand be denied, neither the letter of the National compact, nor its 
spirit, by just construction, will sanction a claim to remuneration, and 
the expence of Troops, otherwise employed must fall exclusively upon 
the State." The minority also argued that, even with a state army, Mas-
sachusetts was obligated to defend the Union; that refusal to comply 
with legal requisitions not only violated national duty but would tend to 
the dissolution of the Union. It warned that any compact entered into 
by the Hartford Convention without the consent of Congress would be 
unconstitutional and could result in "civil dissentions and convulsions." 
Worse, the country could become "vanquished and tributary colonies 
to a haughty and implacable foreign foe."27 
Because of the constitutional ramifications of the Hartford Con-
vention, more attention has been paid to the challenge to federal au-
thority than to the actual statement of grievances drafted by the del-
egates. In fact, at the heart of the report was the issue of federal control 
over state militia. After the preliminary statement, the first major griev-
ance cited was "the claims and pretensions advanced, and the authority 
exercised over the militia, by the executive and legislative departments 
of the National Government." If these claims were conceded, it would 
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"render nugatory the rightful authority of the States," and transferring 
control over the militias to the national government would "enable it at 
pleasure to destroy their liberties, and erect a military despotism on the 
ruins." If the declaration of the president be the "unerring test of the 
existence of these cases, this important power would depend, not upon 
the truths of the fact, but upon executive infallibility." Therefore, state 
authorities had as much duty "to watch over the rights reserved, as of 
the United States to exercise the powers which are delegated." The con-
vention report also criticized the stationing of regular army officers in 
districts to command militia units called out. If these drafts or conscrip-
tions be allowed, it was argued, "the whole militia may be converted 
into a standing army disposable at the will of the President of the United 
States." Part of the report laid out the proposition that states provide 
for their own protection and reserve a portion of their national taxes for 
defense.28 
Perhaps the most damning indictment of the militia system, and 
an indication of its failure during the war, was the establishment of state 
armies. Had the war continued another year, it seems certain that a 
significant majority of the states would have forsaken reliance upon the 
militia and established permanent (standing) state armies. By 1815, at 
least ten of the eighteen states had adopted, or were in the process of 
adopting, laws establishing state armies. In three other states their gover-
nors recommended consideration of such a force. 
In New England, Connecticut authorized in October 1812 two 
regiments of infantry, four companies of artillery, and four troops of 
horse to serve for the duration of the war. Governor J ohn Cotton Smith, 
in a message to the legislature in the spring of 1813, made the assump-
tion that must have been made in other states. "The sums it may be 
necessary to appropriate to this object," he declared, "we have a right to 
expect will be ultimately refunded by the general government; it being 
an essential purpose of the confederacy, that expences incurred in a 
common cause should be defrayed from a common treasury." Hezekiah 
Niles declared that Connecticut had availed itself of one of the negative 
clauses of the Constitution that barred states from keeping troops in 
time of peace and "construed this into an express admission that any 
state in time of war may keep on foot troops. "29 
In October 1814 the Connecticut legislature authorized the gov-
ernor to raise a body of 1,000 for three years of service. Vermont in 
1812 authorized a force of volunteers (number unspecified) to be sub-
ject to the orders of the governor for the duration of the war. Rhode 
Islands legislature directed the governor in June 1814 to raise a state 
corps and appoint officers "as soon as the President of the United States 
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consents to receive them into service." Massachusetts approved a corps 
of 10,000 men in October 1814.30 
In the Middle Atlantic region, Governor Daniel D. Tompkins, 
while saluting the achievements of the New York militia, reminded his 
legislature in late September 1814 of his earlier declaration that the 
burden of militia duty fell most heavily upon the poorer class. He again 
asked for reform of the militia system, arguing that the population and 
resources of New York enabled it to raise 10,000 state troops and 10,000 
minutemen uniformed, equipped, and disciplined for local defense "as 
a substitute for ordinary militia." A few days later, he sent a message to 
the legislature detailing the various drafts of militia for the Niagara 
frontier, Sackets Harbor, New York City, and Lake Champlain. Be-
cause most militiamen appeared without firearms or equipment, the 
state spent $5,000 for arms and supplies. Observant persons, he argued, 
saw that "the expence, public inconvenience, waste and destruction of 
military stores, and interruption of agricultural pursuits, arising from 
calls on the ordinary militia ... are totally disproportioned to their 
efficiency in service, and that therefore a resort to some other measure 
to repel invasion and to meet emergencies, is indispensable." He asked 
for the creation of an advanced corps of 20,000, so that the ordinary 
militia would be used only as a last resort.31 
The legislature responded on October 24 by creating a 12,000-
man state army and a reserve, making a permanent force of20,000 men. 
The troops were, however, to be paid, clothed, and subsisted by the 
United States, and they were to be raised by "equal classification" (pre-
sumably, not allowing for exemptions).32 The war ended before it could 
be tested whether the United States government would bear the cost of 
a New York army or, for that matter, whether the concept of "equal 
classification" would produce such an army. 
Federalists attacked the New York law as conscription. One pam-
phlet, signed "By an Exempt," denounced it as "the abominable law of 
conscription disguised under the mild and deceptive name of classifica-
tion." Although "ostensibly to relieve the poor ... ," the author argued, 
"The real design is to supply the national government with twelve thou-
sand recruits," subject to the orders of the president. The author con-
cluded, the "noble body of militia, which, if well regulated, is a firm 
bulwark of civil liberty and national independence, shall be transformed 
into a dreadful engine of military despotism."33 
As early as December 1812 a resolution was introduced in the 
Pennsylvania legislature to create two regiments (2,000 men) "to serve 
during the war in substitution of a portion of the quota of militia which 
may be demanded by the general government." Nothing was done, 
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however, as Pennsylvania governor Simon Snyder observed to Maj. Gen. 
David Mead in February 1814. "It is a matter of regret," Snyder wrote, 
"that no mode of guarding against a sudden invasion of our lake fron-
tier has been adopted less expensive to the State than the one pursued ... ," 
and he added, "if calls en masse are continued, our ordinary resources 
will be altogether unequal." Snyder suggested a plan to keep a small 
force at possible invasion points and a system to alert militia held "in 
readiness to march in a moment's warning." His suggestion was made, 
he continued, "to prevent a dissipation of public treasure in the pursuit 
of measures which appear to me of doubtful utility." Snyder recom-
mended in his December 1814 annual message that his legislature cre-
ate "a few regiments, to serve during the war, for the defence of the 
state." A bill dated February 24, 1815, which originated in the Senate, 
passed to a second reading before peace was confirmed. It called for 
every twentieth man to volunteer for twelve months of duty and would 
indeed have created a state army.34 
In New Jersey, Governor William S. Pennington contended in 
his message of January 1814: "It is next to impossible that the great 
body of militia should acquire much proficiency in tactics and disci-
pline," and he urged his legislature to create a select corps such as a rifle 
corps. Experience showed, he said, that "they form the best corps of 
irregular troops." In October 1814 Pennington recommended to his 
legislature a "military corps of more durability than is compatible with 
the nature of militia service," but the war ended before the legislature 
could act. 35 
In January 1815, Maryland approved a state force of five regi-
-ments of infantry and five companies of artillery for a period of five 
years or the duration of the war. Use of this force was limited to the 
region bound by the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania and the Blue 
Ridge Mountains and the James River in Virginia. The law stipulated 
that if the federal government did not accept the whole force, the gov-
ernor was to scale its size accordingly.36 
In the South Atlantic states, Virginia created a force in February 
1813 of one regiment of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one company of 
riflemen, and two companies of artillery "to serve during the present 
war." The force was contingent, however, upon the national 
governments reimbursing Virginia for "all reasonable expenses incurred 
in consequence thereof." Perhaps fearing the precedent set by their 
own state, Madison and Monroe moved swiftly to negate the act. Mon-
roe wrote Governor James Barbour on March 21, 1813, that he had not 
"examined the constitutional propriety of the measure," but he sup-
posed every object contemplated by the law "might be secured by means 
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of, and under the authority of, this government." Secretary Armstrong 
informed Barbour the next day that a draft of militia by the governor 
was approved by the president. Barbour responded on March 24 that 
the Council of State agreed with him that the law should not be ex-
ecuted, on the basis of their "ardent disposition to cherish concord be-
tween the two governments." Eventually, Barbour convened the legis-
lature into extraordinary session. He advised the lawmakers that the 
general government had taken up their defense, had sanctioned the call 
of militia, and had authorized another regular regiment "to be officered 
by our citizens exclusively." Under these circumstances and the fact 
that carrying the states law into effect would involve expenses of a half 
million dollars, as well as establishing "a precedent liable to be per-
verted to the worst of purposes," Barbour asked the legislature to re-
peal the law, which was done on May 26, 1813.37 
Yet in October 1814, Governor Barbour asked his legislature "to 
consider whether a substitution of a permanent military force ... would 
not be preferable to calling out and continuing in service large masses 
of militia; a system as burthensome to our citizens, as expensive to the 
commonwealth." He argued that by proper representations to the gen-
eral government, arrangements could be made satisfactory to both gov-
ernments. The legislature adopted a resolution asking the governor to 
query the national government whether the United States would pay 
for a state army as a substitute for militia.38 
In early 1815, the Virginia legislature, characterizing the drafts of 
militia for short terms of service as "wasteful, expensive and improvi-
dent ... , productive of an unnecessary and deplorable waste of lives, 
without any equivalent of public advantage," again created a force of up 
to 10,000 men. As before, the plan was contingent upon the federal 
government's agreement to pay, equip, clothe, and subsist these troops. 39 
North Carolina Governor WIlliam Hawkins recommended in late 
1814 that his legislature organize a state corps to serve for two years, 
along with encampments for officers of fifteen days each in the spring 
and fall, but the war ended before the legislature took any action. South 
Carolina authorized in December 1814 a state army of two brigades 
(four regiments) for the duration of the war. It was stipulated that they 
be kept within the state for defense "unless in the case of an actual 
invasion of a contiguous state." The force was not to be organized until 
May 1, 1815, however, which was after the war was over.40 
In the West, Governor Return J. Meigs, citing the disorganiza-
tion of the Ohio militia, urged the legislature in his annual message of 
December 1812 to form companies of mounted volunteers to be held 
in constant readiness. "When occasion for this species of service ... has 
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occurred," he said, "so much time has unavoidably been consumed in 
associating-collecting and organizing-that the object has been lost, 
the movements not sufficiently simultaneous-too tardy for the emer-
gency." Although the legislature did not act to establish a standing force, 
the idea resurfaced early in 1815. Thomas Worthington, Ohio's new 
governor, recommended that the legislature establish an elite corps to 
muster and train frequently at state expense and be the first to go when 
calls were made for troops. The plan was under consideration when the 
war ended.41 
Kentucky, in effect, created two state armies. In 1813 the legisla-
ture authorized a force of up to 3,000 men for six months to be used as 
Governor Isaac Shelby chose. Near the end of the war, in] anuary 1815, 
Shelby again cited the urgent need for a state army: "We have too deep 
an interest at stake to rest our sole reliance upon the General Govern-
ment," and he recommended a 1O,000-man force. Peace came, how-
ever, before the Kentucky legislature acted upon the recommendation. 
Undoubtedly, they would have granted the popular governor's request.42 
How the state armies would have related to the United States army, 
and what impact such standing armies would have had upon the con-
cept of republicanism, are just two issues that would have aggravated 
state-federal relations had the war continued another year. Certainly 
the question of how the state armies would be paid would have arisen 
between the states and the national government. Many of the state laws, 
as noted, were contingent upon the federal government's footing the 
bill. To say the least, such an eventuality was unlikely. 
It is quite possible that the states would have adopted the idea 
broached in the Hartford Convention and suggested as well by Ohio 
and Virginia near the end of the war, namely, withholding direct taxes 
owed by the state to the federal government to cover the state's costs in 
paying their militias and providing for their defense. The case of Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut is easily understood because of their long-
standing differences with the administration. Connecticut governor] ohn 
Cotton Smith affirmed his support for the recommendation of the Hart-
ford Convention that states assuming the burden of defense should re-
tain a portion of the taxes collected within the state to meet state de-
fense needs. "The plainest principles of justice and self-preservation 
demand," he said, "that whilst the burden of defence is laid upon the 
state so much of its resources as may be adequate to that end, should in 
any event be retained."43 
Ohio's proposal was apparently more innocent. The state legisla-
ture adopted a resolution late in 1814 proposing essentially that the 
state pay its direct taxes instead to its citizens who had unpaid claims 
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against the federal government. In forwarding the proposal to Treasury 
Secretary Alexander James Dallas early in January 1815, Governor 
Worthington declared that because the national government had failed 
to meet its obligations, "feelings of dissatisfaction are created towards 
the government, which cannot too soon be removed." Dallas, at least, 
saw the dangers of such a move. His emphatic refusal brought an apolo-
getic reply from Worthington, who declared that the motives of his 
legislature were "patriotic." He added that they had no desire, as Dallas 
had phrased it, "to procure a partial accommodation, for the citizens of 
Ohio, at the expense of an injury to the fiscal affairs of the General 
Government. "44 
Dallas did, however, sanction another use of direct taxes. Gover-
nor David Williams of South Carolina wrote Dallas on December 22, 
1814, that having been informed by Maj. Gen. Thomas Pinckney that 
he had no funds to subsist his troops, he had recommended to his legis-
lature that their direct taxes be applied to this need. Accordingly, 
$260,000 had been appropriated and placed in the Bank of South Caro-
lina for that purpose. The $260,000 figure was only an estimate of di-
rect taxes owed; the state promised to make up any additional sum. In 
fact, South Carolina's share came to nearly $304,000.45 South Carolina~ 
innovative use of its direct taxes was satisfactory, but it is very likely that 
had the war continued and the national government remained bank-
rupt and unable to meet its obligations to pay states for their war costs, 
many other states would have withheld their funds from the national 
government to meet their own desperate needs. 
State-federal relations during the War of 1812 were thus often 
turbulent. Partisan politics in Congress precluded a cooperative effort, 
and Federalist governors used their most powerful weapon in opposi-
tion to the war, that of withholding their militias from the federal gov-
ernment. The states' rights arguments used by the Federalists were a 
convenient shield to rationalize their antiwar opposition. Joseph Gales, 
in December 1814, editorialized in the pages of the Daily National 
Intelligencer against the Federalist opposition. "The doctrines which they 
advance in relation to the militia," he wrote, "are calculated entirely to 
destroy its efficacy." The Federalist contention that the militia was "ex-
clusively a state force, and disposable by the National Government, only 
in cases of actual invasion, actual insurrection, &c. and then only through 
the agency of state authorities," Gales asserted, stripped the nation of 
its "natural defensive force" and would leave the nation at the mercy of 
the enemy or upon the "liberality of state governments." Such a situa-
tion was never contemplated by the Constitution, he declared.46 
Governor Strong of Massachusetts argued, no doubt with perfect 
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sincerity, that states were the guardians of their sovereignty and the 
rights of individual citizens. As he informed his legislature in January 
1815, it was their duty "to guard the Constitution itself, as well against 
silent and slow attacks, as more open and daring violations."47 
The constitutional question was not addressed in Congress until 
after the war was over. Speaking for the administration, Secretary of 
War Monroe forwarded the relevant documents to the Senate. In an 
accompanying letter, he asserted that the right of the government to 
call out the militia for the purposes specified in the Constitution was 
"unconditional." "It was obviously the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution," he argued, "that these powers, vested in the general gov-
ernment, should be independent of the states' authorities, and adequate 
to the ends proposed." As precedents he cited occasions under Presi-
dent George Washington when the permission of state governors had 
not been asked for militia drafts. He contended that when militia en-
tered federal service "all State authority over them ceases"; such a na-
tional force, paid by the nation, would serve under the command of 
regular officers. The assertion by the Massachusetts judges that only 
the president could command the militia in the field, Monroe declared, 
"pushes the doctrine of State rights further than I have ever known it to 
be carried in any other instance. "48 
William Branch Giles of Virginia reported for the Senate Com-
mittee on Military Affairs on February 28, 1815. He observed that a 
return of peace had relieved the committee of providing a legislative 
remedy, but he asserted that in a future war the same question might be 
raised again and that the problem might deprive the United States of 
the "most efficient legitimate means of prosecuting ... war." The pre-
tensions of the state authorities were "not warranted by the Constitu-
tion, nor deducible from any fair and just interpretation of its principles 
and objects." That position, he concluded, would render the national 
government unable to provide for the common defense and would 
"change the fundamental character of the Constitution itself, and thus 
eventually ... produce its destruction." Not until a decade later, after 
Massachusetts recanted its position, did the national government con-
sider Massachusetts's militia claim (and it was not paid until 1862). In 
1827 the Supreme Court delivered a conclusive decision in Martin v. 
Mott that the authority to call out the militia belonged exclusively to 
the president.49 
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Chapter 9 
War in the South and the 
Battle of New Orleans 
"l X Thile militiamen and their officers frequently confronted profes-
V V sional British soldiers in the North, militiamen in the South 
were called upon to fight a different kind of war against Indians. The 
Indians were a traditional enemy, and the militias should have been 
better prepared to fight them. Nevertheless, the results were mixed. 
Southern militias encountered many of the same problems plaguing 
their counterparts in the North and some that were new. When Gen. 
James Wilkinson called upon Louisiana governor William c.c. 
Claiborne for assistance after war was declared in June 1812, for ex-
ample, Claiborne, apparently considering the territorial law of April 
1811 invalid, expressed his regret that the lack of a militia law pre-
vented him from cooperating with the regular army for the defense of 
the state. Although the legislature finally passed a law in February 1813, 
a lack of weapons and supplies still hampered the organization of the 
Louisiana militia to meet the needs for war.l 
Claiborne wrote in May 1813 to James Brown and Eligius 
Fromentin, the two Louisiana senators, asking their help in securing a 
loan of arms from the national government. General Wilkinson, he 
noted, was able to furnish only 600 of the 4,000 muskets that the state 
needed. "I am making every exertion to organize the militia & to place 
it on the best possible footing," he wrote, "but the want of arms, and 
the impossibility of obtaining them, by private purchases, discourage 
officers & men & check all military ardour." On June 10, learning that 
the Third Regiment of the United States Army had been ordered out 
of the state, Claiborne again wrote his senators to represent to the gov-
ernment that the regular force could not be diminished without endan-
gering the safety of the state. "The militia are not & cannot for some 
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time be made efficient," he wrote, "the want of arms & munitions of 
war, are sources of great embarrassment."2 
Lack of arms was not the only predicament. When General 
Flournoy called upon Claiborne in early June to hold 1,500 militiamen 
in readiness, Claiborne pleaded for time, noting that the militia was "in 
a state of great derangement" due to the necessity of electing captains 
and subalterns under the new militia law. Thus, a year after the declara-
tion of war, Louisiana's militia still had not been organized.3 
In late June 1813, Secretary of War John Armstrong, perhaps in 
response to the lobbying of the Louisiana senators, promised to send 
2,000 stand of arms to Louisiana via Pittsburgh down the Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers. For some reason, the number of arms was reduced 
to 1,500, but the shipment was very tardy. In September, Claiborne 
informed Flournoy that he was trying to arrange shipment from Pitts-
burgh, but he feared that they would not arrive for another two or three 
months. At the same time, Claiborne encouraged Senator Fromentin 
to see if several hundred sabers could also be shipped to Louisiana. 
"The Creoles of this country are very partial to cavalry service," he 
explained, "and in some parts of our State, particularly the Western 
District, they are the kind of troops that could act with greatest ad-
vantage."4 
Thus the usual problems, lack of arms and supplies, not to men-
tion the lack of organization, discipline, and leadership, plagued south-
ern states and contributed to many of the failures of militia. The war in 
the South began in July 1813 when militiamen from the Mississippi 
Territory, having learned that Creek warriors had visited Spanish offi-
cials in Pensacola to obtain arms, ambushed the Indians at Burnt Com 
Creek in Alabama. The attack was initially successful, but the Indians 
regrouped and scattered the militia. One account stated, "nothing saved 
our men from a general slaughter but the inability of the Indians to 
overtake them." In retaliation, the Upper Creeks, or "Red Sticks," as 
the war party was called, who were living in Alabama, attacked Fort 
Mims (about forty miles north of Mobile) on August 30. The fort was 
caught by surprise, and over 250 people, including women and chil-
dren, were slaughtered.5 Reports of the massacre rippled through the 
South and led to cries for revenge. 
Governor David Holmes in the Mississippi Territory was quite 
willing to cooperate, but the lack of supplies was a constant problem. 
When the Creek War broke out in 1813, he agreed to summon his 
troops if he could procure supplies from the regulars. He advised Brig. 
Gen. Thomas Flournoy on August 12 that "to delay the troops until 
ammunition, camp equipage, &c. could be sent from Orleans would be 
15
3
rn
5
-CI,) 
-::» 
o 
-.I 
War in the South & Battle of New Orleans 159 
T 
MISSISSIPPI 
TERRITORY 
Nashville 
• 
Burnt Corn 
• 
The Southern Theater. Courtesy of the Laboratory for Remote Sensing 
and Geographic Information Systems, Department of Geography, The 
University of Memphis. 
160 Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 
to abandon the object of calling them out." He promised to try to pro-
cure what supplies he could and send them on. When General Flournoy 
informed Holmes that he did not have the authority to call out the 
troops, however, and the Mississippi troops could not be entered into 
the service of the United States, Holmes backed off. "The Territory has 
not the funds requisite to furnish camp equipage, forage, and ammuni-
tion without which troops cannot be marched to a distant part of the 
country .... I shall not embody the troops," he continued, "until I re-
ceive further information upon the subject."6 
Holmes wrote Mississippi territorial judge Harry Toulmin that 
the failure to embody the force to march to Fort Stoddart was "a source 
of much mortification, and real distress." He said he assumed that 
Flournoy possessed the same powers as Wilkinson to call upon the mi-
litia. The news of the massacre at Fort Mims on the Alabama River in 
late August, however, changed the situation as far as Holmes was con-
cerned. He ordered all of the cavalry of the territory into service (four 
troops, or about 200 men). Supplies were purchased upon the credit of 
the War Department, and Holmes wrote General Flournoy, "I am con-
fident the President will consider them as in the service of the United 
States." Holmes explained to Armstrong why he called out the troops, 
and he confidently assumed that the government would pay for them 
and that suppliers would accept government IOUs. He announced he 
had drawn upon the War Department for $2,000, but he promised "no 
more money will be expended than is absolutely requisite." Flournoy 
refused to take responsibility for these militia. Holmes traveled to 
Fort Stoddart to smooth things over, but Flournoy had departed for 
New Orleans before he arrived. Nevertheless, the cavalry remained 
in service.7 
In fact, even prior to the incident at Burnt Corn, the War Depart-
ment had authorized a draft of militia. On July 13, 1813, Secretary 
Armstrong had instructed Tennessee and Georgia each to call out 1,500 
men. Governor Willie Blount of Tennessee, however, interpreted the 
letter as only an alert to his militia. After Burnt Corn and Fort Mims, 
Governor David Mitchell of Georgia, learning of Blount's lack of ac-
tion, informed the War Department that he was summoning 2,500 men. 
Blount and his legislature belatedly authorized not 1,500 but 3,500 for 
service against the Creeks. President Madison approved this additional 
force, despite Armstrong's protests about excessive costs. To avoid hav-
ing a militia general, Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson, outrank Brig. Gen. 
Thomas Flournoy, the commander of the Seventh Military District, 
Maj. Gen. Thomas Pinckney's Sixth Military District was extended, 
and he was placed in command of the Creek operation.8 
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In addition to the above-mentioned force, Brig. Gen. Ferdinand 
Claiborne's Mississippi Volunteers had been called out earlier. While 
there was certainly a sufficient force authorized to engage the Creeks, 
there were serious problems of supply because the contractors were 
unable on such short notice to gather adequate quantities of food and 
other necessities to meet the demands of the militia force being col-
lected. Moreover, there were organizational problems and a lack of co-
ordination and cooperation among the various forces designated to en-
gage the Creeks. Two armies from Tennessee, one from East Tennessee 
under Gen. John Cocke, and the other from West Tennessee under 
Gen. Andrew Jackson, were to converge in northern Alabama under 
Jackson and drive the Creeks southward. Another force of Georgia 
militia under Brig. Gen. John Floyd was to proceed westward into Ala-
bama and meet the Tennessee force at the junction of the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa Rivers. Meanwhile, a fourth army, composed of the Third 
Regiment of the u.s. Army and Mississippi Territory militia, com-
manded by Gen. Claiborne, was to advance up the Alabama River and 
join with the other armies.9 
Claiborne was the first to act. In early October he advanced to-
wards the Alabama River from Fort Stephens on the Tombigbee. Gen-
eral Flournoy, however, refused to accept Maj. Thomas Hinds's Missis-
sippi Dragoons, despite Claiborne's protests. Flournoy contended that 
Hinds's force was called out under Governor Holmes's authority and 
instructed Claiborne to "have nothing to do with them." Flournoy ob-
viously resented being superseded by General Pinckney, and these 
hurt feelings impinged on the campaign. He advised Claiborne to take 
a defensive posture until he was joined by Jackson and the Tennesseans. 
"You had better never fight a battle, than run the risk of defeat," he 
cautioned, because it would "not only prove the destruction of the fron-
tier inhabitants, but will in all likelihood lead to the destruction of the 
whole country." Flournoy informed Claiborne in early November that 
he was returning to New Orleans and that he no longer considered the 
Third Regiment of regulars under Col. Gilbert Russell under his com-
mand, thereby freeing them to join Claiborne. "It concerns me that I 
am not to be among the conquerors of the Creek Indians," Flournoy 
wrote. "But this seems to be determined otherwise by a power beyond 
my control."l0 
Despite Flournoys cautionary advice, Claiborne, with about 1,200 
men, moved into the Indian country and captured the Creek village of 
Holy Ground, near the juncture of the Alabama and Cahaba Rivers. A 
large quantity of supplies, which the Indians badly needed, was cap-
tured and another village nearby destroyed. Claiborne wrote Secretary 
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Armstrong that he would have marched on and destroyed other towns 
but for the condition of his troops, "who were destitute of shoes or 
cloathing [sic], not having been paid for several months past; and the 
want of provision which from the difficulty in procuring transporta-
tion, could not be obtained." He did erect Fort Claiborne, about eighty-
five miles above the old Fort Mims on the Alabama River, but in Janu-
ary 1814 Claiborne had to dismiss his militiamen whose terms had 
expired. Only the Third Regiment of regulars remained to engage the 
Creeks in south Alabama. 11 
Mter his campaign against the Creek Indians in the fall of 1813, 
General Claiborne wrote Armstrong on January 24, 1814, explaining 
why his militiamen refused to enlist in the regular army. His Mississippi 
Volunteers were returning to their homes "with eight months pay due 
to them and almost literally naked. They have served for two or three 
months of an inclement winter, withoutshoes or blankets and almost with-
out shirts." He added that they were "still attached to their country, and 
properly impressed with the justice and necessity of the war," but "as 
they believe that some of these sufferings and privations were not un-
avoidable, they have for some months past almost uniformly declined 
prolonging their terms of service by enlisting in the regular army."12 
WIth the terms of the militia called out in September due to expire 
in April, Holmes informed Flournoy in March 1814 that he was sum-
moning replacement militiamen without federal authorization because 
he deemed it essential to keep up a force on the frontier until the war was 
ended. Six companies were drafted, and Holmes again drew upon the 
War Department for $1,900 to equip and furnish this militia forceY 
Meanwhile, in Georgia, Governor Mitchell wrote anxiously that 
his militia was "destitute of all supplies. This state is not possessed of 
any camp equipage and of but very little ammunition." Having said so, 
he wrote that he would "confidently rely upon a refund by the United 
States of the money I advance for the detachment."14 
When the Georgia militia rendezvoused in late August at Fort 
Hawkins in western Georgia, a "small difficulty" presented itself. War 
Department rules stated not only that the militiamen had to be inspected 
by a federal officer but that they also had to be organized into compa-
nies of 100 privates and 5 officers. Georgia's militia, however, was orga-
nized into companies of 75 rank and file and 3 officers. The regular 
army officer at Fort Hawkins, Capt. Philip Cook, refused to inspect the 
companies if they were not properly organized. Mitchell informed 
Armstrong that "a reorganization of them at this time will be produc-
tive of serious inconvenience." He also asserted to Cook that the War 
Department regulation was "contrary to law" and a matter for the gov-
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ernor and secretary of war to settle. He urged Cook to accept the force 
as organized, lest he endanger "the enterprize for which they have been 
called into the field." When Cook refused to budge, Mitchell wrote 
Brig. Gen. John Floyd that Cook's refusal was "of no importance; di-
rect the Adjutant General to prepare the troops, and the Brigade Major 
to inspect them, who will make a regular return which will be certified 
by yourself, one copy to me & the other to the Secretary of War." He 
added, "I will endeavour to make that answer in place of one made by a 
United States officer."15 
Although the Georgia militia rendezvoused at Fort Hawkins on 
August 25, Mitchell advised Armstrong on September 14 that no con-
tractor had yet shown up and no funds had been received from the 
quartermaster department. Mitchell had been obliged to advance state 
money, but he warned that he could not do so much longer. He also 
cautioned that if the troops were allowed to suffer it would cause "a 
state of discontent which may eventually prove very injurious to the 
intended service."16 
By mid-September, General Floyd's force amounted to nearly 2,400 
men, but he was plagued by supply problems and sickness that delayed 
his movement into Creek country. Reorganizing his volunteer and mi-
litia units delayed him further. In November he reached the 
Chattahoochee River and constructed Fort Mitchell. In late November 
he advanced toward Autosse, an Indian town on the Tallapoosa River. 
His army was detected by the Indians, who were more sizable in num-
ber than Floyd had anticipated. The ensuing battle was hard fought on 
both sides, but in the end Floyd's artillery and a bayonet charge broke 
the Indian line, and he won an important victory, killing over 200 Creeks. 
A shortage of supplies obliged him to retire to Fort Mitchell rather 
than pursue the demoralized Indians. 17 
Plagued by supply problems and the approaching expiration of his 
militia terms in February, Floyd advanced about forty miles west of the 
Chattahoochee and built Fort Hull. From there he again entered into 
Creek country, but he was surprised on January 27, 1814 by an ambush. 
Floyd and his men were able to fight off the Indians, but he suffered 
twenty-six killed and about 150 wounded. The Creeks had forty-nine 
killed in the attack IS 
Floyd retired to Fort Hull, and his militiamen, with their enlist-
ments running out, threatened to leave the camp with or without their 
officers. Floyd withdrew to Georgia, and South Carolina militiamen 
were called out to assist the Georgians. Floyd left a situation not unlike 
that left by General Claiborne. While there had been some success 
against the Indians, no knockout blow had been delivered. 
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Peter Early, who succeeded Mitchell in the Georgia governor-
ship, informed Secretary Armstrong in November 1813 that the quar-
termaster department had no funds and that the state legislature had 
authorized $20,000, which he had gotten by loan for 120 days. He indi-
cated that a portion of this fund would be applied to an additional mili-
tia force he had called out following an Indian raid on November 6 on 
the frontier. Early made it clear that the legislature expected the na-
tional government to pay, "the case being one both of actual invasion 
and such imminent danger of repetition as would not admit of delay, it 
constitutes I apprehend, a strong claim." On January 12,1814, nothav-
ing received a response to his previous letter, Early again wrote 
Armstrong. He was anxious to know whether the government was go-
ing to pay, for the loan came due on March 24. Early also communi-
cated with Congressman George M. Troup to learn whether the gov-
ernment intended to pay the Georgia troops in service. Their term 
expired February 25, they had not received one cent from the govern-
ment, and they were suffering great privations. 19 
Early's fears were realized. The troops at Fort Mitchell became 
mutinous, and General Floyd warned that he might have to relinquish 
the fort before South Carolina militiamen arrived to relieve them. Early 
advised General Pinckney in early February that if the troops aban-
doned General Floyd, "I earnestly hope that all such may be returned 
as deserters & made to suffer all the privations and punishment due to 
such conduct."2o 
"Whether it was a lack of pay, miserable conditions, or other fac-
tors, Governor Early lamented to General Pinckney in fall 1814 that he 
was "grieved" to learn that the detachment of militiamen "now garri-
soning the forts westwardly are in a miserable state of insubordination 
and entirely without discipline." He asserted that an application had 
been made for the arrest of the major commanding. In fact, Early urged 
Pinckney to place Maj. Philip Cook, a regular officer, in command, but 
Pinckney declined.21 
General Jackson;" Tennessee militia faced the same supply prob-
lems that Floyd confronted. Despite his shortages, Jackson aggressively 
advanced into Creek country. He sent Gen. John Coffee to raid the 
Black Warrior River towns in October 1813. With his main army,Jack-
son moved to the area of Ten Islands on the Coosa River in late Octo-
ber and built Fort Strother. On November 3, Jackson ordered Coffee 
to destroy the Indian town of Tallushatchee, about eight miles away. 
Coffee estimated he had killed approximately 200 Indians while sus-
taining five fatalities. In his report to Jackson, Coffee praised his men;" 
"deliberation and firmness": indeed, "all appeared cool and determined." 
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On November 7, Jackson marched with about 2,000 men toward 
Talladega, a friendly Creek village under attack by Red Sticks. Approxi-
mately 1,100 Creeks were besieging the town. On November 8, J ackson ~ 
men encircled the attackers. His plan was to entice the enemy toward 
his main force and then counterattack. Instead of attacking, however, 
the militiamen retreated before the approaching Indians. Jackson rushed 
in his cavalry to break the Indian charge. The militia, Jackson noted, 
"speedily rallied," but he was clearly displeased. "Had I not been com-
pelled by the faux pas of the militia in the onset of the battle, to dis-
mount my reserve, I believe not a man of them would have escaped." 
Most of the Creeks made their escape, but not before about 300 were 
killed.22 As with General Floyd, Jackson's supply shortage forced him 
to withdraw rather than pursue a defeated group ofIndians to deliver a 
knockout blow. 
Gen. John Cocke, a political rival of Jackson, failed to join with 
Jackson's force as had been planned by the state governors early in the 
campaign. Instead, Cocke destroyed some towns of the Upper Creeks 
between November 11 and November 17, culminating in the destruc-
tion of Hillabee Towns the next day. Had Cocke cooperated and joined 
his force with Jackson's, the Creek resistance might have been broken 
before the end of the year. Jackson was furious, and he eventually brought 
charges against Cocke, who was acquitted by the court-martial.23 
Jackson continued to be plagued by lack of supplies and by the 
expiration of militia terms. At one point his force at Fort Strother 
dwindled to 130 men. Reports of the chronic lack of supplies and food, 
in fact, made one group of 200 militiamen marching to join Jackson 
desert and return home instead. When he was able to gather approxi-
mately 800 fresh troops in January 1814, Jackson wasted no time in 
moving again into Indian country. On January 15 he led about 1,000 
men, including friendly Indians, across the Coosa River. By January 18 
he reached Talladega, where additional friendly Indians (between 200 
and 300) joined. Two days later Jackson approached the enemy encamped 
at Emuckfau. "The insubordination of the new troops, and the want of 
skill in most of their officers became more & more apparent," Jackson 
later informed General Pinckney. The Red Sticks, perhaps realizing 
that Jackson was overextended and vulnerable, attacked on January 22, 
but they were repelled. Jackson decided to abandon his campaign and 
began to withdraw toward Fort Strother. After crossing Enitachopco 
Creek on the twenty-fourth, he was again assaulted by the Red Sticks. 
The First Regiment of West Tennessee Volunteer mounted gunmen 
was assigned the task of rear guard. Earlier, they had performed well, 
but now they unfortunately broke and ran. Jackson's account of the 
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battle asserted that "This shameful retreat was disastrous in the ex-
treme." Fortunately, the regulars and artillery held firm and after a des-
perate fight drove off the enemy. Jackson contended that but for "the 
unfortunate retreat of the rear guard in the affair of the 24th inst., I 
think I could safely have said that no army of militia ever acted with 
more cool and deliberate bravery." Upon reflection, he added that the 
failures on the twenty-fourth "ought rather to be ascribed to the want 
of conduct in many of their officers than to any cowardice in the men." 
The commander of the West Tennessee Volunteers, Col. Nicholas Tate 
Perkins, and Lt. Col. John Stump, second in command, were court-
martialed for cowardice, disobedience, and abandoning their posts. 
Perkins was acquitted, but Stump was cashiered.24 
Returning to Fort Strother, Jackson began to assemble a capable 
army. When a militia captain argued "that no power existed but the 
president of the United States" to order him and his troops out, Jack-
son replied angrily that the captain's position was "calculated to sow 
seeds of sedition & disobedience." He reminded the captain that his 
company was called into the service of the United States by Maj. Gen. 
Thomas Pinckney and that Jackson commanded all the troops in Ten-
nessee in the service of the United States. He expected the captain and 
his men to organize and march immediately.25 
Governor Blount had called out 5,000 militia, and General 
Pinckney augmented Jackson's force by assigning the Thirty-ninth Regi..: 
ment of regulars. By early March 1814, Jackson had a large force, care-
fully disciplined, to move again into Indian country. With the addition 
of about 1,000 friendly Indians, he approached the strongly fortified 
main enemy encampment on the Tallapoosa River known as Horse-
shoe Bend. On March 27, after placing General Coffee's force across 
the river behind the enemy, Jackson's army assaulted the main enemy 
fortifications. The combination of attacks from the front and rear even-
tually broke the Creek resistance, and Jackson won a major victory. His 
army suffered 49 killed and 153 wounded, but somewhere between 800 
and 900 of the Indians were killed. Although Coffee's Tennessee Vol-
unteers and the regulars of the Thirty-ninth Regiment were critical to 
victory; Jackson related in his battle report to General Pinckney that 
"the militia of the venerable Genl. [George] Doherty accompanied them 
in the charge, with a vivacity & firmness which would have done honor 
to Regulars." In a proclamation to the Tennessee troops a few days after 
the battle, Jackson praised the militiamen, declaring that they had "re-
deemed the character of Tennessee, & of that description of troops of 
which the greater part of the army was composed."26 
By the end of April the various forces fighting the Creeks joined 
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at the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers in a meeting that 
signaled the end of Indian resistance. As happened so often during the 
war, there were problems of seniority caused by the reluctance of the 
regular officers to defer to Jackson, the senior militia officer. The ar-
rival of General Pinckney to take command resolved that issue, how-
ever. In time, Jackson's contribution to the Creek War was recognized. 
In late May h~ was appointed to the regular army to command the 
Seventh Military District in place of General Flournoy, who had re-
signed. Jackson was to be a brigadier general with a brevet major gen-
eral, but the resignation of General Harrison allowed the government 
to give Jackson the rank of major general.27 
After negotiating a harsh treaty at Fort Jackson with the defeated 
Creeks in August 1814, Jackson turned his attention to his district. There 
were reports that the British were inciting Indians along the Gulf in 
Spanish-held Florida. Even more disturbing was the news that a British 
force had arrived in Pensacola in mid-August with Spanish acquies-
cence. In late August, Jackson learned that the British were planning an 
invasion of Mobile and probably also of New Orleans. He immediately 
urged Governor Willie Blount to call out the Tennessee militia to meet 
this threat.28 
Jackson also asked the Mississippi Territory in late July to give 
him 500 troops for the defense ofN ew Orleans. Governor David Holmes 
pledged his support, but he cautioned that there was a shortage of tents 
and camp equipage of every kind. Since the fall of Fort Mims, he said, 
the Mississippi Territory had put a large force in the field; but none had 
been paid and nothing had been heard on that subject from the War 
Department. "This circumstance," he declared, "will make it difficult 
to procure many volunteers." On September 19, Holmes wrote Jack-
son that he was doing all he could to forward the movement of troops, 
but he was "greatly embarrassed for the want of equipments." Ten days 
later, Holmes informed Jackson that Maj. Thomas Hinds would lead a 
battalion of cavalry "partly armed with muskets, and as well furnished 
in other respects as our means would permit."29 
In early September a British attack launched from Pensacola upon 
Mobile was repulsed by American regulars commanded by Maj. Will-
iam Lawrence at Fort Bowyer. Jackson decided to attack Pensacola to 
deprive the British of this place as a staging base. He assembled a force 
of approximately 4,100 men, about two-thirds militia, including battle-
tested volunteers, and the remainder regulars and Indians. On Novem-
ber 6,Jackson arrived at Pensacola and demanded that the Spanish sur-
render. The Spanish, who had only about 500 men, vacillated. Jackson 
did not hesitate and invaded the city the next day. Pensacola was cap-
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tured with little resistance. The British withdrew to their vessels in 
Pensacola Bay, blew up two forts guarding the entrance, and sailed out 
into the Gulf. They continued to hover off the coast to lend aid to the 
Indians in the area.3D 
Having accomplished his object, Jackson turned his attention to 
Mobile and New Orleans. His dilemma was whether to focus his efforts 
on the defense of the former, which he believed the most likely British 
target, or the latter, which his government was urging him to de-
fend. Belatedly, he received intelligence that the British intended to 
assault New Orleans. He turned over the defense of Mobile to Gen. 
James Winchester and hurried to New Orleans, where he arrived on 
December pI 
In New Orleans, little had been done to prepare the city's de-
fenses. Louisiana governor William c.c. Claiborne wrote Acting Sec-
retary of War James Monroe on October 25 that while about two-thirds 
of the local militiamen were well armed (an exaggeration), "the militia 
in the interior of the State are almost wholly destitute of arms; they 
are," he added, "very pressing in their demands on me, and it is with 
regret I find myself without the means of arming them." Another prob-
lem was that citizens of French and Spanish descent who had been sum-
moned for militia duty "absolutely refused to be marched," insisting 
that they were subjects of France or Spain. 32 
Jackson's energetic activities, however, soon spurred the people to 
action. Jackson scouted the various approaches to the city and prepared 
defenses. He also set about raising a military force to meet the invaders. 
Obviously the city militia would not be adequate. Jackson therefore 
called for volunteers from Tennessee, the Mississippi Territory, and even 
Kentucky, which was not within his military district.33 . 
Governor Holmes informed Claiborne that he had ordered out 
his Mississippi Territory militia for the protection of Louisiana. Holmes 
declared, perhaps correctly, "Since the commencement of the war, we 
have constantly had upon the Eastern frontier, in proportion to the 
number of our Inhabitants, more troops in service than any state or 
territory in the Union." In late December, Holmes wrote GeneralJack-
son that he was sending between 400 and 500 troops. Only 200 mus-
kets were available, so the remaining militiamen had to be armed with 
rifles and shotguns. As usual, Holmes charged the expenses to the War 
Department.34 
One interesting and extremely valuable addition to Jackson s force 
were pirates from Barataria Bay, led by Jean Laffite. About 1,000 in 
number, they brought with them not only intelligence about the enemy 
but also arms, ammunition, powder, flints, and other supplies. Jackson 
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also added free black militia companies to his force. Governor Claiborne 
had been daring enough to consider organizing the thousand or so free 
blacks in and around New Orleans into militia companies. The legisla-
ture had balked at the idea before, but perhaps because of the declara-
tion of war, it authorized a corps of "free men of colour" in September 
1812. The act decreed that the commander must be white, that no more 
than four companies could be organized, and that eligibility would be 
limited to those holding landed property of at least $300.35 
While Jackson was preparing defenses, Commodore Daniel T 
Patterson, the naval commander, asked the Louisiana legislature to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus to allow the impressment of seamen. A 
joint committee recommended against suspension, but Jackson, after 
learning of the British capture of American gunboats on Lake Borgne, 
ended the discussion by declaring martial law on December 16. Two 
days earlier, he had ordered Governor Claiborne to hold the Louisiana 
militia in readiness. 36 
Despite Jackson's best efforts, not all approaches to New Orleans 
were obstructed, and the British found their way to the Mississippi River 
by means of Villere's Cana1 on December 23. Jackson wasted no time 
and rushed 1,750 men, including 800 of Gen. John Coffee's Tennessee 
volunteers, about 400 Louisiana militia, and the remaining regulars, to 
Villeres plantation, where he attacked the British two hours after dark. 
The nighttime attack, while not entirely "highly honorable to our arms," 
as Jackson noted, at least delayed the British attack on New Orleans. 
Jackson was given critical time to prepare his defenses along the 
Rodriguez Canal about two miles up the Mississippi from the Villere 
plantation.37 
Jackson was still assembling his force. Unfortunately, many of the 
drafted militiamen either failed to appear at rendezvous or quickly de-
serted. Claiborne complained to Jackson, who was too busy to go after 
these deserters, about the "base and wilful neglect of duty" of many 
militiamen. Jackson reported to Secretary Monroe that he had about 
3,000 effectives, although they were very deficient in arms, accouter-
ments, and flints. 38 (Unfortunately, arms enroute from Pittsburgh and 
traveling by way of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers since November 8 
failed to arrive in New Orleans until January 26.) 
As of December 29, the Kentucky militia still had not arrived in 
New Orleans. On January 2, 1815, Gen. John Adair, adjutant general 
of the Kentucky militia, appeared in Jackson's camp ahead of his troops, 
who arrived a couple of days later. As Jackson reported to Monroe, 
however, of the approximately 2,300 Kentuckians, not more than a third 
were armed, "& those very indifferently." He wondered whether he could 
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make any useful disposition of them. Many were also ill clothed and 
suffering from exposure. The legislature and citizens of New Orleans 
provided blankets, which were then made by the women of the city into 
clothes for the ill-clad troops. Jackson took muskets from the city mili-
tiamen and armed 400 of the Kentuckians. He also ordered a search of 
every house and store in New Orleans for muskets, bayonets, cartridge 
boxes, spades, shovels, pickaxes, and hoes. To augment his forces fur-
ther, Jackson ordered that every man under fifty belonging to fire com-
panies or others legally exempted from militia duty be enrolled imme-
diately in a volunteer company.39 
While Jackson had built a fortification line along the Rodriguez 
Canal that was capable of withstanding a strong artillery bombardment, 
he had taken few precautions to prepare a defensive line on the right (or 
west) bank. The main position on the west bank was about three miles 
below the city. There Commodore Patterson established a battery of 
guns capable of firing on the flanks of an enemy attacking Jackson's line 
on the opposite side. While the main attack of the British was made on 
January 8 on Jackson's line, the enemy also attacked on the west bank. 
The British plan was to assault the west bank position prior to the main 
attack, but because of delays in getting troops across the river, the main 
attack was actually made first. 
The British commander on the west bank was Col. William 
Thornton. His objective was to knock out Patterson's batteries and pos-
sibly to turn these guns upon Jackson's flank. The American line was 
unprepared. Only about 200 yards of the line extending from the river 
(about one-tenth) was fortified when the attack occurred. The remain-
der of the line was a shallow ditch, lighdy defended. The defense was 
commanded by Maj. Gen. David B. Morgan, who had about 500 Loui-
siana militiamen under his command. In addition, Jackson ordered 400 
Kentucky militiamen under Col. John Davis to reinforce Morgan. Un-
beknownst to Jackson, however, only about 260 crossed the river; the 
others returned to camp rather than go over unarmed.40 
Thornton's force was roughly equal to Morgan's, but there was a 
vast difference in the quality of the soldiers. Not only were Morgan's 
troops inferior, but they were also badly deployed. About 120 Louisi-
ana militiamen were placed about a mile in advance of the line to con-
test the enemy landing. When the British landed, however, as General 
Morgan later recounted, the "corps retreated in a most shameful and 
dastardly manner without even firing a gun, and in lieu of retreating to 
my lines ... , they ran precipitately into the woods, since which time I 
have not received any intelligence." Colonel Davis's small force of Ken-
tuckians, also placed in advance of the line, upon their first contact with 
tl
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the British fired off about two rounds and then broke and ran. General 
Morgan was critical of their precipitate flight also: "It was a complete 
flight in place of a retreat, they were in the utmost disorder, one run-
ning after another, or in other words every man for himself."41 
The Kentuckians regrouped behind the American lines and were 
assigned to defend the far right flank close to the woods. Almost imme-
diately they were assaulted by the British and were flanked, so that an-
other retreat occurred with a rippling effect. The officers could not 
stop the withdrawal, which quickly turned into a general rout. The can-
non placed behind the lines could not be used without firing into the 
retreating militia. The retreat left the cannon untenable. They were 
spiked and the ammunition thrown into the river. The militiamen did 
not stop their flight until Morgan was able to form a new line about a 
mile and a half upriver. Most of the militia, however, had scattered and 
could not be found. 42 
The conduct of the militiamen on the right bank was the source 
of a great deal of controversy for many years thereafter. Jackson was 
furious at the militiamen. In the immediate aftermath of the battle he 
told the troops that "no words can express the mortification I felt at 
witnessing the scene Exhibited on the opposite bank." He added, "The 
want of Discipline, the want of Order, a total disregard to Obedience, 
and a Spirit of insubordination, not less destructive than Cowardise 
itself, this appears to be the cause which led to the disaster." Jackson 
clearly blamed the Kentucky militia. In his official report of the Battle 
of New Orleans, Jackson described the events on the right bank and 
stated, "The Kentucky reinforcements, ingloriously fled, drawing after 
them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding 
to the enemy that most fortunate position."43 
A court of inquiry mostly exonerated the Kentucky militia on the 
right bank because of a lack of arms and poor troop placement. Gen. 
John Adair, who commanded the Kentuckians on the right bank, sought 
to get Jackson to withdraw his harsh judgment of the Kentuckians.Jack-
son, however, refused to concede Adair's point, and this triggered an 
angry response in the press in Kentucky that lasted many years and was 
dredged up again during Jackson's presidential campaigns in 1824,1828) 
and 1832.44 
While the militia on the right bank failed utterly to perform its 
duty, albeit under difficult circumstances, the militia on the left bank 
won great glory on January 8. Here, however, the militia was behind a 
firmly entrenched line facing an enemy assault head-on. Moreover, 
Jackson'!> militiamen included many veterans of the Creek War, par-
ticularly those in William Carroll's and John Coffee's brigades, who 
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performed creditably in this battle. It should be noted, however, that 
contemporary evidence, as well as common sense, suggests the greatest 
damage done to the British was by the American artillery manned by 
the Baratarian pirates and not the muskets and rifles of militia.45 
The mythmaking about the militia in the Battle of New Orleans 
began almost immediately. Jackson himself was one of the most potent 
mythmakers. He wrote to Gen. James WInchester on January 19, for 
example, that his effective force on the left bank amounted to only 3,000, 
and of the 550 regulars, two-thirds were "not better than raw militia." 
Yet with this force he had "defeated this Boasted army of Lord 
Wellingtons-double my numbers at least." He also wrote to Senator 
James Brown of Louisiana on January 27, declaring that "3200 effectives 
met on the line 9500 of the choice of Wellingtons army two thirds of 
whom ... were destroyed since the[y] landed." Jackson's figures are 
low. He had between 4,000 and 5,000 troops on his line, with about 
3,000 in reserve (but mostly unarmed). Moreover, many, if not most, of 
Coffee's Volunteers and Carroll's Tennessee Volunteers (about 2,000) 
were veterans of the Creek War and were as well-disciplined as any 
regulars. Jackson also had with him many able and experienced of-
ficers.46 
Jackson's feelings about militia were indicated in his letter to Sec-
retary Monroe on January 25. After reporting that the enemy had de-
camped, he asked for "not less than 5000" regulars, "the only descrip-
tion of troops upon which reliance can be placed." While the militiamen 
had shown themselves worthy, "it is only for purposes thus temporary 
that they can be considered as valuable." Noting their short terms, he 
remarked that "they are so strongly recalled to their families & home 
[which] render them a very unequal match, in continued warfare, for 
men ... following arms as a profession."47 
Indeed, as soon as news of a peace treaty reached New Orleans, 
Jackson was besieged with requests to release the militiamen to return 
to their homes. Jackson was concerned that until the treaty was offi-
cially ratified he must keep up his guard. He even refused a request 
from Governor Claiborne to allow the Louisiana militia, called out en 
masse, to return to their homes. Regardless of Jacksons concern, the 
militiamen no longer saw an emergency, and desertions became com-
mon. One officer informed Jackson on February 24 that unless serious 
steps were taken to stop the desertions at Camp ChefMenteur, he would 
"in a few days ... be left without a private to command."48 
Jackson persisted in his war of wills with the militia. When two 
privates from the Louisiana militia were sentenced to death by a court-
martial for desertion, a petition from citizens of Louisiana pleaded for 
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Andrew Jackson, by Ralph W. Earl. Courtesy of the National Portrait Gal- . 
lery, Smithsonian Institution. 
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mercy on the grounds that the news of peace placed their offense in a 
different light. Jackson waited until the day of the execution to pardon 
them. When 137 militiamen secured certificates of citizenship from 
the French consul to gain release from the militia, Jackson responded 
by ordering all French subjects having certificates "to repair to the in-
terior not short of Baton Rouge."49 
One militia officer informed Jackson that his command at Camp 
Navy Yard "was almost abandoned" because of "a malignant disease ... 
in consequence of which many of our brethren in arm[ s] are consigned 
to the solitary mansions of the grave." He added that "there are many 
who have a[b]sented without leave and deserted I am persuaded in 
consiquence [sic] of the disease that visited us in so unfriendly a manner 
with other Causces [sic]." Jackson's position was plain: he intended to 
maintain martial law. "We must be prepared for defence, we must be 
vigilant and ready to act on the shortest notice-Or our brave expul-
sion of the Enemy may ultimate in disgrace and surprise."50 
Jackson's firmness led to a messy dispute with Dominick A. Hall, 
judge of the federal district court. Before it was over, Jackson had jailed 
not only Hall but also the federal district attorney and another federal 
judge. He also ordered Judge Hall and the French consul to be ban-
ished from New Orleans. Eventually, Judge Hall convicted Jackson in 
March 1815 for contempt and fined him $1,000.51 
Jackson's rather bizarre actions during this period did not dimin-
ish his place among American heroes of the war. Moreover, the militia 
had its image refurbished. Jackson continued to foster the militia myth. 
In dismissing the Louisiana militia on March 7,1815, he stated grandly, 
"The Commanding General in parting with the Militia, is enabled in 
all the Simplicity of truth, to say, by these men the invincibles of 
Wellington were foiled, the Conquerors of Europe Conquered."52 
Jackson's leadership of the militia during the Battle of New Or-
leans showed once again that, under the right circumstances, given 
proper leadership, discipline, training, and arms and equipment, Ameri-
can militiamen were capable of fighting. Jackson's force, drawn up be-
hind defensive lines, as with William Henry Harrison's men at Fort 
Meigs, could hold off superior numbers. The example on the right bank, 
however, as critics pointed out, revealed the weaknesses of the militia 
that were amply demonstrated at Bladensburg. Once drawn from be-
hind barricades, the militia was no match for professional soldiers. De-
fenders of the militia, however, pointed to the example of New Orleans 
as proof that the militiamen were truly the bulwark of liberty in the 
War of 1812. 
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Chapter 10 
The War's End and the 
Decline of the Militia 
T he end of the war coincided with the news of the victory at New Orleans. Some critics of the militias now turned to praise them. 
The Philadelphia Aurora, for example, declared that the British, "on the 
very threshold of a spot which they had selected as the weakest and 
most disaffected portion of the union ... , have been met, beaten, and 
disgraced, with the loss of their most valued and distinguished com-
manders, by a raw militia, hastily collected together from the adjoining 
. country, and commanded by farmers and planters." The Boston Yankee 
similarly exclaimed, "His veterans fall before the undisciplined militia 
of our country like snow before the sun." Hezekiah Niles was more 
restrained. He noted that regulars had won glory on the Niagara and 
the militiamen at New Orleans and Plattsburgh. The latter two victo-
ries, he added, "spunges off the stain" of the debacle at Washington. 
He expressed the hope a peace establishment would be kept that re-
tained the "experience derived in the war."! 
Congress had sought for months by numerous expedients to fill 
the regular army and avoid calling on the militia. Now, ever adaptable, 
politicians shifted to accolades for the citizen soldier and to refurbish-
ing the militia myth. George M. Troup hailed "the farmers of the coun-
try triumphantly victorious over the conquerors of the conquerors of 
Europe." He added, "The men of Europe, bred in camps, trained to 
war, with all the science and all the experience of modern war, are not a 
match for the men of America taken from the closet, the bar, the court-
house, and the plough." Troup took exception to the wording of a Sen-
ate resolution giving thanks to Gen. Andrew Jackson and his troops. It 
was obvious, Troup declared, that it was a "triumph of militia over regular 
troops," but the Senate resolution gave the impression that regular troops 
were the principal force and the militiamen the auxiliary. He moved to 
T
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amend the resolution to correct that impression. The Senate, however, 
disagreed with the House amendment. The House insisted, and the 
Senate adhered to its disagreement. The point of difference was whether 
the credit belonged principally to the drafted militiamen or to the regu-
lars, volunteer militia, and drafted militiamen. The House asked for a 
conference on February 22 to clear up the "unfortunate disagreement." 
The compromise that was worked out added to the resolution thanking 
Jackson and his officers and soldiers of the regular army, militia, and 
the volunteers the phrase "the greater proportion of which troops con-
sisted of militia and volunteers suddenly collected together."2 
With the war now at an end, Congress turned its attention to 
reduction of the regular army. On February 22, Troup reported a bill 
from his committee to fix a peacetime establishment of 10,000. When 
the bill was taken up in the Committee of the Whole on February 25, 
Troup stated that several factors had been considered, including ques-
tions of the security of the country; the interest of the country, and the 
just claims of the army. He cautioned against unilateral reductions. 
Wisdom and prudence suggested that the reduction should be "moder-
ate, limited, and gradual." Although the administration proposed a force 
of 20,000, the committee had recommended 10,000, and he did not 
think the House should go any lower. Left unspecified was the role that 
the militias would play in providing for national security. Joseph Desha, 
who had declared earlier during the debate on the volunteer bill that 
the militia was inefficient and expensive and that "we must rely princi-
pally on regulars," now reversed his position and argued that the militia 
was "a better security than ten, or even fifty thousand regulars." Ac-
cordingly, he moved to insert 6,000 for the regular force. He also de-
clared, "It is proven that the militia of the country are capable at all 
times at least of defensive operations .... We have boasted that a well 
organized militia was the bulwark of our liberty, and recent circum-
stances have proved it to be a fact."3 
Deshas motion was supported generally by Federalists and south-
ern Republicans. John Jackson, a Republican from Virginia, declared 
that he "would rather rely on the militia to repel sudden invasion than 
keep up a force enervated by the inactivity of a camp in time of peace-
a moth on the public treasury." Samuel M. Hopkins (N.Y.) argued, how-
ever, that those who objected to an adequate force for fear it would 
become a standing army should "reflect that they were creating a mili-
tary host by resorting to militia, and that danger to our civil institutions 
was much more likely to arise from making every man in the country a 
soldier, than from keeping up an efficient Peace Establishment." John 
C. Calhoun also argued that "it is easier to keep soldiers than to get 
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them-to have officers of skill and renown in your possession, than to 
make them." Thomas Grosvenor of New York surprised his Federalist 
friends by supporting the larger force, citing the maxim, "to be sure of 
peace you must be prepared for war." Nevertheless, Desha's motion 
was sustained in the committee of the whole by nineteen votes.4 
The question was not whether a regular force was necessary but 
how large a force the circumstances warranted. Obviously, many still 
considered 6,000 a sizable peacetime army. In response to concerns 
that the militia was not completely reliable, the Old Republican, 
Nathaniel Macon (N.C.), declared that "the true way to make our mili-
tia efficient, is to let them know that the safety of the nation depends on 
them." He added, "History almost universally proves, that in propor-
tion as you rely on regulars, militia lost their efficiency and utility." 
Albert Cuthbert (Ga.) denied, however, that militiamen were "calcu-
lated for garrison duty." Nor were they "fit to contest a regular cam-
paign ... [or] to sustain an equal conflict with regular troops." Desha's 
motion was approved by ten votes, and the bill passed easily on March 1.5 
The debate on the size of the regular force to be retained and the 
efficacy of relying upon militias for national defense was also waged in 
the newspapers. One correspondent, "E," called for the retention of a 
decent military force, particularly the "services of qualified meritorious 
officers." Another writer, "Crisis," maintained, astonishingly, that an 
army of 25,000 was needed to retain military genius. He added that the 
people should not fear a standing army. "A Militia-Man" declared in 
the Daily National Intelligencer that "experience appears to lose all effect 
upon us." A militia force was not adequate in an emergency, he contin-
ued, and he added, "we appeal to the experience of other nations as well 
as our own, and, if a particular instance is required, we will point to the 
ruins of our capito1." Moreover, militiamen were much more expensive 
than regulars. As for New Orleans, he noted that every general was not 
a Jackson; that the battle was fought in an ideal defensive posture, and 
even Jackson admitted "that he durst not venture out and expose him-
self to the skill of the enemy, which would not have been the case with 
disciplined troops."6 
In the Senate, the House bill was amended to insert 15,000 in lieu 
of 6,000. The Senate approved other amendments, including retention 
of two major generals instead of one, and the bill was passed on March 
3. The House rejected the Senate amendments, and when the Senate 
insisted, the House asked for a conference. The conference committee 
recommended 10,000, which both houses accepted. The House accepted 
two major generals but rejected the other Senate amendments. The bill 
was approved by both houses and was signed into law on March 3.7 
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The new peacetime army was substantially larger than the autho-
rized force prior to the war. It consisted of eight regiments of infantry 
and riflemen, one light artillery regiment, and eight battalions of artil-
lery. Although there was no provision for a commanding general, Maj. 
Gen. Jacob Brown commanded the northern division, and Maj. Gen. 
Andrew Jackson the southern. Four brigadier generals and other staff 
officers were apportioned among the two divisions. Separate Ordnance, 
Medical, Pay, and Purchasing Departments were established.8 Overall, 
in terms of personnel and organization, the new army was a vast im-
provement over the regular army prior to the war. 
Nevertheless, there were critics, such as "Wallace" in the Albany 
Argus, who declared that the new military establishment fell short of 
public expectations. He feared army reduction would lose the military 
experience gained. The country would again be forced to rely on militia 
for defense, with "masses of citizens being thrown together in camp, 
ignorant of the rudiments of discipline, and deficient in every principle 
of camp police." "Wallace" estimated that ten militiamen "perished by 
disease ... where one has by the sword"; militia operations, "in most 
instances, terminate[d] in disaster." Even at Plattsburgh the militiamen 
faced no sterner test than skirmishing, while at New Orleans they fought 
behind entrenched defenses, and on the other bank of the Mississippi 
the militiamen "fled ingloriously without firing a single shot." He quoted 
George Washington, who said at the end of the Revolution, "if called 
upon to declare under oath whether militia had been more serviceable 
or prejudicial to the American cause, I should subscribe to the latter!" 
The experience in the War of 1812, "Wallace" declared, "confirmed 
the wisdom of the above remark." Breaking up the army was not only 
impolitic but unjust. A "decent sized army" was needed to deter Britain 
from aggression. "In war it would prevent a long train of disasters, which 
inevitably attend military operations with militia and would save a prodi-
gal waste of life and treasure." He concluded, "It would impart energy 
to the federal system, which is daily becoming more necessary, from the 
increasing centrifugal propensities of the bodies which compose it."9 
Despite the persistence of the militia myth, the concept of the mili-
tia as a main defense force was eroded during the war, as "Wallace's" 
critique suggests. Contrary to expectations, whether intended or not, the 
Army Reduction Act of 1815 was a positive step toward a professional 
army. The militia was relegated to a secondary role in national defense. 
The Army Reduction Act was an early indication of a growing 
disenchantment with the idealized but inefficient and unreliable mili-
tia. The Albany Argus, in fact, declared that the creation of a standing 
army represented the "predominance of popular feeling."l0 The reor-
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ganization of the regular army carried out in the spring of 1815 re-
tained officers and soldiers in the service who were highly meritorious 
and provided a higher degree of professionalism than ever before. 
The growing professionalism of the regular army portended a 
neglect of the militia by the federal government. This new attitude was 
reflected in correspondence between Brig. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines and 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in September 1818. Reporting hos-
tilities by Seminoles in Florida, Gaines stated that he would have called 
for two militia regiments "had I not been taught by painful experience 
that the good to be expected from a force of drafted militia falls too far 
short of the common calculations." Calhoun agreed and urged Gaines 
to use the regular army and avoid "the expense and vexation attending 
militia requisitions."ll This correspondence clearly indicates that a genu-
ine reliance on the militia in the pre-War of 1812 era was giving way to 
a verbal reliance in the postwar era. 
In fact, the government had a problem determining the availabil-
ity of militia, as state officials failed to submit their militia returns 
promptly. Benjamin Ruggles of Ohio, chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Militia, solicited suggestions from Secretary Calhoun in 1819 on 
ways to compel returns, even to withholding arms from those that failed 
to comply. Calhoun noted that such a measure would only increase the 
expense of the arsenals of the United States, which would now have to 
preserve the arms, but he could offer no solution to the problem. Re-
turns for 1820 showed none from Delaware since 1810, from South 
Carolina and Maryland since 1811, from Mississippi since 1812, and 
the Arkansas Territory had never made a return. Many states were over 
a year late. The adjutant for Delaware wrote in 1820 that its law of 
February 2, 1816, repealed militia fines for nonattendance at training. 
"The consequences naturally flowing from that law," he wrote, "have 
been a total neglect of every appearance of militia duty."12 
When the effects of the panic of 1819 reduced government in-
come and forced retrenchment, an anti army faction moved to reduce 
the authorized strength of the regular army from 1 0,000 to 6,000. Much 
of the debate in the Sixteenth Congress over army reduction revolved 
around the ability of the militiamen to support the regular army during 
wartime. Pro army supporters argued that reduction of the regular force 
would leave the nation without an effective defense. Claiming the mantle 
of Republican orthodoxy, the antiarmy faction asserted that the militia 
was the only safe and reliable defense for the nation, while a standing 
army was not only dangerous but expensive and burdensome to the 
people. The antiarmy forces prevailed, and on March 2, 1821, the regular 
army was reduced to 6,000.13 
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By the 1820s the militia was fast declining in public favor. In 1823, 
William H. Sumner, the adjutant general of Massachusetts, complained 
about "the open manner in which the militia has been assailed . . . ; 
sentiments are openly promulgated respecting it, which no man, who 
valued his popularity, would have dared to express, even five years ago." 
Sumner's point was echoed by a writer in the North American Review in 
1826 who declared, "The time has past [sic] in the United States, when 
any just fears are entertained of such a standing army, as may be re-
quired by the present system of general defence."14 
Secretary of War James Barbour convened a board of regular and 
militia officers in fall 1826 to review the organization of the state mili-
tias, which were universally believed to be "both defective and oner-
ous." Barbour sent a circular letter to the governors of every state and 
territory asking nineteen questions touching on virtually all aspects of 
militia existence. Among other things, the secretary was interested in 
the relationship of volunteer militia to regular militia. Other questions 
dealt with organization, arming, and the value of militia musters for 
training. About fifty responses-many quite lengthy-were received 
from twenty states. Virtually all lamented the sad state of the militia. 
These documents were laid before the board of officers, chaired by 
Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott. 15 
The board report, dated November 28, 1826, noted various de-
fects including that the current militia law enrolled an excessive num-
ber for militia duty; that the training musters placed a heavy burden 
upon the working class; and that, despite the law, only a small portion 
of the militia was armed. The board proposed changing the age of en-
rollment to twenty-one (from eighteen) and to twenty-nine or thirty 
(instead of forty-five); forcing states to have a uniform organization; 
distributing training manuals to every militia officer at federal expense; 
and assigning an adjutant general for militia to the War Department to 
act as liaison with the state militias. 
More controversial proposals included extending tours of duty from 
three months to twelve and creating ten-day camps of instruction for 
militia officers that would be conducted by regular army officers or 
graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. The report was well received 
by the public, and it continued to be printed and cited for many years. 16 
In Congress, however, the report had little impact, and no effort was 
made to enact the recommendations of the board. 
Fines for nonattendance were gradually reduced over the years, 
and this was general practice all over the Union. The low fines predict-
ably resulted in low attendance at drill days. Brig~ Gen. John McCalla 
of the Third Brigade of the Kentucky militia complained in 1826 that 
.
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his state laws were "little better than an order to disband the militia 
altogether. In consequence of our fine for absence only amounting to 
one dollar, currency, I have seen my regiment, which enrolls upwards 
of 1,000 men, parade less than 110."17 
A continuing problem was that militiamen attended musters with 
no firearms. Most states imposed fines for not appearing at training 
with weapon and equipment in proper order. States also had provisions 
exempting firearms and equipment from any tax lien or judgments 
against an individual's property, however. Poverty exemptions for those 
unable to afford weapons were included in many laws. Some states al-
lowed courts-martial to remit fines on these individuals, while others 
required the towns or militia units to provide public arms for such in-
dividuals. 18 
Still other states assessed no fines, but individuals were required 
to appear even without weapons. General McCalla griped that because 
Kentucky exempted "a militiaman from parading with a gun if he does 
not actually own one, I have seen regiments parade in which not more 
than one in forty or fifty have a gun at al1." Similarly, Daniel Elmer of 
Cumberland County, New Jersey, noted in 1826 that his brigade en-
rolled 2,000 men, but that no more than 325 stand of arms were fit for 
service. 19 
There was general agreement that virtually no training took place 
during these musters. No less a supporter of the militia than Gen. Wil-
liam Henry Harrison declared in 1817, "The late war repeatedly exhib-
ited the melancholy fact, of large corps of militia going into the field of 
battle without understanding a single elementary principle, and with-
out being able to perform a single evolution." An increasingly serious 
problem was a lack of individuals willing to command a militia com-
pany. More than a dozen states exempted officers who served for a cer-
tain number of years, ranging from four to ten years but averaging about 
five. To get a militia officer to stay on for even this period, however, was 
a problem. Ebenezer Huntington estimated in 1826 that the Connecti-
cut legislature, for various reasons, had to issue about 300 new commis-
sions each year.20 
With more than 2 million enrolled militia in the states by the 
1830s, complaints multiplied about the excessive number of militia, the 
time lost (or wasted) in training, and the unnecessary expense and waste 
of public property. The average number of musters gradually declined 
from six per year after the War of 1812 to three by 1830 and to one in 
another fifteen years. In addition, states began to compromise the length 
of militia obligation. At least nine states adopted laws excusing those 
thirty-five to forty-five years old from militia training. In two cases a 
18
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nominal fee was levied for this exemption. Four states-New Jersey 
(1829), Vermont (1837), Ohio (1843), and Michigan (1846)-exempted 
men who were eighteen to twenty-one. Some states experimented with 
their own classification schemes. Louisiana between 1834 and 1835, 
and Indiana between 1840 and 1844, divided their militiamen into two 
classes.21 
Despite the fact that most states had fines for disorderly conduct, 
insubordination, firing of weapons at parade without permission, and 
so on, there were many examples of contempt by muster participants, 
and many made a mockery of the system. One way to show contempt 
was in the election of militia officers. A Pennsylvania regiment in 1824 
elected the town fool as colonel. A board of officers voided the election 
and ordered a new one, but the regiment reelected the "colonel," who 
was not confirmed. Nevertheless, the regiment raucously paraded in 
outlandish uniforms with "ponderous imitations of weapons" before 
the colonel, who delivered a speech to the regiment and proclaimed his 
willingness to fight. In Albany, New York, in 1831, privates from two 
regiments conducted burlesque parades "in the most ludicrous and fan-
tastic costumes imaginable."22 
Not surprisingly, state laws began to appear in the 1830s to counter 
such activity. In July 1834 New Hampshire provided for fines or arrest 
for any militiaman "appearing in a grotesque or unusual dress, or by 
affected awkwardness and ignorance of his duty attempt to disturb the 
order of parade and to bring ridicule upon his officers and company or 
upon the military service." Similar laws were passed in Vermont (1834), 
Maine (1838), Rhode Island (1840), and Louisiana (1850).23 
Despite efforts to maintain the dignity of militia training, George 
W. Bowman, the adjutant general of Pennsylvania, wrote to Governor 
Francis R. Shunk on December 22, 1845, "In almost every town the 
effort to bring [the militia] into contempt, by means of fantastical pa-
rades, has been more or less successful; and, in some places, public opin-
ion is so wholly averse to them, that no officer will undertake to do 
more than call the men out at six o'clock in the evening, read over the 
roll, and dismiss them."24 
Many states, in lieu of the regular militia, encouraged volunteer 
militia, by reducing the service obligation for officers and privates to 
five to fourteen years except in case of invasion. The volunteers had 
separate and more frequent musters, and fines for missing musters were 
usually higher. Obviously some men were attracted to the volunteer 
service. They wore different uniforms and generally had more spirit 
and pride in their units. Volunteer companies were really private clubs. 
They drew up charters, obtained authorization from the state, and es-
21
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tablished their own membership rules. They were responsible for their 
own support, although they did receive occasional arms and equipment 
from state governments. Volunteer companies showed a tendency to 
select wealthy citizens as officers, because such individuals usually con-
tributed liberally to the company funds and expenses. Suffice it to say 
that this method often resulted in inefficient officers. Volunteer units 
adopted elaborate uniforms, often more for show than for active, prac-
tical use, and their training tended to concentrate more on the manual 
of arms and drilling for pageantry and parade than on practical matters 
like rifle practice, camping, maneuvers, and general tactics. One au-
thority on the militia declared that the compulsory militia by 1850 "was 
little more than a vehicle for registering men eligible for military ser-
vice and ... the volunteers had come to more closely resemble a men~ 
social club than a bona fide military organization."25 
Faced by a growing opposition to the universal training provi-
sions of the federal law, states moved with public opinion and progres-
sively weakened their enforcement efforts. State authorities became in-
creasingly negligent about making the required annual returns of militia. 
The most notable fact about these reports is their irregularity. Western 
states were notoriously lax, owing no doubt to their imperfect organi-
zations, which made it nearly impossible to find out how many were 
enrolled. One study charting the returns between 1802 and 1862 found 
that states reported an average of only slightly over 39 percent of the 
time.26 Such reports as were filed were unreliable and would have been 
of little use in case of mobilization. 
Some states and even militia officers adopted resolutions implor-
ing the federal government to reform the militia system but to no avail. 
Secretary of War Lewis Cass noted in 1835 that calls for militia reform 
had been communicated to Congress by the executive branch "no less 
than thirty-one times." No doubt the failure to act was due to a certain 
delicacy about the federal government's interference in a state respon-
sibility, but in truth there was a complex of motives. Pro army advocates 
did not want to "waste" money training militiamen when funds could 
be better spent on the regular army. States' rights advocates feared fed-
eral involvement would lead to federal control over state militia. There 
were some who did not want an efficient militia, fearing that it would 
pose as much of a threat as a regular standing army. Still others held 
that regular discipline enervated and stilled the love of liberty in sol-
diers, and they vowed that militiamen should never have to undergo 
such trainingY 
The militia system established in the law of 1792 continued, un-
changed, until 1903, but the system envisioned by the authors of the 
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law was dead by the 1850s. Compulsory militia training was effectively 
abolished by Delaware in 1829. Massachusetts followed in 1840; Rhode 
Island in 1843; Maine, Vermont, and Ohio in 1844; Michigan and New 
York in 1846; Connecticut and Missouri in 1847; Pennsylvania in 1849; 
and Louisiana and New Hampshire in 1850. Although 12,601 militia-
men were used during the Mexican War, they comprised only 12 per-
cent of the total force, compared to 88 perceNt in the War of 1812. 
Attempts after the Mexican War in several states to reorganize the mi-
litia, most notably in Massachusetts and New York, were short-lived 
and largely ineffectual.28 
That the militia system was maintained as long as it was attests to 
the persistence of the concept of the citizen soldier. Whether the mili-
tia system was a good idea in the first place is debatable, but the Ameri-
can people and its leaders wanted it. It was a substitute for a standing 
army, but at best it gave the federal government only a more readily 
accessible pool of manpower in the event of war. Americans were not a 
martial people, and save for occasional Indian problems and the Mexi-
can War, the nation was not threatened in the first half of the nine-
teenth century. It should be noted that while the militia declined, the 
regular army did not necessarily prosper. Army strength was set at 12,927 
in 1850, but actual strength in the 1850s was usually less, and appro-
priations were small.29 
It might be argued that the survival of the militia enabled states to 
mobilize men to conduct the Civil War and that it would have been 
better if the decline of the militia had been more complete. ,Confirma-
tion of this point was made by Arkansas governor Henry M. Rector, 
who urged his legislature on November 15, 1860, to revise the militia 
code. "Life and liberty," he wrote, "may soon, in each slaveholding state, 
find protection only behind the breastworks of the citizen soldiery."30 
Strikes and violence in the 1870s and 1880s prompted industrial-
ists to campaign to rejuvenate the militia, and a hew corps called the 
national guard was created.31 Thus revived, the guard eventually evolved 
into a respectable and reliable reserve force for our national defense, 
approximating the intent of our Founding Fathers and preserving their 
idea of citizen soldiers. 
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51. Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., ed., Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Con-
stituents, 1789-1829, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1978), II, 961. "Memorandum," n.d. [Nov. 
1814], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (microfilm), reel 55. In his papers there is 
a copy of a .speech he gave against the conscription bill. It was not recorded in the 
Annals of Congress, and the exact date on which he gave it is not certain. He charged 
that the purpose was to turn the militia into regulars, and he called it unconstitu-
tional and arbitrary. He urged the House to "contrive ... practicable & constitu-
tional plans to save the country." Speech on Giles Bill, n.d. [Dec. 1814], ibid. 
52. Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (House), 705-712, 712. 
53. Ibid., 771, 775. 
54. Ibid., 775-799. 
55. Speech against conscription bill, Dec. 9, 1814, Daniel Webster Papers, 
Dartmouth College (Microfilm), reel 2. Webster wrote his brother that upon re-
flection he had decided not to publish his speech (Webster to Ezekiel Webster, Dec. 
22,1814, ibid.), and to a friend (Webster to Jacob McGaw, Dec. 31,1814, ibid.) he 
wrote, "I said nothing worth everybody's reading." Webster, perhaps, considered 
his remarks a little too extreme. 
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56. Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (House), 808-819 (quotation is on 817, 818, and 
819). 
57. Ibid., 841, 863-864. 
58. Ibid., 882-883, 883-884, 897-898, 900, 901-902. 
59. Ibid., 904-913 (quotation is on 911 and 913). 
60. Ibid., 928-929; ibid. (Senate), 131-132; ibid. (House), 972-976, 992-994; ibid. 
(Senate), 141. Webster to Ezekiel Webster, Jan. 9, 1815, Webster Papers, reel 3. 
The Maryland House of Delegates passed a resolution thanking King for killing the 
conscription bill. He acknowledged the resolution but noted that he had voted for 
"supplies of men and money, and for other important measures within the pale of 
the Constitution, that are deemed necessary, to revive the public credit, to protect 
the several states against invasion, and to defend, & save from dismemberment, the 
Territory and Sovereignty of the Nation." See Resolution of House of Delegates 
(Md.),Jan. 6, 1815, and King to Henry Chapman (House of Delegates, Md.),Jan. 8, 
1815, Rufus King Papers, NYHS, Vol. 14. 
61. "Franklin," Daily Nationallntelligencer, Oct. 25, 1814. 
62.Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (House), 482, 519, 520, 521. 
63. Ibid., 541, 715. 
64. Ibid. (Senate), 146, 148, 150, 161-162; (House), 1066, 1071-1072, 1074, 1075, 
1084, 1086. III U.S. Statutes at Large 193. 
65.Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (House), 1125-1128 (Rich quotation is on 1127), 
1128 (Webster), 1128 (Fisk), 1129-1130 (Troup), 1154. 
Chapter 3 
1. Annals, 12th Cong., 1st sess. (Senate), 283. 
2. Message of Gov. Return]. Meigs, Dec. 9, 1812, Niles' Weekly Register 3 Gan. 9, 
1813), 289-290. 
3. Order of Adj. Gen. T.R. Cushing (U.S.), March 19, 1813, encl. in Maj. Gen. 
Thomas Pinckney to Gov. William Hawkins,June 11, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 
256, RSUS, Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 7. 
4. Message of Go v. Alston, Nov. 23, 1813,Niles' Weekly Register 5 (Dec. 18, 1813), 
262; Message of Gov. Barbour, Dec. 6, 1813, ibid., 261. Message of Gov. Snyder, 
Dec. 10, 1813, Daily Nationallntelligencer, Dec. 15, 1813. 
5. Annual Message, Oct. 18, 1814, Executive Journals, 83-86, RSUS, Executive 
Records, Georgia, reel 11. The legislature, on Nov. 23,1814, gave the executive 
authority to reorganize the militia, prescribing 90 privates,S officers,S sergeants, 
4 corporals, and 2 musicians per company. General Order, Dec. 19, 1814, Executive 
Journals, 170-171, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 11. 
6. Annual Message, Dec. 5, 1815, Executive Journals, 276, RSUS, Executive 
Records, Kentucky, reel 2. 
7. The Act of Feb. 28, 1795, I U.S. Statutes at Large 424, established the three-
month tour. The six-month duty was prescribed by the Act of April 10, 1812, II U.s. 
Statutes at Large 705. Many states, such as Tennessee, retained the three-month 
tour. Ohio was an example of a state that established a six-month tour for state 
service. See Act of Feb. 9,1813 (chap. 39), Laws Passed at the First Session of the 
Eleventh GeneralAssembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 [1813 ?]), 13 6, RSUS, 
Session Laws, Ohio, reel 2. General Order,June 3,June 25,1814, Minutes of Ex-
ecutive Department, 17, 26, RSUS, Georgia, reel 11. See also Early to Maj. Isham 
Fannin, May 31,1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 5, RSUS, Executive Records, Geor-
gia, reel 2. Early to Capt. Richard H. Long, Sept. 26, 1814, Governor~ Letterbooks, 
31, RSUS, Georgia, reel 2. 
8, 90 -
ter,] ,18
] 1 ]
Inte ligen ,1
.
Ul
),
H
"Wi li ]
U7eekl
Inte lige
, ti e]
]
S
, 18
3 ),
] ]
,
. overnors
Notes to Pages 42-45 191 
8. Early to Thomas, Oct. 20, 1814, Governor~ Letterbooks, 42; Early to Floyd, 
Oct. 20, Nov. 17, Dec. 1, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 42-43, 53, 53-54; Early to 
Buford, Jan. 7, 1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 65; Early to Floyd, Feb. 1, 1815, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 87, all in RSUS, Georgia, reel 2. Early's message to the 
legislature is in ExecutiveJournals, 83-86, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 
11. In his message to the legislature on Nov. 8, 1815, Early complained, "There are 
many remnants through the State, who in point of fact are complete exempts from 
the public service." He recommended that they be thrown by law back into the line 
and "none suffered to remain in the character of volunteers any longer than they 
shall preserve their full complement of men." Ibid., 313. 
9. Paul Le Roy, Some Social Aspects on the Life and Organization of the Soldier in the 
Warof1812 (Columbus, Ohio, 1958), 1. 
10. Act of Jan. 7, 1812 (chap. 182), Laws Made and Passed by the GeneralAssembly 
of the State of Maryland (Annapolis, 1812), 189, 191-192, RSUS, Session Laws, Mary-
land, reelS. See, for an example of the last provision, Act of March 28, 1814 (chap. 
189), Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 
1814),347, RSUS, Session Laws, Pennsylvania, reel 6. 
11. Act of Feb. 9, 1813 (chap. 39), Laws Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh 
GeneralAssembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 [1813?]), 147, RSUS, Session 
Laws, Ohio, reel 2; Act ofJan. 3, 1814 (chap. 1), Acts of Assembly of the Indiana Terri-
tory (Madison, 1814),54-55, RSUS, Session Laws, Indiana, reel 1; Act of Feb. 3, 
1813 (chap. 90), Acts . .. of the Twenty-first General Assembly for the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1813), 102, RSUS, Session Laws, Kentucky, reel 2; Act of 
Feb. 12, 1814, Public Acts of the Thirty-eighth General Assembly of the State of New 
Jersey, 83, RSUS, Session Laws, New Jersey, reel 5b. 
12. Act of Nov. 9, 1812 (chap. 149), Acts and Laws Passed by the Legislature of the 
State of Vermont (Danville, 1812),207, RSUS, Session Laws, Vermont, reel 2. Act of 
March 28, 1814 (chap. 149), Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1814), 321, RSUS, Session Laws, Pennsylvania, reel 6; 
Act of May 29, 1813 (chap. 19), Laws Made and Passed by the General Assembly of the 
State of Maryland (Annapolis, 1813),20-21, RSUS, Session Laws, Maryland, reelS; 
Act of Feb. 9, 1813 (chap. 39), Laws Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh General 
Assembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 (1813?]), 133, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Ohio, reel 2; Act of Feb. 3, 1813 (chap. 90), Acts . .. of the Twenty-first General 
Assembly for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1813), 102, RSUS, Ses-
sion Laws, Kentucky, reel 2; Act of Feb. 12, 1814, Public Acts of the Thirty-eighth 
GeneralAssembly of the State of New Jersey (Trenton, 1814),83, RSUS, Session Laws, 
New Jersey, reel 5b; Act ofJan. 18, 1815, Acts Passed at a General Assembly of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia (Richmond, 1815), 41-48, RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, 
reel 5. 
13. Perry LeRoy, The Weakness of Discipline and Its Consequent Results in the North-
west During the War of 1812 (Columbus, 1958),3,5-7. 
14. Presidential Proclamation, Oct. 8,1812, quoted in ibid., 5. 
15. Act of Feb. 3, 1813 (chap. 90), Acts . .. of the Twenty-first General Assembly of 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1813), 101, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Kentucky, reel 2. Act of Dec. 24, 1814, Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Eighth 
General Assembly of the Mississippi Territory (Natchez, 1814), 50-51, RSUS, Session 
Laws, Mississippi, reel 2; Act of Jan. 18, 1815 (chap. 6), Acts Passed at a General 
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Richmond, 1815), 49, ibid., Virginia, reel 
5. Vermont stated simply that failure to rendezvous was "deemed desertion" and 
would be "punished as such." Act of Nov. 9,1812 (chap. 149),Acts and Laws Passed by 
the Legislature of the State of Vermont (Danville, [1812]), 205-206, RSUS, Session 
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Laws, Vermont, reel 2. Act of Dec. 25, 1813 (chap. 1), Laws of the State of North 
Carolina (Raleigh, 1814),4, RSUS, Session Laws, North Carolina, reel 4. Ohio fined 
privates from $100 to $200 and required them to serve the next tour of duty. Non-
commissioned officers could be fined from $150 to $250, reduced in rank, and forced 
to serve the next tour as a private. Act of Feb. 9, 1813 (chap. 39), Laws Passed at the 
First Session of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 
[1813?]), 142-143, RSUS, Session Laws, Ohio, reel 2. See also Pennsylvania ($48 
fine), Act of March 28,1814 (chap. 189),Actsofthe GeneralAssembly of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1814), 342, RSUS, Session Laws, Pennsylva-
nia, reel 6; Indiana Territory ($100 to $150 fine), Act ofJan. 3, 1814 (chap. l),Actsof 
Assembly of the Indiana Territory (Madison, 1814), 49, RSUS, Session Laws, Indiana, 
reel 1 ; and New Jersey (up to $100 fine and two months' imprisonment), Act ofF eb, 
18, 1815, Public Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 
(Trenton, 1815),57, RSUS, Session Laws, New Jersey, reel5b. 
16. Message of Gov. Meigs, Dec. 7, 1813, Daily National Intelligencer, Dec. 2l. 
1813. 
17. Gov. Levin Winder to Col. Henry Ashton, May 28, 1813, Letterbooks of the 
Governor and Council, RSUS, Executive Records, Maryland, reel 3; Act of May 29, 
1813, Laws Made and Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Maryland (Annapo-
lis, 1813),22-23, RSUS, Session Laws, Maryland, reel 5. Act of Nov. 23, 1814,Laws 
of Georgia (Milledgeville, 1814), 10-11, RSUS, Session Laws, Georgia, reel 4 . Holmes 
to Brig. Gen. Ferdinand Claiborne, Oct. 6, 1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 233-
234, RSUS, Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2 . Connecticut stated that any non-
commissioned officer, musician, or private refusing to march would be "conducted 
to the place of rendezvous." Act of Oct. Session (chap. 5), The Public Statute Laws of 
the State of Connecticut (n.p., n.d.), 99, RSUS, Session Laws, Connecticut, reel 2. 
18. Act of Sept. 24, 18I3,Acts and Resolutions of the GeneralASsembly of the State of 
South Carolina (Columbia, 1813), 8, RSUS, Session Laws, South Carolina, reel 6. 
States and territories with fines of twenty dollars per month included Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Ohio, and the Indiana Territory. See Act of May 1814 Session (chap. 
24), The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (n.p., n.d.), 167, RSUS, Session 
Laws, Connecticut, reel 2; Act of Sept. 16, 1814, Public Laws of the State of Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations (Newport, [1840 ?]), 183 -184, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Rhode Island, reel 7; Act of Feb. 9, 1813 (chap. 39), Laws Passed at the First Session of 
the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 [1813?]), 143, 
147, RSUS, Session Laws, Ohio, reel 2; Act ofJan. 3, 1814 (chap. 1),Acts of Assembly 
of the Indiana Territory (Madison, 1814),50,54-55, RSUS, Session Laws, Indiana, 
reell. The average wage is cited in Hickey, UiOr of 1812, 76-77. Connecticut im-
prisoned militiamen from thirty to sixty days if the fine was not paid. Act of May 
1814 Session (chap. 24), cited above. States imposing confinement at five dollars 
per month were Pennsylvania and Virginia. See Act of March 28,1814 (chap. 189), 
Acts of the GeneralAssembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1814), 
338, RSUS, Session Laws, Pennsylvania, reel 6; Act of Feb. 14, 1814 (chap. 4),Acts 
Passed at a General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Richmond, 1814),27, 
RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, reel 5. Act of Sept. 16, 1814, Public Laws of the State 
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (Newport, [1840?]), 183-184, RSUS, Ses-
sion Laws, Rhode Island, reel 7. 
19. General Orders, March 1, 1814, Governor\; Letterbooks, 432 -433, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2. 
20. Act of Nov. 9.1812 (chap. 149), Acts and Laws Passed by the Legislature of the 
State of Vermont (Danville, [1812]),208-209, RSUS, Session Laws, Vermont, reel 2; 
Act of Feb. 15, 1813 (chap. 3), Acts Passed at a GeneralAssembly of the Commonwealth 
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of Virginia (Richmond, 1813), 17, RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, reel 4; Act of Feb. 
14, 1815 (chap. 54), Acts Passed at the First Session of the Thirteenth GeneralAssembly of 
the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1814 [1815?]), 219, RSUS, Session Laws, Ohio, reel 2. 
21. LeRoy, Weakness of Discipline, 5-7. Anne Castrodale Golovin, "WIlliam Wood 
Thackara, Volunteer in the War of 1812," PMHB 91 Guly 1967), 308. 
22. LeRoy, Weakness of Discipline, 5-6,9. 
23. As quoted in James Wallace Hammack, Jr., Kentucky and the Second American 
Revolution: The Warof1812 (Lexington, Ky., 1976),30-31. 
24. LeRoy, Weakness of Discipline, 7. 
25. "Papers on the Defence of Boston and Other Places," Feb. 27,1813, Doc. 4, 
11, RSUS, Legislative Documents, Massachusetts, reel 2. 
26. Act ofJan. 7,1812 (chap. 189), Laws Made and Passed by the GeneralAssembly 
of the State of Maryland (Annapolis, 1812), 178-179, RSUS, Session Laws, Mary-
land, reel 5; Act ofJune 18, 1812 (chap. 9), ibid., 8. 
27. Message of Gov. Plumer, Nov. 18, 1812, Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Dec. 5, 
1812),209-211. 
28. Act ofJan. 29, 1812 (chap. 297), Acts . .. of the Twentieth General Assembly for 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1812), 7 -8, RSUS, Session Laws, Ken-
tucky' reel 2; Act of Feb. 3, 1813 (chap. 90), Acts . .. of the Twenty-first General 
Assembly for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1813), 101-103, RSUS, 
Session Laws, Kentucky, reel 2. Act of Oct. Session, 1812 (chap. 1), The Public Stat-
ute Laws of the State of Connecticut (n.p., n.d.), 95-97, RSUS, Session Laws, Con-
necticut, reel 2; Act of Oct. 26, 1812 (chap. 46), Acts and Laws Passed by the Legisla-
ture of the State of Vermont (Danville, [1812]), 52-53, RSUS, Session Laws, Vermont, 
reel 3; Act of Dec. 22, 1814, Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Eighth General 
Assembly of the Mississippi Territory (Natchez, 1814), 16-17, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Mississippi, reel 2. . 
29. Act of Oct. 19, 1812 (chap. 28), Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Ninth 
GeneralAssembly of the State of Tennessee (Nashville, 1812),27, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Tennessee, reel 2; Act of Sept. 16, 1814, Public Laws of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations (Newport, [1840?]), 182-183, RSUS, Session Laws, Rhode 
Island, reel 7. 
30. Tisdale to Hawkins, June 1, 1813, Hawkins to Tisdale, June 12, 1813, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 236, 246, RSUS, Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 
7; Act of1814 (chap. 1), Laws of the State of North Carolina (Raleigh, 1815),3, RSUS, 
Session Laws, North Carolina, reel 4. 
31. Act of Dec. 16, 1814,Acts Passed at the Second Session of the First Legislature of the 
State of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1815), 14-16, RSUS, Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 2. 
32. Claiborne to Col. Tousard, Oct. 13, 1812, Governors Letterbooks, 212, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2 . Holmes to Morgan, April 2 3, 1814, Governors 
Letterbooks, 6-9, RSUS, Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2. 
33. Act ofJune 1814, Public Laws of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plan-
tations (Newport, [1840?]), 24, RSUS, Session Laws, Rhode Island, reel 8; Act of 
Oct. 18, 1814 (chap. 69), Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Boston, 1814-
1815),568-569, RSUS, Session Laws, Massachusetts, reel 6; Act of Nov. 9,1812 
(chap. 149), Acts and Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of Vermont (Danville, 
[1812]),208, RSUS, Session Laws, Vermont, reel 2; Act of Dec. 17, 1812, The Public 
Laws of the State of New Hampshire (Concord, 1812),34, RSUS, Session Laws, New 
Hampshire, reel 2, and Act ofJune 14, 1814, Public Laws of the State of New Hamp-
shire (Concord, 1814),28-29, RSUS, Session Laws Act of Feb. 19, 1813, Public Acts 
of the Thirty-seventh General Assembly of the State of New Jersey (Trenton, 1813), 50, 
RSUS, Session Laws, New Jersey, reel5b. The Pennsylvania provision was enacted 
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several times. See Act of March 29,1813 (chap. 203), Acts of the GeneralAssembly of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1813), 254, RSUS, Session Laws, 
Pennsylvania, reel 6, and Act of March 28,1814 (chap. 189),348, ibid. 
34. Act of Feb. 27, 1813 (chap. 70), Acts of the General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1813),95-96, RSUS, Session Laws, Pennsylva-
nia; Act of Feb. 2,1813 (chap. 27), Laws Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh 
General Assembly of the State of Ohio (Chillicothe, 1812 [1813 ?]), 59-60, RSUS, Ses-
sion Laws, Ohio, reel 2; Act ofJan. 29, 1813 (chap. 57), Acts . .. of the Twenty-first 
GeneralAssembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Frankfort, Ky., 1813), 53, RSUS, 
Session Laws, Kentucky, reel 2. Debate on bill to regulate militia of Pennsylvania, 
March 11, 1813, Journal of the Twenty Third House of Representatives of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania . .. (Harrisburg, 1812 [1813?]), 516-517, 530-532, RSUS, 
Session Laws, Pennsylvania, reel 12. 
35. See Hawkins to Adj. Gen. Calvin Jones, April 27, 1812, Lenoir to Hawkins, 
May 22, 1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 129-13 3, 199-200, RSUS, Executive Records, 
North Carolina, reel 7. Hawkins to Eustis,June 3,1812, Eustis to Hawkins,June 8, 
1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 170-171,202, ibid. 
36. Early to Carruth, Dec. 14, 1814, March 3,1815, April 7, 1815, Governor's 
Letterbooks, 58-59,95, 105, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2. On mer-
chants' refusal to forward supplies, see, for example, WIlliam H. Harrison to WIll-
iam Eustis, Aug. 28, 29,1812, Harrison Papers, LC. Daily NationalIntelligencer,Jan. 
19,1813 (figures on frostbite). 
37. Paul John Woehrmann, The American Invasion of Western Upper Canada, Sep-
tember-October, 1813 (Columbus, 1962), 18, 15. 
38. Le Roy, Social Aspects of Soldiers in the TMlr of 1812, 4-5. 
39. Samuel R. Brown, Views of the Campaigns of the North- Western Army, &c. ... 
(Burlington, Vt., 1814), 113-115. Reports dated Nov. 6, 8,11,1812, in New York 
Evening Post, Nov. 25, 1812, in Ernest Cruikshank, ed., The Documentary History of 
the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 9 vols. Welland, Canada, 1902-1908) (reprint, 
4 vols., New York, 1971), pt. 2, I, 218-220; Statement of David Harvey, undated, 
ibid., pt. 2, 1,249. 
40. Elias Darnall, A Journal, Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account of the 
Hardships, Sufferings, Battles, Defeat and Captivity of those Heroic Kentucky VOlunteers 
and Regulars Commanded by General James Winchester in the Years 1812-1813 ... (Frank-
fort, Ky., 1814),25. See also Robert Breckinridge McMee,History of the Late TMlrin 
the Western Country . .. (Lexington, Ky., 1816), 183-184. 
41. "Journal of the Northwestern Campaign of 1812-13 under Major General 
WHo Harrison; by E.D. Wood," in George W Cullum, Campaigns of the TMlr of 
1812-1815 ... (New York, 1879),402-403. 
42. McAfee, History of the Late TMlr, 302. 
43. Cameron to Hawkins, Aug. 21, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 393-394, 
RSUS, Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 7; King to Hawkins, Oct. 28,1813, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 466, ibid. 
44. Dudley to Miller, Jan. 13, 1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 39-40; Croom to 
Miller, Dec. 26, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 29-30; Miller to Croom, Jan. 13, 
1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 38-39. Blount to Miller, Jan. 24,1815, Governor's 
Letterbooks, 53, all in RSUS, Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 7. 
45. McDonald to Miller, Jan. 16, 1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 42-43; Atkinson 
to Miller, Feb. 1, 1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 69-70, in RSUS, Executive Records, 
North Carolina, reel 7. 
46. (From the Richmond Enquirer), in the Daily National Intelligencer, Jan. 19, 
1815. 
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47. Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and 
the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa, 1912),204. Golovin, "William Wood 
Thackara," PMHB91 (1967), 306, 310. 
48. Quoted in James T. Doyle, The Organization and Operational Administration 
of the Ohio Militia in the I#Ir of 1812 (Columbus, 1958),31. LeRoy, Weakness of 
Discipline, 1. Taul's account as quoted in Hammack, Kentucky and the I#Ir of 1812, 
26-27. 
49. Jackson to RachaelJackson, Jan. 28,1814, Harold D. Moser eta!., The Papers 
of Andrew Jackson,S vols. to date (Knoxville, 1991), III, 20-21. 
50. Golovin, "William Wood Thackara," PMHB 91 (1967), 314. 
51. Report of Gen. Samuel Hopkins to Gov. Isaac Shelby, [Oct.], Nov. 27,1812, 
Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Nov. 28, Dec. 26, 1812),204-205, 264-265. 
52. Winder to Armstrong, Aug. 7, 1813, Letterbooks of the Governor and Coun-
cil, RSUS, Executive Records, Maryland, Reel 3. 
53. James Grant Forbes, Report of the Trial of Brig. General William Hull; Com-
manding the Northwestern Army of the United States . .. (New York, 1814), 118. 
54. Doyle, Organization of Ohio Militia, 26-27. 
55. Golovin, "William Wood Thackara," PMHB 91 (1967),307-308. 
56. McAfee, History of the Late 1#Ir, 149-151. . 
57. Quoted in Daily Nationaiintelligencer, Jan. 17, 1814. 
58. "Journal ofE.D. Wood," Cullum, Campaigns of the I#Ir of 1812-1815, 378, 
383. 
59. McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10, 1813,Annals, 13th Cong., 2d sess. (appen-
dix),2474-2475. 
60. Jackson to Willie Blount, Jan. 2, 1814,Jackson to Robert Hays, Jan. 4,1814, 
Jackson to Hugh Lawson White,Jan. 6,1814, Moser, ed.,Jackson Papers, III, 5-6, 7-
8, 9. See also Marquis James, Andrew Jackson: Border Captain (Indianapolis, 1938), 
173-176; Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek 
I#Ir and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812-1815 (Gainesville, 1981),68-71. 
61. Patton, Harris, and Pickens to Jackson, Feb. 3, 1814, Moser, ed., Jackson 
Papers, III, 24-26. 
Chapter 4 
1. Hammack, Kentucky and the I#Ir of 1812, 14-15, 19-20. The other congress-
men were Richard M. Johnson, who organized a regiment of mounted volunteers; 
John Simpson and William P. Duvall, who served as captains in the militia; and 
Samuel McKee and Thomas Montgomery, who served as lowly privates. Daily Na-
tionaiintelligencer, June 11, 1812. 
2. Niles' Weekly Register 2 (June 13,27, Aug. 15, 1812),256,286,392. Other 
reports are found in the Daily National Intelligencer, June 2, 1812. 
3. A.Y. Nicoll to Eustis,June 6,1812, Annals, 12th Cong., 1st sess. (appendix), 
2111-2112; Eustis to Anderson,June 8, 1812, ibid., 2113. Eustis to Anderson,June 
6,1812, ibid., 2110; Act of April 10, 1812, ibid., 2267-2269. 
4. Mullany to Gen. Peter B. Porter,July 12,1812, Augustus A. Porter Papers, 
BEHS, reel 2. 
5. Capt. WilliamJ ack and Lt. Robert Layson to Claiborne,June 12, 1813, ].F.H. 
Claiborne Collection, Box 14, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 
6. (From the Virginia Patriot), Daily National Intelligencer, June 2, 1812. Niles' 
Weekly Register3 (Oct. 17, 1812), 103-104. 
7. The Daily National Intelligencer account in the Baltimore Patriot, Aug. 19, 1813, 
mentions only one apprentice, Daniel Wells. The Baltimore-based Niles' Weekly 
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Register 5 (Sept. 18, 1813),47-48, adds more information and lists another appren-
tice, John Pocock. 
8. Daily National Intelligencer, Sept. 8, 1813, April 1, 1814; Niles' Weekly Register 6 
(April 16, 1814), 120. 
9. Niles' Weekly Register (Supplement), 7 (Feb. 15, 1815),96. 
10. Ibid., 8 (March 18, 1815),46. 
11. The quotas were: Massachusetts, 1 0,000; New Hampshire, 3,500; Connecti-
cut, 3,000; Vermont, 3,000, and Rhode Island, 500. ASPMA, Doc. 111, 1,319. A 
good general discussion of state command versus federal command appears in Donald 
R. Hickey, "New England's Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Con-
vention," NEQ 50 (Dec. 1977), 587-604. The relevant documents are conveniendy 
gathered in Message of His Excellency Governour GriS7JJold to the General Assembly, at 
their Special Session, August 25, 1812 (New Haven, 1812), RSUS, Executive Records, 
Governor's Messages, Connecticut, reel 1. Documents cited in the text are: Eustis 
to Griswold,June 12, 1812; Griswold to Eustis, June 17, 1812; Dearborn to Griswold, 
June 22,1812; Griswold to Council,June 29,1812; Council to Griswold,June 29, 
1812. 
12. Lt. Gov. John Cotton Smith (Acting Governor) to Dearborn, July 2, 1812; 
Smith to Eustis,July 2,1812; Eustis to Smith,July 14,1812; Dearborn to Smith, 
July 17,1812; Council Report, Aug. 4,1812, Message of His Excellency Gouvernour 
GriS7JJold to the General Assembly, RSUS, Executive Records, Governor's Messages, 
Connecticut, reel 1. 
13. Griswold to Eustis, Aug. 13, 1812, Proclamation of Governor, Aug. 6,1812, 
Message to His Excellency Gourvernour GriS7JJold to the General Assembly, RSUS, Ex-
ecutive Records, Governor's Messages, Connecticut, reel 1. See Report of the Com-
mittee of the General Assembly at their Special Session, August 25, 1812, on that Part of 
His Excellency, the Governour's Speech, which relates to his Correspondence with the Secre-
tary of War, &c. (New Haven, 1812), RSUS, Executive Records, Governor's Mes-
sages, Connecticut, reel 1. . 
14. Speech of His Excellency the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ... in 
January, 1812 (Boston, 1811 [?]), 19, RSUS, Legislative Documents, Massachu-
setts, reel 1. According to Gerry, even former president John Adams had received a 
threat upon his life. 
15 . ASPMA, Doc. 115, 1,324. The three justices were Theophilus Parsons, Samuel 
Sewall, and Isaac Parker. 
16. Strong to Eustis (enclosing Supreme Court opinion), Aug. 5, 1812, ibid., 
323. 
17. AnS7JJer of the House of Representatives, to His Excellency the Governor's Speech 
(n.p., 1812), 38, RSUS, Legislative Documents, Massachusetts, reel 1 ; AnS7JJer of the 
Senate, to the Governor's Speech . .. in October, 1812 (Boston, 1812), 4-6, ibid. 
18. Minutes of the Council of War, Aug. 12, 1812, 1-2, RSUS, Executive Records, 
Proceedings of Extraordinary Executive Bodies, Rhode Island, reell.ASPMA, Doc. 
142, I, 621. Minutes of the Council of War, Sept. 24, 1812,3-4, RSUS, Executive 
Records, Proceedings of Extraordinary Executive Bodies, Rhode Island, reel 1. 
19. [John Lowell,] Perpetual War, the Policy ofMr. Madison . .. (Boston 1812), 11, 
73,89. 
20. Ibid., 96. 
21. Message of Gov. Plumer, Nov. 18, 1812, in Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Dec. 5, 
1812),209-211; ibid. 3 (Dec. 19, 1812),256. The vote was 7-5 in the New Hampshire 
Senate and 93-77 in the New Hampshire House. Ibid., 3 (Oct. 24,1812),115-116. 
22. The two letters, entided "The Militia of the Union," are in the Daily National 
Intelligencer, May 29,June 7,1813. For the Gales editorial, see ibid., June 7,1813. 
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23. Resolutions of House of Delegates (Md.), Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Dec. 19, 
1812),248; Resolutions of Dec. 24,1812, ibid. Gan. 2,1813),273; Senate Resolu-
tions (Md.), ibid. Gan. 16, 1813),305. Niles noted the Senate resolutions replied to 
the former set of House resolutions of Dec. 22. Either Niles misstated the date or 
his Dec. 19 issue was printed later than the publication date. 
24. Message of Gov. Barbour, Daily National Intelligencer, Nov. 30, 1812; Mes-
sage of Gov. Middleton, Aug. 24,1812, Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Sept. 24,1812),50. 
25. Richardson, comp., Messages and Papers, I, 516. 
26. Message of Gov. Plumer, June 6, 1812, Niles' Weekly Register 2 Gune 27, 
1812),274; Message of Gov. Galusha, ibid., 3 (Oct. 24, 1812), 115-116. 
27. Report of House Committee, Oct. sess., 33-34, RSUS, Session Laws, Rhode 
Island, reel 7; Message of Gov. Jones, Feb. 16, 1813, Feb. sess., 3-4, ibid.; Message 
of Gov. Jones, June 29, 1813,June sess., 3, ibid. 
28. Senate committee report, n.d., Doc. 4, 4-6, 6-7,10-11,13-14,16, RSUS, 
Legislative Documents, Massachusetts, reel 2; Public Documents of the Legislature of 
Massachusetts . .. (Boston, 1813), Doc. 8, 68-69, ibid. 
29. Tompkins to Dearborn,June 28,1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary His-
tory, pt. 1, 1,83-84. See also the message of Gov. Arthur Middleton (S.c.), Aug. 24, 
1812, in Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Sept. 26, 1812), 50. 
30. Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1812, Journal of the Senate, vol. 23 (Harrisburg, 
1812),16-19, RSUS, Legislative Records, Pennsylvania, reel 7. 
31. Message of Dec. 8, 1813, Letterbooks of the Governor and Council, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Maryland, reel 3. Act of Feb. 2, 1811 (chap. 157), Laws of the 
State of Delaware (Dover, 1811),443-444, RSUS, Session Laws, Delaware, reel 2. 
On May 25, 1812, however, Delaware reinstituted fines. The number of drills was 
not prescribed, but companies had to be mustered on or before the first Monday of 
August to be classed. Company captains failing to comply would forfeit their com-
missions and pay a fine of fifty dollars. Act of May 25, 1812 (chap. 217), ibid., 582-
586. 
32. Hawkins to Eustis,June 3,1812, Eustis to Hawkins,June 8, 1812, Governor's 
Letterbooks, 170-171,202, RSUS, Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 7. An-
nualMessage, Nov. 18, 1812, ibid., 371. See also Maj. Nathan Tisdale to Adj. Gen. 
Calvin Jones, Sept. 8, 1812, ibid., 307. 
33. Pinckney to Hawkins,July4, 1812, ibid., 221; Major General Thomas Brown 
to Hawkins, Aug. 1, 1812, ibid., 261; Pinckney to Hawkins, Aug. 27, Sept. 19, 1812, 
ibid., 267, 321; Major Nathan Tisdale to Adj. Gen. Calvin Jones, Sept. 8,1812, 
ibid., 307, ibid.; General Orders, Nov. 4,1812, by James Ferguson (aide-de-camp to 
Pinckney), ibid., 357-358. 
34. General Orders, Jan. 7, 1812, Executive Journals, 271, RSUS, Executive 
Records, Georgia, reel 10; Mitchell to Brig. Gen. John Floyd, March 29, 1812, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 58, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2. Mitchell to 
Brig. Gen. Thomas Flournoy, Sept. 21,1812,73, RSUS, Executive Records, Geor-
gia, reel 2. 
35. Annual Message, Nov. 2,1812, ExecutiveJournals, 37-38, RSUS, Executive 
Records, Georgia, reel 10; Mitchell to Jones, March 26, 1813, Governor's 
Letterbooks, 98-99, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2. 
36. Mitchell to Gen. Thomas Flournoy, Sept. 21,1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 
73-74, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2. Mitchell to Maj. Gen. John McIn-
tosh, Sept. 1, 1813, ibid., 150. 
37. Holmes to Eustis, June 15, 1812, Holmes to Wilkinson, July 22, 1812, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 173-174, 195, RSUS, Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 
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2. Holmes to Eustis, Sept. 29,1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 230, ibid .. Holmes to 
Wilkinson, Oct. 6,1812, Governor's Letterbooks, 231, ibid. 
38. Details of the insurrection may be found in Gov. Claiborne to Major St. 
Armand, Jan. 9, 1811, Claiborne to Major Bullingney, Jan. 9, 1811, Claiborne to 
Secretary of State, n.d., Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 11, 12, 1811, Claiborne 
to Colonel Andre, Jan. 13, 1811, Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 16, 1811, 
Claiborne toJudge St. Martin, Jan. 19,1811, Claiborne to John N. Detrehan, Jan. 
19,1811, Claiborne to Major Dubourg, Jan. 21,1811, Official Letters, 18, 19-20, 
20,21,22,23,25,26-27,32-33,38, RSUS, Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. 
Claiborne's Message to Legislature, Jan. 29, 1811, gives a succinct official version of 
the events, Official Letters, 61-62, ibid. See also Herbert Aptheker, American Negro 
Slave Revolts (1943; reprint, New York, 1969),249-251. Claiborne to Ballinger,Jan. 
20,1811, Claiborne to Andre, Jan. 14, 1811, Official Letters, 39, 25, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. 
39. Message to Legislature, Jan. 29, 1811, Official Letters, 63-64, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. Act of April 29, 1811,Acts Passed at the Second Session 
of the Third Legislature of the Territory of Orleans ... (New Orleans, 1811), chap. 34, 
RSUS, Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 2 . Claiborne to Eustis, May 31, 1811, Official 
Letters, 286, RSUS, Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. 
40. Message to Legislature, July 30,1812, Official Letters, 155, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. The veto is in Message to Legislature, Sept. 5, 1812, 
Claiborne to Wilkinson, Sept. 22,1812, ibid., 190-191, 199. The legislature also 
passed a resolution requesting a loan from the national government of 4,000 stand 
of arms as well as other equipment. Resolution, Sept. 7, 1812,Acts Passed at the First 
Session of the First GeneralAssembly of the State of Louisiana ... (New Orleans, 1812), 
chap. 23, 84, RSUS, Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 1. 
ChapterS 
1. Robert S. Lambert, "The Conduct of Militia at Tippecanoe: Elihu Stout's 
Controversy with Colonel John P. Boyd, January 1812," Indiana Magazine of History 
51 (Sept. 1955),237-250. 
2. "Resolutions of Militia Officers of St. Clair County," Feb. 7, 1812; "Statement 
of Militia Officers of St. Clair County," Feb. 7, 1812; Edwards to Eustis, March 3, 
1812; Eustis to Edwards, March 11, 1812; Eustis to Edwards and Gov. Charles Scott 
(Ky.), May 2, 1812, in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United 
States: vol. 16, The Territory of Illinois, 1809-1814 (Washington, D.C., 1948), 188-
189,189-190,193-194,197-198,217. 
3. McMee, History of the Late J#lr, 49-52. Forbes, Trial of Brig. General William 
Hull, 124, 105, 124-125. 
4. Cass to Eustis, Sept. 10, 1812. Forbes, Trial of Brig. General William Hull, app. 2, 
28. 
5. William Hull, Defence of Brigadier General W Hull . .. (Boston, 1814), 52. 
Forbes, Trial of Brig. General William Hull, 21, 124-125, 153. 
6. Hull, Defence, 54,89-92. 
7. Ibid., 92-93. Alec R. Gilpin, The T#lr of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lan-
sing, Mich., 1958), 79-80; McMee, History of the Late T#lr, 64. 
8. Forbes, Trial of Brig. General William Hull, 67, 70. McAfee, History of the Late 
T#lr, 73-75. Hull, Defence, 107, 137. 
9. Hull, Defence, 94, 82, 100. Forbes, Trial of Brig. General William Hull, 123. 
10. Hull, Defence, 165. 
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11. McAfee, History of the Late Ttar, 106-108. Hammack, Kentucky and the Ttar of 
1812,30-34. 
12. McAfee, History of the Late Ttar, 151. Campbell is quoted in] ohn H. Niebaum, 
"The Pittsburgh Blues," WPHM 4 (1921),117-118. See also Gilpin, Ttarof1812 in 
the Old Northwest, 153 -154; McAfee, History of the Late Ttar, 177-181. 
13. Hammack, Kentucky and the Ttar of 1812, 46-47. Gilpin, Ttar of 1812 in the 
Old Northwest, 161-164. 
14. McAfee, History of the Late Ttar, 204-207. Darnall,Journal, 29. 
15. The most extensive account of this episode is in McAfee, History of the Late 
Ttar, 204-227. See also Hammack, Kentucky and the Ttarof1812, 47-54, and Gilpin, 
Ttarof1812 in the Old Northwest, 163-169. 
16. Ibid., 174-176. See also Emanuel Hallaman, The British Invasions of Ohio-
1813 (Columbus, Ohio, 1958), 1-2. 
17. Armstrong served as aide-de-camp to Gen. Horatio Gates and later as minis-
ter to France. A controversial choice, he was grudgingly approved to head the War 
Department because of his authorship of the Newburgh Addresses, written at the 
end of the Revolutionary War. In France, Armstrong studied the military campaigns 
of the French army, and he was believed to have a good military mind. In 1812, 
Madison appointed him a brigadier general and placed him in charge of the defense 
ofN ew York City. Armstrong also found time to publish a short book, Hints to Young 
Generals, a distillation of the concepts of the French military writer Maj. Gen. Antoine 
H.] omini. A good judge of military talent, Armstrong advanced the careers of many 
young military leaders who influenced the U.S. Army until the Civil War. See C. 
Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr., 1758-1843: A Biography (Syracuse, 1981). His 
appointment is discussed on 121-125; his conduct of the War Department on 127-
143. Armstrong to Duane, April 29, 1813, Historical Magazine 4 (Aug. 1868),62. 
18. Armstrong to Harrison, March 5, 7, May 4, 1813, Logan Esarey, ed., Mes-
sages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1922), II, 379-380, 
380-381,430-431. See also Armstrong to Capt. Thomas S. Jesup, March 9, 1813, 
WDILS, VI, 310. 
19. Harrison to Armstrong, March 27,1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 400-
404. 
20. Harrison to Armstrong, March 28,1813, ibid., II, 404-406. 
21. Harrison to Shelby, April 9, 1813, ibid., II, 416-417; Harrison to Armstrong, 
April 17, 1813, ibid., II, 418-419. Shelby is quoted in Hammack, Kentucky and the 
TtarofI812,59. 
22. Armstrong to Huntington, April 1, 1813, WDILS, VI, 343-344. 
23. A good, succinct account is Hallaman, British Invasions of Ohio, 2-17. See also 
McAfee, History of the Late Ttar, 258-277. 
24. For accounts of the siege and battle on May 5, see McAfee, History of the Late 
Ttar, 259-277; Hammack, Kentucky and the Ttarof 1812,62-68; Gilpin, Ttar of 1812 
in the Old Northwest, 183-190. 
25. Quoted in Hallaman, British Invasions of Ohio, 15. General Orders, May 9, 
1813, Daily National Intelligencer, May 22, 1813. Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 
1813, Niles' Weekly Register 4 (May 22, 1813), 192. 
26. Niles' Weekly Register 4 (May 22,1813),190. 
27. Armstrong to Harrison, April 11, 1813, Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 
1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 417, 442-447. See also Meigs to Armstrong, 
April 11, 1813, Worthington to Armstrong, April 10, 1813, McArthur and Cass to 
Armstrong, March 31, 1813, Owings to Armstrong, May 2, 1813, Cass to Armstrong, 
April 18,May 8,]une 16, 1813, Harrison to Armstrong, May 26, 1813,McArthurto 
Armstrong,]une 30,1813, WDILR. 
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28. OwingstoArmstrong,Apri117, 1813, WDILR. 
29.Johnson to Armstrong, April 13, 1813, WDILR. See also Armstrong to Ninian 
Edwards, May 4,1813, WDILS, VIII, 146. Armstrong to Johnson, May 5,1813, 
WDILS, VIII, 148; Johnson to Armstrong, May 12,1813, WDILR. 
30. Harrison to Armstrong, May 23,1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 458-
459. Johnson to Armstrong, June 4, 1813, WDILR;Johnson to Harrison,June 14, 
1813, WDILR.Johnson to Harrison,July 4,1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 
482. See also Harrison to Meigs,June 23,1813, ibid., 476; Harrison to Armstrong, 
June 24,July 2,1813, ibid., 478, 480-482; McMee,History of the Late Uilr, 293-307. 
31. Armstrong to Harrison,July 14,1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 491-
492. See also Harrison to Armstrong, July 9, 12, 1813, ibid.; Johnson to Harrison, 
July 9,1813, ibid. 
32. Harrison to Armstrong, July 6, 1813, ibid., II, 484; Harrison to Shelby, July 
20, 1813, ibid., II, 492-493; Harrison to Meigs, Aug. 6,1813, ibid., 11,517. 
33. Harrison to Armstrong, July 23,July 24,1813, ibid., II, 494-495, 496. 
34. Gilpin, Uilr of 1812 in the Old Northwest, 205-208; Hallaman, British Inva-
sions of Ohio, 28-35; Harrison to Armstrong, Aug. 4, 1813, Croghan to Harrison, 
Aug. 5, 1813, Daily National Intelligencer, Aug. 12, 1813; Niebaum, "The Pittsburgh 
Blues," WPHM 4, pt. 2 (1921), 184-185. 
35. Harrison to Armstrong, Aug. 11, 1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 523. 
Harrison to Armstrong, Aug. 22, 29, 1813, Sept. 8, 1813, Esarey, ed., Harrison Let-
ters, II, 525-526, 531, 537. 
36. Perry to Harrison, Sept. 10, 1813, ibid., 539; Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 
15, 1813, ibid., 541; Perry to Secretary of the Navy William Jones, Sept. 23, 1813, 
ibid., 546; Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 27, 1813, ibid., 551. 
37. Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 30, 1813, ibid., 556. Harrison to Armstrong, 
Oct. 9,1813, ibid., 558-565. Accounts of the battle are in Woehrmann, American 
Invasion of Western Upper Canada, 37 -4 5, and McMee, History of the Late Uilr, 362-
398. 
38. Daily National Intelligencer, Oct. 28, 1813. 
39. Niles' Weekly Register 5 (Dec. 18, 1813),263-264. 
40. Harrison to Armstrong, Feb. 13, 1814, quoted in Freeman Cleaves, Old 
Tippecanoe (New York, 1939), 218. 
41. Armstrong to Harrison, March 2, 1814, in Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 
631. Armstrong to Harrison, April 25, 1814, in ibid., II, 645; Armstrong to Holmes, 
April 25, 1814, WD/LS, VII, 172; Croghan to Harrison [n.d.], McMee, History of 
the Late Uilr, 449-452. 
42. Cleaves, Old Tippecanoe, 222. See also Harrison to Madison, May 11, 1814, in 
Esarey, ed., Harrison Letters, II, 647-648. 
43. Skeen, Armstrong, 142-143. Daily National Intelligencer, Sept. 3, 1814. See 
also Gilpin, Uilrof1812 in the Old Northwest, 242-245. 
44. McArthur to Armstrong, July 31, Aug. 8,1814, WDILR. 
45. Shelby to Armstrong, Aug. 13, 1814, ibid. 
46. McArthur Report, Nov. 18, 1814, Daily National Intelligencer, Dec. 22, 1814. 
Chapter 6 
1. Asa Stanard, John Selay, and Blenact Field to Porter, April 15 , 1812, Augustus 
A. Porter Papers, BEHS, reel 2. 
2. Tompkins to Porter, May 11, 1812, Porter Papers, BEHS, reel 2; Swift and 
Barton to Porter,June 24,1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary History, pt. 1, I, 
71-73. Tompkins to Porter,June 20, 1812, Porter Papers, BEHS, reel 2 ; Wadsworth 
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to Tompkins, June 28,1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary History, pt. 1, 1,77-78. 
Tompkins to Peter B. Porter,July 8, 1812, Porter Papers, BEHS, reel 2. 
3. Hall to Tompkins, July 4, 1812, Porter Papers, BEHS, reel 2. See alsoJohnM. 
O'Connor to Peter B. Porter,July 1,1812, and Augustus Porter to Peter B. Porter, 
July 2,1812, ibid. 
4. Van Rensselaer to Tompkins,July 23,1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary 
History, pt. 1, I, 142. 
5. Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, Aug. 28,Aug. 31, Sept. 1,1812, ibid., I, 219, 227, 
230. Dearborn to Van Rensselaer, Sept. 1, Sept. 2,1812, ibid., I, 231, 232. 
6. Solomon Van Rensselaer to Maj. Gen. Morgan Lewis, Sept. 11, 1812, ibid., I, 
254. Van Rensselaer's anger with Porter almost resulted in a duel, but Gen. Van 
Rensselaer forbade the duel. See Solomon Van Rensselaer to Porter, Sept. 14, 1812, 
ibid., I, 262. 
7. Oliver Phelps, Freeman Attwater, and J. Howley to Gov. Tompkins, Oct. 4, 
1812, ibid., pt. 2, 1,32. 
8. Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, Oct. 14, 1812, in Daily National Intelligencer, Oct. 
29,1812. See, for example, Hickey, Warof1812, 87. Statement of Lt. Col. Thomp-
son Mead, Seventeenth Regiment, Detached Militia, Nov. 18, 1812, in Cruikshank, 
ed., Documentary History, pt. 2, I, 90-93. Accounts of the Battle of Queenston may 
be found in Daily National Intelligencer, Oct. 27, Nov. 7, 1812; Niles' Weekly Register 
3 (Oct. 31, 1812), 140-141. See also Theodore Crackel, "The Battle of Queenston 
Heights, 13 October 1812," in Charles Heller and William Stofft, eds., America's 
First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, Kans., 1986),33-56. 
9. Smyth to Van Rensselaer, Sept. 29, 1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary 
History, pt. 1, I, 300; Van Rensselaer to Smyth, Sept. 30, 1812, ibid., pt. 1, I, 305-
306. 
10. Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, Oct. 8,1812, ibid., pt. 1, I, 40-42. Van Rensselaer 
to Eustis, ibid., pt. 1, I, 81. 
11. Van Rensselaer to Smyth, Oct. 10, 11, and 12, 1812, ibid., pt. 1, 1,59-60,66, 
68. Smyth to Editor of Daily National Intelligencer, Nov. 8, 1812, published in ibid., 
Nov. 26, 1812. 
12. Tompkinss Message to the New York Legislature, Nov. 3, 1812, ibid., Nov. 
17, 1812. 
13 . Inspection reports of Capt. William King, enclosed in Gen. Smyth to Langdon 
Cheves (Speaker of the House of Representatives), Feb. 8,1814, in Annals, 13th 
Cong., 2d sess. (appendix), Docs. 3 and 4,2482-2483,2483-2484. 
14. Ibid., Doc. 9, 2486, Doc. 11,2487; Doc. 18,2491-2492. 
15. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, Nov. 4. 1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documen-
tary History, pt. 2, I, 181; Livingston to Smyth, Nov. 4, 1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 180. 
16. On the executions, see statement of David Harvey, undated, ibid., pt. 2, I, 
249. Smyth's statement appears in ibid., pt. 2, I, 232-233. 
17. Smyth to Dearborn, Nov. 9,1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 186-188. 
18. Snyder to Brigade Inspectors, Aug. 25, 1812, ibid., pt. 1, I, 208. Smyth to 
Dearborn, Nov. 9,1812, ibid., pt. 2, 1,186-188. Smyth to Tannehill, Nov. 21,1812, 
ibid., pt. 2, I, 225. Tannehill to Smyth, Nov. 22, 1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 225-226. 
19. Proclamation, Nov. 10, 1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 194. Josiah Robinson to Col. 
Solomon Van Rensselaer, Dec. 2,1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 266. See also the report in the 
Buffalo Gazette, Dec. 1, 1812, ibid., pt. 2, I, 259. 
20. Smyth to George McClure, Lewis Birdsall, John Griffin, and William B. 
Rochester,Dec. 3, 1812, in Cruikshank, ed., Documentary History, pt. 2, I, 270-271. 
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84. Lt. Edward MacMahon to William Jarvis, Aug. 22,1814, ibid., Iv, 166-168. 
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also Brown to Secretary of War, Sept. 18, 1814, in ibid., pt. 1, Iv, 206-207. Porterto 
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356-357, ibid. Pasteur to Hawkins, Aug. 12, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 384. 
12. Morris to Secretary of the Navy William Jones, Sept. 20,1814, in Daily Na-
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ington," Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1518-1738, Van Ness Statement, 1685. 
Armstrong Statement, Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1565. 
15. Armstrong Statement, 1565. 
16. Memorandum of the CabinetmeetingofJuly 1,1814, Madison Papers, LC; 
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17. Winder statement, Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1577-1578, 1601. Armstrong 
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ment, Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1579. 
18. Madison to Barbour,June 16, 1814, Madison Papers, LC. 
19. Winder to Armstrong, July 23, 1814, Winder Statement, Annals, 13th Cong., 
3d sess., 1582. 
20. Ibid., 1581, 1603. 
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28. Madison to Monroe, Aug. 21, 1814, Madison Papers, LC. Winder State-
ment,Annalr, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1609-1610, 1622. 
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36. Account of Henry Crease (Acting Commander of the Menelaus), Sept. 1, 
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ecutive Records, Georgia, reel 2. 
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12. Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1813, Letterbooks of the Governor and Council, 
RSUS, Executive Records, Maryland, reel 3. Winder to General Assembly, Dec. 23, 
1813, ibid. 
13. Martin to General Assembly, Dec. 10, 1814, ibid. 
14. Message of Gov. Rodney,Jan. 18, 1814, Niles' Weekly Register 5 (Feb. 5, 1814), 
371. Armstrong to Cheves, Jan. 24,1814, ibid., 5 Gan. 29,1814), 362-363; Armstrong 
to Cheves, Jan. 28,1814, ibid., 5 (Feb. 5, 1814),379. 
15. Governor's message, Dec. 20, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, XXI, 3-4, RSUS, 
Executive Records, North Carolina, reel 8. Miller's Address to Assembly, Dec. 20, 
1814, XXI, 3-4, ibid.; Miller to William Britton, May 1, 1815, XXI, 165, ibid.; Miller 
toJames Graham, Sept. 6,1815, XXI, 239, ibid. Sarah McCulloh Lemmon, North 
Carolina and the Jtar of 1812 (Raleigh, 1971), 14. 
16. Shelby to Armstrong, Aug. 13, 1814, WDILR. See Robert Brent (paymaster 
of the United States) to Armstrong, Aug. 19, 1814, Madison Papers, LC. 
17. Early to Floyd,June 29,1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 9-10, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Georgia, reel 2. 
18. Ibid.; Early to Senate and House of Representatives, Nov. 9, 1814, Governor's 
Letterbooks, 135, ibid. 
19. Holmes to Monroe, Feb. 20, March 13 ,June 2,1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 
161,169-170,185-187 (quotation at 187), ibid., Mississippi, reel 2; Report of House 
Committee on Militia Claims, Jan. 11, 1816, 14th Cong., 1st sess., ASPMA, Doc. 
143, I, 624. 
20. Niles' Weekly Register 4 (Aug. 21, 1813),407. 
21. Hickey, "New England's Defense Problem," NEQ 50 (1977),594-596. 
22. Ibid., 591-593. Correspondence relating to this affair is conveniently gath-
ered in Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (appendix), 1777-1789. 
23. Hickey, "New England's Defense Problem," NEQ 50 (1977),596-598. 
24. Ibid., 598-599. 
25. Strong to Secretary of War, Sept. 7,1814, Monroe to Strong, Sept. 17, 1814, 
Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (appendix), 1769-1770, 1772-1773. A similar letter was 
sent to Governor Smith of Connecticut. 
26. Report of Committee on the Governor's Message, Oct. 15, 1814, Doc. 20, 3-
8, RSUS, Legislative Records, Massachusetts, reel 2. 
27. Senate Minority Report, Oct. 15, 1814, and Protest of the Minority of the 
House of Representatives, [Oct. 1814], in Daily NationalIntelligencer, Oct. 27, 1814. 
2 8. For the Hartford Convention resolutions, see ibid., Jan. 11, 1815. See also 
Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates . .. Convened at Hartford . .. December 15, 
1814, 3d ed. (Boston, 1815), Doc. 34,6-12, RSUS, Legislative Records, Massachu-
setts, reel 2. 
29. Act of Oct. sess., 1812 (chap. 1), The Public Laws of the State of Connecticut 
(n.p., n.d.), 95-97, RSUS, Session Laws, Connecticut, reel 2; Speech of Gov. John 
Cotton Smith, Daily National Intelligencer, May 22, 1813. Niles was commenting on 
an article by "A Constitutionalist" from the Boston Daily Advertiser. See Niles' Weekly 
Register 5 (Nov. 20,1813),199. 
30. Act of Oct. sess., 1814 (chap. 2), The Public Laws of the State of Connecticut, 
170, RSUS, Session Laws, Connecticut, reel 2; Act of Oct. 26,1812 (chap. 46),Acts 
and Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of Vermont (Danville, [1812]), 51-53, 
RSUS, Session Laws, Vermont, reel 3; Act oOune 1814, Public Laws of the State of 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (Newport, [1840?]), 24-25, ibid., Rhode Is-
land, reel 7; Act of Oct. 20,1814 (chap. 77), Laws of the Commonwealth ofMassachu-
setts (Boston, 1814-1815), 575-578, ibid., Massachusetts, reel 6. 
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5,1814; Message of Gov. Tompkins, Sept. 30, 1814, Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Oct. 27, 
1814),97-98. 
32. "Legislature of New York," Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Oct. 29,1814),123. 
33. See the critique and objection to the New York law by Chancellor James 
Kent, Minutes of the Council of Revision, Oct. 24,1814,363-366, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Miscellany, New York, reel 9. An Address to the Citizens of Oneida, on the 
Subject of the Late Law of this State for Raising 12,000 Men, by Classification of the 
Militia. By an Exempt. (Utica, 1814), 5-6, 9. 
34. Niles' Weekly Register3 (Jan. 9,1813),300. Snyder to Mead, Feb. 4,1814, in 
Cruikshank, ed., Documentary History, pt. 2, III, 164. Message of GoY. Snyder, Dec. 
10,1814, Journal of the Senate, vol. 25 (Harrisburg, 1814),20-21, RSUS, Session 
Laws, Pennsylvania, reel 9. The draft of the act is in the appendix, 50-57. 
35. Message of Gov. Pennington, Jan. 14, 1814, Daily NationalIntelligencer; Feb. 
4,1814. Message of Gov. Pennington, Oct. 1814, Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Nov. 19, 
1814), 161. 
36. Act ofJan. 31,1815 (chap. 114), Laws Made and Passed by the GeneralAssembly 
of the State of Maryland (Annapolis, 1815), 126-129, RSUS, Session Laws, Mary-
land, reel 5. 
37. Act of Feb. 15, 1813 (chap. 3),Acts Passedata GeneralAssembly of the Common-
wealth of Virginia (Richmond, 1813), 13-18, RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, reel 4; 
Monroe to Barbour, March 21,1813, Niles' Weekly Register 4 (May 29,1813),207; 
Armstrong to Barbour, March 22,1813, ibid., 208; Barbour to Monroe, March 24, 
1813, ibid., 207-208; Message of Gov. Barbour, May 17,1813, ibid., 206-207; Act of 
May 26, 1813 (chap. 3), Acts Passed at a General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia (Richmond, 1813),4, RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, reelS. 
38. Message of Gov. Barbour, Oct. 10, 1814, Daily NationalIntelligencer; Oct. 22, 
1814. See also Daily National Intelligencer; Oct. 25, 1814. 
39. ActofJan. 18, 1815 (chap. 6), Acts Passedata GeneralAssembly of the Common-
wealth of Virginia (Richmond, 1815),40-51, RSUS, Session Laws, Virginia, reel 5. 
40. Message of Gov. Hawkins, Nov. 23, 1814, Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Supple-
ment), 121-122; Act of Dec. 20, 1814, Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of 
the State of South Carolina (Columbia, 1815), 27-33, RSUS, Session Laws, South 
Carolina, reel 6. 
41. Message of Gov. Return J Meigs, Dec. 9, 1812, Niles' Weekly Register 3 (Jan. 
9, 1813),289-290. Message of Gov. Worthington, Daily National Intelligencer; Jan. 
14,1815. 
42. Message of Gov. Shelby, Jan. 25,1815, RSUS, Executive Documents, Ken-
tucky, reel 2. 
43. Smiths speech is in Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Supplement), 95. 
44. Worthington to Dallas, Jan. 4, Feb. 8, 1815, Governor's Letterbooks, 7-8, 
RSUS, Executive Records, Ohio, reel 1. See also Hickey, War of 1812,277,279. 
45. Gov. Williams to Dallas, Dec. 22,1814, Thomas Lee (Comptroller General 
of South Carolina) to Dallas, Dec. 21, 1814, Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Jan. 14, 1815), 
318,318-319; Dallas to Williams, Dec. 29, 1814, Dallas to Lee, Dec. 29, 1814, 
Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Supplement), 192. For a chart showing directtaxes for 1815, 
see Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Jan. 28,1815),348. 
46. Daily National Intelligencer; Dec. 12, 1814. 
47. Message of Governor Strong, Jan. 18, 1815, Niles' Weekly Register 7 (Supple-
ment),98. 
48. Monroe to Senate Committee, Feb. 11, 1815,ASPJI,fA, Doc. 142, I, 605-607. 
49. Ibid., 604. Brant, Madison, Commander-in-Chief, 49. See also Martin v. Mott, 
12 Wheaton 19. 
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Chapter 9 
1. Claiborne to Wilkinson, Dec. 28,1812, Official Letters, 231, RSUS, Execu-
tive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. Act of Feb. 12, 1813,Acts Passed at the Second Session 
of the First Legislature of the State of Louisiana ... (New Orleans, 1813),40-84, RSUS, 
Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 2. 
2. Claiborne to Brown and Fromentin, May 19,June 10, 1813, Official Letters, 
247-248,257, RSUS, Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. 
3. Claiborne to Flournoy, June 17, 1813, ibid., 260. 
4. Armstrong to Claiborne;June 22, 1813, ibid., 28-29; Claiborne to Flournoy, 
Sept. 17, 1813, ibid., 54; Claiborne to Fromentin, Sept. 17, 1813, ibid., 56. 
5. Col. Joseph Carson to Brig. Gen. Ferdinand L. Claiborne,July 30, 1813,DaiOr 
NationalIntelligencer, Sept. 20,1813. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 30-41. 
6. Holmes to Flournoy, Aug. 12, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 320, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2; Holmes to Armstrong, Aug. 30, 1813, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 327, ibid. 
7. Holmes to Toulmin, Sept. 3, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 329, ibid. Holmes 
to Flournoy, Sept. 12, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 339-340, ibid.; Holmes to 
Armstrong, Sept. 14, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 343. Holmes to Flournoy, Nov. 
3,1813, Holmes to Maj. Thomas Hinds, Nov. 9,1813, Holmes to Harry Toulmin, 
Nov. 10, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 389-392, 394, 397, ibid. 
8. Skeen, Armstrong, 171-172, 173. 
9. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 45. 
10. For Hinds's command, see Flournoy to Claiborne, Oct. 28, Nov. 5 (quota-
tion), 7,9, 10, 1813, J,F.H. Claiborne Collection, Box 14, MDAH. Flournoy to 
Claiborne, Nov. 7,9, 1813, ibid. 
11. Claiborne to Armstrong, Jan. 1, 1814, ibid. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 46-48. 
12. Claiborne to Armstrong, Jan. 24, 1814,J,F.H. Claiborne Collection, Box 14, 
MDAH. 
13. Holmes to Flournoy, March 6,1814, Holmes to Lt. Col. Nixon, March 21, 
1814, Holmes to Armstrong, March 26, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 434, 438-
439,441, RSUS, Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2. 
14. Armstrong to Governors Blount and Mitchell, July 13,1813, WDILS, VII, 
14; Mitchell to Armstrong, Aug. 9, 24, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 137-138, 
244, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2; General Orders, Aug. 19, 1813, 
ExecutiveJournals, 237, RSUS, Executive Records, reel 10. 
15. Mitchell to Armstrong, Aug. 31, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 140, RSUS, 
Executive Records, reel 2 ; Mitchell to Cook, Sept. 7, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 
152, ibid. Mitchell to Floyd, Sept. 17, 1813, Governor's Letterbooks, 158-159, ibid. 
16. Mitchell to Armstrong, Sept. 14, 1813, ibid., 157. 
17. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 52-55. 
18. Ibid., 57-59. 
19. Early to Armstrong, Nov. 18, 1813,Jan. 12, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 
178,195-196, RSUS, Executive Records, Georgia, reel 2; Early to Troup, Jan. 12, 
1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 196, ibid. 
20. Early to Pinckney, Feb. 6, Feb. 7, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 204, ibid.; 
Early to Gen. McIntosh, Feb. 8, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 206, ibid. 
21. Early to Pinckney, Sept. 30, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 34, ibid. 
22. Coffee to Jackson, Nov. 4, 1813,Niles' WeekOr Register 5 (Nov. 27,1813),218-
219. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 62-66; Jackson to Gov. Willie Blount, Nov. 11, 1813, 
Niles' WeekOr Register 5 (Dec. 18,1813), 267; Jackson to Armstrong, Nov. 20, 1813, 
John Spencer Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6 vols. (Washington, 
D.C., 1926), 1,355-357. 
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23. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 66-67. Moser, ed., Jackson Papers, III, 37-39,43, 
146,245. 
24. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 68-70, 72. Jackson to Pinckney,Jan. 29, 1814,Dai0' 
Nationaiintelligencer, Feb. 19, 1814; Bassett, ed., Jackson Correspondence, 1,447-454. 
See also Jackson to RachaelJ ackson, Jan. 28, 1814, in Moser, ed.,Jackson Papers, III, 
17-22,21. . 
25. Jackson to Capt. Eli Hammond, Feb. 1,1814, Moser, ed.,Jackson Papers, III, 
22. 
26. Jackson to Pinckney, March 28,1814, Moser, ed.,Jackson Papers, III, 52-54. 
See also Jackson to RachaelJackson, April 1, 1814, ibid., 54-55. The most complete 
account of the battle is Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 78-82. Moser, ed., Jackson Papers, 
III,57. 
27. For the controversy surrounding this appointment, see Skeen, Armstrong, 
142-143. 
28. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 92-94. 
29. Holmes to Jackson, Aug. 15, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 33-35, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Mississippi, reel 2. Holmes to Jackson, Sept. 19, Sept. 29, 1814, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 57, 71-72, ibid. 
30. Hickey, "Warof1812, 205-206. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 112-119. 
31. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 120-126. 
32. Claiborne to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 5, RSUS, Ex-
ecutive Records, Louisiana, reel 2 . The quoted statement appears in Hickey, "War of 
1812,206. 
33. The Battle of New Orleans is well covered by historians. An excellent ac-
count is Robin Reilly, The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the "War 
of 1812 (New York, 1974). Also useful are Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, and Adams, 
History, VIII, 311-385. Wilburt S. Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida 
and Louisiana, 1814-1815 (University, Ala., 1969), is ably reasoned. Two useful but 
not always reliable contemporary accounts are A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir 
of the "War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15 (1816; reprint, Gainesville, 1964); 
and George R. Gleig, The Campaigns of the British Army at "Washington and New 
Orleans (1827; reprint, Totowa, N.J., 1972). 
34. Holmes to Claiborne, Oct. 3,1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 74, RSUS, Ex-
ecutive Records, Mississippi, reel 2. Holmes to Jackson, Dec. 26, Dec. 30,1814, 
Governor's Letterbooks, 118, 114, ibid. 
35. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 131. Act of Sept. 6, 1812 (chap. 23), Acts Passed at 
the First Session of the First General Assemb0' of the State of Louisiana (New Orleans, 
1812), 72, RSUS, Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 2. On organizing free blacks, see 
Claiborne to Eustis, Aug. 31, 1811, Official Letters of the Governor, 396, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2 . On use of the "coloured militia," see Claiborne 
to Jackson, Oct. 24, Oct. 28, Official Letters of the Governor, 4-5, 8, ibid. 
36. General Orders, Dec. 16, 1814, in Moser, ed., Jackson Papers, III, 206-207. 
37. Jackson to Gov. David Holmes, Dec. 25,1814, in Moser, ed.,Jackson Papers, 
III, 218-220. In a private note to Col. Robert Hays, Jackson stated his suspicion that 
the British had gained their foothold on the Mississippi through the treachery of 
Louisiana militia. See Jackson to Hays, Dec. 26,1814, in ibid., III, 221-222. 
38. Claiborne to Jackson, Oct. 28, 1814, Governor's Letterbooks, 10, RSUS, 
Executive Records, Louisiana, reel 2. Jackson to Monroe, Dec. 29,1814, in Moser, 
ed., Jackson Papers, III, 224-225. 
39. Jackson to Monroe, Jan. 3, 1815, in ibid., III, 228-229. Reilly, British at the 
Gates, 287-288. Edward Livingston to Nicholas Girod, Dec. 29, 1814, in Moser, 
ed.,Jackson Papers, III, 225. 
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40. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 155. 
41. "General David B. Morgan's Defense of the Conduct of the Louisiana Mili-
tia in the Battle on the Left Side of the River, January 8, 1815," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 9 (Jan. 1926), 18, 19. 
42. Ibid., 20-21. 
43. Jackson's Address to his Troops on the Right Bank," Jan. 8,1815, in Bassett, 
ed.,Jackson Correspondence, II, 135-136. Jackson to Monroe, Jan. 9, 1815, in ibid., II, 
136-138. 
44. Adair to Jackson, March 20, 1815,Jackson to Adair, April 2, 1815, in ibid., II, 
192-195,200-201. 
45. See the discussion by John William Ward,Andrew Jackson: Symbolfor an Age 
(New York, 1955), 18-27. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 163-164, noted that cannon fire 
"broke the British ranks," but he attributed the greatest damage to musket fire. 
46. Jackson to Winchester, Jan. 19, 1815, in Moser, ed., Jackson Papers, III, 252. 
Jackson to Brown,Jan. [27], 1815, ibid., III, 259. Owsley, Gulf Borderlands, 158-159, 
162-163. 
47. Jackson to Monroe, Jan. 25,1815, in Moser, ed., Jackson Papers, III, 255. 
48. Claiborne to Jackson, Feb. 24, 1815,Jackson to Claiborne, Feb. 25,1815, in 
ibid., III, 286-287, 287. Brigadier General Robert McCausland to Jackson, Feb. 24, 
1815, in ibid., III, 287. 
49. Citizens of Louisiana to Jackson, Feb. 27,1815, in ibid., 111,291. Order to 
the French Citizens of New Orleans, Feb. 28, 1815, in ibid., III, 294. 
5 o. John Wright to Jackson, March 3, 1815,J ackson to Philemon Thomas, March 
4, 1815, in ibid., III, 294-296, 296-297. 
51. See Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 
1767-1821 (New York, 1977),308-315. 
52. General Orders, "To the Louisiana Militia," March 7, 1815, in Moser, ed., 
Jackson Papers, III, 303-304. 
Chapter 10 
1. Both newspapers are quoted in Daily Nationallntelligencer, Feb. 16, 1815. Niles' 
Weekly Register 8 (March 4, 1815),417,419. 
2.Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (House) 1155-1157,1167,1174,1184-1185, 1191, 
1194; ibid. (Senate), 233-234, 238-239, 239-241, 241-243, 250, 253, 258-259, 274. 
The resolution, dated Feb. 27, is in ibid. (appendix), 1966-1967. 
3. Ibid. (House), 538,1200-1201. Desha served as a major general of volunteers 
under Gen. William Henry Harrison during the Battle of the Thames. 
4. Ibid., 1208, 1212, 1216, 1221, 1223. 
5. Ibid., 1230-1231, 1233-1234, 1251-1252, 1254. 
6. Daily NationalIntelligencer, Feb. 24, 28,1815. "A Militia-Man," ibid., March 3, 
1815. 
7. Annals, 13th Cong., 3d sess. (Senate), 287, 291-292, 297-298; ibid. (House), 
1266, 1267, 1271-1272, 1272-1273. 
8. The Act of March 3 is in III Stat. 224. Details of the reorganization are found 
in Department of the Army, American Military History, 1607-1953 (Washington, 
D.C., 1956), 150-151. . 
9. "Wallace," Daily NationalIntelligencer, April 1, 1815. 
10. Albany Argus, March 7, 1815. 
11. Gaines to Calhoun, Sept. 20,1818, Calhoun to Gaines, Sept. 23,1818, in W. 
Edwin Hemphill, ed., The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1817-1818, 23 vols. to date 
(Columbia, S.c., 1963), II, 144, 152. See also Carlton B. Smith, "Congressional 
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Attitudes Toward Military Preparedness During the Monroe Administration," Mili-
tary Affairs 40 (Feb. 1976),22-25. 
12. Calhoun to Ruggles, Feb. 18, 1819, Hemphill, ed., Calhoun Papers, III, 587. 
The returns for 1820 are inASPMA, Doc. 191, II, 134-137; W. Kennedy (Adjutant, 
Del.) to Daniel Parker (Adjutant and Inspector General, United States), Dec. 22, 
1820, ibid., Doc. 208, II, 320. 
13. Examples of proarmy speeches are Alexander Smyth (Va.),Annals, 16th Cong., 
2d sess. (House), 735, 744-756; Eldred Simpkins, ibid., 758-767. Examples of 
antiarmyspeeches are Lewis Williams (N.c.), ibid., 767-779; Charles Fisher (N.c.), 
ibid., 816-821; and Newton Cannon (Tenn.), ibid., 824-841. See Act of March 2, 
1821, ibid., 1789-1799. For an in-depth analysis of army reduction, see C. Edward 
Skeen, "Calhoun, Crawford, and the Politics of Retrenchment," South Carolina His-
toricalMagazine 73 Guly 1972),141-155. 
14. William H. Sumner, An Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia to a Common-
wealth . .. (Boston, 1823),4, 13. North American Review 23 (Oct. 1826),274. 
15. "Annual Report of the Secretary of War ... and Report of the Board of 
Officers on the Organization of the Militia," in ASPMA, Doc. 334, III, 330-488. 
Barbour's cover letter, dated Nov. 28, 1826, is on 330-331, and the circular letter, 
dated July 11,1826, is on 393-394. The other members of the board were Maj. Gen. 
Thomas Cadwalader, First Division, Pennsylvania militia; William H. Sumner, Ad-
jutant General of Massachusetts; Beverly Daniel, Adjutant of North Carolina; Lt. 
Col. Abram Eustis, Fourth Artillery; Lt. Col. Zachary Taylor; Lt. Col. Enos Cutler, 
Third Infantry; and Capt. Charles]. Nourse. An in-depth analysis of the report is 
John K. Mahon, "A Board of Officers Considers the Condition of the Militia in 
1826," MA 15 (Summer 1951), 85-94. 
16. The board report is in ASPMA, Doc. 334, III, 388-392. At about the same 
time, Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, after touring the United States to assess the 
military situation, rendered a report concerning the militia. See "General Remarks 
Concerning the Militia of the United States," Dec. 2, 1826,ASPMA, Doc. 407, Iv, 
134-140. Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown did not forward the report to the Secretary of 
War. This report was found in Brown's office after his death in March 1828, and it 
was not submitted to Congress until Feb. 27, 1829. Gaines proposed an elaborate 
classification scheme and active duty training of three to four months on a rotating 
basis. The estimated cost of training one-tenth of the disposable force every two 
years was $3 million annually, which perhaps explains why Brown did not forward 
the report. Gaines argued that it was less than was "annually expended by the militia 
of the United States under the present defective system, taking into view the value 
of their time lost and expenses incurred in attending musters, trainings, courts-
martial, &c .... incurred without the attainment of any useful knowledge ... but 
often with the loss of health and morals." The board report was republished in 
1833. See "Militia of the United States," Military and Naval Magazine of the United 
States 1 (April 1833), 65-79; 1 Gune 1833),235-243; 1 Guly 1833), 269-280; 1 (Aug. 
1833), 353-362. 
17. Brig. Gen. John M. McCalla to James Barbour, Sept. 18, 1826, ASPMA, 
Doc. 334, III, 418. 
18. See, for example, Act ofJuly 1, 1819,June sess., 1819,Lawsofthe State of New 
Hampshire, 195, RSUS, Session Laws, New Hampshire, reel 2. Maine provided for 
fines of twenty dollars to fifty dollars for towns negligent in providing arms and 
equipment to privates. 
19. Brig. Gen. John M. McCalla to James Barbour, Sept. 18, 1826, ASPMA, 
Doc. 334, III, 418; Daniel Elmer to James Barbour, Aug. 14, 1826, ibid., III, 452. 
These reports confirm the study of Michael A. Bellesiles, "The Origins of Gun 
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Culture in the United States, 1760-1865," JAH83 (Sept. 1996),425-455, esp. 428-
438, which shows a relatively disarmed America during this period. 
20. Report of House committee, Jan. 17, 1817, 14th Cong., 2d sess., ASPMA, 
Doc. 152, I, 664. Huntington to Gov. Oliver Wolcott, Sept. 2, 1826, ibid., 408; 
Elmer to James Barbour, Aug. 14, 1826, ibid., 452. 
21. Act of March 8, 1834, Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Eleventh Legisla-
ture of the State of Louisiana ... , 143,155-156, RSUS, Session Laws, Louisiana, reel 
3; Act of March 19, 1835,Acts Passed at the First Session of the Twelfth Legislature of the 
State of Louisiana . .. , 128, ibid.; Act of Feb. 24, 1840, Laws of a General Nature, 
Passed at the Twenty-fourth Session of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana . .. , 
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Histofians of the War of 1812, surprisingly, have paid scant attention to 
the role of the militia. I have relied heavily, as the endnotes attest, upon 
primary sources for this study. (For a complete list of sources used, 
please see the endnotes as well.) 
Primary Sources 
This work is based heavily on the microfilm collection of early state 
records. In the 1940s the Library of Congress and the University of 
North Carolina organized a collection of the early records of the forty-
eight states. The final compilation, the Records of the States of the 
United States, consists of approximately 2.75 million pages on 1,867 
reels. The collection, housed in Washington, D.C., in the Library of 
Congress, is arranged into six classes: legislative records, statutory law, 
constitutional records, administrative records, and court records. The 
most useful for the purposes of my study was the collection of statutory 
law, which is divided into four parts: codes and compilations, session 
laws, special laws, and miscellany. Every state militia law passed in the 
four years before and during the War of 1812, as well as most of the laws 
from the War of 1812 to the 1850s, was examined and mined for infor-
mation. The other useful collection was the administrative records, which 
are divided into five parts: executive department journals, governors' 
letterbooks and papers, secretaries' journals and papers, proceedings of 
extraordinary bodies, and miscellany, which were extremely valuable 
for understanding the numerous problems involving the militia that 
the state governors confronted. 
A useful bibliography of the War of 1812 that is marred, however, 
by numerous typographical errors, is John C. Fredriksen, comp., Free 
Trade and Sailors' Rights: A Bibliography of the U'llr of 1812 (Westport, 
Conn., 1985). Primary sources consulted included Joseph Gales, ed., 
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Annals of Congress of the United States . .. , 42 vols. (Washington, D.C., 
1834-1856), theAmerican State Papers, Indian Affairs, 2 vols. (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1832), and American State Papers, Military Affairs, 3 vols. 
(Washington, D.C., 1832). Department of War Papers available on 
microfilm and housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. 
(Record Group 107) that were most useful included: Letters Received 
by the Secretary of War, Registered Series and Irregular Series; Letters 
Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs; Letters Sent 
to the President by the Secretary of War; and Reports to Congress 
from the Secretary of War. Consulted on microfilm were the papers of 
Peter B. Porter (Buffalo and Erie Historical Society, Buffalo, N.Y.), 
Timothy Pickering (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.) 
and Daniel Webster (Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.). Also con-
sulted in manuscript were the Papers of] ames Monroe (New York Public 
Library, New York City, N.Y., and Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.), John Armstrong (WA. Chanler Collection, New York Histori-
cal Society, New York City, N.Y., and Rokeby Collection, Red Hook, 
New York), andJ.F.H. Claiborne (Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History, Jackson, Miss.). Published collections of papers of partici-
pants in the war were very helpful, such as Logan Esarey, ed., Messages 
and Letters of William Henry Hamson, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1922); John 
s. Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6 vols. (Washington, 
D.C., 1926-1933); Harold D. Moser, ed., The Papers of Andrew Jackson, 
5 vols. to date (Knoxville, 1980-); W Edwin Hemphill et al., eds., The 
Papers of John C. Calhoun, 22 vols. to date (Columbia, S.c., 1959-);James 
F. Hopkins et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Clay, 11 vols. (Lexington, 
Ky., 1959-1992); Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James 
Monroe, 7 vols. (New York, 1901); Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of 
James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900-1910); Congressional Edition, 
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1865); 
and Noble E. Cunningham, ed., Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their 
Constituents, 1789-1829, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978). 
Newspapers were also a valuable source of information (and some-
times misinformation). Niles' Register (Baltimore), really a news maga-
zine, complete with an index (although unreliable), proved to be the 
most useful. The "Washington National Intelligencer, the semiofficial Re-
publican Party newspaper, proved to be a reliable source on the war. 
Many other newspapers were consulted on specific aspects of the war, 
including: the Philadelphia Aurora, United States' Gazette (Philadelphia), 
Albany Argus, Maryland Gazette (Annapolis, Md.), Charleston (S.c.) Cou-
rier, Hartford Courant (Connecticut), Lexington (Ky.) Gazette, Richmond 
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Enquirer, New York Evening Post, Nashville Gazette (Tennessee), Scioto 
Gazette (Chillicothe, Ohio), and Pittsburgh Gazette. 
Secondary Sources 
There is no book dealing specifically with the militia in the War of 
1812. A few general histories of the militia touch on the war. The most 
recent work is John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National 
Guard (New York, 1983), which deals with the war in one chapter. Even 
more general treatment is given the war in William H. Riker, Soldier of 
the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1957), and Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and 
Uilr: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, Pa., 1964). See also 
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (1904, reprinted 
New York, 1968). 
A good background on the militia before the War of 1812 may be 
found in many works, such as John K. Mahon, The American Militia: 
Decade of Decision, 1789-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1960); Lawrence D. 
Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the 
Uilr of 1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981); Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and 
Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America (New York, 
1975); Theodore J. Crackel, Mr. Jefferson s Army: Political and Social Re-
form of the Military Establishment, 180 1-1809 (New York, 1987); C. J 0-
seph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its De-
velopment Since 1775 (Harrisburg, Pa., 1955); and Leonard D. White, 
The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-18 29 (New 
York, 1951). 
General information on the militia during the War of 1812 may 
be found in virtually any work on the war. Although he devotes little 
space to the conduct of the militia during the war, Donald R. Hickey, 
The Uilr of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana, Ill., 1989), is a superb 
study of the War of 1812 and should remain the standard work on the 
war for many years to come. Other excellent accounts of the war in-
clude ].C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madisons Uilr: Politics, Diplomacy, and Uilifare 
in the Early Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, 1983);]ohn K. Mahon, Uilr 
of 1812 (Gainesville, Fla., 1972); Reginald Horsman, The Uilr of 1812 
(New York, 1969); Harry L. Coles, The Uilr of 1812 (Chicago, 1965); 
Glenn Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the Uilr of 
1812, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, Ind., 1954); James R. Jacobs and Glenn 
Tucker, The Uilr of 1812: A Compact History (New York, 1969); Benson 
]. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the Uilr of 1812 (New York, 1868), 
and C. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong: A Biography (Syracuse, N.Y., 
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1981). Although his work is most useful for diplomatic and political 
history, Henry Adams, History of the United States During the Adminis-
trations of Jefferson and Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-1891), is also 
valuable for the military history of the War of 1812. 
State studies with useful information on the militia during the war 
include Sarah McCulloh Lemmon; Frustrated Patriots: North Carolina 
and the U'ltr of 1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973), which is very good. 
James Wallace Hammack, Jr., Kentucky and the Second American Revolu-
tion: The U'ltr of 1812 (Lexington, Ky., 1976), is a useful source on 
Kentucky's role. Jean Martin Flynn, The Militia in Antebellum South 
Carolina Society (Columbia, S.C, 1991), is helpful for the post-War of 
1812 militia in that state. Two regional studies of the war have good 
information. Allan S. Everest, The U'ltr of 1812 in the Champlain Valley 
(Syracuse, N.Y., 1981), does not focus on the militia, but Frank L. 
Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek U'ltr and the Battle 
of New Orleans, 1812-1815 (Gainesville, Fla., 1981), does, because the 
militia was heavily used in the southern theater. 
Two articles that broadly address the war include Robert L. Kerby, 
"The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 1812," Indiana 
Magazine of History 73 (1977), 102-124, andJohnK.Mahon, "ThePrin-
cipal Causes for the Failure of the United States Militia System During 
the War of 1812," Indiana Military History Journal 4 (1979), 15-21. 
Militia organization and activity in the Northwest is found in con-
temporary accounts, such as Robert B. McMee, History of the Late U'ltr 
in the Western Country . .. (Lexington, Ky., 1816); Elias Darnell, A Jour-
nal, Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account of the Hardships, Suf 
ferings, Battles, Defeat & Captivity of those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers & 
Regulars Commanded by General Winchester in the }ears 1812-1813 . . . 
(Frankfort, Ky., 1814); Samuel R. Brown, Views of the Campaigns of the 
North-WesternArmy, &c ... (Burlington, Vt., 1814);JamesGrantForbes, 
Report on the Trial of Brig. General William Hull; Commanding the North-
western Army of the United States . .. (New York, 1814); and William 
Hull, Defence of Brig. General W. Hull . .. with an Address to the Citizens 
of the United States, written by himself (Boston, Mass., 1814). More re-
cent accounts of the militia in the Northwest include, "The Conduct of 
Militia at Tippecanoe: Elihu Stout's Controversy with ColonelJohn P. 
Boyd, January 1812," Indiana Magazine of History 51 (Sept. 1955): 237-
250; "Journal of the Northwestern Campaign of 1812 -1813 under Major 
General WHo Harrison; by E.D. Wood," in George W Cullum, Cam-
paignsofthe U'ltrof1812-1815 ... (New York, 1879);John H. Niebaum, 
"The Pittsburgh Blues," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 4 
(1921), 110-122, 175-185,259-270; 5 (1922),244-250; E.D. Cruikshank, 
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ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of 
Detroit, 1812 (WeIland, Ont., 1912); James T. Doyle, The Organization 
and Operational Administration of the Ohio Militia in the U'llr of 1812 (Co-
lumbus, Ohio, 1958); Emanuel Hallaman, The British Invasions of Ohio-
1813 (Columbus, Ohio, 1958); Paul LeRoy, Some Social Aspects on the 
Life and Organization of the Soldier in the U'llr of 1812 (Columbus, Ohio, 
1958); Perry LeRoy; The Weakness of Discipline and Its Consequent Results 
in the Northwest During the U'llr of 1812 (Columbus, Ohio, 1958); Paul 
John Woehrmann, The American Invasion of Western Upper Canada, Sep-
tember-October 1813 (Columbus, Ohio, 1962); and Alec R. Gilpin, The 
U'llr of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lansing, Mich., 1958). Freeman 
Cleaves, Old Tippecanoe (New York, 1939), is an adequate biography; 
but a new study of William Henry Harrison's role in the War of 1812 is 
needed. 
Any study of the militia along the Niagara frontier must begin 
with the extremely valuable Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., Documentary 
History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 9 vols. (WeIland, Ont., 
1908), reprint, 4 vols. (New York, 1971). An interesting study of events 
along the northern frontier from the Canadian perspective are two works 
by Pierre Berton, The Invasion of Canada, 1812-1813 (Boston, Mass., 
1980), and Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 
1813-1814 (Boston, Mass., 1981). Also helpful in understanding New 
England's dispute over militia with the federal government during the 
War of 1812 is Donald R. Hickey, "New Englands Defense Problem 
and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention," New England Quarterly 
50 (1977), 587-604. 
The Bladensburg debacle is covered adequately in the standard 
histories of the War of 1812. The most balanced specialized account is 
Walter Lord, The Dawn's Early Light (New York, 1971). Older accounts 
are John S. Williams, History of the Invasion and Capture ofU'llshington by 
the British (New York, 1857), and Edward Duncan Ingraham, A Sketch 
of the Events which Preceded the Capture of U'llshington by the British ... 
(Philadelphia, 1849). 
Militia involvement in the Southern theater and New Orleans may 
be found in biographies of Andrew Jackson, such as Robert V. Remini, 
Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York, 
1977), and Marquis James, Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain (New 
York, 1933). See also Robin Reilly, The British at the Gates: The New 
Orleans Campaign in the U'llr of 1812 (New York, 1974); Wilburt S. 
Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-
1815 (University, Ala., 1969); and two useful works by contemporaries, 
A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir of the U'llr in West Florida and 
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Louisiana in 1814-15 (Philadelphia, 1816), and George R. Gleig, The 
Campaig;ns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans (Philadel-
phia, 1827). John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New 
York, 1955), details how the Battle of New Orleans enhanced the repu-
tations ofJackson and the militia. A defense of the militias conduct on 
the west bank during the Battle of New Orleans is "General David 
Morgan's Defense of the Conduct of the Louisiana Militia in the Battle 
on the Left Side of the River, January 8, 1815," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 9 (1926), 16-29. 
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army, 114-15 
Harper, Robert Goodloe: supports 
militia reform, 9 
Harris, ] ames, 61 
Harrison, William Henry, 44, 48,53, 
56,84,87,89,90,167,174,181; 
dispute with Winchester over 
rank, 58-59; dispute with Boyd 
over Battle of Tippecanoe, 77-78; 
appointed major general of Ken-
tucky militia, 83; abandons winter 
campaign (1812-1813),85; defends 
Fort Meigs from siege by British, 
88; wins victory at Battle of 
Thames, 92; dispute with Arm-
strong and resignation, 93-94; 
brings troops to Fort George, 109 
Index 
Hartford Convention, 35, 72,154; 
report of convention, 150 
Hawkins, William, 50, 52, 54, 73, 
128; calls for a state army, 153 
Henderson, Thomas, 9 
Hickey, Donald, 1 
Hinds, Thomas, 161, 167 
Holmes, Andrew H. 94 
Holmes, David, 46,50,74,146,147, 
162, 167; cites shortage of 
supplies, 158; orders out Missis-
sippi militia to defend Louisiana, 
168 
Holton, William, 44 
Holy Ground: captured by Claiborne 
(1813),161 
Hopkins, Samuel, 57, 62, 83 
Hopkins, SamueIM., 176 
Hopkins, Timothy: calls out militia 
to defend Buffalo, 110-11 
Horseshoe Bend, Battle of, 166 
Howard, Benjamin, 93 
Hufty,Jacob,14 
Hull, William, 51, 57, 58, 78, 80; 
conduct at Detroit and surrender 
of Detroit, 80-82 
Hunter, Charles w., 57 
Huntington, :Ebenezer, 19, 181 
Huntington, Samuel, 88 
Ingersoll, Charles]., 35 
Irish Greens: involvement in Buffalo 
riot (1812), 104 
Irving, William, 35-36 
Izard, George, 123; given command 
along Lake Champlain (1814), 
115; evacuates Fort Erie, 125 
Jackson, Andrew, 30, 57, 60, 61,137, 
147,160,161,164,175,176,177; 
appointed major general, 94; 
voted medal by Congress, 125; 
campaign against Creeks, 165-66; 
appointed <;ommander of Seventh 
Military District, 167; arrives in 
New Orleans, 168; prepares 
defenses at New Orleans, 169; 
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controversy over conduct of 
Kentucky militia, 171; develops 
militia myth after Battle of New 
Orleans, 172; commander of 
northern division, 178 
Jackson, John, 176 
"Jackson," and militia reform, 30 
Jefferson, Thomas, 10, 12; urges 
classification of militia, 11 
Jennings, Jonathan, 25 
Johnson, Richard M., 27,37,54,91, 
146; raises mounted riflemen 
regiment, 90; and Battle of the 
Thames, 92 
Jones, George, 74 
Jones, William, 71,148; withholds 
Rhode Island militia, 68 
Kennedy, John, 64 
King, Cyrus, 32 
King, Rufus, 36; motion against 
conscription bill, 36 
King, William (Capt.), 101 
King, William (Maine), 68,147 
King, w.R., 55 
Knox, Henry, 4, 6, 7, 8; militia 
proposal, 6 
La Cole Mill, Battle of, 115 
Lafitte, Jean: adds his force to 
Jackson's, 168 
Law, Lyman, 22 
Lawrence, William, 167 
Lenoir, William, 52 
Lewis, William, 84 
Livingston, J. w., 102 
Lowell, John, 68-69 
Lundy'S Lane (Canada), Battle of, 94, 
121 
Lyon, Matthew, 14 
Macdonough, Thomas: wins victory 
on Lake Champlain, 117 
Macomb, Alexander, 115; in charge 
of defense of Plattsburgh, 116; 
voted medal by Congress, 125 
Macon, Nathaniel, 15, 177 
225 
Madison, George, 85 
Madison,James, 12, 18,31,71,78, 
94,110,127,132,134,135,152; 
calls for classification of militia, 
13; proclamation pardoning 
deserters, 45; comments on New 
England's refusal to release their 
militia, 70; sets up new military 
district for Washington, 130; 
approves militia force for Creek 
War, 160 
Manlius Times (NY), 112 
Martin v. Mott, 156 
Martin, William B., 145 
Mason, Jeremiah, 33 
Matteson, Abraham, 123 
McMee, Robert B., 54 
McArthur, Duncan, 58,82,90,95; 
assigned recruiting duties, 89; 
replaces Harrison as commander 
in the West, 94 
McCalla,John, 180, 181 
McClure, George, 60, 123; assigned 
to command of New York militia, 
108; proposes expedition against 
Burlington Heights, 109; burns 
village of Newark, 110; blames 
militia for Buffalo being burned, 
111-12 
McDonald, Duncan, 55 
McHenry, James, 10 
McIntosh,John,l44 
McKee, Samuel, 15, 25 
McKim,Alexande~ 15 
Mead, David, 152 
Meigs, ReturnJ., 39,45,62, 78; calls 
for a state army, 153-54 
Menonists (Mennonites). See 
"conscientiously scrupulous" 
Middleton, Arthur, 70 
Militia: act to arm, 12; act to estab-
lish state quotas for the war, 2, 21; 
conscription of, 28,31-36; courts-
martial and punishment of, 29, 
44-46,47-48,80,84,101-2,103, 
104,106,111-12,115-16,121; 
decline of training, 181, 182; 
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decline of confidence in, 3, 177-
79,180; desertions by, 44-45, 47, 
102, 104, 172; disputes between 
militia and regular officers, 58-59, 
63-64, 100; dissolution of by 
states, 184; drafts of, 26-27, 41-42, 
43-44,59-61,133-34,142,143-
45,162-63; exemptions from, 48-
51,101,181-82; failure to be paid 
by federal government, 3, 25, 27-
28,125,146,147-48; failure to 
submit state militia returns, 179, 
183; ill-discipline of, 1,7,39,52, 
56,80,84,101-2,103,104,106, 
111-12,115-16,121, 126, 128, 
129,133,134,136-37,140,142-
43,158,163-64,165-66,170-71, 
178,179,181,182,183;inad-
equacy of supplies and equipment 
of, 2, 23-25, 26,39,52-53,71, 72, 
84,98,118-19,129,157-58,160, 
162,164,165,167,168,170,181; 
New England's dispute over, 2-3, 
65-70,113-14,116,147-49,150, 
155-56; officers, 56-57, 81; 
organization of, 40-41; sickness 
and ill-health, 53-56, 84, 174; use 
of substitutes, 8, 33-34,43-44; 
volunteer, 12, 13-15, 16, 18,22, 
28-29,37-38,43,69,78,83,89, 
90-91,101-2,103,104,106,111-
12,115-16,121,122,123,124, 
147,161,168,169,171,182-83; 
withholding state direct taxes for, 
3,154-55 
-classification of, 6, 9, 11, 13, 19-20, 
24,25,31,44,151; -, by states, 
182 
-myth-making: after Revolution, 8; 
after Battle of New Orleans, 172, 
175-76 
-reform proposals: after Revolution, 
4-5; under Washington, 8-10; 
under Jefferson, 11-12; under 
Madison, 12-13,29-31,180,183; 
by Gaines, 213 n 16 
-refusal to cross international boun-
Index 
dary, 2; debate in Congress on, 
13-15,27,28,80,98-99,104,114 
-use of: in 1790s, 7-8; in Chesa-
peake, 126, 128-29, 130, 132-38; 
in Creek War, 158-67; on Gulf 
Coast, 158, 160, 167-72; on New 
England coast, 129-30; on 
Niagara front, 98-103,106-11, 
112, 118-24; in Lake Champlain 
area, 105, 113-17; in West, 78, 80-
85,88-92,94-95 
"Militia-Man, A": critical of militia, 
177 
Miller, Daniel, 101, 102 
Miller, James, 58, 80, 81, 82; voted 
medal by Congress, 125 
Miller, John, defender of Fort Meigs, 
89 
Miller, Morris, 28, 34-35 
Miller, William,S 5, 145 
Mills, John: killed at Sackets Harbor, 
106 
Minor, George, 13 5, 13 7 
Mississinewa, Battle of, 83 
Mitchell, David B., 160, 162, 163, 
164; calls for reform of Georgia's 
militia, 73-74 
Monroe,James, 30, 31, 84, 85, 130, 
135,152,168,169,172;becomes 
acting secretary of war, 21; 
redeploys troops at Bladensburg, 
136; asserts government authority 
to call out state militia, 156 
Mooers, Benjamin, 113; commands 
New York militia at Plattsburgh, 
116-17 
Morgan (Lt. Col.), 51 
Morgan, David B., 170; criticizes 
Kentucky militia, 171 
Morris, Charles, 129 
Moseley, Jonathan 0.,14,22 
Mullany, James R., 63 
Murray, John, 113 
National Intelligencer (Washington), 
23,25,29,30,33,36,63,93,105, 
155,177 
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Nelson, Roger, 15 
Newell,]ohn, 116 
Index 
New Orleans, Battle of, 2, 3, 13 7, 169-
72; assessed, 174, 175, 177, 178 
New York Columbian, 114 
Nicoll, A.Y., 63 
Niles, Hezekiah, 63, 65, 89,137,150, 
175 
Nisbet, Charles, 9 
North American Review, 180 
Northcutt, William, 48 
O'Neill,]ohn, 126 
Otis, Harrison Gray, 149 
Owings, Thomas D.: assigned 
recruiting duties, 89-90 
Parker, Peter, 137-38 
Parker, Thomas, 101 
Pasteur, Abner, 129 
Patterson, Daniel T.: establishes 
batteries on west bank of the 
Mississippi River, 170 
Patton, Samuel B., 61 
Pearson,]oseph,34 
Pennington, William S., 114; calls 
for a state army, 152 
Pensacola, Battle of, 167-68 
Perkins, Nicholas Tate, 166 
Perry, Oliver Hazard, 95; and Battle 
of Lake Erie, 91-92 
Peters, Richard, 64 
Petersburg (Va.) Volunteers: defend-
ers of Fort Meigs, 89 
Philadelphia Aurora, 85, 175 
Philips,]ohn, 102 
Pickens,]ames,61 
Pickering, Timothy, 34 
Pinckney, Thomas, 42, 73, 74, 128, 
155,161,164,165,166,167; 
command extended over Creek 
campaign, 160 
Pitkin, Timothy, 26 
Pittsburgh Blues: volunteer militia, 
83; in Battle of Mississinewa, 83; 
defenders of Fort Meigs, 89; 
defenders of Fort Stephenson, 91 
227 
Plattsburgh, Battle of, 116-17, 175, 
178 
Plumer, William, 69, 71 
Polinger, Abraham, 65 
Pomeroy (Federalist), riot in his 
Buffalo hotel, 104 
Porter, Augustus, 107 
Porter, Moses, 105 
Porter, Peter B., 19,96, 104, 105, 
111, 123; duel with Smyth, 103; 
leads American militia at Battle of 
Black Rock, 106; career summa-
rized, 107; conducts raid into 
Canada, 107-8; given command of 
volunteer force, 118-19; in Battle 
of Chippewa, 119-21; in Battle of 
Lundy's Lane, 121-22; defender of 
Fort Erie, 122; leadership 
abilities, 124; voted medal by 
Congress, 125 
Potter, Elisha, 28 
Powell, Ann, 65 
Prevost, George: attacks Plattsburgh, 
116; gives up siege of Plattsburgh, 
117 
Procter, Henry: attacks and captures 
Frenchtown, 84-85; attacks Fort 
Meigs, 88; abandons siege of Fort 
Meigs, 89; attacks Fort Meigs and 
Fort Stephenson, 91 
Quakers. See "conscientiously 
scrupulous" 
Queenston, Battle of, 99-100,101, 
103,105 
Quincy, ] osiah, 25 
Randolph,]ohn, of Roanoke, 15,23 
Rector, Henry M., 184 
"Red Sticks" (Creek war party), 158, 
165 
Reed, Philip, 138 
Rhea,] ohn, 22, 30 
Rich, Charles, 37, 38 
Richardson,].L., 125 
Ripley, Eleazer W, 122, 123; voted 
medal by Congress, 125 
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Richmond Enquirer, 55, 69 
Ritchie, Thomas, 55 
River Raisin, massacre at, 85 
Roberts, Isaac, 60, 61 
Roberts, Jonathan, 20 
Rochester, WIlliam Bo, 118 
Rodney, Daniel, 145 
Roop, Jonas, 65 
Root, Erastus, 14, 15 
Ross,John,14 
228 
Ross, Robert, 13 5, 13 7; killed near 
Baltimore, 138 
Ruggles, Benjamin, 179 
Russell, Gilbert, 161 
Russell, WIlliam, 78 
Rutherford, Robert, 9 
Sto Clair, Arthur: defeat of, by the 
Indians, 6-7 
Scott, Charles, 83 
Scott, Hercules: killed attacking Fort 
Erie, 122 
Scott, WInfield, 180; involvement in 
Battle of Chippewa, 119-21; voted 
medal by Congress, 125 
Sebree, Uriel, 89 
Sharp, Solomon, 25; resolution 
denouncing Chittenden, 114 
Shelby, Isaac, 41,58,85,90,94-95; 
invited by Harrison to lead 
Kentucky militia, 91; joins 
Harrison in Battle of Thames, 92; 
complaint about non-payment of 
militia, 146; calls for a state army, 
154 
Shorner,]., 64 
Shunk, Francis R., 182 
Smilie, John, 15 
Smith,John Cotton, 148, 150, 154 
Smith, Samuel, 13,26; conducts 
defense of Baltimore, 138 
Smyth,Alexander, 28, 51, 63,101, 
102,104,109; given command of 
regular forces on Niagara frontier, 
100; cancels two attacks across the 
Niagara River, 102-3; retires from 
the army, 105 
Index 
Snyder, Simon, 40,72,102,141,142; 
calls for a state army, 152 
Spencer,John c., 99,111 
"Spirit of the Times": supports 
militia reform, 30 
Stansbury, Tobias Eo, 136 
State armies, 3; in Connecticut, 150; 
in Vermont, 150; in Rhode Island, 
150-51; in Massachusetts, 151; in 
New York, 151; in Pennsylvania, 
151-52; in New Jersey, 152; in 
Maryland, 152; in Virginia, 152-
53; in North Carolina, 153; in 
South Carolina, 153; in Ohio, 
153-54; in Kentucky, 154 
Steuben, Baron Friedrich von, 4,9, 
16 
Stockton,Richard,35 
Stone, David, 128 
Stone, Isaac W: dismissed from 
service by Brown, 121 
Stricker,John, 138 
Strong, Caleb, 71,148,155-56; 
withholds Massachusetts militia, 
67-68 
Strong, Samuel, 116 
Stull, ].1., 13 3 
Stump,John, 166 
Sumner, WIlliam Ho, 180 
Swift,John, 118 
Tallmadge, Benjamin, 20, 24 
Tannehill, Adamson, 104; commands 
Pennsylvania militia, 102 
Taul, Micah, 56 
Taylor,John W, 27, 29, 32 
Taylor, Robert, 59 
Tecumseh, 27, 88, 89; killed at the 
Battle of Thames, 92 
Thackara, WIlliam, 47,57,59 
Thames, Battle of, 27, 92, 95,109 
Thomas,Jett,42 
Thornton, WIlliam: attacks Ameri-
cans on west bank, 170 
Tilghman, c.]., 65 
Tippecanoe, Battle of, 77, 78 
Tisdale, Nathan, 50 
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Index 
Tompkins, Daniel D., 72, 98, 102, 
107,109,110,111,112,113,122; 
calls for reform of New York 
militia (1812), 101; assigns 
McClure to command militia, 
108; recommends volunteer force, 
117 -18; calls for a state army, 151 
Toulmin, Harry, 160 
Treaty of Ghent, 31 
Trimble, Allen, 83 
Trimble, William A., 56 
Troup, George M., 22, 25, 26, 28,34, 
37,38,164,175 
Tunkers (Dunkers). See "conscien-
tiously scrupulous" 
Tupper, Edward, 59 
Turner, James, 128 
Uniform Militia Act (1792), 6, 7, 8, 
21,48,76 
United States v. Peters, 143 
Van Horne, Archibald, 13 
Van Horne, Thomas, 81, 82 
Van Ness,John P., 130, 133 
Van Rensselaer, Solomon, 99 
Van Rensselaer, Stephen, 28, 51, 98; 
and Battle of Queenston, 99- 100 
Varnum, Joseph, 11, 25, 33 
Wadsworth,James,113 
Wadsworth, William, 98 
"Wallace": critical of militia, 178 
Ward, Artemas, Jr., 36 
Washington, George, 7,23,156,178; 
quoted, 4; calls for militia reform, 
8 
Wayne, Anthony, 7, 99 
Weaver (Sgt.), of Va. volunteers: role 
in defense of Fort Stephenson, 91 
229 
Webster, Daniel, 26, 32, 36; speech 
against conscription bill, 35 
Weekly Register (Baltimore), 63, 137 
Wells, Samuel, 84 
Whiskey Rebellion: militia in, 7 
Whistler, John, 80 
White, Hugh Lawson, 60 
Widgery, William, 18 
Wilkinson,James, 74, 157; takes 
command on Northern front, 
108; moves down St. Lawrence 
and calls off assault on Montreal, 
114-15 
Willcocks, Joseph: killed at Fort Erie, 
123 
Williams, David R, 19,20,21,23, 
155 
Winchester, James, 48, 54, 83, 172; 
dispute with Harrison over rank, 
58-59; involvement in River 
Raisin incident, 84-85; placed in 
charge of defense of Mobile, 168 
Winder, Levin, 58, 72, 130; seeks 
support of national government 
for defense, 126-27; complains of 
defense expenses, 144-45 
Winder, William, 132, 133, 134, 135, 
138; appointed command of Tenth 
Military District, 130; and Battle 
of Bladensburg, 136- 137 
Wood, Eleazer D., 54, 59-60, 85 
Wool,John E., 99, 116 
Worrell (Pennsylvania), 142 
Worthington, Thomas, 56,155; calls 
for a state army, 154 
Yates,J.B.,I23 
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